Zevachim 111

בקרבו נסכים במדבר פליגי

They disagree with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement with regard to whether wine libations were offered in the Tabernacle in the wilderness before the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara will soon explain the logical connection between the two issues.

רבינא אמר בלמדין ניסוך המים מניסוך היין פליגי

Ravina said: Everyone agrees that wine libations are valid even if they are not first consecrated in a sacred service vessel. Therefore, one who pours a wine libation outside the courtyard is liable even if it was not first consecrated in a service vessel. They disagree with regard to whether the liability for pouring a water libation can be derived from that of a wine libation. The first tanna holds that it can; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that it cannot.

תנו רבנן המנסך שלשה לוגין יין בחוץ חייב רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר והוא שקדשן בכלי

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One who pours as a libation three log of wine outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: And that is in a case where he first consecrated the wine in a sacred service vessel.

מאי בינייהו אמר רב אדא בר רב יצחק בירוצי מידות איכא בינייהו

What is the difference between them? Rav Adda bar Rav Yitzḥak said: The difference between them is with regard to whether the overfill of measuring vessels is also consecrated. Both agree that one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard only if it was first consecrated in a service vessel. The first tanna holds that the liquid that rises above the rim of a vessel is also consecrated, and if one collects three log of that liquid and pours it as a liba-tion outside the courtyard he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that only the wine within the walls of the vessel itself is consecrated.

רבא בריה דרבה אמר קרבו נסכים בבמה איכא בינייהו

Rava, son of Rabba, said: The difference between them is with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement as to whether wine libations were offered on private altars.

ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא במת יחיד אינה צריכה נסכים דברי רבי וחכמים אומרים טעונה נסכים

He explains: And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: An offering sacrificed on a private altar does not need to be accompanied by wine libations; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It does require wine libations. Service vessels are not used in the context of private altars. Therefore, if libations are brought on private altars then it is apparent that libations can be valid even if they were not first consecrated in a service vessel. Accordingly, one would be liable for pouring a libation outside the Temple even if it had not first been consecrated in a service vessel. If libations are not brought on private altars, then there is there is no precedent of a libation that was not first consecrated in a service vessel, and one would not be liable for pouring a non-consecrated libation outside the Temple.

והני תנאי כהני תנאי דתניא כי תבאו להטעינה נסכים בבמה גדולה הכתוב מדבר

And the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In introducing the mitzva to bring wine libations together with animal offerings, the verse states: “When you come into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you” (Numbers 15:2), which indicates that the mitzva to bring libations began only once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a great public altar. This assumes libations were not brought on a public altar in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required.

אתה אומר בבמה גדולה או אינו אפילו בבמה קטנה כשהוא אומר אל ארץ מושבתיכם אשר אני נתן לכם הרי בבמה הנוהגת לכולכם הכתוב מדבר דברי רבי ישמעאל

Do you say that the verse is referring to offerings brought on a great public altar, or is it even referring to offerings brought on a small private altar? Perhaps libations were brought on the public altar in the wilderness, and it is therefore unnecessary to state that after entering Eretz Yisrael libations should continue to be brought on a public altar. Accordingly, the verse must be teaching that after the Jewish people have entered Eretz Yisrael, libations are required even on private altars. This suggestion is rejected: When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you [lakhem],” using the plural form of the word “you,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of a public altar that is used by everyone; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

רבי עקיבא אומר כי תבאו להטעינה נסכים בבמה קטנה הכתוב מדבר

Rabbi Akiva says: Through its introductory clause: “When you come,” the verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a small private altar. This assumes libations were already brought in the wilderness, and the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.

אתה אומר לבמה קטנה או אינו אלא לבמה גדולה כשהוא אומר אל ארץ מושבתיכם הרי בבמה הנוהגת בכל מושבות הכתוב מדבר

Do you say that the verse is speaking of a small private altar outside the Temple? Or is it only referring to a great public altar? Perhaps libations were not brought on the public altar in the wilderness and the verse is necessary in order to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of an altar that is used in all your dwellings, which certainly must be referring to private altars, as there was only one central public altar.

כשתמצא לומר לדברי רבי ישמעאל לא קרבו נסכים במדבר ולדברי רבי עקיבא קרבו נסכים במדבר

The Gemara explains: When you analyze the matter you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, libations were not offered in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. And according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva libations were offered in the wilderness. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.

רבי נחמיה אומר שירי הדם שהקריבן בחוץ חייב

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.

אמר רבי יוחנן [תנא] רבי נחמיה כדברי האומר שיריים מעכבין

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Neḥemya taught this halakha in accordance with the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering.

מיתיבי רבי נחמיה אומר שירי הדם שהקריבן בחוץ חייב אמר לו רבי עקיבא והלא שירי הדם שירי מצוה הם אמר לו איברין ופדרין יוכיחו שהן שירי מצוה והמקריבן בחוץ חייב אמר לו לא אם אמרת באיברים ופדרים שהן תחלת עבודה תאמר בשירי הדם שאינן תחלת עבודה

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Neḥemya says that for the remainder of the blood of an offering that one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Isn’t pouring the remainder of the blood considered a non-essential mitzva, which is not indispensable to the validity of the offering? Accordingly, one should not be liable for sacrificing the blood outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: Sacrificial limbs and fats of a burnt offering will prove the matter, as they are considered a non-essential mitzva, and yet one who sacrifices them outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable with regard to the burning of the limbs and fats, which is the start of a sacrificial rite, i.e., burning them is an sacrificial rite in and of itself, shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood, which is not the start of a sacrificial rite, but is just the conclusion of the sprinkling of the blood?

ואם איתא לימא ליה הני נמי מעכבי תיובתא

The Gemara explains the challenge from the baraita: And if it is so that Rabbi Neḥemya holds that that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, let Rabbi Neḥemya say in response to Rabbi Akiva: These too, i.e., the pouring of the remainder of the blood, are considered to be a sacrificial rite in and of themselves because failure to pour out the remainder disqualifies the offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.

והשתא דאמר רב אדא בר אהבה מחלוקת בשיריים הפנימיים אבל בשיריים החיצונים דברי הכל לא מעכבי כי קאמר רבי נחמיה בשיריים הפנימים כי תניא ההיא בשיריים החיצונים

The Gemara qualifies its rejection: And now that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The dispute between the tanna’im with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar, but with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar everyone agrees that failure to pour it does not disqualify the offering; the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement and the baraita can therefore be resolved. When Rabbi Neḥemya says in the mishna that one is liable for sacrificing the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard, he is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar. The pouring of that blood is considered a rite in and of itself, and one is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple. When that statement of Rabbi Neḥemya is taught in the baraita, it is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Concerning such blood, Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the pouring is not considered a rite in and of itself.

ורבי עקיבא לא ידע מאי קאמר רבי נחמיה הוא סבר רבי נחמיה שיריים חיצונים אמר וקא מהדר ליה שיריים החיצונים ורבי נחמיה לדבריו דרבי עקיבא קאמר

In light of this, the Gemara explains the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Neḥemya: And Rabbi Akiva did not know what Rabbi Neḥemya was saying. Rabbi Akiva thought that Rabbi Neḥemya was stating a ruling about the pouring of the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva responded to him with a claim relating to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar and said that it is a non-essential mitzva. And then Rabbi Neḥemya answered him by saying a defense of his opinion in accordance with the misconception underlying the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

מתני׳ המולק את העוף בפנים והעלה בחוץ חייב מלק בחוץ והעלה בחוץ פטור השוחט את העוף בפנים והעלה בחוץ פטור

MISHNA: One who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up outside the courtyard is liable. But if one pinched its nape outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard he is exempt, as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. One who slaughters, with a knife, a bird offering inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard is exempt, as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering.

שחט בחוץ והעלה בחוץ חייב

But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable.

נמצא דרך הכשירו בפנים פטורו בחוץ דרך הכשירו מבחוץ פטורו בפנים

Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard.

רבי שמעון אומר כל שחייבין עליו בחוץ חייבין על כיוצא בו בפנים שהעלה בחוץ חוץ מן השוחט בפנים ומעלה בחוץ

Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

גמ׳ האי הכשירו חיובו הוא תני חיובו

GEMARA: In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This term: The manner of its preparation, is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard is the reason for its liability. The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and teach: Its liability.

רבי שמעון אומר [וכו׳] אהיכא קאי

§ The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: To what does he refer?

אילימא ארישא קאי המולק עוף בפנים והעלה בחוץ חייב מלק בחוץ והעלה בחוץ פטור ואמר ליה רבי שמעון כי היכי דפנים מיחייב בחוץ נמי מיחייב האי כל שחייבין עליו בחוץ כל שחייבין עליו בפנים מיבעי ליה

If we say that he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which states: One who pinches the nape of the bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, but if one pinched its nape outside and then offered it up outside, he is exempt; and it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who pinches its nape outside and then offers it up outside is liable, this is difficult. If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.

אלא כי היכי דבחוץ לא מיחייב בפנים נמי לא ליחייב האי כל שאין חייבין עליו בחוץ מיבעי ליה

Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who pinches its nape inside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue either.

אלא אסיפא קאי השוחט עוף בפנים והעלה בחוץ פטור שחט בחוץ והעלה בחוץ חייב ואמר ליה רבי שמעון כי היכי דבפנים לא מיחייב בחוץ נמי לא מיחייב האי כל שאין חייבין מיבעי ליה

Rather, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna: One who slaughters a bird offering inside and offers it up outside is exempt, but if one slaughtered a bird offering outside and then offered it up outside, he is liable. And it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who slaughters it outside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.

אלא כי היכי דבחוץ מיחייב בפנים נמי מיחייב הא קתני חוץ מן השוחט בפנים והמעלה בחוץ

Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who slaughters it inside and then offers it up outside is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold this, as the mishna teaches that he concludes: This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

אמר זעירי שחיטת בהמה בלילה איכא בינייהו והכי קאמר [וכן] השוחט בהמה בפנים בלילה והעלה בחוץ פטור שחט בחוץ בלילה והעלה בחוץ חייב

If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first tanna with regard to another issue. Ze’eiri said: The difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the slaughter of an animal offering at night inside the courtyard, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who slaughters an animal offering inside the courtyard at night and then offers it up outside is exempt, as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who slaughtered an animal outside the courtyard at night and then offered it up outside is liable.

רבי שמעון אומר כל שחייבין עליו בחוץ חייבין על כיוצא בו בפנים והעלה בחוץ חוץ מן השוחט עוף בפנים והעלה בחוץ

It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

רבא אמר קבלה בכלי חול איכא בינייהו והכי קאמר [וכן] המקבל בכלי חול בפנים והעלה בחוץ פטור המקבל בכלי חול בחוץ והעלה בחוץ חייב

The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rava said that the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the collection of the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel inside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is exempt, as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel outside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is liable.

רבי שמעון אומר כל שחייבין עליו בחוץ חייבין על כיוצא בו בפנים והעלו בחוץ חוץ מן השוחט עוף בפנים והעלו בחוץ

It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

השתא דתני אבוה דשמואל בר רב יצחק המולק עוף בפנים והעלו בחוץ חייב מלק בחוץ והעלה בחוץ פטור ורבי שמעון מיחייב רבי שמעון התם קאי ותני כל שחייבין עליו בפנים והעלה בחוץ חייבין עליו בחוץ

The Gemara comments: Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught a baraita, another explanation can be provided. The baraita teaches: One who pinches the nape of a bird inside the courtyard and then offers it up outside is liable, but one who pinched the nape of a bird outside and then offered it up outside is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon says that he is liable. It is apparent then that Rabbi Shimon in the mishna is referring to there, i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna and teach: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.

מתני׳ חטאת שקבל דמה בכוס אחד נתן בחוץ וחזר ונתן בפנים בפנים וחזר ונתן בחוץ חייב שכולו ראוי בפנים

MISHNA: With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard.

קבל דמה בשתי כוסות נתן שניהם בפנים פטור שניהם בחוץ חייב אחד בפנים ואחד בחוץ פטור אחד בחוץ ואחד בפנים חייב על החיצון והפנימי מכפר

If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.

למה הדבר דומה למפריש חטאתו ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ואחר כך נמצאת הראשונה והרי שתיהן עומדות שחט שתיהן בפנים פטור שתיהן בחוץ חייב אחת בפנים ואחת בחוץ פטור אחת בחוץ ואחת בפנים חייב על החיצונה והפנימית מכפרת

To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.

כשם שדמה פוטר את בשרה כך היא פוטרת את בשר חבירתה

The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.