Zevachim 111
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
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Summary
The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate – found in other sources as well – regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites’ time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel.
Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia’s position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved.
The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis’ rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations – either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement as it appears there.
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
Zevachim 111
בְּקָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר פְּלִיגִי.
They disagree with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement with regard to whether wine libations were offered in the Tabernacle in the wilderness before the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara will soon explain the logical connection between the two issues.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: בִּלְמֵדִין נִיסּוּךְ הַמַּיִם מִנִּיסּוּךְ הַיַּיִן פְּלִיגִי.
Ravina said: Everyone agrees that wine libations are valid even if they are not first consecrated in a sacred service vessel. Therefore, one who pours a wine libation outside the courtyard is liable even if it was not first consecrated in a service vessel. They disagree with regard to whether the liability for pouring a water libation can be derived from that of a wine libation. The first tanna holds that it can; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that it cannot.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמְנַסֵּךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה לוּגִּין יַיִן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: וְהוּא שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁן בִּכְלִי.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One who pours as a libation three log of wine outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: And that is in a case where he first consecrated the wine in a sacred service vessel.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: בֵּירוּצֵי מִידּוֹת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
What is the difference between them? Rav Adda bar Rav Yitzḥak said: The difference between them is with regard to whether the overfill of measuring vessels is also consecrated. Both agree that one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard only if it was first consecrated in a service vessel. The first tanna holds that the liquid that rises above the rim of a vessel is also consecrated, and if one collects three log of that liquid and pours it as a libation outside the courtyard he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that only the wine within the walls of the vessel itself is consecrated.
רָבָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בְּבָמָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
Rava, son of Rabba, said: The difference between them is with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement as to whether wine libations were offered on private altars.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי – דְּתַנְיָא: בָּמַת יָחִיד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה נְסָכִים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: טְעוּנָה נְסָכִים.
He explains: And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: An offering sacrificed on a private altar does not need to be accompanied by wine libations; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It does require wine libations. Service vessels are not used in the context of private altars. Therefore, if libations are brought on private altars then it is apparent that libations can be valid even if they were not first consecrated in a service vessel. Accordingly, one would be liable for pouring a libation outside the Temple even if it had not first been consecrated in a service vessel. If libations are not brought on private altars, then there is no precedent of a libation that was not first consecrated in a service vessel, and one would not be liable for pouring a non-consecrated libation outside the Temple.
וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי – דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי תָבֹאוּ״ – לְהַטְעִינָהּ נְסָכִים לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
And the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In introducing the mitzva to bring wine libations together with animal offerings, the verse states: “When you come into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you” (Numbers 15:2), which indicates that the mitzva to bring libations began only once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a great public altar. This assumes libations were not brought on a public altar in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בָּמָה קְטַנָּה? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֶל אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם״ – הֲרֵי בְּבָמָה הַנּוֹהֶגֶת לְכוּלְּכֶם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל.
Do you say that the verse is referring to offerings brought on a great public altar, or is it even referring to offerings brought on a small private altar? Perhaps libations were brought on the public altar in the wilderness, and it is therefore unnecessary to state that after entering Eretz Yisrael libations should continue to be brought on a public altar. Accordingly, the verse must be teaching that after the Jewish people have entered Eretz Yisrael, libations are required even on private altars. This suggestion is rejected: When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you [lakhem],” using the plural form of the word “you,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of a public altar that is used by everyone; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי תָבֹאוּ״ – לְהַטְעִינָהּ נְסָכִים (בְּבָמָה) [לְבָמָה] קְטַנָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Rabbi Akiva says: Through its introductory clause: “When you come,” the verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a small private altar. This assumes libations were already brought in the wilderness, and the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְבָמָה קְטַנָּה; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֶל אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם״ – הֲרֵי בְּבָמָה הַנּוֹהֶגֶת בְּכׇל מוֹשָׁבוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Do you say that the verse is speaking of a small private altar outside the Temple? Or is it only referring to a great public altar? Perhaps libations were not brought on the public altar in the wilderness and the verse is necessary in order to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of an altar that is used in all your dwellings, which certainly must be referring to private altars, as there was only one central public altar.
כְּשֶׁתִּמְצָא לוֹמַר; לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – לֹא קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר, וּלְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר.
The Gemara explains: When you analyze the matter you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, libations were not offered in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. And according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva libations were offered in the wilderness. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: [תַּנָּא] רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר שִׁירַיִים מְעַכְּבִין.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Neḥemya taught this halakha in accordance with the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering.
מֵיתִיבִי: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וַהֲלֹא שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה הֵם! אָמַר לוֹ: אֵיבָרִין וּפְדָרִין יוֹכִיחוּ – שֶׁהֵן שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, וְהַמַּקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ חַיָּיב! אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵיבָרִים וּפְדָרִים – שֶׁהֵן תְּחִלַּת עֲבוֹדָה, תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁאֵינָן תְּחִלַּת עֲבוֹדָה?!
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Neḥemya says that for the remainder of the blood of an offering that one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Isn’t pouring the remainder of the blood considered a non-essential mitzva, which is not indispensable to the validity of the offering? Accordingly, one should not be liable for sacrificing the blood outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: Sacrificial limbs and fats of a burnt offering will prove the matter, as they are considered a non-essential mitzva, and yet one who sacrifices them outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable with regard to the burning of the limbs and fats, which is the start of a sacrificial rite, i.e., burning them is a sacrificial rite in and of itself, shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood, which is not the start of a sacrificial rite, but is just the conclusion of the sprinkling of the blood?
וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: הָנֵי נָמֵי מְעַכְּבִי! תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara explains the challenge from the baraita: And if it is so that Rabbi Neḥemya holds that that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, let Rabbi Neḥemya say in response to Rabbi Akiva: These too, i.e., the pouring of the remainder of the blood, are considered to be a sacrificial rite in and of themselves because failure to pour out the remainder disqualifies the offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשִׁירַיִים הַפְּנִימִיִּים, אֲבָל בְּשִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא מְעַכְּבִי; כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה – בְּשִׁירַיִים הַפְּנִימִים, כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא – בְּשִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים.
The Gemara qualifies its rejection: And now that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The dispute between the tanna’im with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar, but with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar everyone agrees that failure to pour it does not disqualify the offering; the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement and the baraita can therefore be resolved. When Rabbi Neḥemya says in the mishna that one is liable for sacrificing the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard, he is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar. The pouring of that blood is considered a rite in and of itself, and one is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple. When that statement of Rabbi Neḥemya is taught in the baraita, it is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Concerning such blood, Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the pouring is not considered a rite in and of itself.
וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לָא יָדַע מַאי קָאָמַר רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה; הוּא סָבַר: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה שִׁירַיִים חִיצוֹנִים אָמַר, וְקָא מַהְדַּר לֵיהּ שִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים. וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה – לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא קָאָמַר.
In light of this, the Gemara explains the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Neḥemya: And Rabbi Akiva did not know what Rabbi Neḥemya was saying. Rabbi Akiva thought that Rabbi Neḥemya was stating a ruling about the pouring of the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva responded to him with a claim relating to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar and said that it is a non-essential mitzva. And then Rabbi Neḥemya answered him by saying a defense of his opinion in accordance with the misconception underlying the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹלֵק אֶת הָעוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הָעוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: One who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up outside the courtyard is liable. But if one pinched its nape outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard he is exempt, as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. One who slaughters, with a knife, a bird offering inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard is exempt, as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering.
שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable.
נִמְצָא דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ בִּפְנִים – פְּטוּרוֹ בַּחוּץ, דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ מִבַּחוּץ – פְּטוּרוֹ בִּפְנִים.
Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עַל כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים שֶׁהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ; חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ.
Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
גְּמָ׳ הַאי ״הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ״?! חִיּוּבוֹ הוּא! תְּנִי ״חִיּוּבוֹ״.
GEMARA: In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This term: The manner of its preparation, is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard is the reason for its liability. The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and teach: Its liability.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר [וְכוּ׳]. אַהֵיכָא קָאֵי?
§ The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: To what does he refer?
אִילֵּימָא אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי: הַמּוֹלֵק עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְנִים מִיחַיַּיב, בַּחוּץ נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב. הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ״?! ״כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בִּפְנִים״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
If we say that he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which states: One who pinches the nape of the bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, but if one pinched its nape outside and then offered it up outside, he is exempt; and it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who pinches its nape outside and then offers it up outside is liable, this is difficult. If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.
אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּבְחוּץ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, בִּפְנִים נָמֵי לָא לִיחַיַּיב? הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who pinches its nape inside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue either.
אֶלָּא אַסֵּיפָא קָאֵי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כִּי הֵיכִי דְּבִפְנִים לָא מִיחַיַּיב, בַּחוּץ נָמֵי לָא מִיחַיַּיב. הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rather, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna: One who slaughters a bird offering inside and offers it up outside is exempt, but if one slaughtered a bird offering outside and then offered it up outside, he is liable. And it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who slaughters it outside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.
אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּבַחוּץ מִיחַיַּיב, בִּפְנִים נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב? הָא קָתָנֵי: חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וְהַמַּעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ!
Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who slaughters it inside and then offers it up outside is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold this, as the mishna teaches that he concludes: This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
אָמַר זְעֵירִי: שְׁחִיטַת בְּהֵמָה בַּלַּיְלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: [וְכֵן] הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה בִּפְנִים בַּלַּיְלָה וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ בַּלַּיְלָה וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first tanna with regard to another issue. Ze’eiri said: The difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the slaughter of an animal offering at night inside the courtyard, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who slaughters an animal offering inside the courtyard at night and then offers it up outside is exempt, as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who slaughtered an animal outside the courtyard at night and then offered it up outside is liable.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עַל כְּיוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ, חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ.
It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
רָבָא אָמַר: קַבָּלָה בִּכְלִי חוֹל אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: [וְכֵן] הַמְקַבֵּל בִּכְלִי חוֹל בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. הַמְקַבֵּל בִּכְלִי חוֹל בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rava said that the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the collection of the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel inside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is exempt, as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel outside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is liable.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ, חַיָּיבִין עַל כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ, חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ.
It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
הַשְׁתָּא דְּתָנֵי אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: הַמּוֹלֵק עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מִיחַיַּיב; רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָתָם קָאֵי – וְתָנֵי: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ.
The Gemara comments: Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught a baraita, another explanation can be provided. The baraita teaches: One who pinches the nape of a bird inside the courtyard and then offers it up outside is liable, but one who pinched the nape of a bird outside and then offered it up outside is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon says that he is liable. It is apparent then that Rabbi Shimon in the mishna is referring to there, i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna and teach: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.
מַתְנִי׳ חַטָּאת שֶׁקִּבֵּל דָּמָהּ בְּכוֹס אֶחָד; נָתַן בַּחוּץ וְחָזַר וְנָתַן בִּפְנִים, בִּפְנִים וְחָזַר וְנָתַן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁכּוּלּוֹ רָאוּי בִּפְנִים.
MISHNA: With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard.
קִבֵּל דָּמָהּ בִּשְׁתֵּי כּוֹסוֹת; נָתַן שְׁנֵיהֶם בִּפְנִים – פָּטוּר. שְׁנֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. אֶחָד בַּחוּץ וְאֶחָד בִּפְנִים – חַיָּיב עַל הַחִיצוֹן, וְהַפְּנִימִי מְכַפֵּר.
If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְמַפְרִישׁ חַטָּאתוֹ וְאָבְדָה וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת. שָׁחַט שְׁתֵּיהֶן בִּפְנִים – פָּטוּר. שְׁתֵּיהֶן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אַחַת בִּפְנִים וְאַחַת בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. אַחַת בַּחוּץ וְאַחַת בִּפְנִים – חַיָּיב עַל הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְהַפְּנִימִית מְכַפֶּרֶת.
To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
כְּשֵׁם שֶׁדָּמָהּ פּוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ, כָּךְ הִיא פּוֹטֶרֶת אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶירְתָּהּ.
The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.
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Zevachim Daf 109-114– Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time
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Zevachim 111
בְּקָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר פְּלִיגִי.
They disagree with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement with regard to whether wine libations were offered in the Tabernacle in the wilderness before the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara will soon explain the logical connection between the two issues.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: בִּלְמֵדִין נִיסּוּךְ הַמַּיִם מִנִּיסּוּךְ הַיַּיִן פְּלִיגִי.
Ravina said: Everyone agrees that wine libations are valid even if they are not first consecrated in a sacred service vessel. Therefore, one who pours a wine libation outside the courtyard is liable even if it was not first consecrated in a service vessel. They disagree with regard to whether the liability for pouring a water libation can be derived from that of a wine libation. The first tanna holds that it can; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that it cannot.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמְנַסֵּךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה לוּגִּין יַיִן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: וְהוּא שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁן בִּכְלִי.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One who pours as a libation three log of wine outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: And that is in a case where he first consecrated the wine in a sacred service vessel.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: בֵּירוּצֵי מִידּוֹת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
What is the difference between them? Rav Adda bar Rav Yitzḥak said: The difference between them is with regard to whether the overfill of measuring vessels is also consecrated. Both agree that one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard only if it was first consecrated in a service vessel. The first tanna holds that the liquid that rises above the rim of a vessel is also consecrated, and if one collects three log of that liquid and pours it as a libation outside the courtyard he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that only the wine within the walls of the vessel itself is consecrated.
רָבָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר: קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בְּבָמָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
Rava, son of Rabba, said: The difference between them is with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement as to whether wine libations were offered on private altars.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי – דְּתַנְיָא: בָּמַת יָחִיד אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה נְסָכִים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: טְעוּנָה נְסָכִים.
He explains: And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: An offering sacrificed on a private altar does not need to be accompanied by wine libations; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It does require wine libations. Service vessels are not used in the context of private altars. Therefore, if libations are brought on private altars then it is apparent that libations can be valid even if they were not first consecrated in a service vessel. Accordingly, one would be liable for pouring a libation outside the Temple even if it had not first been consecrated in a service vessel. If libations are not brought on private altars, then there is no precedent of a libation that was not first consecrated in a service vessel, and one would not be liable for pouring a non-consecrated libation outside the Temple.
וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי – דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי תָבֹאוּ״ – לְהַטְעִינָהּ נְסָכִים לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
And the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In introducing the mitzva to bring wine libations together with animal offerings, the verse states: “When you come into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you” (Numbers 15:2), which indicates that the mitzva to bring libations began only once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a great public altar. This assumes libations were not brought on a public altar in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בָּמָה קְטַנָּה? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֶל אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם״ – הֲרֵי בְּבָמָה הַנּוֹהֶגֶת לְכוּלְּכֶם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל.
Do you say that the verse is referring to offerings brought on a great public altar, or is it even referring to offerings brought on a small private altar? Perhaps libations were brought on the public altar in the wilderness, and it is therefore unnecessary to state that after entering Eretz Yisrael libations should continue to be brought on a public altar. Accordingly, the verse must be teaching that after the Jewish people have entered Eretz Yisrael, libations are required even on private altars. This suggestion is rejected: When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you [lakhem],” using the plural form of the word “you,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of a public altar that is used by everyone; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי תָבֹאוּ״ – לְהַטְעִינָהּ נְסָכִים (בְּבָמָה) [לְבָמָה] קְטַנָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Rabbi Akiva says: Through its introductory clause: “When you come,” the verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a small private altar. This assumes libations were already brought in the wilderness, and the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְבָמָה קְטַנָּה; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֶל אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם״ – הֲרֵי בְּבָמָה הַנּוֹהֶגֶת בְּכׇל מוֹשָׁבוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Do you say that the verse is speaking of a small private altar outside the Temple? Or is it only referring to a great public altar? Perhaps libations were not brought on the public altar in the wilderness and the verse is necessary in order to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of an altar that is used in all your dwellings, which certainly must be referring to private altars, as there was only one central public altar.
כְּשֶׁתִּמְצָא לוֹמַר; לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – לֹא קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר, וּלְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – קָרְבוּ נְסָכִים בַּמִּדְבָּר.
The Gemara explains: When you analyze the matter you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, libations were not offered in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. And according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva libations were offered in the wilderness. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: [תַּנָּא] רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר שִׁירַיִים מְעַכְּבִין.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Neḥemya taught this halakha in accordance with the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering.
מֵיתִיבִי: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וַהֲלֹא שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה הֵם! אָמַר לוֹ: אֵיבָרִין וּפְדָרִין יוֹכִיחוּ – שֶׁהֵן שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, וְהַמַּקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ חַיָּיב! אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵיבָרִים וּפְדָרִים – שֶׁהֵן תְּחִלַּת עֲבוֹדָה, תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם שֶׁאֵינָן תְּחִלַּת עֲבוֹדָה?!
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Neḥemya says that for the remainder of the blood of an offering that one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Isn’t pouring the remainder of the blood considered a non-essential mitzva, which is not indispensable to the validity of the offering? Accordingly, one should not be liable for sacrificing the blood outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: Sacrificial limbs and fats of a burnt offering will prove the matter, as they are considered a non-essential mitzva, and yet one who sacrifices them outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable with regard to the burning of the limbs and fats, which is the start of a sacrificial rite, i.e., burning them is a sacrificial rite in and of itself, shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood, which is not the start of a sacrificial rite, but is just the conclusion of the sprinkling of the blood?
וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: הָנֵי נָמֵי מְעַכְּבִי! תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara explains the challenge from the baraita: And if it is so that Rabbi Neḥemya holds that that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, let Rabbi Neḥemya say in response to Rabbi Akiva: These too, i.e., the pouring of the remainder of the blood, are considered to be a sacrificial rite in and of themselves because failure to pour out the remainder disqualifies the offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשִׁירַיִים הַפְּנִימִיִּים, אֲבָל בְּשִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא מְעַכְּבִי; כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה – בְּשִׁירַיִים הַפְּנִימִים, כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא – בְּשִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים.
The Gemara qualifies its rejection: And now that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The dispute between the tanna’im with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar, but with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar everyone agrees that failure to pour it does not disqualify the offering; the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement and the baraita can therefore be resolved. When Rabbi Neḥemya says in the mishna that one is liable for sacrificing the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard, he is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar. The pouring of that blood is considered a rite in and of itself, and one is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple. When that statement of Rabbi Neḥemya is taught in the baraita, it is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Concerning such blood, Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the pouring is not considered a rite in and of itself.
וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לָא יָדַע מַאי קָאָמַר רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה; הוּא סָבַר: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה שִׁירַיִים חִיצוֹנִים אָמַר, וְקָא מַהְדַּר לֵיהּ שִׁירַיִים הַחִיצוֹנִים. וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה – לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא קָאָמַר.
In light of this, the Gemara explains the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Neḥemya: And Rabbi Akiva did not know what Rabbi Neḥemya was saying. Rabbi Akiva thought that Rabbi Neḥemya was stating a ruling about the pouring of the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva responded to him with a claim relating to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar and said that it is a non-essential mitzva. And then Rabbi Neḥemya answered him by saying a defense of his opinion in accordance with the misconception underlying the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹלֵק אֶת הָעוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הָעוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: One who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up outside the courtyard is liable. But if one pinched its nape outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard he is exempt, as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. One who slaughters, with a knife, a bird offering inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard is exempt, as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering.
שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable.
נִמְצָא דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ בִּפְנִים – פְּטוּרוֹ בַּחוּץ, דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ מִבַּחוּץ – פְּטוּרוֹ בִּפְנִים.
Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עַל כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים שֶׁהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ; חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ.
Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
גְּמָ׳ הַאי ״הֶכְשֵׁירוֹ״?! חִיּוּבוֹ הוּא! תְּנִי ״חִיּוּבוֹ״.
GEMARA: In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This term: The manner of its preparation, is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard is the reason for its liability. The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and teach: Its liability.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר [וְכוּ׳]. אַהֵיכָא קָאֵי?
§ The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: To what does he refer?
אִילֵּימָא אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי: הַמּוֹלֵק עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְנִים מִיחַיַּיב, בַּחוּץ נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב. הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ״?! ״כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בִּפְנִים״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
If we say that he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which states: One who pinches the nape of the bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, but if one pinched its nape outside and then offered it up outside, he is exempt; and it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who pinches its nape outside and then offers it up outside is liable, this is difficult. If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.
אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּבְחוּץ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, בִּפְנִים נָמֵי לָא לִיחַיַּיב? הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who pinches its nape inside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue either.
אֶלָּא אַסֵּיפָא קָאֵי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כִּי הֵיכִי דְּבִפְנִים לָא מִיחַיַּיב, בַּחוּץ נָמֵי לָא מִיחַיַּיב. הַאי ״כֹּל שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rather, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna: One who slaughters a bird offering inside and offers it up outside is exempt, but if one slaughtered a bird offering outside and then offered it up outside, he is liable. And it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who slaughters it outside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.
אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּבַחוּץ מִיחַיַּיב, בִּפְנִים נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב? הָא קָתָנֵי: חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וְהַמַּעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ!
Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who slaughters it inside and then offers it up outside is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold this, as the mishna teaches that he concludes: This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
אָמַר זְעֵירִי: שְׁחִיטַת בְּהֵמָה בַּלַּיְלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: [וְכֵן] הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה בִּפְנִים בַּלַּיְלָה וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ בַּלַּיְלָה וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first tanna with regard to another issue. Ze’eiri said: The difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the slaughter of an animal offering at night inside the courtyard, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who slaughters an animal offering inside the courtyard at night and then offers it up outside is exempt, as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who slaughtered an animal outside the courtyard at night and then offered it up outside is liable.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עַל כְּיוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ, חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ.
It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
רָבָא אָמַר: קַבָּלָה בִּכְלִי חוֹל אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: [וְכֵן] הַמְקַבֵּל בִּכְלִי חוֹל בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. הַמְקַבֵּל בִּכְלִי חוֹל בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.
The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rava said that the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the collection of the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel inside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is exempt, as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel outside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is liable.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ, חַיָּיבִין עַל כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ, חוּץ מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ.
It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
הַשְׁתָּא דְּתָנֵי אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: הַמּוֹלֵק עוֹף בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלוֹ בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מָלַק בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מִיחַיַּיב; רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָתָם קָאֵי – וְתָנֵי: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו בַּחוּץ.
The Gemara comments: Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught a baraita, another explanation can be provided. The baraita teaches: One who pinches the nape of a bird inside the courtyard and then offers it up outside is liable, but one who pinched the nape of a bird outside and then offered it up outside is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon says that he is liable. It is apparent then that Rabbi Shimon in the mishna is referring to there, i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna and teach: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.
מַתְנִי׳ חַטָּאת שֶׁקִּבֵּל דָּמָהּ בְּכוֹס אֶחָד; נָתַן בַּחוּץ וְחָזַר וְנָתַן בִּפְנִים, בִּפְנִים וְחָזַר וְנָתַן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁכּוּלּוֹ רָאוּי בִּפְנִים.
MISHNA: With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard.
קִבֵּל דָּמָהּ בִּשְׁתֵּי כּוֹסוֹת; נָתַן שְׁנֵיהֶם בִּפְנִים – פָּטוּר. שְׁנֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. אֶחָד בַּחוּץ וְאֶחָד בִּפְנִים – חַיָּיב עַל הַחִיצוֹן, וְהַפְּנִימִי מְכַפֵּר.
If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְמַפְרִישׁ חַטָּאתוֹ וְאָבְדָה וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת. שָׁחַט שְׁתֵּיהֶן בִּפְנִים – פָּטוּר. שְׁתֵּיהֶן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. אַחַת בִּפְנִים וְאַחַת בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. אַחַת בַּחוּץ וְאַחַת בִּפְנִים – חַיָּיב עַל הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְהַפְּנִימִית מְכַפֶּרֶת.
To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
כְּשֵׁם שֶׁדָּמָהּ פּוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ, כָּךְ הִיא פּוֹטֶרֶת אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶירְתָּהּ.
The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.
