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Today's Daf Yomi

March 14, 2022 | 讬状讗 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Yevamot 7

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Betsy Mehlman in loving memory of her father Harold Mondshein, Zvi Menachem Mendel ben Shlomo on his 38th yahrzeit. 鈥淗e was a kind, loving man with an optimistic outlook on life and a baal koreh with a beautiful voice.”聽

Today’s daf is sponsored by Julie Landau in loving memory of Melvin Landau. “My father loved all kinds of learning and knew something about every topic. He never hesitated to help those in need. Twelve years on, he is sorely missed.”

Today’s daf is sponsored in honor of Naomi Cohen on her birthday. “Happy Birthday from all your family in celebration of your birthday but also to celebrate your dedication to Talmud study and general Jewish knowledge.”

Rav Shimi suggests that the reason that a drasha was needed to teach that one cannot light a fire on Shabbat even to administer a court related punishment was because it could have been derived from a聽kal va鈥檆homer聽that it would override聽Shabbat. What is the聽kal va鈥檆homer? The braita which in the end teaches that one cannot administer court death penalties on Shabbat is explained both according to the interpretation on 6b that without the drasha, one would have assumed it was permitted as a positive commandment overrides a negative one even when it is punishable by聽karet, and according to Rav Shimi鈥檚 explanation. After not being able to find a conclusive source to learn that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, even when punishable by聽karet, the Gemara continues to search for a reason for why if there wasn鈥檛 a drasha, we would have assumed that聽yibum聽could be performed even if it meant a man marrying his wife鈥檚 sister. One suggestion is that since聽yibum聽overrides the prohibition to marry one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife and that is singled out, we can apply the principle that if something is singled out, it comes to teach about the whole group. This, however is rejected as the general rule is by a prohibition and it is singled out by聽yibum聽to permit it. That is not the typical use of a generalization and a detailed case. Another suggestion is the one鈥檚 brother鈥檚 wife would serve as the paradigm for all forbidden relationships 鈥 since聽yibum聽overrides that, it would then override all the others. That suggestion is rejected as well as all聽yibum聽situations are with the brother鈥檚 wife, but if one would permit another forbidden relationship, it would permit two forbidden relationships. Why don鈥檛 we say, since it was permitted for the brother鈥檚 wife, we can permit everything as is the case by a leper whose eighth days falls on erev Pesach and he has a seminal emission that day 鈥 since he was permitted that day to put his hands, ears and toe into the聽azara聽as a leper, he is permitted to do it as well, even though he had a seminal emission. But is this really a fair comparison?

讜诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 砖讛讬讗 讞诪讜专讛 讜讚讜讞讛 砖讘转 专爪讬讞讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪注诐 诪讝讘讞讬 转拽讞谞讜 诇诪讜转 砖讘转 砖谞讚讞转 诪驻谞讬 注讘讜讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转讛讗 专爪讬讞讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛

If the Temple service, which includes the sacrifice of offerings, is so severe that it overrides Shabbat, as offerings were brought on Shabbat, and yet the halakha of murder overrides it, i.e., the obligation to execute a sentenced convict overrides the Temple service, as it is stated with regard to one sentenced to death: 鈥淵ou shall take him from My altar, that he may die鈥 (Exodus 21:14), then in the case of Shabbat, which is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the halakhot of murder should likewise override it?

讜诪讗讬 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讚拽讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛注讘讜讚讛 讜讗讬谉 讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛砖讘转 讛讚专 讗诪专 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 转讚讞讛 砖讘转 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 砖讛讬讗 讚讜讞讛 砖讘转 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛

搂 The Gemara analyzes a puzzling statement in the above baraita. And what is the meaning of the claim: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, which the tanna stated in an unexplained reversion to his previous suggestion? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: The a fortiori reasoning can be refuted, as the obligation to bury a corpse with no one available to bury it [met mitzva] can prove otherwise, as the obligation to bury a met mitzva overrides the Temple service, and yet it does not override Shabbat. The tanna then retracted his statement and said that one can claim that the burial of a met mitzva overrides Shabbat by means of the same a fortiori inference: If the Temple service overrides Shabbat, and the burial of a met mitzva overrides it.

诪讜诇讗讞讜转讜 砖讘转 砖谞讚讞讛 诪驻谞讬 注讘讜讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转讛讗 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜

The Gemara pauses in the middle of the a fortiori inference to explain this last point. This is derived from the superfluous phrase 鈥渙r for his sister鈥 in the verse 鈥淗e shall not make himself ritually impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die鈥 (Numbers 6:7), which is referring to a nazirite. This verse teaches that even a nazirite on his way to sacrifice the Paschal lamb must render himself ritually impure to bury a met mitzva. The Gemara resumes the a fortiori inference: If so, as Shabbat is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the burial of a met mitzva should override it? Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day鈥 (Exodus 35:3).

讜诇诪讗讬 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 诪讗讬 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讚拽讗诪专

This concludes Rav Shimi bar Ashi鈥檚 interpretation of the baraita, that the tanna suggested that a court-administered death penalty might override Shabbat not because of the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, but due to a potential a fortiori inference. The Gemara asks: And according to that which entered his mind at the outset, that the assumption of the tanna was indeed based on the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, what is the meaning of the clause: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, that the tanna said? How should the baraita be explained according to the initial interpretation?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬讛 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讘砖讗专 诪诇讗讻讜转 讞讜抓 诪诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讚讞讬 砖讘转 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛

The Gemara explains that this is what the tanna is saying: It would have been possible to say the following: How do I establish the verse 鈥淓very one who profanes it shall surely be put to death鈥 (Exodus 31:14)? This applies to other prohibited labors, except for court-imposed capital punishment. However, court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, as a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition.

讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讬诪专 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讗 转注砖讛 讙专讬讚讗 诇讗 转注砖讛 砖讬砖 讘讜 讻专转 诪讬 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讚讞讬 讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讟讜 注砖讛 讚讜讞讛 讗转 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讗讜 诇讗 转注砖讛 讞诪讜专 诪讬谞讬讛 讜拽讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讬讛

The tanna then retracted his statement and said: You can say that we stated the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, yet this is true for a regular prohibition alone. However, did you hear that it overrides a prohibition that includes karet? The tanna then said, hinting at a counter-claim: Is that not to say, with regard to the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, that the prohibition is more stringent than the positive mitzva? After all, the court punishes one who violates a prohibition with lashes, which is not the case for a failure to uphold a positive mitzva. And yet by Torah law the positive mitzva comes and overrides it.

诪讛 诇讬 讞讜诪专讗 讝讜讟讗 讜诪讛 诇讬 讞讜诪专讗 专讘讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜

If so, what difference is it to me if it is a case of a minor stringency and what difference is it to me if it is a major stringency? Once the Torah has stated that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition, there should be no difference between a relatively stringent prohibition and a lenient one. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle.鈥 In sum, the Gemara has not found a clear proof for the opinion that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet.

讗诇讗 [讗讬爪讟专讬讱] 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬讛讜讬 讛讗讬 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诪谉 讛讻诇诇 诇诇诪讚 诇讗 诇诇诪讚 注诇 注爪诪讜 讬爪讗 讗诇讗 诇诇诪讚 注诇 讛讻诇诇 讻讜诇讜 讬爪讗

Consequently, the Gemara suggests a different interpretation. The superfluous phrase 鈥渨ith her鈥 indeed teaches that the obligation of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden. However, this derivation is required not because one might have thought that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet. Rather, this phrase is necessary because it could enter your mind to say: Let this case of a brother鈥檚 wife, to whom the mitzva of levirate marriage applies, be treated in accordance with a well-established hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization.

讚转谞讬讗 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诪谉 讛讻诇诇 讜讻讜壮 讻讬爪讚

The Gemara explains the application of this principle to the current case. Since the prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife is included in the general prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden, it can be claimed that the halakha of levirate marriage renders not only a brother鈥檚 childless wife permitted, but in this case it renders permitted all women with whom relations are usually forbidden. As it is taught in a baraita that clarifies this hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization. How so?

讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转讗讻诇 讘砖专 诪讝讘讞 讛砖诇诪讬诐 讜讟讜诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜 讜讛诇讗 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讻诇诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讛讬讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗讜 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛谉 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 诪讬讜讞讚讬诐 拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讗祝 讻诇 拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讬爪讗讜 拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转

The baraita provides an example of this principle by citing a verse: 鈥淏ut the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belong to the Lord, with his ritual impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20). But aren鈥檛 peace-offerings included in the general category of all consecrated offerings? And why were they explicitly singled out from of the rest in the above verse? To draw an analogy between them and to say to you: Just as peace-offerings are unique in that they are consecrated for the altar, so too, this halakha that one who eats of them is liable to receive karet applies to all food that is consecrated for the altar, which excludes objects that are consecrated for the Temple maintenance.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讗 讗砖转 讗讞 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讛注专讬讜转 讛讬转讛 讜诇诪讛 讬爪转讛 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讗砖转 讗讞 砖专讬讗 讗祝 讻诇 注专讬讜转 谞诪讬 砖专讬讬谉

The above baraita provided an example of the principle that an item singled out from a general category teaches a halakha with regard to the entire category. Here too, one can argue: This case of a brother鈥檚 wife was included in the general category of all women with whom relations are forbidden, and why was she singled out? To compare to her and say to you: Just as a childless brother鈥檚 wife is permitted, so too, all women with whom relations are forbidden are likewise permitted.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讻诇诇 讘讗讬住讜专 讜驻专讟 讘讗讬住讜专 讛讻讗 讻诇诇 讘讗讬住讜专 讜驻专讟 讘讛讬转专

The Gemara raises an objection: Is it comparable? There, in the case cited as an example of this hermeneutical principle, the generalization, i.e., all offerings, are included in the prohibition against eating offerings while ritually impure, and the detailed case of peace-offerings is also included in the prohibition. Consequently, it can be said that the specific case was singled out to teach about the entire category. By contrast, here, in the case of levirate marriage with forbidden relatives, the generalization is included in the prohibition against engaging in forbidden relations, and yet the detailed case is permitted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the detail has been singled out so as to clarify some aspect of the general category; rather, its halakha differs from the rest.

讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 砖讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讻诇诇讜 注讚 砖讬讞讝讬专谞讜 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讘驻讬专讜砖 讚转谞讬讗 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讻诇诇讜 注讚 砖讬讞讝讬专谞讜 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讘驻讬专讜砖

Instead, this case is comparable only to those that fit a different hermeneutical principle, concerning a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter. If a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, then you cannot return it to its generalization even for other matters, to the extent that this case has been entirely removed from the general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter, you may not return it to its generalization until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization.

讻讬爪讚 讜砖讞讟 讗转 讛讻讘砖 讘诪拽讜诐 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟 讗转 讛讞讟讗转 讜讗转 讛注讜诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讛拽讚砖 讻讬 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讛讜讗 诇讻讛谉 砖讗讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讜诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐

How so? The baraita provides an example of this principle. With regard to the guilt-offering of a leper, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest鈥檚, so is the guilt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering,鈥 since apparently this comparison does not teach anything new because the halakhot of guilt-offerings are already stated elsewhere (Leviticus 7:1鈥10), then what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering鈥?

诇驻讬 砖讬爪讗 讗砖诐 诪爪讜专注 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 讘讘讛谉 讬讚 讜讘讛谉 专讙诇 讛讬诪谞讬转 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 讟注讜谉 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞

Since the guilt-offering of a leper was specified from the general category of all guilt-offerings to discuss a new matter, i.e., that the blood is placed on the thumb of the right hand and the big toe of the right foot of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt-offering does not require placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, as for this guilt-offering the placement of blood on the leper is sufficient.

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讛讜讗 诪讛 讞讟讗转 讟注讜谞讛 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讗祝 讗砖诐 讟注讜谉 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞

Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 7:13), to teach that just as the sin-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, so too, the leper鈥檚 guilt-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar.

讜讗讬 诇讗 讗讛讚专讬讛 拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇诪讗讬 讚谞驻拽 谞驻拽 讜诇诪讗讬 讚诇讗 谞驻拽 诇讗 谞驻拽 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讬砖转专讗 讗讬砖转专讗讬 砖讗专 注专讬讜转 诇讗

The Gemara comments: And had the verse not explicitly restored this case of guilt-offering to its generalization, I would say: With regard to that which was excluded from the generalization as a novel ruling in this case, it was excluded, and with regard to that case which was not excluded, it was not excluded, and therefore the halakha would have been different in the various cases. Here, too, I would say: A brother鈥檚 wife who was permitted is permitted, whereas the other women with whom relations are forbidden were not permitted at all. Consequently, there is no proof from here that one might have thought that women with whom relations are forbidden are in fact permitted in levirate marriage.

讗诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬转讬 讘诪讛 诪爪讬谞讜 诪讗砖转 讗讞 诪讛 讗砖转 讗讞 诪讬讬讘诪讛 讗祝 讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 转转讬讬讘诐

Rather, the suggestion that other women with whom relations are usually forbidden might be permitted for levirate marriage was based on a different argument: It might enter your mind to say: Let this claim be derived by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, which is a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details. In other words, the halakha of all other women with whom relations are forbidden can be derived from that of a brother鈥檚 wife: Just as a brother鈥檚 wife enters levirate marriage, so too, a wife鈥檚 sister should enter into levirate marriage.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讞讚 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讻讗 转专讬 讗讬住讜专讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬砖转专讬 讗讬砖转专讬

The Gemara wonders about this: Is it comparable? How can one case be derived from the other? There, in the case of a brother鈥檚 wife, only one prohibition has been permitted, the prohibition with regard to a brother鈥檚 wife, whereas here, we are dealing with two prohibitions, both a brother鈥檚 wife and a wife鈥檚 sister. The Gemara answers: It is nevertheless necessary to refute this suggestion, lest you say: Since it is permitted, it is permitted. In other words, as the Torah permitted a brother鈥檚 wife in levirate marriage despite the fact that she is ordinarily forbidden, she remains permitted even if the additional prohibition with regard to a wife鈥檚 sister applies to her.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬砖转专讬 讗讬砖转专讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪爪讜专注 砖讞诇 砖诪讬谞讬 砖诇讜 讘注专讘 讛驻住讞 讜专讗讛 拽专讬 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讜讟讘诇 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 讗讞专 谞讻谞住 讝讛 谞讻谞住

And from where do you say that we state this reasoning of: Since it is permitted, it is permitted? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a leper whose eighth day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his leprosy and brings his last offerings to the Temple, occurs on the eve of Passover, and he experienced a seminal emission on that eighth day and then immersed in a ritual bath, the Sages said: Although any other individual who immersed himself that day for purification from his ritual impurity may not enter the Temple before sunset, this leper, who saw an emission of semen and immersed, may enter the Temple.

诪讜讟讘 砖讬讘讗 注砖讛 砖讬砖 讘讜 讻专转 讜讬讚讞讛 注砖讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 讻专转 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注砖讛 诇讬转 讘讬讛

The baraita explains the reason for this exception. It is better that a positive mitzva that includes karet, i.e., bringing the Paschal lamb at the right time, comes and overrides a positive mitzva that does not include karet, i.e., not entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity. If the leper does not become purified of his leprosy he may not sacrifice the Paschal lamb. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: By Torah law there is not even the overriding of a positive mitzva in this case of one who immersed himself during the day entering the Temple.

砖谞讗诪专 讜讬注诪讜讚 讬讛讜砖驻讟 讘拽讛诇 讬讛讜讚讛 诇驻谞讬 讛讞爪专 讛讞讚砖讛 诪讗讬 讞爪专 讛讞讚砖讛 讗诪专 (专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉) 砖讞讚砖讜 讘讛 讚讘专讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 诇讗 讬讻谞住 诇诪讞谞讛 诇讜讬讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan explains his claim: As it is stated: 鈥淎nd Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah and Jerusalem, in the House of the Lord, before the new courtyard鈥 (II聽Chronicles 20:5). What is the meaning of 鈥渢he new courtyard鈥? Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This is referring to the place where they issued new matters and said that one who immersed himself that day may not enter the camp of the Levites, which in Jerusalem is the Temple Mount, despite the fact that by Torah law no such prohibition applies.

讜讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪讛 讟注诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专 诇爪专注转讜 讛讜转专 诇拽专讜讬讜 诪讬 讚诪讬 诇讚注讜诇讗

And with regard to this halakha itself, that a leper who experienced a seminal emission may nevertheless sacrifice offerings in the Temple, Ulla said: What is the reason that this is permitted to him? Since it is permitted for his leprosy, i.e., the Torah allowed him to enter the Temple Mount while still a leper to achieve full ritual purification, which requires that he sacrifice offerings, it is permitted with regard to his seminal emission as well. This shows that the tanna accepts the principle that as one prohibition is permitted, two prohibitions are likewise permitted. The Gemara rejects this argument: Is this assumption comparable to the case of Ulla?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Yevamot 7

讜诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 砖讛讬讗 讞诪讜专讛 讜讚讜讞讛 砖讘转 专爪讬讞讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪注诐 诪讝讘讞讬 转拽讞谞讜 诇诪讜转 砖讘转 砖谞讚讞转 诪驻谞讬 注讘讜讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转讛讗 专爪讬讞讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛

If the Temple service, which includes the sacrifice of offerings, is so severe that it overrides Shabbat, as offerings were brought on Shabbat, and yet the halakha of murder overrides it, i.e., the obligation to execute a sentenced convict overrides the Temple service, as it is stated with regard to one sentenced to death: 鈥淵ou shall take him from My altar, that he may die鈥 (Exodus 21:14), then in the case of Shabbat, which is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the halakhot of murder should likewise override it?

讜诪讗讬 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讚拽讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛注讘讜讚讛 讜讗讬谉 讚讜讞讛 讗转 讛砖讘转 讛讚专 讗诪专 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 转讚讞讛 砖讘转 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 注讘讜讚讛 砖讛讬讗 讚讜讞讛 砖讘转 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛

搂 The Gemara analyzes a puzzling statement in the above baraita. And what is the meaning of the claim: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, which the tanna stated in an unexplained reversion to his previous suggestion? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: The a fortiori reasoning can be refuted, as the obligation to bury a corpse with no one available to bury it [met mitzva] can prove otherwise, as the obligation to bury a met mitzva overrides the Temple service, and yet it does not override Shabbat. The tanna then retracted his statement and said that one can claim that the burial of a met mitzva overrides Shabbat by means of the same a fortiori inference: If the Temple service overrides Shabbat, and the burial of a met mitzva overrides it.

诪讜诇讗讞讜转讜 砖讘转 砖谞讚讞讛 诪驻谞讬 注讘讜讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖转讛讗 拽讘讜专转 诪转 诪爪讜讛 讚讜讞讛 讗讜转讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜

The Gemara pauses in the middle of the a fortiori inference to explain this last point. This is derived from the superfluous phrase 鈥渙r for his sister鈥 in the verse 鈥淗e shall not make himself ritually impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die鈥 (Numbers 6:7), which is referring to a nazirite. This verse teaches that even a nazirite on his way to sacrifice the Paschal lamb must render himself ritually impure to bury a met mitzva. The Gemara resumes the a fortiori inference: If so, as Shabbat is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the burial of a met mitzva should override it? Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day鈥 (Exodus 35:3).

讜诇诪讗讬 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 诪讗讬 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讚拽讗诪专

This concludes Rav Shimi bar Ashi鈥檚 interpretation of the baraita, that the tanna suggested that a court-administered death penalty might override Shabbat not because of the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, but due to a potential a fortiori inference. The Gemara asks: And according to that which entered his mind at the outset, that the assumption of the tanna was indeed based on the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, what is the meaning of the clause: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, that the tanna said? How should the baraita be explained according to the initial interpretation?

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬讛 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讘砖讗专 诪诇讗讻讜转 讞讜抓 诪诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 诪讬转转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讚讞讬 砖讘转 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛

The Gemara explains that this is what the tanna is saying: It would have been possible to say the following: How do I establish the verse 鈥淓very one who profanes it shall surely be put to death鈥 (Exodus 31:14)? This applies to other prohibited labors, except for court-imposed capital punishment. However, court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, as a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition.

讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讬诪专 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讗 转注砖讛 讙专讬讚讗 诇讗 转注砖讛 砖讬砖 讘讜 讻专转 诪讬 砖诪注转 诇讬讛 讚讚讞讬 讛讚专 讗诪专 讗讟讜 注砖讛 讚讜讞讛 讗转 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讗讜 诇讗 转注砖讛 讞诪讜专 诪讬谞讬讛 讜拽讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 诇讬讛

The tanna then retracted his statement and said: You can say that we stated the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, yet this is true for a regular prohibition alone. However, did you hear that it overrides a prohibition that includes karet? The tanna then said, hinting at a counter-claim: Is that not to say, with regard to the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, that the prohibition is more stringent than the positive mitzva? After all, the court punishes one who violates a prohibition with lashes, which is not the case for a failure to uphold a positive mitzva. And yet by Torah law the positive mitzva comes and overrides it.

诪讛 诇讬 讞讜诪专讗 讝讜讟讗 讜诪讛 诇讬 讞讜诪专讗 专讘讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讗 转讘注专讜

If so, what difference is it to me if it is a case of a minor stringency and what difference is it to me if it is a major stringency? Once the Torah has stated that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition, there should be no difference between a relatively stringent prohibition and a lenient one. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle.鈥 In sum, the Gemara has not found a clear proof for the opinion that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet.

讗诇讗 [讗讬爪讟专讬讱] 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬讛讜讬 讛讗讬 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诪谉 讛讻诇诇 诇诇诪讚 诇讗 诇诇诪讚 注诇 注爪诪讜 讬爪讗 讗诇讗 诇诇诪讚 注诇 讛讻诇诇 讻讜诇讜 讬爪讗

Consequently, the Gemara suggests a different interpretation. The superfluous phrase 鈥渨ith her鈥 indeed teaches that the obligation of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden. However, this derivation is required not because one might have thought that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet. Rather, this phrase is necessary because it could enter your mind to say: Let this case of a brother鈥檚 wife, to whom the mitzva of levirate marriage applies, be treated in accordance with a well-established hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization.

讚转谞讬讗 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诪谉 讛讻诇诇 讜讻讜壮 讻讬爪讚

The Gemara explains the application of this principle to the current case. Since the prohibition proscribing a brother鈥檚 wife is included in the general prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden, it can be claimed that the halakha of levirate marriage renders not only a brother鈥檚 childless wife permitted, but in this case it renders permitted all women with whom relations are usually forbidden. As it is taught in a baraita that clarifies this hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization. How so?

讜讛谞驻砖 讗砖专 转讗讻诇 讘砖专 诪讝讘讞 讛砖诇诪讬诐 讜讟讜诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜 讜讛诇讗 砖诇诪讬诐 讘讻诇诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讛讬讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗讜 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛谉 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诇诪讬诐 诪讬讜讞讚讬诐 拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讗祝 讻诇 拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讬爪讗讜 拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转

The baraita provides an example of this principle by citing a verse: 鈥淏ut the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belong to the Lord, with his ritual impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20). But aren鈥檛 peace-offerings included in the general category of all consecrated offerings? And why were they explicitly singled out from of the rest in the above verse? To draw an analogy between them and to say to you: Just as peace-offerings are unique in that they are consecrated for the altar, so too, this halakha that one who eats of them is liable to receive karet applies to all food that is consecrated for the altar, which excludes objects that are consecrated for the Temple maintenance.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讗 讗砖转 讗讞 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讛注专讬讜转 讛讬转讛 讜诇诪讛 讬爪转讛 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 讗砖转 讗讞 砖专讬讗 讗祝 讻诇 注专讬讜转 谞诪讬 砖专讬讬谉

The above baraita provided an example of the principle that an item singled out from a general category teaches a halakha with regard to the entire category. Here too, one can argue: This case of a brother鈥檚 wife was included in the general category of all women with whom relations are forbidden, and why was she singled out? To compare to her and say to you: Just as a childless brother鈥檚 wife is permitted, so too, all women with whom relations are forbidden are likewise permitted.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讻诇诇 讘讗讬住讜专 讜驻专讟 讘讗讬住讜专 讛讻讗 讻诇诇 讘讗讬住讜专 讜驻专讟 讘讛讬转专

The Gemara raises an objection: Is it comparable? There, in the case cited as an example of this hermeneutical principle, the generalization, i.e., all offerings, are included in the prohibition against eating offerings while ritually impure, and the detailed case of peace-offerings is also included in the prohibition. Consequently, it can be said that the specific case was singled out to teach about the entire category. By contrast, here, in the case of levirate marriage with forbidden relatives, the generalization is included in the prohibition against engaging in forbidden relations, and yet the detailed case is permitted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the detail has been singled out so as to clarify some aspect of the general category; rather, its halakha differs from the rest.

讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 砖讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讻诇诇讜 注讚 砖讬讞讝讬专谞讜 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讘驻讬专讜砖 讚转谞讬讗 讚讘专 砖讛讬讛 讘讻诇诇 讜讬爪讗 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讻诇诇讜 注讚 砖讬讞讝讬专谞讜 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讘驻讬专讜砖

Instead, this case is comparable only to those that fit a different hermeneutical principle, concerning a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter. If a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, then you cannot return it to its generalization even for other matters, to the extent that this case has been entirely removed from the general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter, you may not return it to its generalization until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization.

讻讬爪讚 讜砖讞讟 讗转 讛讻讘砖 讘诪拽讜诐 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟 讗转 讛讞讟讗转 讜讗转 讛注讜诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讛拽讚砖 讻讬 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讛讜讗 诇讻讛谉 砖讗讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讜诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐

How so? The baraita provides an example of this principle. With regard to the guilt-offering of a leper, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest鈥檚, so is the guilt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering,鈥 since apparently this comparison does not teach anything new because the halakhot of guilt-offerings are already stated elsewhere (Leviticus 7:1鈥10), then what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering鈥?

诇驻讬 砖讬爪讗 讗砖诐 诪爪讜专注 诇讬讚讜谉 讘讚讘专 讛讞讚砖 讘讘讛谉 讬讚 讜讘讛谉 专讙诇 讛讬诪谞讬转 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讗 讟注讜谉 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞

Since the guilt-offering of a leper was specified from the general category of all guilt-offerings to discuss a new matter, i.e., that the blood is placed on the thumb of the right hand and the big toe of the right foot of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt-offering does not require placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, as for this guilt-offering the placement of blood on the leper is sufficient.

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻讬 讻讞讟讗转 讛讗砖诐 讛讜讗 诪讛 讞讟讗转 讟注讜谞讛 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讗祝 讗砖诐 讟注讜谉 诪转谉 讚诪讬诐 讜讗讬诪讜专讬诐 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞

Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎s the sin-offeringso is the guilt-offering鈥 (Leviticus 7:13), to teach that just as the sin-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, so too, the leper鈥檚 guilt-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar.

讜讗讬 诇讗 讗讛讚专讬讛 拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇诪讗讬 讚谞驻拽 谞驻拽 讜诇诪讗讬 讚诇讗 谞驻拽 诇讗 谞驻拽 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讗砖转 讗讞 讚讗讬砖转专讗 讗讬砖转专讗讬 砖讗专 注专讬讜转 诇讗

The Gemara comments: And had the verse not explicitly restored this case of guilt-offering to its generalization, I would say: With regard to that which was excluded from the generalization as a novel ruling in this case, it was excluded, and with regard to that case which was not excluded, it was not excluded, and therefore the halakha would have been different in the various cases. Here, too, I would say: A brother鈥檚 wife who was permitted is permitted, whereas the other women with whom relations are forbidden were not permitted at all. Consequently, there is no proof from here that one might have thought that women with whom relations are forbidden are in fact permitted in levirate marriage.

讗诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬转讬 讘诪讛 诪爪讬谞讜 诪讗砖转 讗讞 诪讛 讗砖转 讗讞 诪讬讬讘诪讛 讗祝 讗讞讜转 讗砖讛 转转讬讬讘诐

Rather, the suggestion that other women with whom relations are usually forbidden might be permitted for levirate marriage was based on a different argument: It might enter your mind to say: Let this claim be derived by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, which is a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details. In other words, the halakha of all other women with whom relations are forbidden can be derived from that of a brother鈥檚 wife: Just as a brother鈥檚 wife enters levirate marriage, so too, a wife鈥檚 sister should enter into levirate marriage.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讞讚 讗讬住讜专讗 讛讻讗 转专讬 讗讬住讜专讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬砖转专讬 讗讬砖转专讬

The Gemara wonders about this: Is it comparable? How can one case be derived from the other? There, in the case of a brother鈥檚 wife, only one prohibition has been permitted, the prohibition with regard to a brother鈥檚 wife, whereas here, we are dealing with two prohibitions, both a brother鈥檚 wife and a wife鈥檚 sister. The Gemara answers: It is nevertheless necessary to refute this suggestion, lest you say: Since it is permitted, it is permitted. In other words, as the Torah permitted a brother鈥檚 wife in levirate marriage despite the fact that she is ordinarily forbidden, she remains permitted even if the additional prohibition with regard to a wife鈥檚 sister applies to her.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬砖转专讬 讗讬砖转专讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪爪讜专注 砖讞诇 砖诪讬谞讬 砖诇讜 讘注专讘 讛驻住讞 讜专讗讛 拽专讬 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讜讟讘诇 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 讗讞专 谞讻谞住 讝讛 谞讻谞住

And from where do you say that we state this reasoning of: Since it is permitted, it is permitted? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a leper whose eighth day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his leprosy and brings his last offerings to the Temple, occurs on the eve of Passover, and he experienced a seminal emission on that eighth day and then immersed in a ritual bath, the Sages said: Although any other individual who immersed himself that day for purification from his ritual impurity may not enter the Temple before sunset, this leper, who saw an emission of semen and immersed, may enter the Temple.

诪讜讟讘 砖讬讘讗 注砖讛 砖讬砖 讘讜 讻专转 讜讬讚讞讛 注砖讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 讻专转 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注砖讛 诇讬转 讘讬讛

The baraita explains the reason for this exception. It is better that a positive mitzva that includes karet, i.e., bringing the Paschal lamb at the right time, comes and overrides a positive mitzva that does not include karet, i.e., not entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity. If the leper does not become purified of his leprosy he may not sacrifice the Paschal lamb. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: By Torah law there is not even the overriding of a positive mitzva in this case of one who immersed himself during the day entering the Temple.

砖谞讗诪专 讜讬注诪讜讚 讬讛讜砖驻讟 讘拽讛诇 讬讛讜讚讛 诇驻谞讬 讛讞爪专 讛讞讚砖讛 诪讗讬 讞爪专 讛讞讚砖讛 讗诪专 (专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉) 砖讞讚砖讜 讘讛 讚讘专讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 诇讗 讬讻谞住 诇诪讞谞讛 诇讜讬讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan explains his claim: As it is stated: 鈥淎nd Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah and Jerusalem, in the House of the Lord, before the new courtyard鈥 (II聽Chronicles 20:5). What is the meaning of 鈥渢he new courtyard鈥? Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This is referring to the place where they issued new matters and said that one who immersed himself that day may not enter the camp of the Levites, which in Jerusalem is the Temple Mount, despite the fact that by Torah law no such prohibition applies.

讜讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪讛 讟注诐 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜转专 诇爪专注转讜 讛讜转专 诇拽专讜讬讜 诪讬 讚诪讬 诇讚注讜诇讗

And with regard to this halakha itself, that a leper who experienced a seminal emission may nevertheless sacrifice offerings in the Temple, Ulla said: What is the reason that this is permitted to him? Since it is permitted for his leprosy, i.e., the Torah allowed him to enter the Temple Mount while still a leper to achieve full ritual purification, which requires that he sacrifice offerings, it is permitted with regard to his seminal emission as well. This shows that the tanna accepts the principle that as one prohibition is permitted, two prohibitions are likewise permitted. The Gemara rejects this argument: Is this assumption comparable to the case of Ulla?

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