Shevuot 40
תֵּדַע, דְּקָא תָנֵי סֵיפָא: ״דִּינַר זָהָב לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא דִּינָר כֶּסֶף וּטְרֵיסִית וּפוּנְדְּיוֹן וּפְרוּטָה״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַכֹּל מִין מַטְבֵּעַ [אַחַת] הֵן. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא שָׁוֶה – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי חַיָּיב; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דַּוְקָא – אַמַּאי חַיָּיב?
The Gemara discusses the basis for Rav’s explanation. Know that the mishna is referring to claims of monetary value, as it teaches in the latter clause that if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Granted, if you say that the claim was for the value of a gold dinar, it is due to that reason that he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim. But if you say that the claim was specifically for a dinar of gold, why is he liable? The claim was for gold, and he admitted to owing silver or copper.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּשֶׁטְּעָנוֹ בְּדִינָר מַטְבְּעוֹת, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דִּפְרוּטָה בִּכְלַל מַטְבֵּעַ אִיתָא. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: שֶׁהַכֹּל מִין מַטְבֵּעַ אַחַת.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Rabbi Elazar says: This mishna is referring to a case where one claimed that the defendant owes him a dinar of coins, i.e., coins worth a dinar. The claim was for specific coins, and not a monetary value. Since the claim concerned coins and not a specific weight of metal, and all coins are used for commercial transactions, all types of coins are considered of the same type. And it teaches us that a peruta is included in the category of a coin. According to this explanation, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: The defendant is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type [min]; they are all coins. In other words, even a peruta is a type of coin.
וְרַב – שֶׁהַכֹּל דִּין מַטְבֵּעַ אַחַת.
The Gemara asks: And how would Rav, who holds that the claim in this case was for the value of a dinar, explain the fact that the mishna states: As they are all of one type; they are all coins? Why does it matter that they are all of one type? The Gemara answers that according to Rav, the reason the defendant is liable to take an oath is that because the claim is for the value of a dinar, all descriptions of monetary value based on different coins have one status under halakha [din]; they are all coins, and it is of no significance that they are made of different materials.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – לֵימָא מִדְּסֵיפָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל מְתָרֵץ, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי כִּשְׁמוּאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ?
The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, shall we say that since he explains the latter clause in the mishna as referring to a specific item and not a value, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, then also with regard to the former clause, that states the claim must be for two silver ma’a, he apparently holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, i.e., that it is referring to two actual ma’a, and not the value of two ma’a?
לָא; סֵיפָא דַּוְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֶׁהַכֹּל מִין מַטְבֵּעַ אַחַת״; וְרֵישָׁא – כְּרַב אוֹ כִּשְׁמוּאֵל.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, Rabbi Elazar explains that the latter clause of the mishna is referring specifically to actual items in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as it teaches explicitly: As they are all of one type; they are all coins. But the former clause can be interpreted either in accordance with the opinion of Rav or in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״דִּינַר זָהָב זָהוּב לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא דִּינַר כֶּסֶף״ – חַיָּיב. טַעְמָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״זָהָב זָהוּב״, הָא סְתָמָא – שָׁוֶה קָאָמַר לֵיהּ!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof that a claim for a coin is referring to its value: It is taught in a baraita that if the claimant said: I have a coined gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as the claim and the admission are both referring to a coin. The Gemara infers: The reason this claim is referring specifically to a coin is that the claimant says to him: You owe me a coined gold dinar; but if the claim was for an unspecified gold dinar, i.e., without specifying that it was coined, the claimant is saying to him that he owes him an item with the value of a dinar, not necessarily a coin, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״דִּינַר זָהָב״, כְּאוֹמֵר ״דִּינַר זָהָב זָהוּב״ דָּמֵי.
Rav Ashi said in response that according to the opinion of Shmuel, this is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who says: A gold dinar, is considered like one who says: A coined gold dinar; i.e., he is referring to the coin and not to its value.
תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַב: ״סֶלַע לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא סֶלַע חָסֵר שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף״ – חַיָּיב, ״חָסֵר מָעָה״ – פָּטוּר.
Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a baraita in support of the opinion of Rav: If the claimant said: I have a sela in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a sela minus two silver ma’a in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. If the defendant responded: I owe you only a sela minus one silver ma’a, he is exempt. Clearly, the reason is that he denied less than two ma’a of the claim, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּטַעֲנַת מַלְוֶה וְהוֹדָאַת לֹוֶה; אֲבָל טַעֲנַת מַלְוֶה וְהַעֲדָאַת עֵד אֶחָד, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא טְעָנוֹ אֶלָּא בִּפְרוּטָה – חַיָּיב.
§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that Shmuel says: The requirement that the claim be at least the value of two silver ma’a to render the defendant liable to take an oath was taught only with regard to a case where the oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the partial admission of the debtor. But in a case where the defendant’s liability to take an oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the testimony of one witness in support of the claim, even if the claimant claimed from him only one peruta, the defendant is liable to take an oath.
מַאי טַעְמָא? דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא יָקוּם עֵד אֶחָד בְּאִישׁ לְכׇל עָוֹן וּלְכׇל חַטָּאת״ – לְכׇל עָוֹן וּלְכׇל חַטָּאת הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ קָם, אֲבָל קָם הוּא לִשְׁבוּעָה. וְתַנְיָא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם מְחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, עֵד אֶחָד מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה.
What is the reason for this distinction? As it is written: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin” (Deuteronomy 19:15). It is inferred from here that it is for any iniquity or for any sin that he may not rise up, as the testimony of one witness is not enough for this purpose, but he may rise up to render one liable to take an oath. And it is taught in a baraita: In any place where two witnesses render a defendant liable to pay money, the testimony of one witness renders him liable to take an oath. Therefore, since two witnesses render the defendant liable to pay if the claim is worth at least one peruta, so too, one witness renders him liable to take an oath with regard to a claim of this value.
וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין, וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב.
§ And Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of these types, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to part of a claim.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יִצְחָק: יִישַׁר, וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: מִישְׁהָא הֲוָה שָׁהֵי לֵיהּ וְשָׁתֵיק לֵיהּ, אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: מִישְׁתָּא הֲוָה שָׁתֵי לֵיהּ וּשְׁתֵיק לֵיהּ.
Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him: You have spoken well, and so also said Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to this matter, since Rabbi Yitzḥak mentioned that Rabbi Yoḥanan agreed, and did not reference Reish Lakish, who often engages in disputes with Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: There is no record of Reish Lakish expressing his opinion at that time. There are those who say that this is because he was tarrying and remaining silent, waiting for Rabbi Yoḥanan to finish his statement, and Rabbi Yitzḥak did not find out whether or not he subsequently disagreed with him, and there are those who say that Reish Lakish was drinking at the time, and he therefore remained silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – פָּטוּר. וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב. טַעְמָא דִּטְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין, הָא חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב!
Let us say that the wording of the mishna supports Shmuel’s opinion: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt according to the first tanna is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, it can be inferred he is liable to take an oath.
לָא; הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין נָמֵי פָּטוּר; וְהַאי דְּקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּחִטִּין – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna states that the first tanna and Rabban Gamliel disagree with regard to a case where the claim was specifically for wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, that the defendant is liable to take an oath even if his admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.
תָּא שְׁמַע: טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת; הוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת, בְּקַרְקָעוֹת וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath.
הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת קַרְקָעוֹת – פָּטוּר. בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים – חַיָּיב.
If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.
טַעְמָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – דְּקַרְקַע לָאו בַּת שְׁבוּעָה הִיא; הָא כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – חַיָּיב!
The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, or for wheat and barley, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.
הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים נָמֵי פָּטוּר; וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים, חַיָּיב אַף עַל הַקַּרְקָעוֹת.
The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is exempt. And the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land is that this teaches us that in a case where the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? זוֹקְקִין?! תְּנֵינָא: ״זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן״!
The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too.
הָא עִיקָּר, הָהִיא אַגַּב גְּרָרָא נַסְבַהּ.
The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.
וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין, וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – פָּטוּר. וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: יִישַׁר, וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן! אָמוֹרָאֵי נִינְהוּ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagrees with Shmuel and says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say to Rav Naḥman: You have spoken well in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; and so also said Rabbi Yoḥanan? If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: They are amora’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
תָּא שְׁמַע: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – פָּטוּר, וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב. טַעְמָא דִּטְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין; הָא חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof against the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he would be liable to take an oath.
הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין נָמֵי פָּטוּר, וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי הָכִי – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches specifically this case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.
תָּא שְׁמַע: טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת; וְהוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת, בְּקַרְקָעוֹת וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – פָּטוּר. הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת קַרְקַע – פָּטוּר. בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים – חַיָּיב. טַעְמָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – דְּקַרְקַע לָאו בַּת שְׁבוּעָה הִיא; הָא כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – חַיָּיב!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.
הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים נָמֵי פָּטוּר; וְהָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּהוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים, חַיָּיב אַף עַל הַקַּרְקָעוֹת. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? זוֹקְקִין?! תְּנֵינָא: זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת, לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן! הָא עִיקָּר, הָהִיא אַגַּב גְּרָרָא נַסְבַהּ.
The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that the same is true, that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type he is exempt. And the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because this teaches us that if the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): The movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too. The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: טְעָנוֹ שׁוֹר וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּשֶׂה, שֶׂה וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּשׁוֹר – פָּטוּר. טְעָנוֹ בְּשׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב.
Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from a baraita: If one claimed that another owes him an ox, and the latter admitted to owing him a sheep, or conversely, if the claim was for a sheep and the defendant admitted to owing him an ox, he is exempt from taking an oath. If one claimed that another owes him an ox and a sheep, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא. אִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי!
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, the defendant should be liable to take an oath even in the first clause of the baraita, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.
אֶלָּא הָא מַנִּי – אַדְמוֹן הִיא; וְלָא דַּחוֹיֵי מְדַחֵינָא לָךְ, אֶלָּא תַּלְמוּד עָרוּךְ הוּא בְּפִיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא מַנִּי – אַדְמוֹן הִיא.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba explained: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon, who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). And I am not dismissing your objection insubstantially; rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon.
אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין, וְקָדַם וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – אִם כְּמַעֲרִים, חַיָּיב. אִם בְּמִתְכַּוֵּין, פָּטוּר.
§ Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and claimed that he owes him wheat, and before he finished his claim, the defendant first admitted that he owes him barley, in this case, if the defendant did so as one who employs artifice, so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is liable to take an oath. But if he did so as one who intends to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is exempt.
וְאָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ שְׁתֵּי מְחָטִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב; לְפִיכָךְ יָצְאוּ כֵּלִים לְמָה שֶׁהֵן.
And Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owes him two needles, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath. It is for this reason that vessels were singled out in the verse, to teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of any value.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וּפְרוּטָה, וְהוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּפְּרוּטָה – פָּטוּר. הוֹדָה בַּפְּרוּטָה וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – חַיָּיב.
Rav Pappa says: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and also one peruta, and the latter admitted to owing him the vessels but denied the claim that he owes him the peruta, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted that he owes him one peruta but denied the claim that he owes him the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.
חֲדָא כְּרַב, וַחֲדָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל. חֲדָא כְּרַב – דְּאָמַר: כְּפִירַת טַעֲנָה שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף. חֲדָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל – דְּאָמַר: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב.
The Gemara comments: One of these rulings is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The former one, that if the defendant denied owing the peruta he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says that the denial of a claim must be of least the value of two silver ma’a in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter one, that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.
״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – פָּטוּר. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: וּמַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעַת הֶיסֵּת. מַאי טַעְמָא? חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם תּוֹבֵעַ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יֵשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו.
§ The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt. Rav Naḥman says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him. What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant’s denial should be examined through an oath.
אַדְּרַבָּה, חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ! אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, סָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵי לִי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara objects: On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant’s denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor’s categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.
תִּדַּע, דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמִלְוֶה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת. בְּפִקָּדוֹן – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת.
Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Ḥisda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness. The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.
רַב חֲבִיבָא מַתְנֵי אַסֵּיפָא – ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״; לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, ״נְתַתִּיו לָךְ״ – פָּטוּר. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעַת הֶיסֵּת.
Rav Ḥaviva teaches Rav Naḥman’s statement as referring to the latter clause in the mishna: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. And Rav Naḥman says: Nevertheless, the court administers an oath of inducement to him.
מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי אַרֵישָׁא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַסֵּיפָא;
The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Naḥman’s statement: With regard to the one who teaches it in reference to the former clause, where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, all the more so does this amora agree that an oath of inducement is administered in the case of the latter clause, where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.
