Zevachim 29
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Summary
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Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices – specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul.
An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process.
Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul.
If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet.
Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her mother, Lila Klein, Leah bat Yosef v’Pasha, who passed away on Hoshana Rabbah eight years ago. “A preschool teacher and director, she loved to share our holidays, music, and Jewish values with the little ones. May her memory be a blessing.”
Zevachim 29
לֹא יְעָרֵב בּוֹ מַחְשָׁבוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת.
indicates that to render an offering piggul, the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul. If he has more than one type of improper intent, the offering is disqualified, but it is not rendered piggul.
״פִּגּוּל״ – זֶה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
When the verse states: “Piggul,” this is referring to an offering that one had intent to consume outside its designated area.
״יִהְיֶה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמִּצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה.
And since the verse states: “It shall be,” and not: They shall be, this teaches that intent to consume half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time and intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area join together with one another to constitute the minimum measure required to disqualify the offering.
״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם; וְאֵיזֶה? זֶה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – דְּגָמַר ״עָוֹן״–״עָוֹן״ מִנּוֹתָר, דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.
Finally, when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” the term “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of karet, but not two of them. And which is this? It is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as one derives by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from notar (Leviticus 19:8), that “bear his iniquity” means that one is liable to receive karet. The comparison is apt since notar is similar to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin, beit.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: לְדִידָךְ, ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ דְּפָרָשַׁת ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ – מַאי דָּרְשַׁתְּ בֵּיהּ? הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמָקוֹם שֶׁיְּהֵא מְשׁוּלָּשׁ בְּדָם, בְּבָשָׂר וּבְאֵימוּרִין.
Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to your opinion, in what way do you interpret the reference to the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy”? Rava responded: That verse is necessary to teach that a given location is considered to be outside the offering’s designated area only if it is so in three ways, i.e., outside the permitted limits of the blood, of the meat, and of the sacrificial portions.
תִּיפּוֹק לִי מִקְרָא קַמָּא: ״אִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״ – מִדְּאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן ״שְׁלִישִׁי״!
The Gemara asks: Why not let me derive that halakha from the first verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day” (Leviticus 7:18), since the Merciful One expresses that verse as well with the term “third”? Since Rava derives the disqualification of intent to consume an offering outside its designated area from this verse, why not let him derive this halakha from the verse as well?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב מַתְנָה; אָמַר לִי: אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – פְּרָט, ״פִּגּוּל״ – כְּלָל; וְנַעֲשֶׂה כְּלָל מוּסָף עַל הַפְּרָט, וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Mattana, and he said to me: If one were to derive this halakha only from there (Leviticus 7:18), I would say: The term “third” is a detail, and the term “piggul” is a generalization, and whenever a detail is followed by a generalization, the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, and consequently, all other areas are included as well. The additional verse teaches us that the halakha includes only those areas that are outside in three ways.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כּוֹף אׇזְנְךָ לִשְׁמוֹעַ – בִּמְחַשֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל מִזִּבְחוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹכֵל מִזִּבְחוֹ לְיוֹם שְׁלִישִׁי? אָמַרְתָּ: אַחַר שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, יַחְזוֹר וְיִפָּסֵל?!
§ The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18): Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear the true meaning of the verse: The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or perhaps it is referring only to one who actually partakes of his offering on the third day, per the straightforward meaning of the verse? But that cannot be; would you say that after the offering is fit for the first two days, it should then be disqualified retroactively by being eaten on the third day?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֵן! מָצִינוּ בְּזָב וְזָבָה וְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם – שֶׁהֵן בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה, וְכֵיוָן שֶׁרָאוּ סָתְרוּ; אַף אַתָּה אַל תִּתְמַהּ עַל זֶה – שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּכְשַׁר, שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיִפָּסֵל.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes, it could be disqualified retroactively. After all, we find with regard to a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav], or a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava], or a woman who observes a clean day for a day when she experiences a discharge, that they all have the presumptive status of purity after immersing. But once they have seen another discharge the same day, they have negated this status retroactively, and everything they had touched after immersing becomes impure. Therefore, you as well should not be surprised about this offering consumed beyond its designated time, that even though it was rendered fit, it may then be disqualified retroactively.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״הַמַּקְרִיב״ – בִּשְׁעַת הַקְרָבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר ״הַמַּקְרִיב״ אֶלָּא זֶה כֹּהֵן הַמַּקְרִיב? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״אֹתוֹ״ – בַּזֶּבַח הוּא מְדַבֵּר, וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר בַּכֹּהֵן.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But the same verse says: “He who offers it,” indicating that the offering is disqualified at the time of its offering, and it is not disqualified on the third day. Or perhaps when the verse says: “He who offers it,” this is referring only to the priest who sacrifices the offering, indicating that he is disqualified. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, when it states instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.
בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: ״אֹתוֹ״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ״ – יָכוֹל אַף מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה, וְאֵין הַמְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה.
Ben Azzai says: Why must the verse state: “It”? It is necessary because elsewhere it is stated: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you, and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). One might have thought that even one who is late in fulfilling his vow is included in: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, the verse states: “It,” to indicate that it, an offering rendered piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted.”
אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ – בְּמַחְשָׁבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי.
Aḥerim say: One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase “neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” which indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention [maḥashava], and it is not disqualified by consumption on the third day.
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – דִּבְזֶבַח הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר וְאֵינוֹ בְּכֹהֵן, מְנָא לֵיהּ? אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדַּאֲחֵרִים, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִדִּכְתִיב ״לֹא יֵרָצוּ״ וְ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ – זִיבְחָא הוּא.
The Gemara asks: And ben Azzai, who interprets the term “it” as excluding vows that were fulfilled late, from where does he derive that the verse is speaking of the offering and not of the priest? The Gemara responds: If you wish, say that he derives it from the statement of Aḥerim that the verse rules out disqualification on the third day itself. This would be necessary only if the verse is referring to the offering and not the priest. Or, if you wish, say instead: From the fact that it is written: “They shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:25), and: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18), it is evident that the verse is referring to an offering, which may be accepted or may not be accepted.
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – אוֹתוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ וְאֵין מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מִדַּאֲחֵרִים נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא, אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: יָכוֹל יְהֵא בְּכוֹר שֶׁעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ –
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the statement of ben Azzai that one derives from the word “it” that it, i.e., piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” is this halakha derived from here? It is derived from the statement of Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: One might have thought that a firstborn animal whose first year passed, during which time it ought to have been sacrificed, should be
כִּפְסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, וְיִפָּסֵל?
like disqualified consecrated animals, and it should be disqualified from being sacrificed, as though it had developed a blemish.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְגוֹ׳״ – מַקִּישׁ בְּכוֹר לְמַעֲשֵׂר; מָה מַעֲשֵׂר – אֵינוֹ נִפְסָל מִשָּׁנָה לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ, אַף בְּכוֹר – אֵינוֹ נִפְסָל מִשָּׁנָה לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ.
Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The verse juxtaposes a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain to indicate that just as the tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next (see Deuteronomy 14:28), so too a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next. If so, one already derives from this verse that an offering is not disqualified even if it is brought late.
אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּכוֹר, דְּלָאו בַּר הַרְצָאָה הוּא; אֲבָל קָדָשִׁים, דִּבְנֵי הַרְצָאָה נִינְהוּ – אֵימָא לָא לִירַצּוֹ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, the verse cited by ben Azzai was necessary, as without it, it might enter your mind to say that this matter applies only to a firstborn, which is not for acceptance, i.e., it does not serve to atone for any sin and is merely a gift for the priest, but with regard to other sacrificial animals that are for acceptance, say that they shall not effect acceptance when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even these others are not disqualified when brought late.
וְאַכַּתִּי מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא?! ״וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא״ – וְלֹא בְּקׇרְבָּנְךָ חֵטְא!
The Gemara asks further: But still, isn’t this halakha derived from a baraita elsewhere: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you; and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), indicating that there is sin in you, but there is no sin in your offering, and therefore it is not disqualified due to the delay?
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – הָהוּא מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא״ – וְלֹא בְּאִשְׁתְּךָ חֵטְא. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם מֵתָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ מָמוֹן וְאֵין לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם אֵין לְךָ לְשַׁלֵּם לָמָּה יִקַּח מִשְׁכָּבְךָ מִתַּחְתֶּיךָ״ – בְּהַאי עָוֹן דְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ נָמֵי מֵתָה; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: Ben Azzai requires that verse to teach a different halakha: The phrase “and it will be sin in you” indicates that there will be sin in you, but there will not be sin in your wife. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: A man’s wife does not die unless his creditors ask him for money that he owes and he does not have it, as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27); therefore, one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, since one has failed to fulfill his commitment. Consequently, the verse teaches us that the sin is imputed to him alone.
אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּמַחְשָׁבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בִּשְׁלִישִׁי. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?
§ The baraita stated that Aḥerim say: The phrase “neither shall it be credited” indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention, and it is not disqualified by consumption beyond its designated time on the third day. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who derives this halakha from a different source, what does he do with the phrase “neither shall it be credited”?
מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: מִנַּיִן לְמַחְשָׁבוֹת שֶׁמּוֹצִיאוֹת זוֹ מִזּוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ – לֹא יְעָרֵב בּוֹ מַחְשָׁבוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת.
The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which Rabbi Yannai says, as Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived with regard to intentions that they displace one another, i.e., that an additional improper intention prevents the offering from being rendered piggul? As it is stated: “Neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” indicating that an offering is rendered piggul only if the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul.
וְרַב מָרִי מַתְנֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: מִנַּיִן לִמְחַשֵּׁב בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהוּא לוֹקֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״.
And Rav Mari teaches that Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived that one who has improper intentions with regard to sacrificial animals is flogged like one who transgressed a prohibition? The verse states: “Neither shall it be credited [lo yeḥashev],” i.e., one reads the verse as if it states: One shall not have improper intention [lo y’ḥashev].
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב מָרִי: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – לוֹקִין עָלָיו.
Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and the principle is that for transgressing any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged. Rav Mari said to him: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: For transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged.
מַתְנִי׳ זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט, וְהַמְקַבֵּל, וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ, וְהַזּוֹרֵק; לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר; כְּזַיִת; חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת; וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
MISHNA: This is the principle: With regard to anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood, with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
כֵּיצַד קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ? שָׁחַט בִּשְׁתִיקָה, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק בִּשְׁתִיקָה; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – זֶהוּ שֶׁמַּקְרִיב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered it with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood in silence; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, that is the case where one sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva.
כֵּיצַד לֹא קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ? שָׁחַט חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ (וְלִזְמַנּוֹ).
How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva.
הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קִיבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – זֶהוּ שֶׁלֹּא קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
Similarly, in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and one collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood not for their sake; or that one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר; כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת.
If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל שֶׁמַּחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת. וְאִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה וָזֶה – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר; שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: In any case where the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר אִילְפָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת; אֲבָל בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת מַחְלוֹקֶת.
GEMARA: With regard to the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning a case where one has intent with regard to both time and area, Ilfa says: There is a disagreement only with regard to two sacrificial rites, i.e., where each intent was held during a different rite, but if both were held in the course of one rite, all agree that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the offering is not rendered piggul. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the intentions were both held in the course of one rite, there is still a disagreement.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאִילְפָא – מִדְּרֵישָׁא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, סֵיפָא נָמֵי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – רֵישָׁא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת?!
The Gemara asks: Granted, the mishna is understandable according to Ilfa, since the first clause of the mishna: If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent and collected…beyond its designated time, etc., is referring to different intentions held in the course of two sacrificial rites, one can assume that the latter clause is referring to two rites as well. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, could it be that the first clause is referring to two rites, and the latter clause is referring to only one rite?
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Zevachim 29
לֹא יְעָרֵב בּוֹ מַחְשָׁבוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת.
indicates that to render an offering piggul, the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul. If he has more than one type of improper intent, the offering is disqualified, but it is not rendered piggul.
״פִּגּוּל״ – זֶה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
When the verse states: “Piggul,” this is referring to an offering that one had intent to consume outside its designated area.
״יִהְיֶה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמִּצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה.
And since the verse states: “It shall be,” and not: They shall be, this teaches that intent to consume half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time and intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area join together with one another to constitute the minimum measure required to disqualify the offering.
״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם; וְאֵיזֶה? זֶה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – דְּגָמַר ״עָוֹן״–״עָוֹן״ מִנּוֹתָר, דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.
Finally, when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” the term “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of karet, but not two of them. And which is this? It is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as one derives by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from notar (Leviticus 19:8), that “bear his iniquity” means that one is liable to receive karet. The comparison is apt since notar is similar to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin, beit.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: לְדִידָךְ, ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ דְּפָרָשַׁת ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ – מַאי דָּרְשַׁתְּ בֵּיהּ? הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמָקוֹם שֶׁיְּהֵא מְשׁוּלָּשׁ בְּדָם, בְּבָשָׂר וּבְאֵימוּרִין.
Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to your opinion, in what way do you interpret the reference to the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy”? Rava responded: That verse is necessary to teach that a given location is considered to be outside the offering’s designated area only if it is so in three ways, i.e., outside the permitted limits of the blood, of the meat, and of the sacrificial portions.
תִּיפּוֹק לִי מִקְרָא קַמָּא: ״אִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״ – מִדְּאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן ״שְׁלִישִׁי״!
The Gemara asks: Why not let me derive that halakha from the first verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day” (Leviticus 7:18), since the Merciful One expresses that verse as well with the term “third”? Since Rava derives the disqualification of intent to consume an offering outside its designated area from this verse, why not let him derive this halakha from the verse as well?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב מַתְנָה; אָמַר לִי: אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – פְּרָט, ״פִּגּוּל״ – כְּלָל; וְנַעֲשֶׂה כְּלָל מוּסָף עַל הַפְּרָט, וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Mattana, and he said to me: If one were to derive this halakha only from there (Leviticus 7:18), I would say: The term “third” is a detail, and the term “piggul” is a generalization, and whenever a detail is followed by a generalization, the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, and consequently, all other areas are included as well. The additional verse teaches us that the halakha includes only those areas that are outside in three ways.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כּוֹף אׇזְנְךָ לִשְׁמוֹעַ – בִּמְחַשֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל מִזִּבְחוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹכֵל מִזִּבְחוֹ לְיוֹם שְׁלִישִׁי? אָמַרְתָּ: אַחַר שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, יַחְזוֹר וְיִפָּסֵל?!
§ The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18): Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear the true meaning of the verse: The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or perhaps it is referring only to one who actually partakes of his offering on the third day, per the straightforward meaning of the verse? But that cannot be; would you say that after the offering is fit for the first two days, it should then be disqualified retroactively by being eaten on the third day?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֵן! מָצִינוּ בְּזָב וְזָבָה וְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם – שֶׁהֵן בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה, וְכֵיוָן שֶׁרָאוּ סָתְרוּ; אַף אַתָּה אַל תִּתְמַהּ עַל זֶה – שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּכְשַׁר, שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיִפָּסֵל.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes, it could be disqualified retroactively. After all, we find with regard to a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav], or a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava], or a woman who observes a clean day for a day when she experiences a discharge, that they all have the presumptive status of purity after immersing. But once they have seen another discharge the same day, they have negated this status retroactively, and everything they had touched after immersing becomes impure. Therefore, you as well should not be surprised about this offering consumed beyond its designated time, that even though it was rendered fit, it may then be disqualified retroactively.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״הַמַּקְרִיב״ – בִּשְׁעַת הַקְרָבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר ״הַמַּקְרִיב״ אֶלָּא זֶה כֹּהֵן הַמַּקְרִיב? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״אֹתוֹ״ – בַּזֶּבַח הוּא מְדַבֵּר, וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר בַּכֹּהֵן.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But the same verse says: “He who offers it,” indicating that the offering is disqualified at the time of its offering, and it is not disqualified on the third day. Or perhaps when the verse says: “He who offers it,” this is referring only to the priest who sacrifices the offering, indicating that he is disqualified. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, when it states instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.
בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: ״אֹתוֹ״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ״ – יָכוֹל אַף מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה, וְאֵין הַמְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּלֹא יֵרָצֶה.
Ben Azzai says: Why must the verse state: “It”? It is necessary because elsewhere it is stated: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you, and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). One might have thought that even one who is late in fulfilling his vow is included in: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, the verse states: “It,” to indicate that it, an offering rendered piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted.”
אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ – בְּמַחְשָׁבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי.
Aḥerim say: One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase “neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” which indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention [maḥashava], and it is not disqualified by consumption on the third day.
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – דִּבְזֶבַח הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר וְאֵינוֹ בְּכֹהֵן, מְנָא לֵיהּ? אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדַּאֲחֵרִים, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִדִּכְתִיב ״לֹא יֵרָצוּ״ וְ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ – זִיבְחָא הוּא.
The Gemara asks: And ben Azzai, who interprets the term “it” as excluding vows that were fulfilled late, from where does he derive that the verse is speaking of the offering and not of the priest? The Gemara responds: If you wish, say that he derives it from the statement of Aḥerim that the verse rules out disqualification on the third day itself. This would be necessary only if the verse is referring to the offering and not the priest. Or, if you wish, say instead: From the fact that it is written: “They shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:25), and: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18), it is evident that the verse is referring to an offering, which may be accepted or may not be accepted.
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – אוֹתוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ וְאֵין מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מִדַּאֲחֵרִים נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא, אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: יָכוֹל יְהֵא בְּכוֹר שֶׁעִיבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ –
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the statement of ben Azzai that one derives from the word “it” that it, i.e., piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” is this halakha derived from here? It is derived from the statement of Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: One might have thought that a firstborn animal whose first year passed, during which time it ought to have been sacrificed, should be
כִּפְסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, וְיִפָּסֵל?
like disqualified consecrated animals, and it should be disqualified from being sacrificed, as though it had developed a blemish.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְגוֹ׳״ – מַקִּישׁ בְּכוֹר לְמַעֲשֵׂר; מָה מַעֲשֵׂר – אֵינוֹ נִפְסָל מִשָּׁנָה לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ, אַף בְּכוֹר – אֵינוֹ נִפְסָל מִשָּׁנָה לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ.
Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The verse juxtaposes a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain to indicate that just as the tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next (see Deuteronomy 14:28), so too a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next. If so, one already derives from this verse that an offering is not disqualified even if it is brought late.
אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּכוֹר, דְּלָאו בַּר הַרְצָאָה הוּא; אֲבָל קָדָשִׁים, דִּבְנֵי הַרְצָאָה נִינְהוּ – אֵימָא לָא לִירַצּוֹ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, the verse cited by ben Azzai was necessary, as without it, it might enter your mind to say that this matter applies only to a firstborn, which is not for acceptance, i.e., it does not serve to atone for any sin and is merely a gift for the priest, but with regard to other sacrificial animals that are for acceptance, say that they shall not effect acceptance when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even these others are not disqualified when brought late.
וְאַכַּתִּי מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא?! ״וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא״ – וְלֹא בְּקׇרְבָּנְךָ חֵטְא!
The Gemara asks further: But still, isn’t this halakha derived from a baraita elsewhere: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you; and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), indicating that there is sin in you, but there is no sin in your offering, and therefore it is not disqualified due to the delay?
וּבֶן עַזַּאי – הָהוּא מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא״ – וְלֹא בְּאִשְׁתְּךָ חֵטְא. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם מֵתָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ מָמוֹן וְאֵין לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם אֵין לְךָ לְשַׁלֵּם לָמָּה יִקַּח מִשְׁכָּבְךָ מִתַּחְתֶּיךָ״ – בְּהַאי עָוֹן דְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ נָמֵי מֵתָה; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: Ben Azzai requires that verse to teach a different halakha: The phrase “and it will be sin in you” indicates that there will be sin in you, but there will not be sin in your wife. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: A man’s wife does not die unless his creditors ask him for money that he owes and he does not have it, as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27); therefore, one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, since one has failed to fulfill his commitment. Consequently, the verse teaches us that the sin is imputed to him alone.
אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּמַחְשָׁבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בִּשְׁלִישִׁי. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?
§ The baraita stated that Aḥerim say: The phrase “neither shall it be credited” indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention, and it is not disqualified by consumption beyond its designated time on the third day. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who derives this halakha from a different source, what does he do with the phrase “neither shall it be credited”?
מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: מִנַּיִן לְמַחְשָׁבוֹת שֶׁמּוֹצִיאוֹת זוֹ מִזּוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״ – לֹא יְעָרֵב בּוֹ מַחְשָׁבוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת.
The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which Rabbi Yannai says, as Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived with regard to intentions that they displace one another, i.e., that an additional improper intention prevents the offering from being rendered piggul? As it is stated: “Neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” indicating that an offering is rendered piggul only if the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul.
וְרַב מָרִי מַתְנֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: מִנַּיִן לִמְחַשֵּׁב בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהוּא לוֹקֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״.
And Rav Mari teaches that Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived that one who has improper intentions with regard to sacrificial animals is flogged like one who transgressed a prohibition? The verse states: “Neither shall it be credited [lo yeḥashev],” i.e., one reads the verse as if it states: One shall not have improper intention [lo y’ḥashev].
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב מָרִי: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – לוֹקִין עָלָיו.
Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and the principle is that for transgressing any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged. Rav Mari said to him: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: For transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged.
מַתְנִי׳ זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט, וְהַמְקַבֵּל, וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ, וְהַזּוֹרֵק; לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר; כְּזַיִת; חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת; וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
MISHNA: This is the principle: With regard to anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood, with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
כֵּיצַד קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ? שָׁחַט בִּשְׁתִיקָה, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק בִּשְׁתִיקָה; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – זֶהוּ שֶׁמַּקְרִיב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered it with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood in silence; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, that is the case where one sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva.
כֵּיצַד לֹא קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ? שָׁחַט חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ (וְלִזְמַנּוֹ).
How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva.
הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קִיבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – זֶהוּ שֶׁלֹּא קָרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ.
Similarly, in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and one collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood not for their sake; or that one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר; כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת.
If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל שֶׁמַּחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת. וְאִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה וָזֶה – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר; שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: In any case where the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר אִילְפָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת; אֲבָל בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת מַחְלוֹקֶת.
GEMARA: With regard to the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning a case where one has intent with regard to both time and area, Ilfa says: There is a disagreement only with regard to two sacrificial rites, i.e., where each intent was held during a different rite, but if both were held in the course of one rite, all agree that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the offering is not rendered piggul. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the intentions were both held in the course of one rite, there is still a disagreement.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאִילְפָא – מִדְּרֵישָׁא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, סֵיפָא נָמֵי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – רֵישָׁא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת?!
The Gemara asks: Granted, the mishna is understandable according to Ilfa, since the first clause of the mishna: If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent and collected…beyond its designated time, etc., is referring to different intentions held in the course of two sacrificial rites, one can assume that the latter clause is referring to two rites as well. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, could it be that the first clause is referring to two rites, and the latter clause is referring to only one rite?
