Shevuot 44

מאי טעמיה דרבי אליעזר אלא לאו בדלא שוי שיעור זוזי ובדשמואל קא מיפלגי

what is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that although the collateral was lost, the debtor is still liable to pay? Rather, is it not a case where the collateral was not worth the amount of money that he lent him? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to the ruling of Shmuel. Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, that if the collateral is lost the entire debt is canceled, and Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion.

לא בדלא שוי כולי עלמא לית להו דשמואל והכא בדשוי שיעור זוזי ובדרבי יצחק קא מיפלגי דאמר רבי יצחק מנין לבעל חוב שקונה משכון שנאמר ולך תהיה צדקה

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, in a case where the collateral was not worth the value of the loan everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is with regard to a case where the collateral was worth the amount of money that he lent him, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated with regard to a creditor who returns the collateral to the debtor for his personal use: “And it shall be a righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13).

אם אינו קונה משכון צדקה מנין לו מכאן לבעל חוב שקונה משכון

Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is his righteousness? If the collateral is not his, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion, maintaining that the creditor has the halakhic status of an unpaid bailee with respect to the collateral, so that he is exempt from paying restitution if it is stolen or lost. He can therefore collect the entire debt from the debtor. Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and holds that since the creditor acquires the collateral, he bears financial responsibility to pay its value in the event of its loss. Therefore, he must deduct the value of the collateral when collecting payment of the debt.

לימא דרבי יצחק תנאי היא ותיסברא אימור דאמר רבי יצחק שמשכנו שלא בשעת הלואה משכנו בשעת הלואה מי אמר

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara answers: And how can you understand that? Say that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that a creditor acquires the collateral in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, but afterward, in order to induce him to return the loan, as described in the context of the aforementioned verse. But in a case where the creditor took the collateral from him at the time of the loan, does Rabbi Yitzḥak say that he has acquired it?

אלא משכנו שלא בשעת הלואתו כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאית להו דרבי יצחק והכא במשכנו בשעת הלואתו

Rather, in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, everyone agrees that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is accepted, and here, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to a case where he took the collateral from him at the time of the loan.

ובשומר אבדה קמיפלגי דאיתמר שומר אבדה רבה אמר כשומר חנם

And they disagree with regard to the halakhic status of one who is safeguarding a lost item that he found but has not yet returned. As it was stated: With regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, Rabba says that his halakhic status is like that of an unpaid bailee, who is exempt from paying restitution in the event that the item is lost or stolen,

ורב יוסף אמר כשומר שכר דמי

and Rav Yosef says that it is like that of a paid bailee, as while performing the mitzva of taking care of a lost item he is exempt from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money, and the money that he saves is tantamount to payment received. Similarly, since safeguarding collateral is part of the mitzva to lend money to the needy, one who does so is exempt during that time from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling, that even if the collateral was lost the creditor collects the entire debt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, and Rabbi Akiva’s ruling, that the creditor loses the value of the collateral, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

לימא דרב יוסף תנאי היא לא בשומר אבידה דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב יוסף והכא במלוה צריך למשכון קא מיפלגי מר סבר מצוה קא עביד ומר סבר לאו מצוה קא עביד

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, with regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, everyone accepts the opinion of Rav Yosef. And here they disagree with regard to a case where the creditor needs the collateral and uses it with the permission of the debtor, deducting a usage fee from the debt. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that he is still performing a mitzva by safeguarding it, and is therefore exempt from performing other mitzvot during that time. Consequently, he has the status of a paid bailee. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that since he derives benefit from the collateral, he is safeguarding it for his own benefit, and is not performing a mitzva. Therefore, he has the status of an unpaid bailee.

לימא כתנאי המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ונכנסה שמיטה אף על פי שאינו שוה אלא פלגא אינו משמט דברי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל רבי יהודה הנשיא אומר אם היה משכונו כנגד חובו אינו משמט ואם לאו משמט

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of Shmuel’s statement that if the creditor loses the collateral, the debt is canceled. Let us say that Shmuel’s ruling is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita with regard to the halakha that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debts for which collateral was taken: If one lends money to another on the basis of collateral and the Sabbatical Year commences, then even if the collateral is worth only half the value of the loan, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the value of the collateral was commensurate with his debt, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, but if it was not commensurate with the debt, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt.

מאי אינו משמט דקאמר תנא קמא אילימא כנגדו מכלל דרבי יהודה הנשיא סבר כנגדו נמי משמט אלא אמאי תפיס משכון

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, which the first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says? If we say it means that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate that part of the debt that is commensurate with the collateral, but it does abrogate the rest, this indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the Sabbatical Year abrogates the entire debt, including the part commensurate with the collateral as well. But if this is so, why did the creditor seize collateral from the debtor at all?

אלא לאו כנגד כולו ובדשמואל קא מיפלגי

Rather, is it not that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt at all, and the debtor is liable to pay an amount commensurate with the entire debt? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s principle that collateral is considered equivalent to the entire debt, even if it is worth less than the debt.

לא לעולם כנגדו ובהא קמיפלגי תנא קמא סבר כנגדו ורבי יהודה הנשיא סבר כנגדו נמי משמט ודקא אמרת למאי תפיס ליה משכון לזכרון דברים בעלמא

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually, the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt is referring only to the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and they disagree with regard to that part of the debt. The first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it abrogates the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral as well. And as for the question you said: For what purpose did he seize collateral from him at all, the answer is that he takes it merely as a reminder, to increase the likelihood that the debt will be paid.

הדרן עליך שבועת הדיינין

מתני׳ כל הנשבעין שבתורה נשבעין ולא משלמין ואלו נשבעין ונוטלין השכיר והנגזל והנחבל ושכנגדו חשוד על השבועה וחנוני על פנקסו

MISHNA: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt himself from a monetary claim. And these litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims that he has not received his wages; and one who was robbed and sues the person who robbed him; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the person who injured him; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. When a person suspected of taking false oaths is liable to take an oath in order to exempt himself, the claimant takes an oath instead and receives payment. And a storekeeper relying on his ledger also takes an oath and is paid.

השכיר כיצד אמר לו תן לי שכרי שיש לי בידך הוא אומר נתתי והלה אומר לא נטלתי הוא נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו תן לי שכרי חמשים דינר שיש לי בידך והוא אומר התקבלת דינר זהב

How does this halakha apply to the hired worker? The case is where one says to his employer: Give me my wages that are still in your possession. The employer says: I already gave them to you. And that worker says: I have not received them. In such a case, the worker takes an oath that he has not received his wages, and he receives payment from his employer. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer. How so? The case is where the worker said to him: Give me my wages, fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received one golden dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Since the employer has admitted that he owes part of the sum, the worker takes an oath and is paid the whole sum.

נגזל כיצד היו מעידין אותו שנכנס לביתו למשכנו שלא ברשות הוא אומר כליי נטלת והוא אומר לא נטלתי הוא נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו שני כלים נטלת והוא אומר לא נטלתי אלא אחד

How does this halakha apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me. And the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the defendant. How so? The case is where the claimant said to him: You took two items. And he says: I took only one. Since the defendant admits that he took one item from the house, the claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his whole claim.

נחבל כיצד היו מעידים אותו שנכנס תחת ידו שלם ויצא חבול ואמר לו חבלת בי והוא אומר לא חבלתי הרי זה נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו חבלת בי שתים והלה אומר לא חבלתי בך אלא אחת

How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? The case is where witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole but left injured, and the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me. And the defendant says: I did not injure you. The injured party takes an oath and receives compensation. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission. How so? The case is where the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me twice. And the other says: I injured you only once. In such a case, the injured party takes an oath that he was injured twice and receives compensation for both injuries.

שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה כיצד

How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath?