Zevachim 46

בשני חילולין הכתוב מדבר אחד פסול נותר ואחד פסול טומאה

The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of notar and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, notar applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.

חוץ מן הדם כו׳ מנא הני מילי אמר עולא אמר קרא ואני נתתיו לכם שלכם יהא

§ The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the halakha of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא אמר קרא לכפר לכפרה נתתיו ולא למעילה

The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: “To make atonement,” teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

רבי יוחנן אמר אמר קרא הוא הוא לפני כפרה כלאחר כפרה מה אחר כפרה אין בו מעילה אף לפני כפרה אין בו מעילה

Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: “For it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

אימא לאחר כפרה כלפני כפרה מה לפני כפרה יש בו מעילה אף לאחר כפרה יש בו מעילה אין לך דבר שנעשית מצותו ומועלין בו

The Gemara asks: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.

ולא והרי תרומת הדשן

The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.

משום דהוי תרומת הדשן ובגדי כהונה שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.

הניחא לרבנן דאמרי והניחם שם מלמד שטעונין גניזה

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.

אלא לרבי דוסא דאמר מותרות הן לכהן הדיוט ובלבד שלא ישתמש בהן ליום הכפורים אחר מאי איכא למימר

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?

משום דהוי תרומת הדשן ועגלה ערופה שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

הניחא למאן דאמר אין מלמדין אלא למאן דאמר מלמדין מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?

תרי מיעוטי כתיבי הכא כתיב הערופה והתם כתיב ושמו

The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: “Whose neck was broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this halakha, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: “And he shall put it” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this halakha applies to “it,” and nothing else.

ותלתא קראי בדם למה לי

The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, from the verse: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).

למעוטי ממעילה מנותר ומטומאה

The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of notar. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming notar. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.

אבל פיגול לא צריך קרא דתנן כל שיש לו מתירין בין לאדם בין למזבח חייבין עליו משום פיגול ודם גופיה מתיר הוא

But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the halakha of piggul, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The permitting factor itself is not subject to piggul. And consequently, piggul does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.

אמר רבי יוחנן שלשה כריתות בשלמים למה

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why do I need three mentions of karet with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from his people” (Leviticus 7:20); “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21); and: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3).

אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט ואחת לדברים שאינן נאכלין

One mention of karet in the verse: “That approaches the sacred items,” is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain halakha was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of karet in the verse: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item,” serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive karet.

ולרבי שמעון דאמר דברים שאין נאכלין אין חייבין עליהם משום טומאה לאיתויי מאי לאיתויי חטאות הפנימיות

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of karet serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.

סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואמר רבי שמעון כל שאינו על מזבח החיצון כשלמים אין חייבין עליו משום פיגול משום טומאה נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of karet teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.

נומי רבי שמעון מחייב את שדרכו לאכול כו׳ איתמר רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש רבי אלעזר ורבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חד מהאי זוזא וחד מהאי זוזא

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.

חד אמר מחלוקת בטומאת בשר אבל בטומאת הגוף דברי הכל אינו לוקה

One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: “And the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.

וחד אמר כמחלוקת בזו כך מחלוקת בזו מאי טעמא כיון דקרינא ביה והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא קרינן ביה וטמאתו עליו

And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: “And the flesh that touches any impure item” (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: “But the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings…having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.

רב טביומי מתני הכי רב כהנא מתני הכי חד מהאי זוזא וחד מהאי זוזא אסיפא חד אמר מחלוקת בטומאת הגוף אבל בטומאת בשר דברי הכל לוקה וחד אמר כמחלוקת בזו כך מחלוקת בזו

The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of amora’im and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.

אמר רבא מסתברא כמאן דאמר כמחלוקת בזו כך מחלוקת בזו מאי טעמא כיון דלא קרינא ביה וטמאתו עליו ונכרתה לא קרינן ביה והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל

Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: “Having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,” as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.”

והאמר מר והבשר לרבות עצים ולבונה לפוסלה בעלמא

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the Master say that the term: “And as for the flesh,” in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.

מתני׳ לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח לשם זבח לשם זובח לשם השם לשם אשים לשם ריח לשם ניחוח והחטאת והאשם לשם חטא

MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.

אמר רבי יוסי אף מי שלא היה בלבו לשם אחד מכל אלו כשר שהוא תנאי בית דין שאין המחשבה הולכת אלא אחר העובד

Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.

גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר רב עולה לשם עולה לאפוקי לשם שלמים דלא אשים לשם אשים לאפוקי כבבא דלא

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), the term “a burnt offering” means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term “an offering made by fire,” teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.

ריח לשם ריח לאפוקי אברים שצלאן והעלן דלא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב אברים שצלאן והעלן אין בהן משום ריח

Rav continues to expound the verse. The term “aroma” indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.

ניחוח לשם הנחת רוח לה׳ לשם מי שאמר והיה העולם

The term “pleasing” means for the sake of pleasing God’s spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression “to the Lord” indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב חטאת ששחטה לשם עולה פסולה לשם חולין כשרה אמר רבי אלעזר מאי טעמא דרב ולא יחללו את קדשי בני ישראל קדשים מחללין קדשים ואין חולין מחללין קדשים

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.

מתיב רבה אמר רבי יוסי אף מי שלא היה בלבו לשם אחד מכל אלו כשר שהוא תנאי בית דין טעמא שלא היה בלבו כלל הא היה בלבו לשם חולין פסול

Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent ab initio. Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.

אמר ליה אביי דלמא לא היה כלל כשר ומרצה הא היה בלבו לשם חולין כשר ואינו מרצה

Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav’s statement can be understood in a similar fashion.

אמר רבי אלעזר חטאת ששחטה לשם חולין כשרה משום חולין פסולה כדבעא מיניה שמואל מרב הונא

Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna: