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Today's Daf Yomi

May 29, 2018 | 讟状讜 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Zevachim 46

讘砖谞讬 讞讬诇讜诇讬谉 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讗讞讚 驻住讜诇 谞讜转专 讜讗讞讚 驻住讜诇 讟讜诪讗讛

The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of notar and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, notar applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讚诐 讻讜壮 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗谞讬 谞转转讬讜 诇讻诐 砖诇讻诐 讬讛讗

搂 The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the halakha of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: 鈥淔or the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls鈥 (Leviticus 17:11). 鈥淭o you鈥 indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讻驻专 诇讻驻专讛 谞转转讬讜 讜诇讗 诇诪注讬诇讛

The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: 鈥淭o make atonement,鈥 teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讜讗 讛讜讗 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讻诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 诪讛 讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗祝 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: 鈥淔or it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul鈥 (Leviticus 17:11). The term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讻诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 诪讛 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讬砖 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗祝 诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讬砖 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讱 讚讘专 砖谞注砖讬转 诪爪讜转讜 讜诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讜

The Gemara asks: But if the term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.

讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉

The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉 讜讘讙讚讬 讻讛讜谞讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 讜讛谞讬讞诐 砖诐 诪诇诪讚 砖讟注讜谞讬谉 讙谞讬讝讛

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: 鈥淎nd he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there鈥 (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜转专讜转 讛谉 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 诇讬讜诐 讛讻驻讜专讬诐 讗讞专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉 讜注讙诇讛 注专讜驻讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?

转专讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讻转讬讘讬 讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 讛注专讜驻讛 讜讛转诐 讻转讬讘 讜砖诪讜

The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: 鈥淲hose neck was broken鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this halakha, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: 鈥淎nd he shall put it鈥 (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this halakha applies to 鈥渋t,鈥 and nothing else.

讜转诇转讗 拽专讗讬 讘讚诐 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yo岣nan, from the verse: 鈥淚 have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul鈥 (Leviticus 17:11).

诇诪注讜讟讬 诪诪注讬诇讛 诪谞讜转专 讜诪讟讜诪讗讛

The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of notar. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming notar. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.

讗讘诇 驻讬讙讜诇 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽专讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 砖讬砖 诇讜 诪转讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘讬谉 诇诪讝讘讞 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 驻讬讙讜诇 讜讚诐 讙讜驻讬讛 诪转讬专 讛讜讗

But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the halakha of piggul, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The permitting factor itself is not subject to piggul. And consequently, piggul does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖诇砖讛 讻专讬转讜转 讘砖诇诪讬诐 诇诪讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Why do I need three mentions of karet with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: 鈥淏ut the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20); 鈥淎nd when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:21); and: 鈥淲hoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 22:3).

讗讞转 诇讻诇诇 讜讗讞转 诇驻专讟 讜讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 谞讗讻诇讬谉

One mention of karet in the verse: 鈥淭hat approaches the sacred items,鈥 is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: 鈥淥f the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,鈥 is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain halakha was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of karet in the verse: 鈥淎nd when anyone shall touch any impure item,鈥 serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive karet.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 谞讗讻诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛诐 诪砖讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讞讟讗讜转 讛驻谞讬诪讬讜转

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of karet serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 注诇 诪讝讘讞 讛讞讬爪讜谉 讻砖诇诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 驻讬讙讜诇 诪砖讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诇讬讞讬讬讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of karet teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.

谞讜诪讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘 讗转 砖讚专讻讜 诇讗讻讜诇 讻讜壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讜讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗

搂 The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of amora鈥檌m disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.

讞讚 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讗讘诇 讘讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛

One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: 鈥淎nd the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it鈥 (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.

讜讞讚 讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚拽专讬谞讗 讘讬讛 讜讛讘砖专 讗砖专 讬讙注 讘讻诇 讟诪讗 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜讟诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜

And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: 鈥淎nd the flesh that touches any impure item鈥 (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: 鈥淏ut the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.

专讘 讟讘讬讜诪讬 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讜讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讗住讬驻讗 讞讚 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讗讘诇 讘讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讜拽讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜

The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of amora鈥檌m and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽专讬谞讗 讘讬讛 讜讟诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜 讜谞讻专转讛 诇讗 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜讛讘砖专 讗砖专 讬讙注 讘讻诇 讟诪讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇

Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: 鈥淗aving his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,鈥 as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: 鈥淎nd the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.鈥

讜讛讗诪专 诪专 讜讛讘砖专 诇专讘讜转 注爪讬诐 讜诇讘讜谞讛 诇驻讜住诇讛 讘注诇诪讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn鈥檛 the Master say that the term: 鈥淎nd as for the flesh,鈥 in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.

诪转谞讬壮 诇砖诐 砖砖讛 讚讘专讬诐 讛讝讘讞 谞讝讘讞 诇砖诐 讝讘讞 诇砖诐 讝讜讘讞 诇砖诐 讛砖诐 诇砖诐 讗砖讬诐 诇砖诐 专讬讞 诇砖诐 谞讬讞讜讞 讜讛讞讟讗转 讜讛讗砖诐 诇砖诐 讞讟讗

MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God鈥檚 will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗祝 诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讗讞讚 诪讻诇 讗诇讜 讻砖专 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗讬谉 讛诪讞砖讘讛 讛讜诇讻转 讗诇讗 讗讞专 讛注讜讘讚

Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 注讜诇讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讚诇讗 讗砖讬诐 诇砖诐 讗砖讬诐 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讻讘讘讗 讚诇讗

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: 鈥淎 burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 1:9), the term 鈥渁 burnt offering鈥 means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term 鈥渁n offering made by fire,鈥 teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.

专讬讞 诇砖诐 专讬讞 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讗讘专讬诐 砖爪诇讗谉 讜讛注诇谉 讚诇讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讘专讬诐 砖爪诇讗谉 讜讛注诇谉 讗讬谉 讘讛谉 诪砖讜诐 专讬讞

Rav continues to expound the verse. The term 鈥渁roma鈥 indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.

谞讬讞讜讞 诇砖诐 讛谞讞转 专讜讞 诇讛壮 诇砖诐 诪讬 砖讗诪专 讜讛讬讛 讛注讜诇诐

The term 鈥減leasing鈥 means for the sake of pleasing God鈥檚 spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression 鈥渢o the Lord鈥 indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讜诇讗 讬讞诇诇讜 讗转 拽讚砖讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: 鈥淎nd they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.

诪转讬讘 专讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗祝 诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讗讞讚 诪讻诇 讗诇讜 讻砖专 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讟注诪讗 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 讻诇诇 讛讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 驻住讜诇

Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent ab initio. Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讛 讻诇诇 讻砖专 讜诪专爪讛 讛讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav鈥檚 statement can be understood in a similar fashion.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专讛 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诇讬谉 驻住讜诇讛 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诪专讘 讛讜谞讗

Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Zevachim 46

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 46

讘砖谞讬 讞讬诇讜诇讬谉 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讗讞讚 驻住讜诇 谞讜转专 讜讗讞讚 驻住讜诇 讟讜诪讗讛

The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of notar and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, notar applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讚诐 讻讜壮 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗谞讬 谞转转讬讜 诇讻诐 砖诇讻诐 讬讛讗

搂 The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the halakha of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: 鈥淔or the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls鈥 (Leviticus 17:11). 鈥淭o you鈥 indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讻驻专 诇讻驻专讛 谞转转讬讜 讜诇讗 诇诪注讬诇讛

The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: 鈥淭o make atonement,鈥 teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讜讗 讛讜讗 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讻诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 诪讛 讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗祝 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讗讬谉 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: 鈥淔or it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul鈥 (Leviticus 17:11). The term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讻诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 诪讛 诇驻谞讬 讻驻专讛 讬砖 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗祝 诇讗讞专 讻驻专讛 讬砖 讘讜 诪注讬诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讱 讚讘专 砖谞注砖讬转 诪爪讜转讜 讜诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讜

The Gemara asks: But if the term 鈥渋t is鈥 teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.

讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉

The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉 讜讘讙讚讬 讻讛讜谞讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬诐 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 讜讛谞讬讞诐 砖诐 诪诇诪讚 砖讟注讜谞讬谉 讙谞讬讝讛

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: 鈥淎nd he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there鈥 (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜转专讜转 讛谉 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 诇讬讜诐 讛讻驻讜专讬诐 讗讞专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讬 转专讜诪转 讛讚砖谉 讜注讙诇讛 注专讜驻讛 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?

转专讬 诪讬注讜讟讬 讻转讬讘讬 讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 讛注专讜驻讛 讜讛转诐 讻转讬讘 讜砖诪讜

The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: 鈥淲hose neck was broken鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this halakha, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: 鈥淎nd he shall put it鈥 (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this halakha applies to 鈥渋t,鈥 and nothing else.

讜转诇转讗 拽专讗讬 讘讚诐 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yo岣nan, from the verse: 鈥淚 have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul鈥 (Leviticus 17:11).

诇诪注讜讟讬 诪诪注讬诇讛 诪谞讜转专 讜诪讟讜诪讗讛

The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of notar. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming notar. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.

讗讘诇 驻讬讙讜诇 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽专讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 砖讬砖 诇讜 诪转讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘讬谉 诇诪讝讘讞 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 驻讬讙讜诇 讜讚诐 讙讜驻讬讛 诪转讬专 讛讜讗

But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the halakha of piggul, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The permitting factor itself is not subject to piggul. And consequently, piggul does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖诇砖讛 讻专讬转讜转 讘砖诇诪讬诐 诇诪讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Why do I need three mentions of karet with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: 鈥淏ut the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20); 鈥淎nd when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:21); and: 鈥淲hoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 22:3).

讗讞转 诇讻诇诇 讜讗讞转 诇驻专讟 讜讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谞谉 谞讗讻诇讬谉

One mention of karet in the verse: 鈥淭hat approaches the sacred items,鈥 is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: 鈥淥f the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,鈥 is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain halakha was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of karet in the verse: 鈥淎nd when anyone shall touch any impure item,鈥 serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive karet.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 谞讗讻诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛诐 诪砖讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讞讟讗讜转 讛驻谞讬诪讬讜转

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of karet serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.

住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 注诇 诪讝讘讞 讛讞讬爪讜谉 讻砖诇诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 驻讬讙讜诇 诪砖讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诇讬讞讬讬讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of karet teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.

谞讜诪讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘 讗转 砖讚专讻讜 诇讗讻讜诇 讻讜壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讜讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗

搂 The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of amora鈥檌m disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.

讞讚 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讗讘诇 讘讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛

One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: 鈥淎nd the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it鈥 (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.

讜讞讚 讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚拽专讬谞讗 讘讬讛 讜讛讘砖专 讗砖专 讬讙注 讘讻诇 讟诪讗 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜讟诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜

And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: 鈥淎nd the flesh that touches any impure item鈥 (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: 鈥淏ut the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings鈥having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.

专讘 讟讘讬讜诪讬 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讜讞讚 诪讛讗讬 讝讜讝讗 讗住讬驻讗 讞讚 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讗讘诇 讘讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讜拽讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜

The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of amora鈥檌m and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讻诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讝讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽专讬谞讗 讘讬讛 讜讟诪讗转讜 注诇讬讜 讜谞讻专转讛 诇讗 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜讛讘砖专 讗砖专 讬讙注 讘讻诇 讟诪讗 诇讗 讬讗讻诇

Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: 鈥淗aving his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,鈥 as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: 鈥淎nd the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.鈥

讜讛讗诪专 诪专 讜讛讘砖专 诇专讘讜转 注爪讬诐 讜诇讘讜谞讛 诇驻讜住诇讛 讘注诇诪讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn鈥檛 the Master say that the term: 鈥淎nd as for the flesh,鈥 in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.

诪转谞讬壮 诇砖诐 砖砖讛 讚讘专讬诐 讛讝讘讞 谞讝讘讞 诇砖诐 讝讘讞 诇砖诐 讝讜讘讞 诇砖诐 讛砖诐 诇砖诐 讗砖讬诐 诇砖诐 专讬讞 诇砖诐 谞讬讞讜讞 讜讛讞讟讗转 讜讛讗砖诐 诇砖诐 讞讟讗

MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God鈥檚 will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗祝 诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讗讞讚 诪讻诇 讗诇讜 讻砖专 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讗讬谉 讛诪讞砖讘讛 讛讜诇讻转 讗诇讗 讗讞专 讛注讜讘讚

Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 注讜诇讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇砖诐 砖诇诪讬诐 讚诇讗 讗砖讬诐 诇砖诐 讗砖讬诐 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讻讘讘讗 讚诇讗

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: 鈥淎 burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 1:9), the term 鈥渁 burnt offering鈥 means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term 鈥渁n offering made by fire,鈥 teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.

专讬讞 诇砖诐 专讬讞 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讗讘专讬诐 砖爪诇讗谉 讜讛注诇谉 讚诇讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讘专讬诐 砖爪诇讗谉 讜讛注诇谉 讗讬谉 讘讛谉 诪砖讜诐 专讬讞

Rav continues to expound the verse. The term 鈥渁roma鈥 indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.

谞讬讞讜讞 诇砖诐 讛谞讞转 专讜讞 诇讛壮 诇砖诐 诪讬 砖讗诪专 讜讛讬讛 讛注讜诇诐

The term 鈥減leasing鈥 means for the sake of pleasing God鈥檚 spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression 鈥渢o the Lord鈥 indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讜诇讗 讬讞诇诇讜 讗转 拽讚砖讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: 鈥淎nd they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.

诪转讬讘 专讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗祝 诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讗讞讚 诪讻诇 讗诇讜 讻砖专 砖讛讜讗 转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讟注诪讗 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 讻诇诇 讛讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 驻住讜诇

Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent ab initio. Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讛 讻诇诇 讻砖专 讜诪专爪讛 讛讗 讛讬讛 讘诇讘讜 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专 讜讗讬谞讜 诪专爪讛

Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav鈥檚 statement can be understood in a similar fashion.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖专讛 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诇讬谉 驻住讜诇讛 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诪专讘 讛讜谞讗

Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna:

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