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Today's Daf Yomi

April 7, 2022 | 讜壮 讘谞讬住谉 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 31

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Today’s daf is sponsored by Daniel and Sara Berelowitz in honor of their granddaughter, Chamutal Matalon’s Bat Mitzvah.

Why did the Mishna not mention a case of doubt in divorce when he threw her the get and it is unclear if it was closer to him or closer to her? Raba answers, but Abaye tries to ascertain why the same issues wouldn’t apply to kiddushin. The cases are different as in a case of doubt about divorce, the chazaka (presumptive status) is that the woman is married and would thereby exempt the co-wife, whereas, in the case of doubt about kiddushin, the chazaka is that she is unmarried and would not exempt the co-wife.聽 Therefore, in kiddushin we are stringent and have the co-wife do chalitza and we are not worried that perhaps one may accidentally do yibum if chalitza is permitted, as based on the chazaka, the co-wife is obligating in yibum. Abaye questions the explanation that chazaka in a divorce would lead us to assume the woman was married and the co-wife exempt, so why in a case when a house fell on a husband and wife and killed them both and we are unsure who died first, we have the co-wife do chalitza (just in case the husband died first)? There is reason to distinguish between the two cases – two different suggestions are brought. A further question is raised from an explanation on a Mishna that states that in a case of doubt of divorce – when it is unclear if the get was closer to him or her – we have the co-wife do chalitza. The answer is that the case there had two sets of witnesses – one said it was closer to him and one said it was closer to her. On account of the witnesses, we no longer rely on the chazaka. How do we know that our Mishna is only one set of witnesses? And is it really the case that with two sets of witnesses, we don’t rely on the chazaka? Based on a source that indicated otherwise, we reject this line of reasoning and suggest that the Mishna in fact included the case of a doubt聽of divorce when it is unclear if the get was closer to him or her and require chalitza. What is left to explain is why the Mishna uses the language “this is a case of…” which seems to exclude other cases. The answer given is that it excludes cases of kiddushin that are similar to the divorce cases – like a document that doesn’t have a date as a date is not important in kiddushin. Why? Two answers are given.

 

讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 诪爪专讻转 讞诇讬爪讛 诪讬讚注 讬讚注讬 讚讞讜诪专讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞诪讬 诇讬转谞讬 讜诇讬爪专讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜诪讬讚注 讬讚注讬 讚讞讜诪专讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

Rabba answered: Since you require 岣litza and you do not exempt her completely, all will know that this is merely a stringency and that the Sages did not decide with certitude that the first betrothal was fully valid. Consequently, they would not come to disregard the other betrothal. Abaye raised a challenge: If so, let the mishna teach the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to divorce, and stipulate that she requires 岣litza. And they would know that this is merely a stringency and not make a mistake.

讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讜转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讗讞讝拽讛 拽讗 拽讬讬诪讗

He answered him: A mistake could in fact be made here, as, if you say that she must perform 岣litza then she may also enter into levirate marriage. People might mistakenly think that if she is suitable for 岣litza then she is also suitable for levirate marriage, and as a result the woman might enter into levirate marriage, despite the fact that it is forbidden for her to do so. Abaye objected: Here too, in the case of uncertain betrothal, the concern exists that if you say that she performs 岣litza then she might also enter into levirate marriage. Rabba answered: So let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that. In this instance she remains with her presumptive status as permitted because she was originally assumed to be permitted and was rendered forbidden only due to our concern. However, there would be no actual transgression involved even if she were to enter into levirate marriage.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 谞驻诇 讛讘讬转 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 讘转 讗讞讬讜 讜讗讬谉 讬讚讜注 讗讬讝讛 诪讛诐 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 爪专转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba by citing a case where even in places of doubt, the woman requires 岣litza. As we learned in a mishna (67b): A house fell on him, on a certain man, and on his brother鈥檚 daughter to whom this man was married, and he was childless, and it is unknown which of them died first. If the deceased wife had a rival wife, then her rival wife must perform 岣litza but may not enter into levirate marriage. If the man had died first, then at the time of his death the rival wife was forbidden to the yavam as the rival wife of his daughter and exempt from levirate marriage. If, however, the daughter had died first, then at the time of the husband鈥檚 death the second wife was not the rival wife of a forbidden relative, and requires levirate marriage. It is due to this doubt that she must perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讗砖讛 讝讜 讘讞讝拽转 讛讬转专 诇砖讜拽 注讜诪讚转 讜诪住驻拽 讗转讛 讘讗 诇讗讜住专讛 讗诇 转讗住专谞讛 诪住驻拽

And according to Rabba鈥檚 opinion, why is that so? Here too, let us say: This woman, the rival wife, has the presumptive status of being permitted to marry a man from the general public. This is because she was exempt from levirate marriage for the entire period of her marriage as the rival wife of a forbidden relative. And due to the uncertainty whether her rival wife was the first to die you come to render her forbidden and require that she perform 岣litza. Do not render her forbidden due to an uncertainty.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讞讜诪专讗 讞讜诪专讗 讚讗转讬 诇讬讚讬 拽讜诇讗 讛讜讗 砖讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚砖讻讬讞讬 讙讝专讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉 诪驻讜诇转 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 诇讗 讙讝专讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉

And if you would say: Here too, we rule more stringently due to the uncertainty. Nevertheless, this would be a stringency that brings about a leniency, for if you say that she must perform 岣litza, she may also enter into levirate marriage. However, it is forbidden for her to enter into levirate marriage, because she is possibly forbidden to the yavam as the rival wife of his daughter and therefore forbidden just like the daughter herself. Rabba replied: In cases of divorce, which are common, the Sages issued a rabbinic decree preventing her from performing 岣litza due to a concern that if she were required to perform 岣litza then she may enter into levirate marriage as well. In cases of collapse, which are not common, the Sages did not issue a rabbinic decree, because they did not introduce decrees with regard to uncommon matters.

讗讬 谞诪讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 注专讜讛 讚拽讗 诪讜讻讞 讜爪专转讛 拽诪爪专讻转 诇讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讗诪专讬 拽诪讜 讘讬讛 专讘谞谉 讘讙讬讟讗 讚讙讬讟讗 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讜讗转讜 诇讬讬讘讜诪讬 诇爪专讛 诪驻讜诇转 诪讬 拽诪讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉 讘诪驻讜诇转

Alternatively, there is another reason to differentiate between the cases. In the case of divorce where there is a forbidden relative who indicates that the rival wife is forbidden due to her status as the rival wife of a forbidden relative, and you require that her rival wife perform 岣litza, people will say: The Sages determined that this bill of divorce is a full-fledged bill of divorce. Consequently, they required her rival wife to perform 岣litza, and people may come to consummate the levirate marriage with the rival wife based on this mistaken assumption. In cases of collapse, however, could the Sages have determined who died first in the collapse? As it is known to all that there was a doubt that could not be clarified, it is clear that the Sages required the rival wife to perform 岣litza only due to this uncertainty. Therefore, there is no concern that she would come to enter into levirate marriage because of this 岣litza.

讜讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛讬转讛 注讜诪讚转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讝专拽讜 诇讛 拽专讜讘 诇讛 诪讙讜专砖转 拽专讜讘 诇讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 诪讞爪讛 注诇 诪讞爪讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转

The Gemara asks: But did we not learn in a mishna about the case where it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce is closer to him or closer to her with regard to situations of divorce whose status is uncertain? And didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: In a case where his wife was standing in the public domain and he threw her the bill of divorce, if the bill landed closer to her, she is divorced. If it was closer to him, she is not divorced. If it was half and half, i.e., if the bill of divorce landed midway between the man and the woman, there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讚讗讬 讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 注专讜讛 讛讬讗 爪专转讛 讘注讬讗 讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转

And we say: With regard to what halakha was the ruling said that she is both divorced and not divorced? The Gemara explains that this affects two areas of halakha. The first is that if the man divorcing his wife is a priest, then his wife is forbidden to him due to the uncertainty that she may in fact be divorced through that bill of divorce. Consequently, he would then be unable to remarry her. The second ramification is that if the woman being divorced was a forbidden relative to her husband鈥檚 brother, and her husband died childless, then her rival wife would require 岣litza. The mishna indicates that in this type of divorce whose status is uncertain as well, the Sages require the rival wife to perform 岣litza, and we do not say that if you say that she must perform 岣litza, she may enter into levirate marriage. Here there is no such concern.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 拽专讜讘 诇讛 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 拽专讜讘 诇讜 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住驻讬拽讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住驻讬拽讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara responds: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that this is referring to a very specific set of circumstances? It is Rabba and Rav Yosef who both say: The doubt here does not result from the facts of the case themselves, but from conflicting testimonies and an inability to decide between them. Here, we are dealing with two sets of witnesses, one of which says that the bill fell closer to her, and one of which says that it fell closer to him. This, then, is an uncertainty in matters of Torah law, for in this case there are two testimonies, each one complete by itself, yet they contradict one another. Such instances are deemed to have the status of an uncertainty with regard to Torah law, and therefore the ruling is stringent. But the mishna here is referring to one set of witnesses who were divided in their testimony or who could not clarify exactly what had occurred. This is considered to be an uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law alone, as there is only a single uncorroborated testimony, and in cases of uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law the ruling is lenient.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讜诪讬讗 讚拽讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讘讻转 讗讞转 讗祝 讙专讜砖讬谉 讘讻转 讗讞转 讜拽讚讜砖讬谉 讙讜驻讬讬讛讜 诪诪讗讬 讚讘讻转 讗讞转 讚诇诪讗 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讗讬 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that the mishna here is referring to a case of uncertainty with one set of witnesses? The Gemara responds: It is similar to that of betrothal. Just as with regard to betrothal it is referring to a case of uncertainty with one set of witnesses, so too, with regard to divorce it is referring to a case of one set of witnesses. The Gemara wonders: And with regard to betrothal itself, from where is it known that the mishna is referring to a case of uncertainty that involves one set of witnesses? Perhaps it is referring to a case of two sets of witnesses? The Gemara answers: If the mishna is referring to a case of two sets of witnesses who contradict one another, then let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that, as there are two witnesses testifying that there was never a betrothal. Therefore, both the cases of betrothal and divorce must be referring to a situation where there is one set of witnesses.

拽讬讬诪讬 注讚讬诐 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽专讜讘 诇讛 讜讗转 讗诪专转 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讜转讜 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 谞诪讬 住驻讬拽讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讜拽讬 转专讬 诇讘讛讚讬 转专讬 讜讗砖讛 讗讜拽诪讛 讗讞讝拽讛

The Gemara challenges: How can one say that? After all, there are witnesses who are standing before us and saying that the object of betrothal fell closer to her. Accordingly, she was betrothed and her rival wife is the rival wife of a forbidden relative. And yet you say to let her enter into levirate marriage and there is no problem with that? And furthermore, with regard to the fundamental difference between two pairs of witnesses and a single pair, the case of two pairs of witnesses is also considered an uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law. This is not considered to be uncertainty with regard to the reality of what actually happened, which would be a case of uncertainty in matters of Torah law, but rather a contradiction between two opposing testimonies. In these cases we say: Place two witnesses against two witnesses, and let the two testimonies cancel each other out. Therefore, the halakha would be to let the woman remain in her original presumptive status. Accordingly, this type of uncertainty stems only from rabbinic law and not from Torah law.

诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗谞讻住讬 讚讘专 砖讟讬讗 讚讘专 砖讟讬讗 讝讘讬谉 谞讻住讬 讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讬 讻砖讛讜讗 讞诇讬诐 讝讘讬谉 讜讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讜 讻砖讛讜讗 砖讜讟讛 讝讘讬谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜拽讬 转专讬 诇讛讚讬 转专讬

The Gemara cites a proof for this: This is just as it is in the case concerning the property of a man named Bar Shatya, who was referred to by this name because he would occasionally go insane. The case is as follows: Bar Shatya sold property. Two witnesses came forward and said that he sold it when he was healthy and therefore the sale was valid. And two others came forward and said that he sold it when he was insane, and so the sale was void. Rav Ashi said with regard to this matter: Place two witnesses against two witnesses and let the testimonies cancel each other out. As there is no valid testimony to rely on,

讜讗专注讗 讗讜拽诪讗 讘讞讝拽转 讘专 砖讟讬讗

let the land remain in the possession of Bar Shatya. Since no substantiated proof was brought forth, the land remains in the hands of its current possessor. As such, the same should be true with regard to cases of betrothal and divorce whose status is uncertain; the woman should remain in her former presumptive status.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专讬注讜 转谞讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

Rather, Rabba鈥檚 understanding of the mishna must be rejected, and Abaye said: The mishna should be understood according to that which is written: 鈥淗is fellow speaks of him鈥 (Job 36:33). This principle teaches that a related case can be inferred from the single case cited. The mishna teaches the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to betrothal, and the same is true with regard to divorce if it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce fell closer to him or closer to her. Similarly, the mishna teaches the case of bills that were written in a questionable manner with regard to divorce, and the same is true with regard to betrothal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专讬注讜 诪讗讬 讝讛讜 讚拽转谞讬

Rava said to him: If you understand that the legal ruling in all of these cases is the same, and the mishna was written in the style of: His fellow speaks of him, then what is the meaning of the term: This is, that the mishna teaches? The mishna in fact emphasizes that this is a betrothal whose status is uncertain and this is a divorce whose status is uncertain, which indicates this case alone and no other.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 砖讬砖 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讬砖 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讬砖 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讝讛讜 讚讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讜拽讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚转谞讗 讝讛讜 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讝讛讜 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讝讛讜 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇诪注讜讟讬 诪讗讬 诇诪注讜讟讬 讝诪谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

Rather, Rava said: All of the cases that exist with regard to betrothal whose status is uncertain exist in cases of divorce as well. However, there are some cases of uncertainty with regard to divorce that do not exist with regard to betrothal, as betrothal performed with a questionable bill is not disqualified. Accordingly, the term: This is, utilized in the mishna with regard to divorce, is not specific and does not imply exclusion of the case where it is possibly closer to him and possibly closer to her. Rather, because the mishna teaches the ruling of: This is, with regard to betrothal, where it is specific it teaches the phrase: This is, with regard to divorce as well. The Gemara asks: And what does the phrase: This is, mentioned with regard to betrothal, come to exclude? The Gemara answers: It comes to exclude the matter of the date, which is not essential with regard to betrothal, as when one betroths a woman by means of a document the date need not be written.

讜诪驻谞讬 诪讛 诇讗 转拽谞讜 讝诪谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 驻讬专讬 讗专讜住讛 诇讬转 诇讛 驻讬专讬

The Gemara asks about this matter itself: And for what reason did they not institute that the date must be included in the betrothal document? This policy works out well according to the one who says that the reason the Sages instituted that the date must be written on a bill of divorce is due to the profits. As the husband receives the profits from the wife鈥檚 properties during the period of their marriage, it was necessary to write a date on the bill of divorce in order to know at what point his right to receive or sell these items was terminated. However, it was not necessary to include a date on a deed of betrothal, as this document serves only to create a bond of betrothal, and there are no profits from a betrothed woman. A husband does not have the right to receive profits from his betrothed鈥檚 property until she is his full-fledged wife.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讘转 讗讞讜转讜 诇讬转拽讬谉 讝诪谉

However, according to the one who says that the Sages instituted the requirement of including the date in the bill of divorce due to a case where a man is married to the daughter of his sister, then they should institute that he must include the date in a deed of betrothal as well. Occasionally a man might marry the daughter of his sister, whom he loves all the more because she is his close relative in addition to being his wife. If he knows that she acted licentiously while she was married to him, he might grant her a bill of divorce without a date so as to save her from the death penalty. Were witnesses to come forth and testify to her behavior, she could claim that at the time of her licentious act she was already a divorced woman. If this was indeed the reason for the Sages鈥 instituting the requirement of including the date in a bill of divorce, then the date should be included in a deed of betrothal as well, for an undated document of betrothal could be utilized equally well to prove the innocence of the daughter of his sister. If she acted licentiously in the period prior to her betrothal, she would not be penalized. Therefore, the date should be written on this document as well.

诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讚诪拽讚砖 讘讻住驻讗 讜讗讬讻讗 讚诪拽讚砖 讘砖讟专讗 诇讗 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讝诪谉

The Gemara answers: Because there are those who betroth by means of money and those who betroth by means of a deed, the Sages did not institute that the date must be written in the document. As the date of the betrothal has no place in the act of betrothal by means of money, the Sages did not distinguish between the various modes of betrothal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讛讗 注讘讚讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讚拽谞讬 讘讻住驻讗 讜讗讬讻讗 讘砖讟专讗 讜转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讝诪谉 讛转诐 专讜讘讗 讘砖讟专讗 讛讻讗 专讜讘讗 讘讻住驻讗

Rav A岣, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But with regard to a slave, where there are those who acquire them with money and there are those who acquire them with a deed, the Sages nevertheless instituted that the date must be written in a slave鈥檚 deed of purchase. He responded: There, with regard to slaves, the majority of people purchase them by means of a deed. Here, with regard to betrothal, the majority of people perform betrothal by means of money.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讛讬讻讬 诇讬注讘讬讚 诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 诪讞拽讛 诇讬讛 诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讝诪谞讬谉 讚讘转 讗讞讜转讜 讛讬讗 讜诪讞驻讛 注诇讛

If you wish, say a different reason why the Sages did not institute that the date must be included in a deed of betrothal. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to institute this in a manner that will ensure that no problems will result. How would we do this? If we leave the deed of betrothal with her, she will erase the date, and so it would remain impossible to prove the juncture at which her licentious behavior took place. If we leave the deed with him, then there are times when she is his sister鈥檚 daughter and he might cover for her by erasing the date himself.

诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 注讚讬诐 讗讬 讚讝讻讬专讬 诇讬转讜 诇讬住讛讜讚 讜讗讬 诇讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讚讞讝讜 诪讻转讘讗 讜讗转讜 诪住讛讚讬 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪驻讬讛诐 讜诇讗 诪驻讬 讻转讘诐

If we leave it with the witnesses who signed the document, if they remember themselves the date when the deed was given to the woman, the date need not be written in the document itself, for let them come forth and testify from their memory. And if they do not remember by themselves, then there are times when they see the date that is written and come forth to testify on that basis. And the Merciful One states: 鈥淏y the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:15). From this verse it is derived: From their mouths, and not from their writings, indicating that testimony is proper only if the individual stated it of himself, and not on the basis of what is written.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讛转诐 诇讛爪诇讛 讚讬讚讛 拽讗转讬 讛讻讗 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬讚讛 拽讗转讬

The Gemara asks: If that is so, let us say that with regard to divorce as well. In cases of divorce there should also be a concern lest the woman erase the date on the bill of divorce in her possession. The Gemara responds: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, the date comes to save her, since the bill of divorce removes her status as a man鈥檚 wife. She therefore would fear erasing anything lest she disqualify the bill altogether, thereby possibly rendering herself a married woman again (Ramban). Here, however, when dealing with a deed of betrothal, the date comes to her disadvantage, since until now she was presumed to be a single woman, and if there is no date on the document then she clearly cannot be punished.

诪转谞讬壮 砖诇砖讛 讗讞讬谉 谞砖讜讗讬谉 砖诇砖 谞讻专讬讜转 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜注砖讛 讘讛 讛砖谞讬 诪讗诪专 讜诪转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讞讜诇爪讜转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪讜转

MISHNA: In the case of three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of the brothers died, the following occurred: The second brother performed levirate betrothal with the wife of the deceased brother and before he was able to consummate the levirate marriage he died as well, leaving behind two women who happen before the third brother for levirate marriage. Then those two women must perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

砖谞讗诪专 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讬讘诪讛 讬讘讗 注诇讬讛 砖注诇讬讛 讝讬拽转 讬讘诐 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖注诇讬讛 讝讬拽转 砖谞讬 讬讘诪讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讗讬讝讜 砖讬专爪讛 讜讞讜诇抓 诇砖谞讬讛

As it is stated: 鈥淚f brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5). This teaches that a woman eligible for levirate marriage is one who has one levirate relationship and not one who has a double levirate relationship. In this case, the wife of the first deceased brother requires levirate marriage due to both the marriage with her first husband as well as the levirate betrothal with the second brother. Rabbi Shimon says: He may consummate the levirate marriage with whichever woman he wishes and then perform 岣litza with the second.

讙诪壮 讜讗讬 讝讬拽转 砖谞讬 讬讘诪讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 讗诇讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讜讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖转讬 讬讘诪讜转 讛讘讗讜转 诪讘讬转 讗讞讚 诪转讬讬讘诪讜转

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If the halakha that a woman who has a double levirate relationship is exempt from levirate marriage is by Torah law, as indicated by the proof offered in the mishna, she should not require 岣litza as well, but be completely exempt. Rather, it is by rabbinic law. The restriction on levirate marriage in this case is not by Torah law, as by Torah law the brother is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with both of these women since each was the wife of a different brother. The requirement for 岣litza in this case was instituted as a rabbinic decree lest people say that two yevamot who come from a single household can enter into levirate marriage. Since the second brother had performed levirate betrothal, people might come to think that both were actually married to him. If the third brother consummates the levirate marriage with both women, it would lead people to think that it is permitted to take two of a brother鈥檚 wives in levirate marriage, when in fact the Torah allows the yavam to marry only a single wife of the deceased.

讜谞讬讬讘诐 诇讞讚讗 讜谞讬讞诇讜抓 诇讞讚讗 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 讘讬转 讗讞讚 诪拽爪转讜 讘谞讜讬

The Gemara asks: So let him consummate the levirate marriage with one woman and perform 岣litza with the other one, and this would eliminate our concern. The Gemara responds: We do not do this due to a rabbinic decree lest they say: When there are two women from a single household, part of it must be built

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 31

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Yevamot 31

讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 诪爪专讻转 讞诇讬爪讛 诪讬讚注 讬讚注讬 讚讞讜诪专讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞诪讬 诇讬转谞讬 讜诇讬爪专讻讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讜诪讬讚注 讬讚注讬 讚讞讜诪专讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

Rabba answered: Since you require 岣litza and you do not exempt her completely, all will know that this is merely a stringency and that the Sages did not decide with certitude that the first betrothal was fully valid. Consequently, they would not come to disregard the other betrothal. Abaye raised a challenge: If so, let the mishna teach the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to divorce, and stipulate that she requires 岣litza. And they would know that this is merely a stringency and not make a mistake.

讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讜转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讗讞讝拽讛 拽讗 拽讬讬诪讗

He answered him: A mistake could in fact be made here, as, if you say that she must perform 岣litza then she may also enter into levirate marriage. People might mistakenly think that if she is suitable for 岣litza then she is also suitable for levirate marriage, and as a result the woman might enter into levirate marriage, despite the fact that it is forbidden for her to do so. Abaye objected: Here too, in the case of uncertain betrothal, the concern exists that if you say that she performs 岣litza then she might also enter into levirate marriage. Rabba answered: So let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that. In this instance she remains with her presumptive status as permitted because she was originally assumed to be permitted and was rendered forbidden only due to our concern. However, there would be no actual transgression involved even if she were to enter into levirate marriage.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 谞驻诇 讛讘讬转 注诇讬讜 讜注诇 讘转 讗讞讬讜 讜讗讬谉 讬讚讜注 讗讬讝讛 诪讛诐 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 爪专转讛 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba by citing a case where even in places of doubt, the woman requires 岣litza. As we learned in a mishna (67b): A house fell on him, on a certain man, and on his brother鈥檚 daughter to whom this man was married, and he was childless, and it is unknown which of them died first. If the deceased wife had a rival wife, then her rival wife must perform 岣litza but may not enter into levirate marriage. If the man had died first, then at the time of his death the rival wife was forbidden to the yavam as the rival wife of his daughter and exempt from levirate marriage. If, however, the daughter had died first, then at the time of the husband鈥檚 death the second wife was not the rival wife of a forbidden relative, and requires levirate marriage. It is due to this doubt that she must perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讗砖讛 讝讜 讘讞讝拽转 讛讬转专 诇砖讜拽 注讜诪讚转 讜诪住驻拽 讗转讛 讘讗 诇讗讜住专讛 讗诇 转讗住专谞讛 诪住驻拽

And according to Rabba鈥檚 opinion, why is that so? Here too, let us say: This woman, the rival wife, has the presumptive status of being permitted to marry a man from the general public. This is because she was exempt from levirate marriage for the entire period of her marriage as the rival wife of a forbidden relative. And due to the uncertainty whether her rival wife was the first to die you come to render her forbidden and require that she perform 岣litza. Do not render her forbidden due to an uncertainty.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讞讜诪专讗 讞讜诪专讗 讚讗转讬 诇讬讚讬 拽讜诇讗 讛讜讗 砖讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚砖讻讬讞讬 讙讝专讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉 诪驻讜诇转 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 诇讗 讙讝专讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉

And if you would say: Here too, we rule more stringently due to the uncertainty. Nevertheless, this would be a stringency that brings about a leniency, for if you say that she must perform 岣litza, she may also enter into levirate marriage. However, it is forbidden for her to enter into levirate marriage, because she is possibly forbidden to the yavam as the rival wife of his daughter and therefore forbidden just like the daughter herself. Rabba replied: In cases of divorce, which are common, the Sages issued a rabbinic decree preventing her from performing 岣litza due to a concern that if she were required to perform 岣litza then she may enter into levirate marriage as well. In cases of collapse, which are not common, the Sages did not issue a rabbinic decree, because they did not introduce decrees with regard to uncommon matters.

讗讬 谞诪讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 注专讜讛 讚拽讗 诪讜讻讞 讜爪专转讛 拽诪爪专讻转 诇讛 讞诇讬爪讛 讗诪专讬 拽诪讜 讘讬讛 专讘谞谉 讘讙讬讟讗 讚讙讬讟讗 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讜讗转讜 诇讬讬讘讜诪讬 诇爪专讛 诪驻讜诇转 诪讬 拽诪讜 讘讛讜 专讘谞谉 讘诪驻讜诇转

Alternatively, there is another reason to differentiate between the cases. In the case of divorce where there is a forbidden relative who indicates that the rival wife is forbidden due to her status as the rival wife of a forbidden relative, and you require that her rival wife perform 岣litza, people will say: The Sages determined that this bill of divorce is a full-fledged bill of divorce. Consequently, they required her rival wife to perform 岣litza, and people may come to consummate the levirate marriage with the rival wife based on this mistaken assumption. In cases of collapse, however, could the Sages have determined who died first in the collapse? As it is known to all that there was a doubt that could not be clarified, it is clear that the Sages required the rival wife to perform 岣litza only due to this uncertainty. Therefore, there is no concern that she would come to enter into levirate marriage because of this 岣litza.

讜讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛讬转讛 注讜诪讚转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讝专拽讜 诇讛 拽专讜讘 诇讛 诪讙讜专砖转 拽专讜讘 诇讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 诪讞爪讛 注诇 诪讞爪讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转

The Gemara asks: But did we not learn in a mishna about the case where it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce is closer to him or closer to her with regard to situations of divorce whose status is uncertain? And didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: In a case where his wife was standing in the public domain and he threw her the bill of divorce, if the bill landed closer to her, she is divorced. If it was closer to him, she is not divorced. If it was half and half, i.e., if the bill of divorce landed midway between the man and the woman, there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讚讗讬 讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 注专讜讛 讛讬讗 爪专转讛 讘注讬讗 讞诇讬爪讛 讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 砖讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转

And we say: With regard to what halakha was the ruling said that she is both divorced and not divorced? The Gemara explains that this affects two areas of halakha. The first is that if the man divorcing his wife is a priest, then his wife is forbidden to him due to the uncertainty that she may in fact be divorced through that bill of divorce. Consequently, he would then be unable to remarry her. The second ramification is that if the woman being divorced was a forbidden relative to her husband鈥檚 brother, and her husband died childless, then her rival wife would require 岣litza. The mishna indicates that in this type of divorce whose status is uncertain as well, the Sages require the rival wife to perform 岣litza, and we do not say that if you say that she must perform 岣litza, she may enter into levirate marriage. Here there is no such concern.

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 专讘讛 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 拽专讜讘 诇讛 讜讗讞转 讗讜诪专转 拽专讜讘 诇讜 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住驻讬拽讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住驻讬拽讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara responds: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that this is referring to a very specific set of circumstances? It is Rabba and Rav Yosef who both say: The doubt here does not result from the facts of the case themselves, but from conflicting testimonies and an inability to decide between them. Here, we are dealing with two sets of witnesses, one of which says that the bill fell closer to her, and one of which says that it fell closer to him. This, then, is an uncertainty in matters of Torah law, for in this case there are two testimonies, each one complete by itself, yet they contradict one another. Such instances are deemed to have the status of an uncertainty with regard to Torah law, and therefore the ruling is stringent. But the mishna here is referring to one set of witnesses who were divided in their testimony or who could not clarify exactly what had occurred. This is considered to be an uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law alone, as there is only a single uncorroborated testimony, and in cases of uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law the ruling is lenient.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讻转 讗讞转 讚讜诪讬讗 讚拽讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讘讻转 讗讞转 讗祝 讙专讜砖讬谉 讘讻转 讗讞转 讜拽讚讜砖讬谉 讙讜驻讬讬讛讜 诪诪讗讬 讚讘讻转 讗讞转 讚诇诪讗 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讗讬 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that the mishna here is referring to a case of uncertainty with one set of witnesses? The Gemara responds: It is similar to that of betrothal. Just as with regard to betrothal it is referring to a case of uncertainty with one set of witnesses, so too, with regard to divorce it is referring to a case of one set of witnesses. The Gemara wonders: And with regard to betrothal itself, from where is it known that the mishna is referring to a case of uncertainty that involves one set of witnesses? Perhaps it is referring to a case of two sets of witnesses? The Gemara answers: If the mishna is referring to a case of two sets of witnesses who contradict one another, then let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that, as there are two witnesses testifying that there was never a betrothal. Therefore, both the cases of betrothal and divorce must be referring to a situation where there is one set of witnesses.

拽讬讬诪讬 注讚讬诐 讜拽讗诪专讬 拽专讜讘 诇讛 讜讗转 讗诪专转 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讜转讜 讘砖转讬 讻讬转讬 注讚讬诐 谞诪讬 住驻讬拽讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讜拽讬 转专讬 诇讘讛讚讬 转专讬 讜讗砖讛 讗讜拽诪讛 讗讞讝拽讛

The Gemara challenges: How can one say that? After all, there are witnesses who are standing before us and saying that the object of betrothal fell closer to her. Accordingly, she was betrothed and her rival wife is the rival wife of a forbidden relative. And yet you say to let her enter into levirate marriage and there is no problem with that? And furthermore, with regard to the fundamental difference between two pairs of witnesses and a single pair, the case of two pairs of witnesses is also considered an uncertainty in matters of rabbinic law. This is not considered to be uncertainty with regard to the reality of what actually happened, which would be a case of uncertainty in matters of Torah law, but rather a contradiction between two opposing testimonies. In these cases we say: Place two witnesses against two witnesses, and let the two testimonies cancel each other out. Therefore, the halakha would be to let the woman remain in her original presumptive status. Accordingly, this type of uncertainty stems only from rabbinic law and not from Torah law.

诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗谞讻住讬 讚讘专 砖讟讬讗 讚讘专 砖讟讬讗 讝讘讬谉 谞讻住讬 讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讬 讻砖讛讜讗 讞诇讬诐 讝讘讬谉 讜讗转讜 讘讬 转专讬 讜讗诪专讜 讻砖讛讜讗 砖讜讟讛 讝讘讬谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗讜拽讬 转专讬 诇讛讚讬 转专讬

The Gemara cites a proof for this: This is just as it is in the case concerning the property of a man named Bar Shatya, who was referred to by this name because he would occasionally go insane. The case is as follows: Bar Shatya sold property. Two witnesses came forward and said that he sold it when he was healthy and therefore the sale was valid. And two others came forward and said that he sold it when he was insane, and so the sale was void. Rav Ashi said with regard to this matter: Place two witnesses against two witnesses and let the testimonies cancel each other out. As there is no valid testimony to rely on,

讜讗专注讗 讗讜拽诪讗 讘讞讝拽转 讘专 砖讟讬讗

let the land remain in the possession of Bar Shatya. Since no substantiated proof was brought forth, the land remains in the hands of its current possessor. As such, the same should be true with regard to cases of betrothal and divorce whose status is uncertain; the woman should remain in her former presumptive status.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专讬注讜 转谞讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

Rather, Rabba鈥檚 understanding of the mishna must be rejected, and Abaye said: The mishna should be understood according to that which is written: 鈥淗is fellow speaks of him鈥 (Job 36:33). This principle teaches that a related case can be inferred from the single case cited. The mishna teaches the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to betrothal, and the same is true with regard to divorce if it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce fell closer to him or closer to her. Similarly, the mishna teaches the case of bills that were written in a questionable manner with regard to divorce, and the same is true with regard to betrothal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专讬注讜 诪讗讬 讝讛讜 讚拽转谞讬

Rava said to him: If you understand that the legal ruling in all of these cases is the same, and the mishna was written in the style of: His fellow speaks of him, then what is the meaning of the term: This is, that the mishna teaches? The mishna in fact emphasizes that this is a betrothal whose status is uncertain and this is a divorce whose status is uncertain, which indicates this case alone and no other.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 砖讬砖 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讬砖 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讬砖 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讝讛讜 讚讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讜拽讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚转谞讗 讝讛讜 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讝讛讜 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜讝讛讜 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇诪注讜讟讬 诪讗讬 诇诪注讜讟讬 讝诪谉 讚诇讬讻讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

Rather, Rava said: All of the cases that exist with regard to betrothal whose status is uncertain exist in cases of divorce as well. However, there are some cases of uncertainty with regard to divorce that do not exist with regard to betrothal, as betrothal performed with a questionable bill is not disqualified. Accordingly, the term: This is, utilized in the mishna with regard to divorce, is not specific and does not imply exclusion of the case where it is possibly closer to him and possibly closer to her. Rather, because the mishna teaches the ruling of: This is, with regard to betrothal, where it is specific it teaches the phrase: This is, with regard to divorce as well. The Gemara asks: And what does the phrase: This is, mentioned with regard to betrothal, come to exclude? The Gemara answers: It comes to exclude the matter of the date, which is not essential with regard to betrothal, as when one betroths a woman by means of a document the date need not be written.

讜诪驻谞讬 诪讛 诇讗 转拽谞讜 讝诪谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 驻讬专讬 讗专讜住讛 诇讬转 诇讛 驻讬专讬

The Gemara asks about this matter itself: And for what reason did they not institute that the date must be included in the betrothal document? This policy works out well according to the one who says that the reason the Sages instituted that the date must be written on a bill of divorce is due to the profits. As the husband receives the profits from the wife鈥檚 properties during the period of their marriage, it was necessary to write a date on the bill of divorce in order to know at what point his right to receive or sell these items was terminated. However, it was not necessary to include a date on a deed of betrothal, as this document serves only to create a bond of betrothal, and there are no profits from a betrothed woman. A husband does not have the right to receive profits from his betrothed鈥檚 property until she is his full-fledged wife.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讘转 讗讞讜转讜 诇讬转拽讬谉 讝诪谉

However, according to the one who says that the Sages instituted the requirement of including the date in the bill of divorce due to a case where a man is married to the daughter of his sister, then they should institute that he must include the date in a deed of betrothal as well. Occasionally a man might marry the daughter of his sister, whom he loves all the more because she is his close relative in addition to being his wife. If he knows that she acted licentiously while she was married to him, he might grant her a bill of divorce without a date so as to save her from the death penalty. Were witnesses to come forth and testify to her behavior, she could claim that at the time of her licentious act she was already a divorced woman. If this was indeed the reason for the Sages鈥 instituting the requirement of including the date in a bill of divorce, then the date should be included in a deed of betrothal as well, for an undated document of betrothal could be utilized equally well to prove the innocence of the daughter of his sister. If she acted licentiously in the period prior to her betrothal, she would not be penalized. Therefore, the date should be written on this document as well.

诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讚诪拽讚砖 讘讻住驻讗 讜讗讬讻讗 讚诪拽讚砖 讘砖讟专讗 诇讗 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讝诪谉

The Gemara answers: Because there are those who betroth by means of money and those who betroth by means of a deed, the Sages did not institute that the date must be written in the document. As the date of the betrothal has no place in the act of betrothal by means of money, the Sages did not distinguish between the various modes of betrothal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讛讗 注讘讚讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讚拽谞讬 讘讻住驻讗 讜讗讬讻讗 讘砖讟专讗 讜转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讝诪谉 讛转诐 专讜讘讗 讘砖讟专讗 讛讻讗 专讜讘讗 讘讻住驻讗

Rav A岣, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But with regard to a slave, where there are those who acquire them with money and there are those who acquire them with a deed, the Sages nevertheless instituted that the date must be written in a slave鈥檚 deed of purchase. He responded: There, with regard to slaves, the majority of people purchase them by means of a deed. Here, with regard to betrothal, the majority of people perform betrothal by means of money.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讛讬讻讬 诇讬注讘讬讚 诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 诪讞拽讛 诇讬讛 诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讝诪谞讬谉 讚讘转 讗讞讜转讜 讛讬讗 讜诪讞驻讛 注诇讛

If you wish, say a different reason why the Sages did not institute that the date must be included in a deed of betrothal. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to institute this in a manner that will ensure that no problems will result. How would we do this? If we leave the deed of betrothal with her, she will erase the date, and so it would remain impossible to prove the juncture at which her licentious behavior took place. If we leave the deed with him, then there are times when she is his sister鈥檚 daughter and he might cover for her by erasing the date himself.

诇讬谞讞讛 讙讘讬 注讚讬诐 讗讬 讚讝讻讬专讬 诇讬转讜 诇讬住讛讜讚 讜讗讬 诇讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讚讞讝讜 诪讻转讘讗 讜讗转讜 诪住讛讚讬 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪驻讬讛诐 讜诇讗 诪驻讬 讻转讘诐

If we leave it with the witnesses who signed the document, if they remember themselves the date when the deed was given to the woman, the date need not be written in the document itself, for let them come forth and testify from their memory. And if they do not remember by themselves, then there are times when they see the date that is written and come forth to testify on that basis. And the Merciful One states: 鈥淏y the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:15). From this verse it is derived: From their mouths, and not from their writings, indicating that testimony is proper only if the individual stated it of himself, and not on the basis of what is written.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讛转诐 诇讛爪诇讛 讚讬讚讛 拽讗转讬 讛讻讗 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬讚讛 拽讗转讬

The Gemara asks: If that is so, let us say that with regard to divorce as well. In cases of divorce there should also be a concern lest the woman erase the date on the bill of divorce in her possession. The Gemara responds: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, the date comes to save her, since the bill of divorce removes her status as a man鈥檚 wife. She therefore would fear erasing anything lest she disqualify the bill altogether, thereby possibly rendering herself a married woman again (Ramban). Here, however, when dealing with a deed of betrothal, the date comes to her disadvantage, since until now she was presumed to be a single woman, and if there is no date on the document then she clearly cannot be punished.

诪转谞讬壮 砖诇砖讛 讗讞讬谉 谞砖讜讗讬谉 砖诇砖 谞讻专讬讜转 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜注砖讛 讘讛 讛砖谞讬 诪讗诪专 讜诪转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讞讜诇爪讜转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪讜转

MISHNA: In the case of three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of the brothers died, the following occurred: The second brother performed levirate betrothal with the wife of the deceased brother and before he was able to consummate the levirate marriage he died as well, leaving behind two women who happen before the third brother for levirate marriage. Then those two women must perform 岣litza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

砖谞讗诪专 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讬讘诪讛 讬讘讗 注诇讬讛 砖注诇讬讛 讝讬拽转 讬讘诐 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖注诇讬讛 讝讬拽转 砖谞讬 讬讘诪讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪讬讬讘诐 诇讗讬讝讜 砖讬专爪讛 讜讞讜诇抓 诇砖谞讬讛

As it is stated: 鈥淚f brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5). This teaches that a woman eligible for levirate marriage is one who has one levirate relationship and not one who has a double levirate relationship. In this case, the wife of the first deceased brother requires levirate marriage due to both the marriage with her first husband as well as the levirate betrothal with the second brother. Rabbi Shimon says: He may consummate the levirate marriage with whichever woman he wishes and then perform 岣litza with the second.

讙诪壮 讜讗讬 讝讬拽转 砖谞讬 讬讘诪讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 讗诇讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讜讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖转讬 讬讘诪讜转 讛讘讗讜转 诪讘讬转 讗讞讚 诪转讬讬讘诪讜转

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If the halakha that a woman who has a double levirate relationship is exempt from levirate marriage is by Torah law, as indicated by the proof offered in the mishna, she should not require 岣litza as well, but be completely exempt. Rather, it is by rabbinic law. The restriction on levirate marriage in this case is not by Torah law, as by Torah law the brother is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with both of these women since each was the wife of a different brother. The requirement for 岣litza in this case was instituted as a rabbinic decree lest people say that two yevamot who come from a single household can enter into levirate marriage. Since the second brother had performed levirate betrothal, people might come to think that both were actually married to him. If the third brother consummates the levirate marriage with both women, it would lead people to think that it is permitted to take two of a brother鈥檚 wives in levirate marriage, when in fact the Torah allows the yavam to marry only a single wife of the deceased.

讜谞讬讬讘诐 诇讞讚讗 讜谞讬讞诇讜抓 诇讞讚讗 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 讘讬转 讗讞讚 诪拽爪转讜 讘谞讜讬

The Gemara asks: So let him consummate the levirate marriage with one woman and perform 岣litza with the other one, and this would eliminate our concern. The Gemara responds: We do not do this due to a rabbinic decree lest they say: When there are two women from a single household, part of it must be built

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