Yevamot 116

למאי ניחוש לה אי לנפילה מזהר זהיר ביה אי לפקדון כיון דשמיה כשמיה לא מפקיד גביה

With regard to what should we be concerned in the case of the promissory note? If we are concerned about the possibility of falling, i.e., that the promissory note might have dropped from this person’s hand and the other one found it, the former is certainly careful with it so as not to lose it, as he knows there is someone else in the city with the same name. If we are concerned about the possibility that it was given as a deposit for safekeeping, i.e., that the actual owner might have given it to the one in possession of it, since his name is the same as the name of the bailee, the owner would not deposit his contract with him without some insurance.

מאי אמרת דלמא מסר ליה אותיות נקנות במסירה

If you say that perhaps the actual owner passed, i.e., transferred the promissory note to this person whose name is the same as his own, i.e., he gave or sold it to him so he may collect it for himself, in that case the one in possession is entitled to collect the money, as letters of credit are acquired through passing. There is no need for an additional act of acquisition here, which means that the promissory note belongs to the one in possession of it, despite the fact that it was not originally written for him. Consequently, no proof can be brought from this case with regard to whether or not one should be concerned about two people with identical names.

ההוא גיטא דאשתכח בסורא וכתיב ביה הכי בסורא מתא אנא ענן בר חייא נהרדעא פטרית ותרכית פלונית אנתתי ובדקו רבנן מסורא ועד נהרדעא ולא הוה ענן בר חייא אחרינא לבר מענן בר חייא מחגרא דהוה בנהרדעא ואתו סהדי ואמור דההוא יומא כי איכתב ההוא גיטא ענן בר חייא מחגרא גבן הוה

The Gemara relates: There was a certain bill of divorce that was found in the city of Sura and the following was written in it: In the city of Sura, I, Anan bar Ḥiyya of Neharde’a, excused and sent away and divorced my wife, so-and-so. And the Sages examined the area from Sura to Neharde’a, throughout almost all of Babylonia, and there was no other Anan bar Ḥiyya than the one they knew, apart from an Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra who was in Neharde’a. And yet witnesses came and said that on that day, when that bill of divorce was written: Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra was with us in Neharde’a, not in Sura.

אמר אביי אף לדידי דאמינא חיישינן הכא לא חיישינן דהא קאמרי סהדי דבנהרדעא הוה מאי בעא בסורא

Abaye said: Even according to my opinion, by which I say that generally we are concerned about the possibility of someone else with the same name, here we are not concerned. The reason is that the witnesses say the other Anan bar Ḥiyya was in Neharde’a; what, then, is he doing in Sura? Consequently, there is no concern that the bill of divorce was written by the Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra.

אמר רבא אף לדידי דלא חיישינן הכא חיישינן דלמא בגמלא פרחא אזל אי נמי בקפיצה אי נמי מילי מסר

Rava said: Even according to my opinion, in which I say that we are not concerned in general, here, when it is established that there definitely is another man by the same name, we are concerned. As for the apparently contradictory testimony, perhaps he went by a flying camel, an extremely fast means of transportation, and was able to travel from Neharde’a to Sura in one day. Alternatively, he might have arrived by a miraculous shortcut. Alternatively, he might have given verbal instructions beforehand for them to write the bill of divorce in a place where he was not physically located.

כדאמר להו רב לספרי וכן אמר להו רב הונא לספרי כי איתנכו בשילי כתובו בשילי אף על גב דמימסרן מילי בהיני וכי איתנכו בהיני כתובו בהיני אף על גב דמימסרן מילי בשילי

This last answer is as Rav said to the court scribes, and likewise Rav Huna said to the scribes: When you are in a place called Shili, write that the contract was written in Shili, even when the instructions are given to you in a different place called Hini. And likewise, when you are in Hini, write that it was written in Hini, even when the instructions are given to you in Shili.

מאי הוה עלייהו דשומשמי רב יימר אמר לא חיישינן רבינא אמר חיישינן והלכתא חיישינן:

The Gemara returns to the original question: What was the conclusion that was reached about this case involving sesame plants? Do they belong to the one who deposited them, or is the claim of the bailee accepted, that he returned them and placed other sesame plants in the same barrel? Rav Yeimar said: We are not concerned that they are different plants, and Ravina said: We are concerned. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that we are concerned about the possibility that the bailee replaced them with others, and we do not rely on the distinguishing marks provided by the claimant in this case.

קטטה בינו לבינה וכו׳: היכי דמי קטטה בינו לבינה אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל באומרת לבעלה גרשיני כולהו נמי אמרו הכי אלא באומרת לבעלה גירשתני

§ The mishna taught: If there was a quarrel between him and her, her testimony that her husband died is not accepted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a quarrel between him and her? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is a case where people heard her say to her husband: Divorce me. The Gemara asks: Is this proof? All women likewise say this when they are angry; this does not prove that there was an unresolved quarrel left between them. Rather, a quarrel is when she says to her husband: You divorced me, i.e., she claims that she was actually divorced.

וליהמנה מדרב המנונא דאמר רב המנונא אשה שאמרה לבעלה גירשתני נאמנת חזקה אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה

The Gemara asks: If she said to her husband that he divorced her, let us believe her claim, in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. As Rav Hamnuna said: A woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, is deemed credible. Why? There is a presumption that a woman would not dare to lie in the presence of her husband about a matter which he knows to be untrue. If so, why isn’t her claim that she was divorced accepted? This would mean that there is no need for any testimony concerning his death, as the ties between them have already been severed.

באומרת גירשתני בפני פלוני ופלוני ושאילנא ואמרו לא היו דברים מעולם

The Gemara answers: In fact, a couple is considered to be quarreling when she says: You divorced me in the presence of two witnesses, so-and-so and so-and-so; and the court asked those men and they said: This matter never happened. In this case it is obvious that there was a terrible quarrel between them, but her claim that she was divorced is not accepted. Consequently, her later claim that her husband is dead is not accepted.

מאי טעמא דקטטה רב חנינא אמר משום דמשקרא רב שימי בר אשי אמר משום דאמרה בדדמי מאי בינייהו

§ The Gemara analyzes the ruling of the mishna itself. What is the reason that in the case of a quarrel between them the court does not accept her testimony? Rav Ḥanina said: Because she lies, i.e., due to their quarrel she is likely to testify falsely that her husband died. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Because she says what she imagines to be the case. When there is peace between them, she examines the matter thoroughly to discover whether he actually died, but if there is a quarrel between them she is not so exacting, as she is pleased to be rid of him. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two explanations?

איכא בינייהו דארגיל הוא קטטה

The practical difference between them is in a case where he initiated the quarrel. In this situation there is no concern that she might knowingly lie, as she loves him. However, due to the quarrel between them she might not be meticulous in her investigations.

איבעיא להו עד אחד בקטטה מהו מאי טעמא דעד אחד מהימן משום דמילתא דעבידא לאיגלויי לא משקר הכא נמי לא משקר או דלמא טעמא דעד אחד מהימן משום דהיא דייקא ומינסבא והכא כיון דאית ליה קטטה לא דייקא ומינסבא תיקו:

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there was one witness who testified that the husband died, in a case that involved a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the different sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because it is a matter that is likely to be revealed, and one does not lie in a case of this kind? Here too, one witness would not lie. Or perhaps the reason that one witness is deemed credible is because she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. And here, since there is a quarrel between them, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again, despite the testimony of the witness. The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.

רבי יהודה אומר לעולם אינה וכו׳: תניא אמרו לו לרבי יהודה לדבריך פקחת תנשא שוטה לא תנשא אלא אחת זו ואחת זו תנשא

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says that a wife is never deemed credible when she testifies that her husband died, unless she came crying and her clothing was torn, while the Rabbis say she may remarry in any case. It is taught in a baraita: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: According to your statement, a crafty woman who knows how to deceive will come with torn clothes crying, and it will be permitted for her to marry. However, a foolish woman who does not know how to deceive will not be permitted to marry. Is this a fair outcome? Rather, both this woman and that woman may marry.

ההיא דאתיא לבי דינא דרבי יהודה אמרי לה ספדי בעלך קרעי מאניך סתרי מזייך אלפוה שיקרא אינהו כרבנן סבירא להו אמרי תעביד הכי כי היכי דלישריה:

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who came to the court of Rabbi Yehuda. The people sitting there said to her: Lament your husband, tear your clothing, unbind your hair, so that you have the appearance of a mourner, and the court will believe you. The Gemara asks: Did they instruct her to lie? The Gemara answers: They thought, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that it is permitted for her to marry in any case. However, they were concerned that Rabbi Yehuda would rule that she may not remarry if she did not display her grief, in accordance with his opinion. Therefore, they said that she should do this, so that Rabbi Yehuda would also permit her to marry, and she would avoid any complications.

מתני׳ בית הלל אומרים לא שמענו אלא בבאה מן הקציר ובאותה מדינה וכמעשה שהיה

MISHNA: Beit Hillel say: We heard that one may accept the testimony of a woman concerning the death of her husband only when she comes from the grain harvest, and when she testified in the same country where he died, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, in which a lenient ruling was issued, as will be explained.

אמרו להם בית שמאי אחת הבאה מן הקציר ואחת הבאה מן הזיתים ואחת הבאה מן הבציר ואחת הבאה ממדינה למדינה לא דברו חכמים בקציר אלא בהווה חזרו בית הלל להורות כבית שמאי:

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: The same halakha applies to a wife who comes from the grain harvest, and one who comes from the olive harvest, and also one who comes from the grape harvest, and even one who comes from one country to another country. Although the incident in question took place during the grain harvest, the Sages spoke of the grain harvest only because it was the present occurrence, i.e., that is what happened in practice, but this is no proof that she is deemed credible only when she arrived specifically from the grain harvest. The mishna comments: Beit Hillel retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai on this issue.

גמ׳ תניא אמרו להם בית שמאי לבית הלל לדבריכם אין לי אלא קציר חטים קציר שעורים מנין ואין לי אלא קוצר בוצר מוסק גודר עודר מנין

GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement that this halakha applies solely in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, if so, I have derived only that it applies in the wheat harvest. From where do I derive that the same applies in the barley harvest? And I have derived only that it applies to one who reaps grain. From where do I derive that this halakha includes someone who harvests grapes, or harvests olives, or harvests dates, or harvests figs?

אלא מעשה שהיה בקציר והוא הדין לכולהו הכא נמי מעשה שהיה באותה מדינה והוא הדין לכולהו

Rather, that incident which occurred during the grain harvest, and the same is true of all these other circumstances. Here too, concerning a woman who comes from another country, and other, similar cases, the incident that occurred took place in that country, but the same is true of all these other cases.

ובית הלל באותה מדינה דשכיחי אינשי מירתת ממדינה למדינה אחרת דלא שכיחי אינשי לא מירתת ובית שמאי הכא נמי שכיחי שיירתא

And Beit Hillel, how did they respond to this argument? In that same country, where people are commonly found moving from place to place, she is scared to lie, lest her account be contradicted. However, between one country and another country, where people are not commonly found moving back and forth, she is not scared, and therefore she might be lying when she says he died. And Beit Shammai reason: Here too caravans are found, and if he was alive the truth would eventually be revealed.

מאי מעשה שהיה דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שילפי קציר חטין היו והלכו עשרה בני אדם לקצור חטין נשכו נחש לאחד מהן ומת ובאת אשתו והודיעה לבית דין ושלחו ומצאו כדבריה באותה שעה אמרו האשה שאמרה מת בעלי תנשא מת בעלי תתייבם

The Gemara asks: What was this incident that occurred? As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It was at the end [shilfei] of the wheat harvest, and ten people went to harvest wheat. A snake bit one of them and he died, and his wife came and told the court that her husband died. And they sent messengers, who discovered that it happened in accordance with her statement. At that time they said: The woman who says: My husband died, may marry on the basis of this testimony. Furthermore, if she says: My husband died without children, and he has a brother, she enters into levirate marriage. This is the case to which Beit Hillel referred.

נימא רבי חנניא בן עקיבא ורבנן בפלוגתא דבית שמאי ובית הלל קמיפלגי דתניא לא ישא אדם מי חטאת ואפר חטאת ויעבירם בירדן ובספינה

§ The Gemara analyzes this dispute. Let us say that Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva and the Rabbis, who argued in this case, disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. As it is taught in a baraita: A person may not carry the waters of purification, i.e., the water containing the ashes of the red heifer for the ritual purification of one who became impure through contact with a corpse, and the ashes of purification, of the red heifer, and transport them on the Jordan River. And one may not transfer them across the river in a boat.

ולא יעמוד בצד זה ויזרק לצד אחר ולא ישיטם על פני המים ולא ירכיבם לא על גבי בהמה ולא על גבי חברו אלא אם כן היו רגליו נוגעות בקרקע אבל מעבירם על הגשר אחד ירדן ואחד שאר נהרות רבי חנניא בן עקיבא אומר לא אמרו אלא ירדן ובספינה וכמעשה שהיה

And one may not stand on one side of the river and throw the ashes to the other side, nor float them upon the water as he crosses, nor ride with them across the river, neither on the back of an animal nor on the back of another person, as this is similar to a boat that passes over the water, unless the legs of the rider were touching the ground. However, one may transport them across the water over a bridge. This prohibition applies to both the Jordan River and all other rivers. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva says: They said this prohibition only with regard to the Jordan, and transporting in a boat, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, when ritual impurity was found in a boat on the Jordan River.

לימא רבנן דאמרי כבית שמאי ורבי חנניא בן עקיבא דאמר כבית הלל

Let us say that the Rabbis say in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, that when a decree is enacted due to a specific case that occurred, this halakha applies to all similar circumstances. And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva says in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, that the decree applies only in the exact circumstances as the precedent case.

אמרי לך רבנן אנן דאמרינן אף כבית הלל עד כאן לא קאמר בית הלל התם אלא משום דמירתת במקום קרוב מירתת במקום רחוק לא מירתת הכא מה לי ירדן מה לי שאר נהרות

The Gemara rejects this suggestion. The Rabbis could say to you: We stated our ruling even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, as there is a difference between the two cases. Beit Hillel state their opinion, that she is not deemed credible when she comes from one country to another, only in that case there, because she is scared. In a nearby place she is scared to give false testimony, as her lie can easily be discovered, whereas in a distant place she is not scared. However, here, concerning the ashes of the red heifer, what difference does it make to me if it is the Jordan River, and what difference does it make to me if it is one of the many other rivers?

רבי חנניא בן עקיבא אמר לך אנא דאמרי אף לבית שמאי עד כאן לא קאמרי בית שמאי התם אלא משום דאיהי דייקא ומינסבא מה לי מקום קרוב מה לי מקום רחוק הכא משום מעשה שהיה בירדן ובספינה דהוה מעשה גזור רבנן בשאר נהרות דלא הוה מעשה לא גזור רבנן

Meanwhile, Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akiva could have said to you: I stated my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as Beit Shammai state their opinion only there, because she herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Since this is the decisive consideration, what difference does it make to me if the place is near, and what difference does it make to me if the place is far? Here, however, the Sages issued their decree due to a specific incident that occurred. And therefore the Sages issued their decree with regard to the Jordan River and in a boat, the circumstances in which the incident occurred. Conversely, the Sages did not issue the decree with regard to other rivers, where the incident did not occur.

מאי מעשה שהיה דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב מעשה באדם שהיה מעביר מי חטאת ואפר חטאת בירדן ובספינה ונמצא כזית מן המת תחוב בקרקעית של ספינה באותה שעה אמרו לא ישא אדם מי חטאת ואפר חטאת ויעבירם בירדן ובספינה:

The Gemara explains: What is this incident that occurred, involving the ashes of the red heifer? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: An incident occurred involving a person who was transporting waters of purification and ashes of purification on the Jordan River, and in a boat, and an olive-bulk of a corpse was found stuck to the bottom of the boat, which rendered the waters and ashes ritually impure. At that time they said: A person may not carry waters of purification and ashes of purification and transport them on the Jordan River, and in a boat. Later Sages dispute whether this decree applies to similar cases, or only to the exact circumstances of this specific incident.

מתני׳ בית שמאי אומרים תנשא ותטול כתובתה בית הלל אומרים תנשא ולא תטול כתובתה אמרו להם בית שמאי התרתם ערוה חמורה ולא נתיר ממון הקל אמרו להם בית הלל מצינו

MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: A woman who testifies that her husband died may marry, and take the money guaranteed in her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: She may marry, but she may not take her marriage contract, as qualified witnesses are required for monetary matters. Beit Shammai said to them: If you have permitted a woman potentially forbidden to him, which is a relatively stringent prohibition, based merely upon her own testimony, will we not permit a monetary matter, which is more lenient, as the money can be returned and this sin does not entail such a severe punishment? Beit Hillel said to them: This is no proof, as we find