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Today's Daf Yomi

January 7, 2018 | 讻壮 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Shevuot 40

Study Guide Shevuot 40. Rav and Shmuel have a basic argument in explaining “a claim must be 2 ma’ah of silver” – is it referring to the amount of the case – meaning what the claimant’s side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant’s side – how much is he/she denying? Many cases in the mishna are brought to question one or the other opinion and they are each explained according to each opinion. Likewise, 2 braitot are brought for the same reason although the last one only supports Rav’s position. Several other halachot of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the another owes him/her 2 different items and one claims one only owes one of the items, one takes an oath of admitting part of the claim. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel’s opinion聽but are proven to be inconclusive and likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.


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转讚注 讚拽讗 转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讚讬谞专 讻住祝 讜讟专讬住讬转 讜驻讜谞讚讬讜谉 讜驻专讜讟讛 讞讬讬讘 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 [讗讞转] 讛谉 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 砖讜讛 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讜拽讗 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara discusses the basis for Rav鈥檚 explanation. Know that the mishna is referring to claims of monetary value, as it teaches in the latter clause that if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Granted, if you say that the claim was for the value of a gold dinar, it is due to that reason that he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim. But if you say that the claim was specifically for a dinar of gold, why is he liable? The claim was for gold, and he admitted to owing silver or copper.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘砖讟注谞讜 讘讚讬谞专 诪讟讘注讜转 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚驻专讜讟讛 讘讻诇诇 诪讟讘注 讗讬转讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转

The Gemara rejects this proof: Rabbi Elazar says: This mishna is referring to a case where one claimed that the defendant owes him a dinar of coins, i.e., coins worth a dinar. The claim was for specific coins, and not a monetary value. Since the claim concerned coins and not a specific weight of metal, and all coins are used for commercial transactions, all types of coins are considered of the same type. And it teaches us that a peruta is included in the category of a coin. According to this explanation, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: The defendant is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type [min]; they are all coins. In other words, even a peruta is a type of coin.

讜专讘 砖讛讻诇 讚讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转

The Gemara asks: And how would Rav, who holds that the claim in this case was for the value of a dinar, explain the fact that the mishna states: As they are all of one type; they are all coins? Why does it matter that they are all of one type? The Gemara answers that according to Rav, the reason the defendant is liable to take an oath is that because the claim is for the value of a dinar, all descriptions of monetary value based on different coins have one status under halakha [din]; they are all coins, and it is of no significance that they are made of different materials.

讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇讬诪讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 诪转专抓 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讻砖诪讜讗诇 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, shall we say that since he explains the latter clause in the mishna as referring to a specific item and not a value, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, then also with regard to the former clause, that states the claim must be for two silver ma鈥檃, he apparently holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, i.e., that it is referring to two actual ma鈥檃, and not the value of two ma鈥檃?

诇讗 住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转 讜专讬砖讗 讻专讘 讗讜 讻砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, Rabbi Elazar explains that the latter clause of the mishna is referring specifically to actual items in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as it teaches explicitly: As they are all of one type; they are all coins. But the former clause can be interpreted either in accordance with the opinion of Rav or in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讚讬谞专 讻住祝 讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 讛讗 住转诪讗 砖讜讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof that a claim for a coin is referring to its value: It is taught in a baraita that if the claimant said: I have a coined gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as the claim and the admission are both referring to a coin. The Gemara infers: The reason this claim is referring specifically to a coin is that the claimant says to him: You owe me a coined gold dinar; but if the claim was for an unspecified gold dinar, i.e., without specifying that it was coined, the claimant is saying to him that he owes him an item with the value of a dinar, not necessarily a coin, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讻讗讜诪专 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 讚诪讬

Rav Ashi said in response that according to the opinion of Shmuel, this is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who says: A gold dinar, is considered like one who says: A coined gold dinar; i.e., he is referring to the coin and not to its value.

转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇住讬讜注讬讛 诇专讘 住诇注 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 住诇注 讞住专 砖转讬 讻住祝 讞讬讬讘 讞住专 诪注讛 驻讟讜专

Rabbi 岣yya teaches a baraita in support of the opinion of Rav: If the claimant said: I have a sela in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a sela minus two silver ma鈥檃 in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. If the defendant responded: I owe you only a sela minus one silver ma鈥檃, he is exempt. Clearly, the reason is that he denied less than two ma鈥檃 of the claim, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘讟注谞转 诪诇讜讛 讜讛讜讚讗转 诇讜讛 讗讘诇 讟注谞转 诪诇讜讛 讜讛注讚讗转 注讚 讗讞讚 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讗诇讗 讘驻专讜讟讛 讞讬讬讘

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says that Shmuel says: The requirement that the claim be at least the value of two silver ma鈥檃 to render the defendant liable to take an oath was taught only with regard to a case where the oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the partial admission of the debtor. But in a case where the defendant鈥檚 liability to take an oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the testimony of one witness in support of the claim, even if the claimant claimed from him only one peruta, the defendant is liable to take an oath.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬拽讜诐 注讚 讗讞讚 讘讗讬砖 诇讻诇 注讜谉 讜诇讻诇 讞讟讗转 诇讻诇 注讜谉 讜诇讻诇 讞讟讗转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 拽诐 讗讘诇 拽诐 讛讜讗 诇砖讘讜注讛 讜转谞讬讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖谞讬诐 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛

What is the reason for this distinction? As it is written: 鈥淥ne witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:15). It is inferred from here that it is for any iniquity or for any sin that he may not rise up, as the testimony of one witness is not enough for this purpose, but he may rise up to render one liable to take an oath. And it is taught in a baraita: In any place where two witnesses render a defendant liable to pay money, the testimony of one witness renders him liable to take an oath. Therefore, since two witnesses render the defendant liable to pay if the claim is worth at least one peruta, so too, one witness renders him liable to take an oath with regard to a claim of this value.

讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

And Rav Na岣an says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of these types, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to part of a claim.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讬讬砖专 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讻诇诇 讚驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诪讬砖讛讗 讛讜讛 砖讛讬 诇讬讛 讜砖转讬拽 诇讬讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诪讬砖转讗 讛讜讛 砖转讬 诇讬讛 讜砖转讬拽 诇讬讛

Rabbi Yitz岣k said to him: You have spoken well, and so also said Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yo岣nan with regard to this matter, since Rabbi Yitz岣k mentioned that Rabbi Yo岣nan agreed, and did not reference Reish Lakish, who often engages in disputes with Rabbi Yo岣nan? The Gemara answers: There is no record of Reish Lakish expressing his opinion at that time. There are those who say that this is because he was tarrying and remaining silent, waiting for Rabbi Yo岣nan to finish his statement, and Rabbi Yitz岣k did not find out whether or not he subsequently disagreed with him, and there are those who say that Reish Lakish was drinking at the time, and he therefore remained silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讛讗 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

Let us say that the wording of the mishna supports Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt according to the first tanna is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, it can be inferred he is liable to take an oath.

诇讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讞讟讬谉 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna states that the first tanna and Rabban Gamliel disagree with regard to a case where the claim was specifically for wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, that the defendant is liable to take an oath even if his admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath.

讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 拽专拽注讜转 驻讟讜专 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘

If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, or for wheat and barley, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转

The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is exempt. And the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land is that this teaches us that in a case where the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too.

讛讗 注讬拽专 讛讛讬讗 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛

The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.

讜专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讬讬砖专 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪讜专讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

And Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba disagrees with Shmuel and says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: If one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yitz岣k say to Rav Na岣an: You have spoken well in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; and so also said Rabbi Yo岣nan? If so, Rabbi Yo岣nan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: They are amora鈥檌m, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讛讗 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof against the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he would be liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches specifically this case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讜讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 拽专拽注 驻讟讜专 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉 讛讗 注讬拽专 讛讛讬讗 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛

The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that the same is true, that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type he is exempt. And the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because this teaches us that if the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): The movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too. The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 诪诪诇 诇专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讟注谞讜 砖讜专 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖讛 砖讛 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖讜专 驻讟讜专 讟注谞讜 讘砖讜专 讜砖讛 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba from a baraita: If one claimed that another owes him an ox, and the latter admitted to owing him a sheep, or conversely, if the claim was for a sheep and the defendant admitted to owing him an ox, he is exempt from taking an oath. If one claimed that another owes him an ox and a sheep, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讗讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said to him in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, the defendant should be liable to take an oath even in the first clause of the baraita, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.

讗诇讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 讗讚诪讜谉 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 讚讞讜讬讬 诪讚讞讬谞讗 诇讱 讗诇讗 转诇诪讜讚 注专讜讱 讛讜讗 讘驻讬讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗 诪谞讬 讗讚诪讜谉 讛讬讗

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba explained: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon, who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). And I am not dismissing your objection insubstantially; rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon.

讗诪专 专讘 注谞谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜拽讚诐 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讗诐 讻诪注专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗诐 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 驻讟讜专

Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and claimed that he owes him wheat, and before he finished his claim, the defendant first admitted that he owes him barley, in this case, if the defendant did so as one who employs artifice, so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is liable to take an oath. But if he did so as one who intends to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is exempt.

讜讗诪专 专讘 注谞谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 砖转讬 诪讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗讜 讻诇讬诐 诇诪讛 砖讛谉

And Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owes him two needles, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath. It is for this reason that vessels were singled out in the verse, to teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of any value.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜驻专讜讟讛 讜讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘驻专讜讟讛 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 讘驻专讜讟讛 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘

Rav Pappa says: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and also one peruta, and the latter admitted to owing him the vessels but denied the claim that he owes him the peruta, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted that he owes him one peruta but denied the claim that he owes him the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

讞讚讗 讻专讘 讜讞讚讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讞讚讗 讻专讘 讚讗诪专 讻驻讬专转 讟注谞讛 砖转讬 讻住祝 讞讚讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara comments: One of these rulings is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The former one, that if the defendant denied owing the peruta he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says that the denial of a claim must be of least the value of two silver ma鈥檃 in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter one, that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜诪砖讘讬注讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 转讜讘注 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬砖 诇讜 注诇讬讜

搂 The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt. Rav Na岣an says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him. What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant鈥檚 denial should be examined through an oath.

讗讚专讘讛 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讛 诇讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara objects: On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant鈥檚 denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor鈥檚 categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.

转讚注 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诇讜讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讘驻拽讚讜谉 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转

Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav 岣sda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness. The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.

专讘 讞讘讬讘讗 诪转谞讬 讗住讬驻讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗诪专 诇讜 讛谉 诇诪讞专 讗诪专 诇讜 转谞讛讜 诇讬 谞转转讬讜 诇讱 驻讟讜专 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪砖讘讬注讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转

Rav 岣viva teaches Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement as referring to the latter clause in the mishna: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. And Rav Na岣an says: Nevertheless, the court administers an oath of inducement to him.

诪讗谉 讚诪转谞讬 讗专讬砖讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗住讬驻讗

The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: With regard to the one who teaches it in reference to the former clause, where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, all the more so does this amora agree that an oath of inducement is administered in the case of the latter clause, where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Shevuot 40

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 40

转讚注 讚拽讗 转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讚讬谞专 讻住祝 讜讟专讬住讬转 讜驻讜谞讚讬讜谉 讜驻专讜讟讛 讞讬讬讘 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 [讗讞转] 讛谉 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 砖讜讛 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讜拽讗 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara discusses the basis for Rav鈥檚 explanation. Know that the mishna is referring to claims of monetary value, as it teaches in the latter clause that if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Granted, if you say that the claim was for the value of a gold dinar, it is due to that reason that he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim. But if you say that the claim was specifically for a dinar of gold, why is he liable? The claim was for gold, and he admitted to owing silver or copper.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘砖讟注谞讜 讘讚讬谞专 诪讟讘注讜转 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚驻专讜讟讛 讘讻诇诇 诪讟讘注 讗讬转讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转

The Gemara rejects this proof: Rabbi Elazar says: This mishna is referring to a case where one claimed that the defendant owes him a dinar of coins, i.e., coins worth a dinar. The claim was for specific coins, and not a monetary value. Since the claim concerned coins and not a specific weight of metal, and all coins are used for commercial transactions, all types of coins are considered of the same type. And it teaches us that a peruta is included in the category of a coin. According to this explanation, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: The defendant is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type [min]; they are all coins. In other words, even a peruta is a type of coin.

讜专讘 砖讛讻诇 讚讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转

The Gemara asks: And how would Rav, who holds that the claim in this case was for the value of a dinar, explain the fact that the mishna states: As they are all of one type; they are all coins? Why does it matter that they are all of one type? The Gemara answers that according to Rav, the reason the defendant is liable to take an oath is that because the claim is for the value of a dinar, all descriptions of monetary value based on different coins have one status under halakha [din]; they are all coins, and it is of no significance that they are made of different materials.

讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诇讬诪讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 诪转专抓 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讻砖诪讜讗诇 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, shall we say that since he explains the latter clause in the mishna as referring to a specific item and not a value, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, then also with regard to the former clause, that states the claim must be for two silver ma鈥檃, he apparently holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, i.e., that it is referring to two actual ma鈥檃, and not the value of two ma鈥檃?

诇讗 住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻诇 诪讬谉 诪讟讘注 讗讞转 讜专讬砖讗 讻专讘 讗讜 讻砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, Rabbi Elazar explains that the latter clause of the mishna is referring specifically to actual items in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as it teaches explicitly: As they are all of one type; they are all coins. But the former clause can be interpreted either in accordance with the opinion of Rav or in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讚讬谞专 讻住祝 讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 讛讗 住转诪讗 砖讜讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof that a claim for a coin is referring to its value: It is taught in a baraita that if the claimant said: I have a coined gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as the claim and the admission are both referring to a coin. The Gemara infers: The reason this claim is referring specifically to a coin is that the claimant says to him: You owe me a coined gold dinar; but if the claim was for an unspecified gold dinar, i.e., without specifying that it was coined, the claimant is saying to him that he owes him an item with the value of a dinar, not necessarily a coin, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讻讗讜诪专 讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 讝讛讜讘 讚诪讬

Rav Ashi said in response that according to the opinion of Shmuel, this is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who says: A gold dinar, is considered like one who says: A coined gold dinar; i.e., he is referring to the coin and not to its value.

转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇住讬讜注讬讛 诇专讘 住诇注 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 住诇注 讞住专 砖转讬 讻住祝 讞讬讬讘 讞住专 诪注讛 驻讟讜专

Rabbi 岣yya teaches a baraita in support of the opinion of Rav: If the claimant said: I have a sela in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a sela minus two silver ma鈥檃 in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. If the defendant responded: I owe you only a sela minus one silver ma鈥檃, he is exempt. Clearly, the reason is that he denied less than two ma鈥檃 of the claim, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘讟注谞转 诪诇讜讛 讜讛讜讚讗转 诇讜讛 讗讘诇 讟注谞转 诪诇讜讛 讜讛注讚讗转 注讚 讗讞讚 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讗诇讗 讘驻专讜讟讛 讞讬讬讘

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says that Shmuel says: The requirement that the claim be at least the value of two silver ma鈥檃 to render the defendant liable to take an oath was taught only with regard to a case where the oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the partial admission of the debtor. But in a case where the defendant鈥檚 liability to take an oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the testimony of one witness in support of the claim, even if the claimant claimed from him only one peruta, the defendant is liable to take an oath.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬拽讜诐 注讚 讗讞讚 讘讗讬砖 诇讻诇 注讜谉 讜诇讻诇 讞讟讗转 诇讻诇 注讜谉 讜诇讻诇 讞讟讗转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 拽诐 讗讘诇 拽诐 讛讜讗 诇砖讘讜注讛 讜转谞讬讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖谞讬诐 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 注讚 讗讞讚 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛

What is the reason for this distinction? As it is written: 鈥淥ne witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:15). It is inferred from here that it is for any iniquity or for any sin that he may not rise up, as the testimony of one witness is not enough for this purpose, but he may rise up to render one liable to take an oath. And it is taught in a baraita: In any place where two witnesses render a defendant liable to pay money, the testimony of one witness renders him liable to take an oath. Therefore, since two witnesses render the defendant liable to pay if the claim is worth at least one peruta, so too, one witness renders him liable to take an oath with regard to a claim of this value.

讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

And Rav Na岣an says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of these types, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to part of a claim.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讬讬砖专 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讻诇诇 讚驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诪讬砖讛讗 讛讜讛 砖讛讬 诇讬讛 讜砖转讬拽 诇讬讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诪讬砖转讗 讛讜讛 砖转讬 诇讬讛 讜砖转讬拽 诇讬讛

Rabbi Yitz岣k said to him: You have spoken well, and so also said Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yo岣nan with regard to this matter, since Rabbi Yitz岣k mentioned that Rabbi Yo岣nan agreed, and did not reference Reish Lakish, who often engages in disputes with Rabbi Yo岣nan? The Gemara answers: There is no record of Reish Lakish expressing his opinion at that time. There are those who say that this is because he was tarrying and remaining silent, waiting for Rabbi Yo岣nan to finish his statement, and Rabbi Yitz岣k did not find out whether or not he subsequently disagreed with him, and there are those who say that Reish Lakish was drinking at the time, and he therefore remained silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讛讗 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

Let us say that the wording of the mishna supports Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt according to the first tanna is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, it can be inferred he is liable to take an oath.

诇讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讞讟讬谉 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna states that the first tanna and Rabban Gamliel disagree with regard to a case where the claim was specifically for wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, that the defendant is liable to take an oath even if his admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath.

讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 拽专拽注讜转 驻讟讜专 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘

If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, or for wheat and barley, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转

The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is exempt. And the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land is that this teaches us that in a case where the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too.

讛讗 注讬拽专 讛讛讬讗 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛

The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.

讜专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讬讬砖专 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪讜专讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉

And Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba disagrees with Shmuel and says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: If one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yitz岣k say to Rav Na岣an: You have spoken well in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; and so also said Rabbi Yo岣nan? If so, Rabbi Yo岣nan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: They are amora鈥檌m, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讛讗 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof against the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he would be liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches specifically this case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.

转讗 砖诪注 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讜讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 拽专拽注 驻讟讜专 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉 讛讗 注讬拽专 讛讛讬讗 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛

The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that the same is true, that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type he is exempt. And the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because this teaches us that if the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): The movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too. The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 诪诪诇 诇专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讟注谞讜 砖讜专 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖讛 砖讛 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖讜专 驻讟讜专 讟注谞讜 讘砖讜专 讜砖讛 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba from a baraita: If one claimed that another owes him an ox, and the latter admitted to owing him a sheep, or conversely, if the claim was for a sheep and the defendant admitted to owing him an ox, he is exempt from taking an oath. If one claimed that another owes him an ox and a sheep, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讗讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said to him in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, the defendant should be liable to take an oath even in the first clause of the baraita, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.

讗诇讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 讗讚诪讜谉 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 讚讞讜讬讬 诪讚讞讬谞讗 诇讱 讗诇讗 转诇诪讜讚 注专讜讱 讛讜讗 讘驻讬讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗 诪谞讬 讗讚诪讜谉 讛讬讗

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba explained: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon, who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). And I am not dismissing your objection insubstantially; rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon.

讗诪专 专讘 注谞谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜拽讚诐 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘砖注讜专讬谉 讗诐 讻诪注专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗诐 讘诪转讻讜讬谉 驻讟讜专

Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and claimed that he owes him wheat, and before he finished his claim, the defendant first admitted that he owes him barley, in this case, if the defendant did so as one who employs artifice, so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is liable to take an oath. But if he did so as one who intends to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is exempt.

讜讗诪专 专讘 注谞谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讟注谞讜 砖转讬 诪讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗讜 讻诇讬诐 诇诪讛 砖讛谉

And Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owes him two needles, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath. It is for this reason that vessels were singled out in the verse, to teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of any value.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜驻专讜讟讛 讜讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘驻专讜讟讛 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 讘驻专讜讟讛 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘

Rav Pappa says: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and also one peruta, and the latter admitted to owing him the vessels but denied the claim that he owes him the peruta, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted that he owes him one peruta but denied the claim that he owes him the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

讞讚讗 讻专讘 讜讞讚讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讞讚讗 讻专讘 讚讗诪专 讻驻讬专转 讟注谞讛 砖转讬 讻住祝 讞讚讗 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讜讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara comments: One of these rulings is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The former one, that if the defendant denied owing the peruta he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says that the denial of a claim must be of least the value of two silver ma鈥檃 in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter one, that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜诪砖讘讬注讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 转讜讘注 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讬砖 诇讜 注诇讬讜

搂 The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt. Rav Na岣an says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him. What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant鈥檚 denial should be examined through an oath.

讗讚专讘讛 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讛 诇讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara objects: On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant鈥檚 denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor鈥檚 categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.

转讚注 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诇讜讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讘驻拽讚讜谉 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转

Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav 岣sda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness. The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.

专讘 讞讘讬讘讗 诪转谞讬 讗住讬驻讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讗诪专 诇讜 讛谉 诇诪讞专 讗诪专 诇讜 转谞讛讜 诇讬 谞转转讬讜 诇讱 驻讟讜专 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪砖讘讬注讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注转 讛讬住转

Rav 岣viva teaches Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement as referring to the latter clause in the mishna: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. And Rav Na岣an says: Nevertheless, the court administers an oath of inducement to him.

诪讗谉 讚诪转谞讬 讗专讬砖讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗住讬驻讗

The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: With regard to the one who teaches it in reference to the former clause, where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, all the more so does this amora agree that an oath of inducement is administered in the case of the latter clause, where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.

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