Zevachim 60

אמה אל הכתף ומה תלמוד לומר חמש אמות משפת מזבח ולמעלה

cubits for the one side” (Exodus 38:14), which indicates that the height of the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle was fifteen cubits. And what is the meaning when the verse states: “And the height five cubits” (Exodus 27:18)? It is referring to the height of the curtains from the upper edge of the altar and above; the curtains surrounding the courtyard were five cubits higher than the altar.

ומה תלמוד לומר ושלש אמות קומתו משפת סובב ולמעלה

Rabbi Yosei continues: And what is the meaning when the verse states: “And you shall make the altar…and its height shall be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1)? The verse means that the altar measures three cubits from the edge of the surrounding ledge and above.

ורבי יהודה כי גמיר גזירה שוה ברחבה הוא דגמיר

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda, who understands that the copper altar built in the time of Moses was actually three cubits high, interpret the verbal analogy based upon the word “square,” from which Rabbi Yosei derived that the height of the copper altar was ten cubits? The Gemara answers: When he learns the verbal analogy, he learns it with regard to the altar’s width, not its height. This is based on the verse in Ezekiel (see 59b). Accordingly, it teaches that the altar built in the time of Moses was ten cubits by ten cubits.

ולרבי יהודה הא קא מיתחזי כהן נהי דכהן מיתחזי עבודה דבידו לא מיתחזי

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the altar was three cubits high and the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle were five cubits high, isn’t the priest visible while performing the service atop the altar? The Gemara answers: Granted, the priest is visible, but the items with which he performs the sacrificial service that are in his hand are not visible.

בשלמא לרבי יהודה היינו דכתיב קידש אלא לרבי יוסי מאי קידש להעמיד בה מזבח

The Gemara returns to the original dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei with regard to whether or not Solomon consecrated the floor of the Temple courtyard. Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the floor of the Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it could serve as an altar, this is the meaning of that which is written: “The king sanctified the middle of the court” (I Kings 8:64). But according to Rabbi Yosei, what is the meaning of the phrase “the king sanctified”? The Gemara answers: It means that Solomon sanctified the courtyard in order to stand the altar in it.

בשלמא לרבי יוסי היינו דכתיב קטן אלא לרבי יהודה מאי קטן הכי קאמר מזבח אבנים שעשה שלמה תחת מזבח הנחשת קטן הוה

The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that the surface of the altar built in the time of Moses was five cubits by five cubits, this is the meaning of that which is written in the continuation of that verse: “Because the copper altar that was before the Lord was too small to receive.” But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that its surface area was ten cubits by ten cubits, what is the meaning of the phrase “too small”? The Gemara answers: The verse is referring to the altar built by Solomon, and this is what it is saying: The stone altar that Solomon built in place of the copper altar built in the time of Moses was too small to accommodate the large quantity of offerings.

במאי פליגי מר סבר דנין חוץ מחוץ ואין דנין חוץ מפנים

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei disagree that causes them to interpret differently the verbal analogy based on the word “square”? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that we derive the dimensions of the external altar built in the time of Moses from the external altar described in Ezekiel; but we do not derive the dimensions of the external altar from the dimensions of the inner altar, used for burning the incense.

ומר סבר דנין כלי מכלי ואין דנין כלי מבנין

And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we derive the dimensions of a portable vessel, i.e., the copper altar built in the time of Moses, from the dimensions of another portable vessel, i.e., the golden incense altar built at that time; but we do not derive the dimensions of a portable vessel from the dimensions of an edifice, i.e., the stone altar in the Temple.

אמר רבא מודה רבי יהודה בדמים דתניא רבי יהודה אומר כוס אחד היה ממלא מדם התערובות ושופכו על גבי מזבח שאם ישפך דמו של אחת מהן נמצא זה מכשירו

§ Rava says: Although Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the entire Temple courtyard is fit for burning the sacrificial portions of offerings, he concedes with regard to the blood and holds that it must be presented on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: On Passover eve, a priest would fill one cup with the blood of the many offerings brought that day and that was now mixed together on the floor. And then he would pour it on the altar, so that if all of the blood of one of the offerings had been spilled and was never presented on the altar, this cup would contain a small amount of that blood and pouring it on the altar would render the offering fit.

ואי סלקא דעתך סבר רבי יהודה כולה עזרה מיקדשא הא איתעבידא ליה מצוותיה

Rava explains his proof: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda maintains the entire Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it had the status of the altar, then the mitzva of sacrificing the Paschal offering was performed even if the blood spilled on the ground of the courtyard and was never presented on the altar.

ודלמא משום דקסבר שפיכה מכח האדם בעינן אם כן נשקליה ונשפיך ליה אדוכתיה

The Gemara attempts to reject this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda requires pouring a cup of the mixture of blood on the altar due to the fact that he holds we require pouring of the blood of the Paschal offering by human force. Since the blood on the floor of the courtyard was not poured there by a person, the mitzva has not yet been fulfilled despite the fact that the floor has the same status as the altar. The Gemara responds: If so, let the priest take the cup of the mixture of blood and pour it in its place on the floor rather than on the altar.

ודלמא משום דבעינן מצוה מן המובחר

The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But perhaps Rabbi Yehuda requires the blood to be poured on the altar only due to the fact that we require the mitzva to be performed in the optimal manner. Even if Rabbi Yehuda holds that the floor of the courtyard has the same status as the altar, he would agree that it is preferable for the blood to be poured on the altar itself.

אמר רבי אלעזר מזבח שנפגם אין אוכלים בגינו שירי מנחה שנאמר ואכלוה מצות אצל המזבח וכי אצל המזבח אכלוה אלא בזמן שהוא שלם ולא בזמן שהוא חסר

§ Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of an altar that was damaged, one may not eat the remainder of a meal offering on its account, as it is stated: “Take the meal offering…and eat it without leaven beside the altar; for it is most holy” (Leviticus 10:12). The verse is difficult: But did the priests have to eat the meal offering beside the altar? A priest may eat sacrificial items even of the most sacred order anywhere in the Temple courtyard. Rather, the verse means that one may eat the meal offering only at a time when the altar is complete, but not at a time when it is lacking.

אשכחן שירי מנחה קדשי קדשים מנלן תלמוד לומר קדש קדשים

The Gemara continues: We found a source for this halakha with regard to the remainder of a meal offering; from where do we derive that this halakha applies to all offerings of the most sacred order? The Gemara answers: The end of the verse states: “For it is most holy.” Since this term is also used with regard to the other offerings of the most sacred order, it is derived through verbal analogy that these offerings may not be eaten if the altar is damaged.

קדשים קלים מנין אמר אביי אתיא מדרשא דרבי יוסי דתניא רבי יוסי אומר שלשה דברים משום

The Gemara continues: From where is it derived that this halakha also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? Abaye said: It is derived from the exposition of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says three halakhic matters in the name of

שלשה זקנים וזה אחד מהן רבי ישמעאל אומר יכול יעלה אדם מעשר שני לירושלים ויאכלנו בזמן הזה ודין הוא בכור טעון הבאת מקום ומעשר טעון הבאת מקום מה בכור אינו אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא בפני הבית

three elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person would bring second-tithe produce up to Jerusalem in the present, after the destruction of the Temple, and eat it. And ostensibly, it could be derived by means of a logical inference that one may not do so: A firstborn offering requires bringing it to the place, to Jerusalem, and eating it there, and second-tithe produce requires bringing it to the place (see Deuteronomy 12:17–18); just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.

מה לבכור שכן טעון מתן דמים ואימורים לגבי מזבח

Rabbi Yishmael notes that this derivation can be challenged: What is notable about a firstborn? Bringing the firstborn to Jerusalem is required only in the presence of the Temple, because it is notable in that it requires placement of its blood and its sacrificial portions upon the altar; will you say the same with regard to second-tithe produce, which requires only that it be consumed in Jerusalem?

ביכורים יוכיחו מה לביכורים שכן טעונין הנחה

He continues: First fruits will prove that placement of blood upon the altar is not a factor, as they do not require placement of blood upon the altar, and yet they are brought to Jerusalem only in the presence of the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael counters: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require placement alongside the altar. Perhaps, since second-tithe produce does not require placement at all, even in the present one must bring it to Jerusalem and eat it there.

תלמוד לומר והבאתם שמה עלתיכם וגו׳ מקיש מעשר לבכור מה בכור אינו אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא בפני הבית

Rabbi Yishmael concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “And there you shall bring your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, and your tithes…and the firstborns of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:6); the Torah juxtaposes second-tithe produce with the firstborn. Just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.

וניהדר דינא וניתי במה הצד

The Gemara questions why a verse was needed to teach that second-tithe produce may not be consumed nowadays: But let the logical derivation return and the halakha will be derived from the common element between the halakhot of firstborn animals and first fruits. Although each has a unique factor, they share a common element: They must be brought to Jerusalem and that they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple. So too, second-tithe produce, which also must be brought to Jerusalem, should be permitted for consumption only in the presence of the Temple.

משום דאיכא למיפרך מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן יש בהן צד מזבח

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael did not present this derivation because it can be refuted in the following manner: What is notable about the two sources that share a common element? Both firstborn animals and first fruits are notable in that they possess an aspect of being offered upon the altar. Since second-tithe produce does not share this characteristic, its halakhot cannot be derived from those pertaining to firstborn animals and first fruits.

מאי קסבר אי קסבר קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא אפילו בכור נמי ואי קסבר לא קידשה לעתיד לבא אפילו בכור נמי תיבעי

The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yishmael hold? If he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, then it should be permitted to build an altar and sacrifice offerings even nowadays, and therefore even a firstborn animal may be eaten. And if he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple area did not sanctify it forever, let the dilemma be raised with regard to a firstborn as well.

אמר רבינא לעולם קסבר לא קידשה והכא במאי עסקינן בבכור שנזרק דמו קודם חורבן הבית וחרב הבית ועדיין בשרו קיים

Ravina said: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael holds that that the initial consecration of the Temple did not sanctify it forever. And al-though one cannot slaughter the firstborn to begin with, here we are dealing with a firstborn that was slaughtered and whose blood was sprinkled on the altar before the destruction of the Temple, and then the Temple was destroyed, and the meat of the firstborn still exists.

ואיתקש בשרו לדמו מה דמו במזבח אף בשרו במזבח ואתי מעשר ויליף מבכור

It is prohibited to eat the meat of the firstborn in this case because its meat was juxtaposed with its blood, which is mentioned in the previous verse, as it is stated: “You shall sprinkle their blood…and you shall burn their fats…and their flesh shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). The juxtaposition teaches that just as its blood is sprinkled only on the altar, so too, its meat may be consumed only in a time when there is an altar. And the case of second-tithe produce comes and is derived from the case of a firstborn. Consequently, second-tithe produce may not be consumed unless there is an altar.

וכי דבר הלמד בהיקש חוזר ומלמד בהיקש מעשר דגן חולין הוא

The Gemara asks: But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition with another case then teach that the halakha applies to a third case via a juxtaposition between the second and third cases? There is a principle that this is not a valid method of deriving halakhot pertaining to consecrated matters. Since the halakha with regard to the meat of the firstborn offering is derived from the juxtaposition of the meat with the blood of the firstborn, one cannot then prove that the same halakha applies to second-tithe produce simply because it is juxtaposed in a verse with the meat of the firstborn. The Gemara answers: Second-tithe grain is non-sacred, and therefore the acceptable methods for deriving its halakhot are not limited in this manner.

הניחא למאן דאמר בתר למד אזלינן אלא למאן דאמר בתר מלמד אזלינן מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: In determining whether the derivation involves consecrated matters or whether it involves non-sacred matters, we follow the matter that is derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition. Since in this case the matter derived is second-tithe produce, which for these purposes is non-sacred, its legal status may be derived from juxtaposition with the halakhot of sacrificial matters. But according to the one who says: We follow the matter that teaches, i.e., from which the halakha is derived, what is there to say? The status of second-tithe produce may not be derived by means of juxtaposition with the status of the firstborn offering, which itself was derived from the blood of the offering, because the firstborn offering is a sacrificial matter.

דם ובשר חדא מילתא היא

The Gemara answers: This is not a matter derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition, as the status of the firstborn offering is not derived from the status of blood; blood and meat are one matter. There is only one derivation in this case, which is that the status of second-tithe produce is derived from the status of the blood and the meat of the firstborn. In any event, Abaye has proven, quoting Rabbi Yishmael’s statement cited by Rabbi Yosei, that even sacrificial items of lesser sanctity may not be eaten if the altar is missing or damaged.

כי סליק רבין אמרה לשמעתא קמיה דרבי ירמיה אמר בבלאי טפשאי אמטול דיתבי בארעא חשוכא אמרי שמעתא דמחשכא לא שמיע להו הא דתניא בשעת סילוק מסעות קדשים נפסלין וזבים ומצורעים משתלחים חוץ למחיצה

The Gemara relates: When Ravin ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this halakha, that even items of lesser sanctity are disqualified if the altar is damaged or missing, in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Foolish Babylonians! Because they dwell in a dark land, they state halakhot that are dim. Have they not heard that which is taught in a baraita: At the time when the Jewish people would dismantle the Tabernacle in order to depart on their journeys in the wilderness, sacrificial food was disqualified from being consumed, since the altar was not in place. Nevertheless, zavim and lepers were sent out of the relevant partition; a zav was sent out of the Levite camp and a leper was sent out of the Israelite camp.

ותניא אידך בשני מקומות קדשים נאכלים מאי לאו הא בקדשי קדשים הא בקדשים קלים

And it is taught in another baraita: Sacrificial food could be consumed in two locations, i.e., one could eat it while the Tabernacle was in place and one could continue eating it after the Tabernacle had been disassembled and transported. What, is it not that this first baraita is referring to offerings of the most sacred order, and that second baraita is referring to offerings of lesser sanctity? Accordingly, Abaye’s statement that offerings of lesser sanctity may not be consumed if the altar is damaged is incorrect.

אמר רבינא אידי ואידי בקדשים קלים ולא קשיא

Ravina said that there is an alternative reconciliation of the two baraitot: Both this baraita and that baraita are referring to offerings of lesser sanctity, and it is not difficult: