Yevamot 85
וַהֲרֵי טוּמְאָה, דְּלָאו שֶׁאֵין שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל, וְטַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן״ וְלֹא בְּנוֹת אַהֲרֹן, הָא לָאו הָכִי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת, מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב?
The Gemara asks: But there is the prohibition for priests to contract ritual impurity from a corpse, which is a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, as only priests are bound by this prohibition, and the reason that this command applies only to male priests is that the Merciful One writes: “Speak to the priests the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), from which it is inferred: The sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron. Therefore, were it not for this specific derivation, I would say that women from priestly families are also obligated to avoid becoming ritually impure. What is the reason for this? Is it not due to the principle that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, that women are equated to men with regard to all punishments in the Torah, including those that are not equally applicable to all?
לָא, דְּגָמְרִינַן מִ״לֹּא יִקָּחוּ״.
The Gemara rejects this proof: No, that initial assumption, that the daughters of priests might be obligated to avoid ritual impurity, is not due to the halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, but rather it is something that we learn through tradition from the words “they may not take.” This phrase teaches that women are included in the marital prohibitions of the priesthood, and we might therefore have thought that they are included in all halakhot pertaining to priests.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: קִיחָה אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לִיגְמַר מִטּוּמְאָה — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
There are those who say a different version of this answer: With regard to that verse about taking, it was necessary for him to mention this explicitly, for it might enter your mind to say: We should learn this halakha from the prohibition of impurity and conclude that just as only male descendants of Aaron are prohibited from contracting ritual impurity, the restrictions of marriage also apply only to men. The verse therefore teaches us, with the words “they may not take,” that this is not the case.
רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אִיקְּלַעוּ לְהִינְצְבוּ, לְאַתְרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין. בְּעוֹ מִינַּיְיהוּ: הוּזְהֲרוּ כְּשֵׁרוֹת לְהִנָּשֵׂא לִפְסוּלִין, אוֹ לָא?
The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, arrived at the town of Hintzevu, to the place of Rav Idi bar Avin. The townspeople asked them: Is it prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men disqualified from the priesthood or not?
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב פָּפָּא, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: עֲשָׂרָה יוּחֲסִין עָלוּ מִבָּבֶל: כֹּהֲנִים, לְוִיִּם, וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים, חֲלָלִים, גֵּרִים, וַחֲרוּרִים, וּמַמְזֵרִים, נְתִינִים, שְׁתוּקֵי, וַאֲסוּפֵי. כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּם יִשְׂרְאֵלִים — מוּתָּרִין לָבֹא זֶה בָּזֶה. לְוִיִּם, יִשְׂרְאֵלִים, חֲלָלִים, גֵּרִים, חֲרוּרִים — מוּתָּרִין לָבֹא זֶה בָּזֶה. גֵּירֵי, חֲרוֹרֵי, וּמַמְזֵרֵי, נְתִינֵי, שְׁתוּקֵי, וַאֲסוּפֵי — מוּתָּרִים לָבֹא זֶה בָּזֶה. וְאִילּוּ כֹּהֶנֶת לְחָלָל — לָא קָתָנֵי.
Rav Pappa said to them: You learned it in a mishna (Kiddushin 69a): People of ten types of lineages ascended from Babylonia: Priests, Levites, and Israelites, ḥalalim, converts, and freed slaves, and mamzerim, Gibeonites, children of unknown paternity [shetukim], and foundlings. With regard to Priests, Levites, and Israelites, they are permitted to marry into one another’s families; Levites, Israelites, ḥalalim, converts, and freed slaves are permitted to marry into one another’s families; converts, freed slaves, and mamzerim, Gibeonites, shetukim, and foundlings are permitted to marry into one another’s families; whereas the tanna does not teach that priestesses, i.e., daughters of priests, are permitted to marry a ḥalal. This must mean they are forbidden to them.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּהָנֵי נָסְבִי מֵהָנֵי וְהָנֵי נָסְבִי מֵהָנֵי — קָתָנֵי. כֹּהֵן, כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ בָּעֵי לְמִינְסַב חֲלָלָה אֲסִירָא לֵיהּ — לָא קָתָנֵי. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין. אֲמַר לְהוּ: דַּרְדְּקֵי, הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: לֹא הוּזְהֲרוּ כְּשֵׁרוֹת לִינָּשֵׂא לִפְסוּלִים.
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him: There is no proof from here, for he teaches the halakha anywhere that these men may marry those women, and there is also a parallel case where these women may marry those men. With regard to the case of a priest, however, since if he wants to marry a ḥalala this is prohibited to him, the tanna does not teach this halakha. Consequently, there is no proof from this mishna that daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests are warned against marrying men disqualified from the priesthood. They came before Rav Idi bar Avin and told him about the question and their debate about the matter. He said to them: Children, this is what Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests are not warned against marrying men disqualified from the priesthood.
שְׁנִיּוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְכוּ׳. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ בְּנֵי בֵירֵי מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: שְׁנִיָּה לַבַּעַל וְלֹא שְׁנִיָּה לַיָּבָם, יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה מִיָּבָם אוֹ לָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן — לֵית לַהּ,
§ We learned in the mishna that secondary forbidden relatives, whose status is established by rabbinic law, are sometimes forbidden to the husband and sometimes to the yavam. The residents of the town of Biri inquired of Rav Sheshet: Is a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative of the husband but not a secondary forbidden relative of the yavam entitled to a marriage contract from the yavam or not? The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Perhaps, since the Master said that in a levirate marriage, the payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and this woman, who was a secondary relative of her first husband, does not receive a marriage contract from him, she consequently does not have the right to one from the yavam either.
אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן, תַּקִּינוּ לַהּ רַבָּנַן מִשֵּׁנִי — אִית לַהּ?
Or perhaps, since there is a principle in levirate marriage that if she does not have a marriage contract from the first husband, e.g., he died without leaving behind any property, the Sages instituted a marriage contract for her from the second one, we should say that she has a marriage contract from the yavam?
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן. וְאִם הָיְתָה שְׁנִיָּה לַבַּעַל — אֲפִילּוּ מִיָּבָם אֵין לָהּ.
Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in a baraita: Payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and if she was a secondary forbidden relative of the husband, she does not have one even from the yavam. This baraita clearly answers the question.
מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא דְּאִית לַהּ מִיָּבָם? חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְאִי לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן — תַּקִּינוּ לַהּ מִשֵּׁנִי. וְאִם הָיְתָה שְׁנִיָּה לַבַּעַל — אֲפִילּוּ מִיָּבָם אֵין לָהּ.
The Gemara asks: Can it be concluded by inference from the baraita that there is a case of a woman in a levirate marriage who does have a marriage contract from the yavam? The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: Payment of her marriage contract is due from the property of her first husband, and if she does not have anything from the first husband because he died without property, they instituted a marriage contract for her from the second one. And if she was a secondary forbidden relative of the husband, she does not have one even from the yavam.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, יֵשׁ לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת אוֹ אֵין לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת? הֵיכִי דָמֵי: אִילֵּימָא דְּיָתְבָה תּוּתֵיהּ, בַּ״עֲמוֹד וְהוֹצֵא״ קָאֵי, מְזוֹנוֹת אִית לַהּ? לָא צְרִיכָא, שֶׁהָלַךְ הוּא לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְלָוְתָה וְאָכְלָה. מַאי?
Rabbi Elazar inquired of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Do women in cases like a widow married to a High Priest and a divorcée or a ḥalutza married to a common priest have rights to payment for their sustenance from their husbands, or do they not have a right to sustenance? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If we say that she is dwelling under his roof, he stands in a position where he is obligated to arise and divorce her. In such a situation, does she have a right to sustenance? It is obvious that she does not. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to ask this question with regard to a case where he went overseas and therefore is not present to divorce her, and in the meantime she borrowed money for her sustenance and ate. What is the halakha in that case?
מְזוֹנֵי תְּנַאי כְּתוּבָה נִינְהוּ, מִדְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָה אִית לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כְּתוּבָּה דִּלְמִשְׁקַל וּמִיפַּק — אִית לַהּ, מְזוֹנֵי, דִּלְמָא תִּיעַכַּב גַּבֵּיהּ — לֵית לַהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֵית לַהּ.
Is it correct to say that sustenance is a stipulation in the marriage contract, and since she has a marriage contract she also has a right to sustenance, and therefore the husband must pay her debt? Or perhaps there is a difference between the cases: Concerning a marriage contract, which gives her motivation to take the money and leave him, she has rights to it, as the Sages wanted to motivate her to seek divorce and end the prohibited marriage. However, with regard to sustenance, we are worried that if he provides for her sustenance, perhaps she might tarry with him, as she would have no reason to rush the divorce, and consequently she does not have rights to it. He said to him: She does not have a right to sustenance.
וְהָתַנְיָא: יֵשׁ לָהּ! כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא — לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that she does have a right to sustenance? The Gemara answers: When that baraita is taught, it is referring to sustenance she receives after his death. At that point, she is no longer in violation of a prohibition, while the obligation to sustain her remains intact.
אִית דְּאָמַר: אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תַּנְיָא: יֵשׁ לָהּ. הָא בַּ״עֲמוֹד וְהוֹצֵא״ קָאֵי? וְאֶלָּא, הָתַנְיָא יֵשׁ לָהּ! כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא, לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
Some say a different version of the discussion, which is that he said to him: It is taught in a baraita that she has a right to sustenance. He replied: He stands in a position where he is obligated to arise and divorce her. He should not be required to provide for her sustenance. He again asked: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that she has a right to sustenance? He responded: When that baraita is taught it is referring to the period after his death.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, פֵּירוֹת, מְזוֹנוֹת, בְּלָאוֹת, וְהִיא פְּסוּלָה, וּוְלָדָהּ פָּסוּל, וְכוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא. שְׁנִיּוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא פֵּירוֹת, לֹא מְזוֹנוֹת, וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת, וְהִיא כְּשֵׁירָה, וּוְלָדָהּ כָּשֵׁר, וְכוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא.
The Sages taught: A widow married to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza married to a common priest has the right to receive payment for her marriage contract; and for the produce of her property that her husband used; and sustenance; and she gets back her worn clothes and other objects she brought to the marriage; and she is disqualified as a ḥalala from marrying a priest; and her offspring is disqualified from the priesthood as a ḥalal; and the court forces him to divorce her. A woman who is a secondary relative prohibited by rabbinic law has neither a marriage contract; nor payment for the produce of her property; nor sustenance; nor does she get back her worn clothes; and she is fit to marry a priest and her offspring is fit for the priesthood; and the court forces him to divorce her.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל וְהִיא פְּסוּלָה. וְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל וְהִיא פְּסוּלָה —
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: For what reason did they say that a widow married to a High Priest has a marriage contract? Because he is disqualified from the priesthood by his marriage to her, as a priest who marries a woman forbidden to him is barred from the Temple service until he divorces her and agrees not to remarry her, and she is rendered a ḥalala and disqualified from the priesthood by intercourse with him, and any place where he is disqualified and she is disqualified,
קָנְסוּ אוֹתוֹ כְּתוּבָּה. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ שְׁנִיּוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר וְהִיא כְּשֵׁרָה. וְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר וְהִיא כְּשֵׁרָה — קָנְסוּ אוֹתָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
they penalized him through the marriage contract. In other words, the Sages did not exempt him from payment of the marriage contract in that case. Since he is disqualified from the priesthood until he divorces her, the marriage will not last, and they did not force her to forfeit her marriage contract. And for what reason did they say that women forbidden as secondary relatives by rabbinic law do not have a marriage contract? Because he is fit for the priesthood and she is similarly fit, the couple therefore sees no need to divorce, and any place where he is fit and she is fit they penalized her by exempting him from payment of the marriage contract, in order to speed up the divorce.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: הַלָּלוּ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה — וְדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה אֵין צְרִיכִין חִיזּוּק. וְהַלָּלוּ דִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים — וְדִבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים צְרִיכִין חִיזּוּק. דָּבָר אַחֵר: זֶה — הוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ, וְזוֹ — הִיא מַרְגִּילָתוֹ.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says a different reason: These cases, a widow married to a High Priest and a divorcée married to a common priest, are prohibited by Torah law, and Torah law does not require strengthening by means of additional enactments. But those secondary relatives are forbidden by rabbinic law, and rabbinic law does require strengthening. Alternatively, the Gemara presents a second explanation: In this case, when they are both disqualified, it is he who encourages her to live with him despite the deleterious effect the prohibition will have on her and her offspring. Therefore, they penalized him by making him pay the marriage contract. But in that case, when they both remain fit for the priesthood despite the prohibited nature of their marriage, it is she who encourages him, and they consequently penalized her.
דָּבָר אַחֵר מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ? אִיכָּא דְּאָמַר: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר קָתָנֵי לַהּ, וּמָה טַעַם קָאָמַר. מָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ הוּא פָּסוּל וְהִיא פְּסוּלָה קָנְסוּ אוֹתוֹ כְּתוּבָּה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ. וּמָה טַעַם הוּא כָּשֵׁר וְהִיא כְּשֵׁרָה קָנְסוּ אוֹתָהּ כְּתוּבָּה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא מַרְגִּילָתוֹ.
The Gemara asks: Who teaches the alternative explanation; whose opinion does it follow? Some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar teaches it and is saying: What is the reason? In other words, the latter part of the baraita provides the rationale for the previous statement: What is the reason that they said that if he is disqualified from the priesthood and she is similarly disqualified, they penalized him through the marriage contract? It is because in such a case he primarily encourages her to violate the prohibition, as the main disqualification concerns her, so they penalize him for enticing her to sin. And for what reason did they say that when he is fit and she is fit they penalized her through the marriage contract? It is because in such a case she encourages him, since she is not disqualified and therefore may care less about the sin. The Sages therefore penalized her.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמַר: רַבִּי קָתָנֵי לַהּ, וַחֲלוּצָה קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: וְהָא חֲלוּצָה דְּרַבָּנַן, וְאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה! הֲדַר אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּפָסֵיל לָהּ מִדְּרַבָּנַן, זֶה — הוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ, וְזוֹ — הִיא מַרְגִּילָתוֹ.
Conversely, some say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the one who teaches it, and the case of a ḥalutza poses a difficulty to his opinion, as it seems to contradict his principle that rabbinic law requires strengthening: A ḥalutza is forbidden to a priest by rabbinic law, and yet she does have a marriage contract. In response, he then said an additional explanation: Since he disqualifies her from the priesthood by rabbinic law, in this case it is he who encourages her, and in that case of secondary relatives, when neither of them is disqualified, she encourages him.
מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: Practically speaking, what difference is there between the explanations of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Rav Ḥisda said: The practical difference between them concerns the cases of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to a Jew of unflawed lineage.
מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מַאן דְּאָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ — הָא הִיא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ.
According to the one who says that the reason the marriage contract is not revoked from a widow who is married to the High Priest is because this relationship is prohibited by Torah law, which doesn’t require strengthening, this too is by Torah law, and therefore she receives her marriage contract. But according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as the woman is disqualified regardless, and she wants to marry a Jew because there is a way for her descendants to be fit to enter the congregation: If her mamzer son marries a maidservant and has children, they will be slaves who can then be freed and enter the congregation.
וּלְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמַר הֲרֵי זֶה עֶבֶד וּמַמְזֵר, הָא לָא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁה מִשֶּׁנִּיסֵּת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ — הָא הִיא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said in a mishna (Kiddushin 69a) that if a mamzer marries a maidservant and they have a child, their son is both a slave and a mamzer, since she has no hope of her descendants being fit to enter into the congregation, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Rav Yosef said: The practical difference between them is with regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she has married another man. According to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as she and her children are unaffected by this marriage.
וּלְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ מַמְזֵר מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין, הָא לָא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּעוּלָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ — הָא הִיא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But according to Rabbi Akiva, who said that offspring from forbidden intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, she does not encourage him at all, because according to this opinion her children would be adversely affected by the marriage. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them involves a non-virgin married to a High Priest. According to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as the marriage merely violates a positive mitzva, which does not disqualify her children.
וּלְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ חָלָל מֵחַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה, הָא לָא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַחֲזִיר סָפֵק סוֹטָתוֹ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that offspring conceived through intercourse with a priest for which one is liable for violating a positive mitzva is a ḥalal, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Rav Ashi said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of one who remarries his wife when there is an uncertainty if she is an adulteress. If a married woman was in seclusion with another man after her husband had become suspicious and had warned her concerning that man, and the husband did not subsequently bring her to be examined by the bitter waters as a sota, but rather continued to live with her, he has acted contrary to Torah law, as she is forbidden to him.
מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַרְגִּילָהּ — הָא הִיא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ. וּלְרַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ, דְּאָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ הָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לְהַשְׁקוֹתָהּ, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ בַּדֶּרֶךְ — עֲשָׂאָהּ זוֹנָה, הָא לָא מַרְגְּלָא לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי! אֶלָּא אָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: סוֹטָה וַדַּאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
In this case, according to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as her children are not disqualified by such a relationship. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash, who said that even if her husband went to cause her to drink the bitter waters and had intercourse with her on the way, he has thereby rendered her a zona and disqualified her from the priesthood, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of a definite adulteress. In such a case, all agree that their children are not mamzerim, despite the prohibition against their cohabitation. Consequently, she encourages him to sin.
מַתְנִי׳ בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מְאוֹרֶסֶת לְכֹהֵן, מְעוּבֶּרֶת מִכֹּהֵן, שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם לְכֹהֵן, וְכֵן בַּת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — לֹא תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה. בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מְאוֹרֶסֶת לְלֵוִי, מְעוּבֶּרֶת מִלֵּוִי, שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם לְלֵוִי, וְכֵן בַּת לֵוִי לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — לֹא תֹּאכַל בְּמַעֲשֵׂר.
MISHNA: If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest, and he died; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly, the daughter of a priest who is betrothed, pregnant from, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite or pregnant from a Levite; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a Levite; and similarly the daughter of a Levite who is betrothed, pregnant from, or a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of tithes.
בַּת לֵוִי מְאוֹרֶסֶת לְכֹהֵן, מְעוּבֶּרֶת מִכֹּהֵן, שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם לְכֹהֵן, וְכֵן בַּת כֹּהֵן לְלֵוִי — לֹא תֹאכַל לֹא בִּתְרוּמָה וְלֹא בְּמַעֲשֵׂר.
If there is a daughter of a Levite betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly a daughter of a priest who is betrothed to or pregnant from a Levite, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is a Levite, she may partake of neither teruma nor tithes. This follows the halakha that betrothal, pregnancy, and waiting for a yavam disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating teruma, but they do not enable an Israelite woman to partake of teruma.
גְּמָ׳ וּתְהֵא זָרָה, זָרָה מִי לָא אָכְלָה בְּמַעֲשֵׂר?! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן אָסוּר לְזָרִים. דְּתַנְיָא:
GEMARA: The mishna states that an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite may not partake of tithes. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And let her even be a complete foreigner who is not a Levite; may a foreigner not partake of tithes? In contradistinction to teruma, no special sanctity pertains to tithes; they are merely the possession of the Levite. What difference does it make, then, whether she is a Levite or not? Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that the first tithe is forbidden to foreigners, i.e., non-Levites, as it is taught in a baraita:
