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Shevuot 44

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Summary

Is Shmuel’s opinion—that a creditor who loses collateral cannot collect the loan even if the collateral was worth much less than the loan amount—the subject of a tannaitic debate? The Gemara suggests two possible tannaitic debates that could relate to this issue, but rejects both, since the basis for each argument can be explained differently.

Generally, oaths are used to exempt defendants from payment. However, in several unique circumstances delineated in the Mishna, a claimant can take an oath in order to receive payment.

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Shevuot 44

מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אֶלָּא לָאו בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי – וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי?

what is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that although the collateral was lost, the debtor is still liable to pay? Rather, is it not a case where the collateral was not worth the amount of money that he lent him? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to the ruling of Shmuel. Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, that if the collateral is lost the entire debt is canceled, and Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion.

לָא; בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל; וְהָכָא בִּדְשָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וּבִדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק קָא מִיפַּלְגִי – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּלְךָ תִּהְיֶה צְדָקָה״.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, in a case where the collateral was not worth the value of the loan everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is with regard to a case where the collateral was worth the amount of money that he lent him, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated with regard to a creditor who returns the collateral to the debtor for his personal use: “And it shall be a righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13).

אִם אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, צְדָקָה מִנַּיִן לוֹ? מִכָּאן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן.

Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is his righteousness? If the collateral is not his, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion, maintaining that the creditor has the halakhic status of an unpaid bailee with respect to the collateral, so that he is exempt from paying restitution if it is stolen or lost. He can therefore collect the entire debt from the debtor. Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and holds that since the creditor acquires the collateral, he bears financial responsibility to pay its value in the event of its loss. Therefore, he must deduct the value of the collateral when collecting payment of the debt.

לֵימָא דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק – שֶׁמִּשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָה; מִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָה מִי אָמַר?!

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara answers: And how can you understand that? Say that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that a creditor acquires the collateral in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, but afterward, in order to induce him to return the loan, as described in the context of the aforementioned verse. But in a case where the creditor took the collateral from him at the time of the loan, does Rabbi Yitzḥak say that he has acquired it?

אֶלָּא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. וְהָכָא – בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ,

Rather, in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, everyone agrees that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is accepted, and here, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to a case where he took the collateral from him at the time of the loan.

וּבְשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵדָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי; דְּאִיתְּמַר: שׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵדָה – רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם,

And they disagree with regard to the halakhic status of one who is safeguarding a lost item that he found but has not yet returned. As it was stated: With regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, Rabba says that his halakhic status is like that of an unpaid bailee, who is exempt from paying restitution in the event that the item is lost or stolen,

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר דָּמֵי.

and Rav Yosef says that it is like that of a paid bailee, as while performing the mitzva of taking care of a lost item he is exempt from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money, and the money that he saves is tantamount to payment received. Similarly, since safeguarding collateral is part of the mitzva to lend money to the needy, one who does so is exempt during that time from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling, that even if the collateral was lost the creditor collects the entire debt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, and Rabbi Akiva’s ruling, that the creditor loses the value of the collateral, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

לֵימָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? לָא; בְּשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף; וְהָכָא בְּמַלְוֶה צָרִיךְ לְמַשְׁכּוֹן קָא מִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד, וּמָר סָבַר לָאו מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד.

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, with regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, everyone accepts the opinion of Rav Yosef. And here they disagree with regard to a case where the creditor needs the collateral and uses it with the permission of the debtor, deducting a usage fee from the debt. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that he is still performing a mitzva by safeguarding it, and is therefore exempt from performing other mitzvot during that time. Consequently, he has the status of a paid bailee. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that since he derives benefit from the collateral, he is safeguarding it for his own benefit, and is not performing a mitzva. Therefore, he has the status of an unpaid bailee.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן וְנִכְנְסָה שְׁמִיטָּה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה אֶלָּא פְּלַג – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ כְּנֶגֶד חוֹבוֹ – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט, וְאִם לָאו – מְשַׁמֵּט.

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of Shmuel’s statement that if the creditor loses the collateral, the debt is canceled. Let us say that Shmuel’s ruling is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita with regard to the halakha that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debts for which collateral was taken: If one lends money to another on the basis of collateral and the Sabbatical Year commences, then even if the collateral is worth only half the value of the loan, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the value of the collateral was commensurate with his debt, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, but if it was not commensurate with the debt, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt.

מַאי ״אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט״ דְּקָאָמַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא כְּנֶגְדּוֹ – מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ נָמֵי מְשַׁמֵּט?! אֶלָּא אַמַּאי תָּפֵיס מַשְׁכּוֹן?

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, which the first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says? If we say it means that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate that part of the debt that is commensurate with the collateral, but it does abrogate the rest, this indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the Sabbatical Year abrogates the entire debt, including the part commensurate with the collateral as well. But if this is so, why did the creditor seize collateral from the debtor at all?

אֶלָּא לָאו כְּנֶגֶד כּוּלּוֹ – וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי?

Rather, is it not that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt at all, and the debtor is liable to pay an amount commensurate with the entire debt? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s principle that collateral is considered equivalent to the entire debt, even if it is worth less than the debt.

לָא; לְעוֹלָם כְּנֶגְדּוֹ, וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ; וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ נָמֵי מְשַׁמֵּט. וּדְקָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְמַאי תָּפֵיס לֵיהּ מַשְׁכּוֹן? לְזִכְרוֹן דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually, the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt is referring only to the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and they disagree with regard to that part of the debt. The first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it abrogates the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral as well. And as for the question you said: For what purpose did he seize collateral from him at all, the answer is that he takes it merely as a reminder, to increase the likelihood that the debt will be paid.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה – נִשְׁבָּעִין וְלֹא מְשַׁלְּמִין. וְאֵלּוּ נִשְׁבָּעִין וְנוֹטְלִין: הַשָּׂכִיר, וְהַנִּגְזָל, וְהַנֶּחְבָּל, וְשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וְחֶנְוָנִי עַל פִּנְקָסוֹ.

MISHNA: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt himself from a monetary claim. And these litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims that he has not received his wages; and one who was robbed and sues the person who robbed him; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the person who injured him; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. When a person suspected of taking false oaths is liable to take an oath in order to exempt himself, the claimant takes an oath instead and receives payment. And a storekeeper relying on his ledger also takes an oath and is paid.

הַשָּׂכִיר – כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי שְׂכָרִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״; הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״נָתַתִּי״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי״ – הוּא נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי שְׂכָרִי חֲמִשִּׁים דִּינָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתָּ דִּינַר זָהָב״.

How does this halakha apply to the hired worker? The case is where one says to his employer: Give me my wages that are still in your possession. The employer says: I already gave them to you. And that worker says: I have not received them. In such a case, the worker takes an oath that he has not received his wages, and he receives payment from his employer. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer. How so? The case is where the worker said to him: Give me my wages, fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received one golden dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Since the employer has admitted that he owes part of the sum, the worker takes an oath and is paid the whole sum.

נִגְזָל – כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנַס לְבֵיתוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת; הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כֶּלְיִי נָטַלְתָּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי״ – הוּא נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ ״שְׁנֵי כֵּלִים נָטַלְתָּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי אֶלָּא אֶחָד״.

How does this halakha apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me. And the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the defendant. How so? The case is where the claimant said to him: You took two items. And he says: I took only one. Since the defendant admits that he took one item from the house, the claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his whole claim.

נֶחְבָּל – כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנַס תַּחַת יָדוֹ שָׁלֵם וְיָצָא חָבוּל; וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״חָבַלְתָּ בִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא חָבַלְתִּי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״חָבַלְתָּ בִּי שְׁתַּיִם״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא חָבַלְתִּי בְּךָ אֶלָּא אֶחָת״.

How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? The case is where witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole but left injured, and the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me. And the defendant says: I did not injure you. The injured party takes an oath and receives compensation. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission. How so? The case is where the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me twice. And the other says: I injured you only once. In such a case, the injured party takes an oath that he was injured twice and receives compensation for both injuries.

שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה – כֵּיצַד?

How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath?

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Marsha Wasserman

Jerusalem, Israel

I started learning at the beginning of this cycle more than 2 years ago, and I have not missed a day or a daf. It’s been challenging and enlightening and even mind-numbing at times, but the learning and the shared experience have all been worth it. If you are open to it, there’s no telling what might come into your life.

Patti Evans
Patti Evans

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

I started learning Daf in Jan 2020 with Brachot b/c I had never seen the Jewish people united around something so positive, and I wanted to be a part of it. Also, I wanted to broaden my background in Torah Shebal Peh- Maayanot gave me a great gemara education, but I knew that I could hold a conversation in most parts of tanach but almost no TSB. I’m so thankful for Daf and have gained immensely.

Meira Shapiro
Meira Shapiro

NJ, United States

When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.

Shoshana Shinnar
Shoshana Shinnar

Jerusalem, Israel

I am grateful for the structure of the Daf Yomi. When I am freer to learn to my heart’s content, I learn other passages in addition. But even in times of difficulty, I always know that I can rely on the structure and social support of Daf Yomi learners all over the world.

I am also grateful for this forum. It is very helpful to learn with a group of enthusiastic and committed women.

Janice Block-2
Janice Block

Beit Shemesh, Israel

My first Talmud class experience was a weekly group in 1971 studying Taanit. In 2007 I resumed Talmud study with a weekly group I continue learning with. January 2020, I was inspired to try learning Daf Yomi. A friend introduced me to Daf Yomi for Women and Rabbanit Michelle Farber, I have kept with this program and look forward, G- willing, to complete the entire Shas with Hadran.
Lorri Lewis
Lorri Lewis

Palo Alto, CA, United States

I started learning Daf Yomi to fill what I saw as a large gap in my Jewish education. I also hope to inspire my three daughters to ensure that they do not allow the same Talmud-sized gap to form in their own educations. I am so proud to be a part of the Hadran community, and I have loved learning so many of the stories and halachot that we have seen so far. I look forward to continuing!
Dora Chana Haar
Dora Chana Haar

Oceanside NY, United States

Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba

Marsha Wasserman
Marsha Wasserman

Jerusalem, Israel

After enthusing to my friend Ruth Kahan about how much I had enjoyed remote Jewish learning during the earlier part of the pandemic, she challenged me to join her in learning the daf yomi cycle. I had always wanted to do daf yomi but now had no excuse. The beginning was particularly hard as I had never studied Talmud but has become easier, as I have gained some familiarity with it.

Susan-Vishner-Hadran-photo-scaled
Susan Vishner

Brookline, United States

Attending the Siyyum in Jerusalem 26 months ago inspired me to become part of this community of learners. So many aspects of Jewish life have been illuminated by what we have learned in Seder Moed. My day is not complete without daf Yomi. I am so grateful to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Community.

Nancy Kolodny
Nancy Kolodny

Newton, United States

I learned Talmud as a student in Yeshivat Ramaz and felt at the time that Talmud wasn’t for me. After reading Ilana Kurshan’s book I was intrigued and after watching the great siyum in Yerushalayim it ignited the spark to begin this journey. It has been a transformative life experience for me as a wife, mother, Savta and member of Klal Yisrael.
Elana Storch
Elana Storch

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!

Anne Mirsky (1)
Anne Mirsky

Maale Adumim, Israel

I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.

Linda Brownstein
Linda Brownstein

Mitspe, Israel

Shevuot 44

מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אֶלָּא לָאו בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי – וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי?

what is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that although the collateral was lost, the debtor is still liable to pay? Rather, is it not a case where the collateral was not worth the amount of money that he lent him? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to the ruling of Shmuel. Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, that if the collateral is lost the entire debt is canceled, and Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion.

לָא; בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל; וְהָכָא בִּדְשָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וּבִדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק קָא מִיפַּלְגִי – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּלְךָ תִּהְיֶה צְדָקָה״.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, in a case where the collateral was not worth the value of the loan everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is with regard to a case where the collateral was worth the amount of money that he lent him, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated with regard to a creditor who returns the collateral to the debtor for his personal use: “And it shall be a righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13).

אִם אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, צְדָקָה מִנַּיִן לוֹ? מִכָּאן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן.

Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is his righteousness? If the collateral is not his, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion, maintaining that the creditor has the halakhic status of an unpaid bailee with respect to the collateral, so that he is exempt from paying restitution if it is stolen or lost. He can therefore collect the entire debt from the debtor. Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and holds that since the creditor acquires the collateral, he bears financial responsibility to pay its value in the event of its loss. Therefore, he must deduct the value of the collateral when collecting payment of the debt.

לֵימָא דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק – שֶׁמִּשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָה; מִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָה מִי אָמַר?!

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara answers: And how can you understand that? Say that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that a creditor acquires the collateral in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, but afterward, in order to induce him to return the loan, as described in the context of the aforementioned verse. But in a case where the creditor took the collateral from him at the time of the loan, does Rabbi Yitzḥak say that he has acquired it?

אֶלָּא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. וְהָכָא – בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ,

Rather, in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, everyone agrees that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is accepted, and here, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to a case where he took the collateral from him at the time of the loan.

וּבְשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵדָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי; דְּאִיתְּמַר: שׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵדָה – רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם,

And they disagree with regard to the halakhic status of one who is safeguarding a lost item that he found but has not yet returned. As it was stated: With regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, Rabba says that his halakhic status is like that of an unpaid bailee, who is exempt from paying restitution in the event that the item is lost or stolen,

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר דָּמֵי.

and Rav Yosef says that it is like that of a paid bailee, as while performing the mitzva of taking care of a lost item he is exempt from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money, and the money that he saves is tantamount to payment received. Similarly, since safeguarding collateral is part of the mitzva to lend money to the needy, one who does so is exempt during that time from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling, that even if the collateral was lost the creditor collects the entire debt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, and Rabbi Akiva’s ruling, that the creditor loses the value of the collateral, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

לֵימָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? לָא; בְּשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף; וְהָכָא בְּמַלְוֶה צָרִיךְ לְמַשְׁכּוֹן קָא מִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד, וּמָר סָבַר לָאו מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד.

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, with regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, everyone accepts the opinion of Rav Yosef. And here they disagree with regard to a case where the creditor needs the collateral and uses it with the permission of the debtor, deducting a usage fee from the debt. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that he is still performing a mitzva by safeguarding it, and is therefore exempt from performing other mitzvot during that time. Consequently, he has the status of a paid bailee. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that since he derives benefit from the collateral, he is safeguarding it for his own benefit, and is not performing a mitzva. Therefore, he has the status of an unpaid bailee.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן וְנִכְנְסָה שְׁמִיטָּה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה אֶלָּא פְּלַג – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ כְּנֶגֶד חוֹבוֹ – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט, וְאִם לָאו – מְשַׁמֵּט.

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of Shmuel’s statement that if the creditor loses the collateral, the debt is canceled. Let us say that Shmuel’s ruling is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita with regard to the halakha that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debts for which collateral was taken: If one lends money to another on the basis of collateral and the Sabbatical Year commences, then even if the collateral is worth only half the value of the loan, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the value of the collateral was commensurate with his debt, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, but if it was not commensurate with the debt, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt.

מַאי ״אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט״ דְּקָאָמַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא כְּנֶגְדּוֹ – מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ נָמֵי מְשַׁמֵּט?! אֶלָּא אַמַּאי תָּפֵיס מַשְׁכּוֹן?

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, which the first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says? If we say it means that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate that part of the debt that is commensurate with the collateral, but it does abrogate the rest, this indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the Sabbatical Year abrogates the entire debt, including the part commensurate with the collateral as well. But if this is so, why did the creditor seize collateral from the debtor at all?

אֶלָּא לָאו כְּנֶגֶד כּוּלּוֹ – וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי?

Rather, is it not that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt at all, and the debtor is liable to pay an amount commensurate with the entire debt? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s principle that collateral is considered equivalent to the entire debt, even if it is worth less than the debt.

לָא; לְעוֹלָם כְּנֶגְדּוֹ, וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ; וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא סָבַר: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ נָמֵי מְשַׁמֵּט. וּדְקָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְמַאי תָּפֵיס לֵיהּ מַשְׁכּוֹן? לְזִכְרוֹן דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually, the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt is referring only to the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and they disagree with regard to that part of the debt. The first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it abrogates the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral as well. And as for the question you said: For what purpose did he seize collateral from him at all, the answer is that he takes it merely as a reminder, to increase the likelihood that the debt will be paid.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה – נִשְׁבָּעִין וְלֹא מְשַׁלְּמִין. וְאֵלּוּ נִשְׁבָּעִין וְנוֹטְלִין: הַשָּׂכִיר, וְהַנִּגְזָל, וְהַנֶּחְבָּל, וְשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וְחֶנְוָנִי עַל פִּנְקָסוֹ.

MISHNA: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt himself from a monetary claim. And these litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims that he has not received his wages; and one who was robbed and sues the person who robbed him; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the person who injured him; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. When a person suspected of taking false oaths is liable to take an oath in order to exempt himself, the claimant takes an oath instead and receives payment. And a storekeeper relying on his ledger also takes an oath and is paid.

הַשָּׂכִיר – כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי שְׂכָרִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״; הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״נָתַתִּי״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי״ – הוּא נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי שְׂכָרִי חֲמִשִּׁים דִּינָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתָּ דִּינַר זָהָב״.

How does this halakha apply to the hired worker? The case is where one says to his employer: Give me my wages that are still in your possession. The employer says: I already gave them to you. And that worker says: I have not received them. In such a case, the worker takes an oath that he has not received his wages, and he receives payment from his employer. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer. How so? The case is where the worker said to him: Give me my wages, fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received one golden dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Since the employer has admitted that he owes part of the sum, the worker takes an oath and is paid the whole sum.

נִגְזָל – כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנַס לְבֵיתוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת; הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כֶּלְיִי נָטַלְתָּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי״ – הוּא נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ ״שְׁנֵי כֵּלִים נָטַלְתָּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא נָטַלְתִּי אֶלָּא אֶחָד״.

How does this halakha apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me. And the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the defendant. How so? The case is where the claimant said to him: You took two items. And he says: I took only one. Since the defendant admits that he took one item from the house, the claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his whole claim.

נֶחְבָּל – כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנַס תַּחַת יָדוֹ שָׁלֵם וְיָצָא חָבוּל; וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״חָבַלְתָּ בִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא חָבַלְתִּי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״חָבַלְתָּ בִּי שְׁתַּיִם״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא חָבַלְתִּי בְּךָ אֶלָּא אֶחָת״.

How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? The case is where witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole but left injured, and the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me. And the defendant says: I did not injure you. The injured party takes an oath and receives compensation. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission. How so? The case is where the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me twice. And the other says: I injured you only once. In such a case, the injured party takes an oath that he was injured twice and receives compensation for both injuries.

שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה – כֵּיצַד?

How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath?

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