Yevamot 116
לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי לִנְפִילָה — מִזְהָר זְהִיר בֵּיהּ. אִי לְפִקָּדוֹן — כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁמֵיהּ כִּשְׁמֵיהּ לָא מַפְקֵיד גַּבֵּיהּ.
With regard to what should we be concerned in the case of the promissory note? If we are concerned about the possibility of falling, i.e., that the promissory note might have dropped from this person’s hand and the other one found it, the former is certainly careful with it so as not to lose it, as he knows there is someone else in the city with the same name. If we are concerned about the possibility that it was given as a deposit for safekeeping, i.e., that the actual owner might have given it to the one in possession of it, since his name is the same as the name of the bailee, the owner would not deposit his contract with him without some insurance.
מַאי אָמְרַתְּ, דִּלְמָא מְסַר לֵיהּ? אוֹתִיּוֹת נִקְנוֹת בִּמְסִירָה.
If you say that perhaps the actual owner passed, i.e., transferred the promissory note to this person whose name is the same as his own, i.e., he gave or sold it to him so he may collect it for himself, in that case the one in possession is entitled to collect the money, as letters of credit are acquired through passing. There is no need for an additional act of acquisition here, which means that the promissory note belongs to the one in possession of it, despite the fact that it was not originally written for him. Consequently, no proof can be brought from this case with regard to whether or not one should be concerned about two people with identical names.
הָהוּא גִּיטָּא דְּאִשְׁתְּכַח בְּסוּרָא וּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ הָכִי: בְּסוּרָא מָתָא אֲנָא עָנָן בַּר חִיָּיא נְהַרְדָּעָא פְּטַרִית וְתָרֵכִית פְּלוֹנִית אִנְתְּתִי. וּבְדַקוּ רַבָּנַן מִסּוּרָא וְעַד נְהַרְדְּעָא, וְלָא הֲוָה עָנָן בַּר חִיָּיא אַחֲרִינָא לְבַר מֵעָנָן בַּר חִיָּיא מְחַגְּרָא דַּהֲוָה בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא. וַאֲתוֹ סָהֲדִי וֶאֱמוֹר דְּהָהוּא יוֹמָא כִּי אִיכְּתַב הָהוּא גִּיטָּא, עָנָן בַּר חִיָּיא מְחַגְּרָא גַּבַּן הֲוָה.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain bill of divorce that was found in the city of Sura and the following was written in it: In the city of Sura, I, Anan bar Ḥiyya of Neharde’a, excused and sent away and divorced my wife, so-and-so. And the Sages examined the area from Sura to Neharde’a, throughout almost all of Babylonia, and there was no other Anan bar Ḥiyya than the one they knew, apart from an Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra who was in Neharde’a. And yet witnesses came and said that on that day, when that bill of divorce was written: Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra was with us in Neharde’a, not in Sura.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַף לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא חָיְישִׁינַן — הָכָא לָא חָיְישִׁינַן, דְּהָא קָאָמְרִי סָהֲדִי דְּבִנְהַרְדְּעָא הֲוָה, מַאי בְּעָא בְּסוּרָא.
Abaye said: Even according to my opinion, by which I say that generally we are concerned about the possibility of someone else with the same name, here we are not concerned. The reason is that the witnesses say the other Anan bar Ḥiyya was in Neharde’a; what, then, is he doing in Sura? Consequently, there is no concern that the bill of divorce was written by the Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף לְדִידִי דְּלָא חָיְישִׁינַן — הָכָא חָיְישִׁינַן, דִּלְמָא בְּגַמְלָא פָּרְחָא אֲזַל. אִי נָמֵי בִּקְפִיצָה. אִי נָמֵי מִילֵּי מְסַר.
Rava said: Even according to my opinion, in which I say that we are not concerned in general, here, when it is established that there definitely is another man by the same name, we are concerned. As for the apparently contradictory testimony, perhaps he went by a flying camel, an extremely fast means of transportation, and was able to travel from Neharde’a to Sura in one day. Alternatively, he might have arrived by a miraculous shortcut. Alternatively, he might have given verbal instructions beforehand for them to write the bill of divorce in a place where he was not physically located.
כְּדַאֲמַר לְהוּ רַב לְסָפְרֵי, וְכֵן אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב הוּנָא לְסָפְרֵי: כִּי אִיתַנְכוּ בְּשִׁילֵי כְּתוּבוּ בְּשִׁילֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִימַּסְרָן מִילֵּי בְּהִינֵי. וְכִי אִיתַנְכוּ בְּהִינֵי כְּתוּבוּ בְּהִינֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִימַּסְרָן מִילֵּי בְּשִׁילֵי.
This last answer is as Rav said to the court scribes, and likewise Rav Huna said to the scribes: When you are in a place called Shili, write that the contract was written in Shili, even when the instructions are given to you in a different place called Hini. And likewise, when you are in Hini, write that it was written in Hini, even when the instructions are given to you in Shili.
מַאי הֲוָה עֲלַיְיהוּ דְּשׁוּמְשְׁמֵי? רַב יֵימַר אָמַר: לָא חָיְישִׁינַן. רָבִינָא אָמַר: חָיְישִׁינַן. וְהִלְכְתָא: חָיְישִׁינַן.
The Gemara returns to the original question: What was the conclusion that was reached about this case involving sesame plants? Do they belong to the one who deposited them, or is the claim of the bailee accepted, that he returned them and placed other sesame plants in the same barrel? Rav Yeimar said: We are not concerned that they are different plants, and Ravina said: We are concerned. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that we are concerned about the possibility that the bailee replaced them with others, and we do not rely on the distinguishing marks provided by the claimant in this case.
קְטָטָה בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְכוּ׳. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי קְטָטָה בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת לְבַעְלָהּ ״גָּרְשֵׁינִי״. כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי אָמְרוּ הָכִי! אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֶרֶת לְבַעְלָהּ ״גֵּירַשְׁתַּנִי״.
§ The mishna taught: If there was a quarrel between him and her, her testimony that her husband died is not accepted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a quarrel between him and her? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is a case where people heard her say to her husband: Divorce me. The Gemara asks: Is this proof? All women likewise say this when they are angry; this does not prove that there was an unresolved quarrel left between them. Rather, a quarrel is when she says to her husband: You divorced me, i.e., she claims that she was actually divorced.
וְלִיהֵמְנַהּ מִדְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא. דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה לְבַעְלָהּ ״גֵּירַשְׁתַּנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. חֲזָקָה אֵין אִשָּׁה מְעִיזָּה פָּנֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי בַּעְלָהּ!
The Gemara asks: If she said to her husband that he divorced her, let us believe her claim, in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. As Rav Hamnuna said: A woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, is deemed credible. Why? There is a presumption that a woman would not dare to lie in the presence of her husband about a matter which he knows to be untrue. If so, why isn’t her claim that she was divorced accepted? This would mean that there is no need for any testimony concerning his death, as the ties between them have already been severed.
בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״גֵּירַשְׁתַּנִי בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי״, וְשַׁאֵילְנָא וְאָמְרוּ: ״לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״.
The Gemara answers: In fact, a couple is considered to be quarreling when she says: You divorced me in the presence of two witnesses, so-and-so and so-and-so; and the court asked those men and they said: This matter never happened. In this case it is obvious that there was a terrible quarrel between them, but her claim that she was divorced is not accepted. Consequently, her later claim that her husband is dead is not accepted.
מַאי טַעְמָא דִּקְטָטָה? רַב חֲנִינָא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דִּמְשַׁקְּרָא. רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרָה בִּדְדָמֵי. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?
§ The Gemara analyzes the ruling of the mishna itself. What is the reason that in the case of a quarrel between them the court does not accept her testimony? Rav Ḥanina said: Because she lies, i.e., due to their quarrel she is likely to testify falsely that her husband died. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Because she says what she imagines to be the case. When there is peace between them, she examines the matter thoroughly to discover whether he actually died, but if there is a quarrel between them she is not so exacting, as she is pleased to be rid of him. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two explanations?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּאַרְגֵּיל הוּא קְטָטָה.
The practical difference between them is in a case where he initiated the quarrel. In this situation there is no concern that she might knowingly lie, as she loves him. However, due to the quarrel between them she might not be meticulous in her investigations.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עֵד אֶחָד בִּקְטָטָה, מַהוּ? מַאי טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מְהֵימַן: מִשּׁוּם דְּמִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר — הָכָא נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר, אוֹ דִלְמָא: טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מְהֵימַן מִשּׁוּם דְּהִיא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, וְהָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לֵיהּ קְטָטָה, לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא? תֵּיקוּ.
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there was one witness who testified that the husband died, in a case that involved a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the different sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because it is a matter that is likely to be revealed, and one does not lie in a case of this kind? Here too, one witness would not lie. Or perhaps the reason that one witness is deemed credible is because she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. And here, since there is a quarrel between them, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again, despite the testimony of the witness. The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר לְעוֹלָם אֵינָהּ וְכוּ׳. תַּנְיָא, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לִדְבָרֶיךָ, פִּקַּחַת — תִּנָּשֵׂא, שׁוֹטָה — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא?! אֶלָּא, אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ תִּנָּשֵׂא.
§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says that a wife is never deemed credible when she testifies that her husband died, unless she came crying and her clothing was torn, while the Rabbis say she may remarry in any case. It is taught in a baraita: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: According to your statement, a crafty woman who knows how to deceive will come with torn clothes crying, and it will be permitted for her to marry. However, a foolish woman who does not know how to deceive will not be permitted to marry. Is this a fair outcome? Rather, both this woman and that woman may marry.
הָהִיא דַּאֲתַאי לְבֵי דִינָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אָמְרִי לַהּ: סִפְדִי בַּעְלִךְ, קְרַעִי מָאנִיךְ, סִתְרִי מַזְיִיךְ. אַלְּפוּהָ שִׁיקְרָא? אִינְהוּ כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לְהוּ, אָמְרִי: תַּעֲבֵיד הָכִי כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִישְׁרְיֻהָ.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who came to the court of Rabbi Yehuda. The people sitting there said to her: Lament your husband, tear your clothing, unbind your hair, so that you have the appearance of a mourner, and the court will believe you. The Gemara asks: Did they instruct her to lie? The Gemara answers: They thought, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that it is permitted for her to marry in any case. However, they were concerned that Rabbi Yehuda would rule that she may not remarry if she did not display her grief, in accordance with his opinion. Therefore, they said that she should do this, so that Rabbi Yehuda would also permit her to marry, and she would avoid any complications.
מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבָאָה מִן הַקָּצִיר, וּבְאוֹתָהּ מְדִינָה, וּכְמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה.
MISHNA: Beit Hillel say: We heard that one may accept the testimony of a woman concerning the death of her husband only when she comes from the grain harvest, and when she testified in the same country where he died, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, in which a lenient ruling was issued, as will be explained.
אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: אַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַקָּצִיר, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַזֵּיתִים, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַבָּצִיר, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִמְּדִינָה לִמְדִינָה. לֹא דִּבְּרוּ חֲכָמִים בַּקָּצִיר אֶלָּא בַּהוֹוֶה. חָזְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְהוֹרוֹת כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי.
Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: The same halakha applies to a wife who comes from the grain harvest, and one who comes from the olive harvest, and also one who comes from the grape harvest, and even one who comes from one country to another country. Although the incident in question took place during the grain harvest, the Sages spoke of the grain harvest only because it was the present occurrence, i.e., that is what happened in practice, but this is no proof that she is deemed credible only when she arrived specifically from the grain harvest. The mishna comments: Beit Hillel retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai on this issue.
גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְבֵית הִלֵּל: לְדִבְרֵיכֶם, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא קְצִיר חִטִּים — קְצִיר שְׂעוֹרִים, מִנַּיִן? וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא קוֹצֵר — בּוֹצֵר, מוֹסֵק, גּוֹדֵר, עוֹדֵר, מִנַּיִן?
GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement that this halakha applies solely in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, if so, I have derived only that it applies in the wheat harvest. From where do I derive that the same applies in the barley harvest? And I have derived only that it applies to one who reaps grain. From where do I derive that this halakha includes someone who harvests grapes, or harvests olives, or harvests dates, or harvests figs?
אֶלָּא מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה בַּקָּצִיר, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכוּלְּהוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה בְּאוֹתָהּ מְדִינָה, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכוּלְּהוּ.
Rather, that incident which occurred during the grain harvest, and the same is true of all these other circumstances. Here too, concerning a woman who comes from another country, and other, similar cases, the incident that occurred took place in that country, but the same is true of all these other cases.
וּבֵית הִלֵּל: בְּאוֹתָהּ מְדִינָה דִּשְׁכִיחִי אִינָשֵׁי — מִירְתַת, מִמְּדִינָה לִמְדִינָה אַחֶרֶת, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי אִינָשֵׁי — לָא מִירְתַת. וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי: הָכָא נָמֵי שְׁכִיחִי שַׁיָּירָתָא.
And Beit Hillel, how did they respond to this argument? In that same country, where people are commonly found moving from place to place, she is scared to lie, lest her account be contradicted. However, between one country and another country, where people are not commonly found moving back and forth, she is not scared, and therefore she might be lying when she says he died. And Beit Shammai reason: Here too caravans are found, and if he was alive the truth would eventually be revealed.
מַאי מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה? דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שִׁילְפֵי קָצִיר חִטִּין הָיוּ, וְהָלְכוּ עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם לִקְצוֹר חִטִּין, נְשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן וּמֵת, וּבָאת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְהוֹדִיעָה לְבֵית דִּין. וְשָׁלְחוּ וּמָצְאוּ כִּדְבָרֶיהָ. בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה אָמְרוּ: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ — תִּנָּשֵׂא, ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ — תִּתְיַיבֵּם.
The Gemara asks: What was this incident that occurred? As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It was at the end [shilfei] of the wheat harvest, and ten people went to harvest wheat. A snake bit one of them and he died, and his wife came and told the court that her husband died. And they sent messengers, who discovered that it happened in accordance with her statement. At that time they said: The woman who says: My husband died, may marry on the basis of this testimony. Furthermore, if she says: My husband died without children, and he has a brother, she enters into levirate marriage. This is the case to which Beit Hillel referred.
נֵימָא רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקִיבָא וְרַבָּנַן בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דְּתַנְיָא: לֹא יִשָּׂא אָדָם מֵי חַטָּאת וְאֵפֶר חַטָּאת וְיַעֲבִירֵם בַּיַּרְדֵּן וּבִסְפִינָה,
§ The Gemara analyzes this dispute. Let us say that Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva and the Rabbis, who argued in this case, disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. As it is taught in a baraita: A person may not carry the waters of purification, i.e., the water containing the ashes of the red heifer for the ritual purification of one who became impure through contact with a corpse, and the ashes of purification, of the red heifer, and transport them on the Jordan River. And one may not transfer them across the river in a boat.
וְלֹא יַעֲמוֹד בְּצַד זֶה וְיִזְרֹק לְצַד אַחֵר, וְלֹא יְשִׁיטֵם עַל פְּנֵי הַמַּיִם, וְלֹא יַרְכִּיבֵם לֹא עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה וְלֹא עַל גַּבֵּי חֲבֵרוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיוּ רַגְלָיו נוֹגְעוֹת בַּקַּרְקַע. אֲבָל מַעֲבִירָם עַל הַגֶּשֶׁר, אֶחָד יַרְדֵּן וְאֶחָד שְׁאָר נְהָרוֹת. רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא יַרְדֵּן, וּבִסְפִינָה, וּכְמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה.
And one may not stand on one side of the river and throw the ashes to the other side, nor float them upon the water as he crosses, nor ride with them across the river, neither on the back of an animal nor on the back of another person, as this is similar to a boat that passes over the water, unless the legs of the rider were touching the ground. However, one may transport them across the water over a bridge. This prohibition applies to both the Jordan River and all other rivers. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva says: They said this prohibition only with regard to the Jordan, and transporting in a boat, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, when ritual impurity was found in a boat on the Jordan River.
לֵימָא רַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי. וְרַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר כְּבֵית הִלֵּל.
Let us say that the Rabbis say in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, that when a decree is enacted due to a specific case that occurred, this halakha applies to all similar circumstances. And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva says in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, that the decree applies only in the exact circumstances as the precedent case.
אָמְרִי לָךְ רַבָּנַן: אֲנַן דְּאָמְרִינַן אַף כְּבֵית הִלֵּל, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר בֵּית הִלֵּל הָתָם, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִירַתְתָ[א]; בְּמָקוֹם קָרוֹב — מִירַתְתָ[א], בְּמָקוֹם רָחוֹק — לָא מִירַתְתָ[א]. הָכָא, מָה לִי יַרְדֵּן מָה לִי שְׁאָר נְהָרוֹת.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion. The Rabbis could say to you: We stated our ruling even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, as there is a difference between the two cases. Beit Hillel state their opinion, that she is not deemed credible when she comes from one country to another, only in that case there, because she is scared. In a nearby place she is scared to give false testimony, as her lie can easily be discovered, whereas in a distant place she is not scared. However, here, concerning the ashes of the red heifer, what difference does it make to me if it is the Jordan River, and what difference does it make to me if it is one of the many other rivers?
רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אַף לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הָתָם, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיהִי דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, מָה לִי מָקוֹם קָרוֹב מָה לִי מָקוֹם רָחוֹק. הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה. בַּיַּרְדֵּן וּבִסְפִינָה דַּהֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה — גְּזוּר רַבָּנַן, בִּשְׁאָר נְהָרוֹת דְּלָא הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה — לָא גְּזוּר רַבָּנַן.
Meanwhile, Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva could have said to you: I stated my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as Beit Shammai state their opinion only there, because she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Since this is the decisive consideration, what difference does it make to me if the place is near, and what difference does it make to me if the place is far? Here, however, the Sages issued their decree due to a specific incident that occurred. And therefore the Sages issued their decree with regard to the Jordan River and in a boat, the circumstances in which the incident occurred. Conversely, the Sages did not issue the decree with regard to other rivers, where the incident did not occur.
מַאי מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה? דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאָדָם שֶׁהָיָה מַעֲבִיר מֵי חַטָּאת וְאֵפֶר חַטָּאת בַּיַּרְדֵּן וּבִסְפִינָה, וְנִמְצָא כְּזַיִת מִן הַמֵּת תָּחוּב בְּקַרְקָעִית שֶׁל סְפִינָה. בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה אָמְרוּ: לֹא יִשָּׂא אָדָם מֵי חַטָּאת וְאֵפֶר חַטָּאת וְיַעֲבִירֵם בַּיַּרְדֵּן וּבִסְפִינָה.
The Gemara explains: What is this incident that occurred, involving the ashes of the red heifer? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: An incident occurred involving a person who was transporting waters of purification and ashes of purification on the Jordan River, and in a boat, and an olive-bulk of a corpse was found stuck to the bottom of the boat, which rendered the waters and ashes ritually impure. At that time they said: A person may not carry waters of purification and ashes of purification and transport them on the Jordan River, and in a boat. Later Sages dispute whether this decree applies to similar cases, or only to the exact circumstances of this specific incident.
מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְתִטּוֹל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא תִּטּוֹל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: הִתַּרְתֶּם עֶרְוָה חֲמוּרָה, וְלֹא נַתִּיר מָמוֹן הַקַּל?! אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית הִלֵּל: מָצִינוּ
MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: A woman who testifies that her husband died may marry, and take the money guaranteed in her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: She may marry, but she may not take her marriage contract, as qualified witnesses are required for monetary matters. Beit Shammai said to them: If you have permitted a woman potentially forbidden to him, which is a relatively stringent prohibition, based merely upon her own testimony, will we not permit a monetary matter, which is more lenient, as the money can be returned and this sin does not entail such a severe punishment? Beit Hillel said to them: This is no proof, as we find
