Zevachim 107

Zevachim 107

רָבָא אָמַר: כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹנָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָה: אָתְיָא ״שָׁם״–״שָׁם״; מָה לְהַלָּן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר.

Rava said: The prohibition can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the verse: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word “there” in the first part of the verse to the word “there” in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.

אַשְׁכְּחַן מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁהֶעֱלָן לַחוּץ; מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁהֶעֱלָן לַחוּץ מִנַּיִן?

§ The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The Gemara asks: We have found that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, which one then offered up outside the courtyard. The verse states: “He will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. From where is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that one then offered up outside?

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וַאֲלֵהֶם תֹּאמַר״ – עַל הַסְּמוּכִין תֹּאמַר.

Rav Kahana said: The beginning of that verse states: “And to them [va’alehem] you shall say” (Leviticus 17:8). The term “alehem,” to them, written with the letter alef, is phonetically similar to the term alehem, about them, written with the letter ayin. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: מִי כְּתִיב ״וַעֲלֵיהֶם״?! ״וַאֲלֵיהֶם״ כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וַאֲלֵהֶם תֹּאמַר״ – לְעָרֵב פָּרָשִׁיּוֹת.

Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? “And to them” is written, and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. Rather, liability in this case is derived as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The opening phrase: “And to them you shall say,” starts with the conjunction “and” to mix the passages of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אָתְיָא הֲבָאָה–הֲבָאָה; מָה לְהַלָּן מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ, אַף כָּאן מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Liability in this case is derived through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be burned outside the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, so too here, with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple, having been slaughtered there.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב בִּיבִי, הָא דִּתְנַן: שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשֵׁשׁ כָּרֵיתוֹת בְּתוֹרָה – תְּלָתִין וְשַׁב הָוְיָין, דְּאִיכָּא הַמַּעֲלֶה וְהַמַּעֲלֶה! קַשְׁיָא.

Rav Beivai objects to these suggestions: But what about that which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a): There are thirty-six cases in the Torah for which one is liable to receive karet. The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, there are thirty-seven, as there is one case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, and the other case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

וְהָדִתְנַן: הַזּוֹרֵק מִקְצָת דָּמִים בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מְנָלַן? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּתַנְיָא: ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב״ – לְרַבּוֹת הַזּוֹרֵק. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹ זָבַח״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַזּוֹרֵק.

§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (110a): One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard, is liable; from where do we derive this? The tanna derives it from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). This serves to include liability for one who sprinkles sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). The term “or” serves to include liability for one who sprinkles blood outside the Temple courtyard.

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, הַאי ״אוֹ זָבַח״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? לְחַלֵּק.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this term “or” in “a burnt offering or sacrifice”? It serves to divide them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, לְחַלֵּק מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יְבִיאֶנּוּ״.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the halakha to divide them into two cases? He derives it from the next verse: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “it” is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: עַל הַשָּׁלֵם הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״לַּעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתוֹ״.

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, why does he not derive that halakha from the term “it”? The Gemara answers: According to him, that term is necessary as the source for the halakha that one is liable for offering up a complete animal, but one is not liable for offering up an incomplete animal. The term “it” indicates an animal in its entirety. And as for Rabbi Akiva, he derives this from the repetition of “it” in the continuation of the verse: “He will not bring it…to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9).

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – חַד לְמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ וְהֶעֱלָן בַּחוּץ, וְחַד לְמוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ. וְהָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל מוּקְטְרֵי פָּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ״ – עַל הַשָּׁלֵם חַיָּיב וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר.

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, how does he explain the repetition of “it”? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: One is referring to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were then offered up outside. And the other one is referring to offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. In both cases one is exempt. And so it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard and that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside, one would be liable. To dispel this notion, the verse states: “To sacrifice it,” which indicates that for offering up a complete animal one is liable, but one is not liable for an incomplete animal.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ, חַיָּיב.

And Rabbi Akiva, who has already expounded both mentions of “it,” disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is liable for offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הַאי ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? לְרַבּוֹת שְׁחִיטַת הָעוֹף. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵ״אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחָט״.

Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse “Blood shall be imputed to that man.” The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man”? He expounds it to include liability for the slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, he derives this halakha from: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ, הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: עַל הַשּׁוֹחֵט הוּא חַיָּיב, וְלֹא עַל הַמּוֹלֵק. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״זֶּה הַדָּבָר״.

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary to teach that only one who slaughters a bird offering outside is liable, but one is not liable for pinching its nape outside. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? He derives it from the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: “This is the matter” (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה; שָׁחַט עוֹף מְנָא לַן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחָט״.

Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse I have derived liability only for one who slaughters an animal offering outside; from where do we derive that one is liable if he slaughtered a bird offering outside? The verse states: “Or that slaughters,” to include liability for slaughtering a bird.

יָכוֹל אַף הַמּוֹלֵק? וְדִין הוּא: מָה שְׁחִיטָה דְּאֵין דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירָהּ בִּפְנִים, חַיָּיב, מְלִיקָה שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירָהּ בְּפָנִים, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֶה הַדָּבָר״.

One might have thought that even one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. And there is a logical inference to support this: If with regard to the slaughter of a bird offering, which is not the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, one is nevertheless liable if he did it outside, then with regard to pinching the nape of a bird offering, which is the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, is it not logical that one is liable if he did it outside? To counter this, the verse states: “This is the matter” (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ: הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה.

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary for expounding as part of a verbal analogy with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: “This is the matter that the Lord has commanded” (Numbers 30:2).

וְהָא דִּתְנַן: הַקּוֹמֵץ וְהַמְקַבֵּל דָּמִים בַּחוּץ פָּטוּר – מְנָלַן? וּמֵהֵיכָא תֵּיתֵי דְּחַיָּיב?

§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (112b): One who takes a handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel outside the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is exempt; from where do we derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: But from where would it be derived that one is liable for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?

תֵּיתֵי מִשְּׁחִיטָה – מָה לִשְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁכֵּן נִפְסֶלֶת שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלִין בְּפֶסַח!

The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest deriving it through a comparison to slaughtering outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is thereby disqualified. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

תֵּיתֵי מִזְּרִיקָה – מָה לִזְרִיקָה, שֶׁכֵּן זָר חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה!

And if you suggest deriving it through a comparison to sprinkling blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: What is notable about sprinkling? It is notable in that a non-priest who sprinkles blood in the Temple is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

תֵּיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּיא.

Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.

אִם כֵּן, לֹא יֵאָמֵר בִּזְרִיקָה, וְתֵיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּיא!

The Gemara rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.

וְתֵיתֵי מִשְּׁחִיטָה – מָה לִשְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁכֵּן נִפְסֶלֶת שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אוֹכְלִין בַּפֶּסַח; תֵּיתֵי מֵהַעֲלָאָה – מָה לְהַעֲלָאָה, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָהּ בַּמִּנְחָה; וְתֵיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּיא;

The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.

לְהָכִי כְּתִיב קְרָא, לְמֵימַר דְּלָא אֲתָא מִבֵּינַיָּיא.

The Gemara explains: It is for this very reason that a verse is written to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, to say to you that liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple cannot be derived from the common element shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שָׁחַט וְזָרַק – לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל חַיָּיב אַחַת, לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם.

§ The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: “Blood shall be imputed to that man” (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: One who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to bring one sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, one is liable to bring two sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ [לְדִבְרֵי] רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״שָׁם תַּעֲשֶׂה״ – הַכָּתוּב עֲשָׂאָן לְכוּלָּן עֲבוֹדָה אַחַת.

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as the verse states with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term “you shall do” in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, the verse has regarded all of the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as one rite with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.

זָרַק וְהֶעֱלָה – לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם, לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who sprinkled the blood of an offering and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael is liable to bring two sin offerings. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ [לְדִבְרֵי] רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם; לְהָכִי פַּלְגִינְהוּ קְרָא: ״שָׁם תַּעֲלֶה״ וְ״שָׁם תַּעֲשֶׂה״.

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as it is for this reason that the verse differentiated between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: “There you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do,” in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.

שָׁחַט וְזָרַק וְהֶעֱלָה – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם.

Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, all agree that he is liable to bring two sin offerings.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״בַּמַּחֲנֶה״ – יָכוֹל הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹלָה בַּדָּרוֹם יְהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֶל מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: “That slaughters…in the camp,” one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, will be liable, as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, the next part of the verse states: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.

יָכוֹל חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת? (תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אוֹ עֵז בַּמַּחֲנֶה״.) מִנַּיִן אַף בְּמַחֲנֵה לְוִיָּיה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּמַּחֲנֶה״.

The baraita continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” one might have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering outside all three of the camps. To dispel this notion, the first part of the verse states: “That slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. From where is it derived that one is liable even if he slaughters inside the Levite camp? The verse states: “That slaughters…in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.

אִי בַּמַּחֲנֶה, יָכוֹל הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹלָה בַּדָּרוֹם יְהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ אֶל מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״.

If the verse stated only the term “in the camp,” which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, will also be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp.”

מָה חוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה מְיוּחָד – שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לִשְׁחִיטַת קָדָשִׁים וְלִשְׁחִיטַת כׇּל זֶבַח; יָצָא דָּרוֹם – שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לִשְׁחִיטַת קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, רָאוּי לִשְׁחִיטַת קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.

This indicates that just as the phrase “outside the camp” is distinctive in that it is referring to an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order or for slaughtering any other type of offering, so too, the term “in the camp” is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This excludes the south of the courtyard, as even though it is an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, it is fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט עַל גַּגּוֹ שֶׁל הֵיכָל – חַיָּיב, הוֹאִיל וְאֵין רָאוּי לִשְׁחִיטַת כׇּל זֶבַח. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, נִיכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״(אֶל) מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״, וְלָא בָּעֵי ״אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״;״אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״ לְמָה לִי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי גַּגּוֹ?

Based on this baraita, Ulla says: One who slaughters an offering on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, since the roof is an area that is not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write only: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp,” and it would not be necessary to write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4). Why do I need the verse to also write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”? Is it not to exclude the roof of the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.

וּלְרָבָא – אִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב: ״אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״; ״בַּמַּחֲנֶה״ ״(וְאֶל) מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״ לְמָה לִי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי גַּגּוֹ?

The Gemara questions Rava’s claim: But according to Rava, if that is so and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then let the verse write only: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” Why do I need the verse to also write “in the camp” and “outside the camp”? Is it not that the term “in the camp” indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves to include liability for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary? According to this, the term “outside the camp” would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.

אָמַר רַב מָרִי: לְאֵיתוֹיֵי כּוּלָּהּ בִּפְנִים וְצַוָּארָהּ בַּחוּץ.

Rav Mari said in defense of Rava: No, the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where its body is entirely inside the courtyard but its neck is outside the courtyard.

[צַוָּארָהּ] בַּחוּץ – פְּשִׁיטָא! אַמַּאי קָפֵיד רַחֲמָנָא – אַשְּׁחִיטָה; וּשְׁחִיטָה בַּחוּץ הִיא! אֶלָּא לְאֵיתוֹיֵי כּוּלָּהּ בַּחוּץ וְצַוָּארָהּ בִּפְנִים.

The Gemara modifies Rav Mari’s statement: If its neck is outside the courtyard, it is obvious that one is liable, as about what is the Merciful One particular? The Merciful One is particular about the slaughter. And in this case, the slaughter is done out-side the courtyard. Rather, say instead that the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering where its body is entirely outside the courtyard but its neck is inside the courtyard.

אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּעֲלֶה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

§ An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard today, when there is no Temple: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב – קְדוּשָּׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה קִידְּשָׁה לִשְׁעָתָהּ וְקִידְּשָׁה לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר – קְדוּשָּׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה קִידְּשָׁה לִשְׁעָתָהּ וְלֹא קִידְּשָׁה לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it forever. Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.

נֵימָא דְּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כְּשֶׁהָיוּ בּוֹנִין בַּהֵיכָל – הָיוּ עוֹשִׂים קְלָעִים בַּהֵיכָל, קְלָעִים בָּעֲזָרוֹת; אֶלָּא שֶׁבַּהֵיכָל בּוֹנִין מִבַּחוּץ, וּבָעֲזָרָה בּוֹנִין מִבִּפְנִים.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they would fashion temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁהָיוּ מַקְרִיבִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בַּיִת, וְאוֹכְלִים קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין קְלָעִים, קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין חוֹמָה; מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדוּשָּׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה קִידְּשָׁה לִשְׁעָתָהּ וְקִידְּשָׁה לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever.

לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר לֹא קִידְּשָׁה?

The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them for-ever? The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – קְדוּשָּׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה קִידְּשָׁה לִשְׁעָתָהּ וְקִידְּשָׁה לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא; וּמָר מַאי דִּשְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ קָאָמַר, וּמָר מַאי דִּשְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ קָאָמַר! וְכִי תֵּימָא: קְלָעִים לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמָה לִי? לִצְנִיעוּתָא בְּעָלְמָא.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.

אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּעֲלֶה וְאֵין בּוֹ כְּזַיִת, וְעֶצֶם מַשְׁלִימוֹ לִכְזַיִת – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

§ An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up outside the Temple a limb of an offering and it does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the bone completes the measure to make an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב – חִיבּוּרֵי עוֹלִין כְּעוֹלִין דָּמֵי. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר – חִיבּוּרֵי עוֹלִין לָאו כְּעוֹלִין דָּמוּ.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar is not regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: הַמַּעֲלֶה

Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard