Zevachim 75

איתיביה אביי קרבן יחיד שנתערב בקרבן יחיד וקרבן ציבור שנתערב בקרבן ציבור וקרבן יחיד וקרבן ציבור שנתערבו זה בזה נותן ארבע מתנות מכל אחד ואחד ואם נתן מתנה מכל אחד יצא ואם נתן ארבע מכולן יצא

Abaye raised an objection to this from a baraita (Tosefta 8:22): With regard to the offering of an individual that was intermingled with another offering of an individual, and likewise a communal offering that was intermingled with another communal offering, or the offering of an individual and a communal offering that were intermingled with each other, the priest places four placements of blood from each and every one of them on the altar, and in this manner fulfills the obligation of the blood rites of all the offerings. But if he placed one placement from each one, he has fulfilled his obligation. And likewise, if he placed four placements from all of them together, he has fulfilled his obligation.

במה דברים אמורים שנתערבו חיין אבל נתערבו שחוטין נותן ארבע מתנות מכולן

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement, that he places from the blood of each of the offerings ab initio, said? In a case where the offerings were intermingled when they were still alive, before they were sacrificed, and therefore the priest could perform four placements from the blood of each animal separately. But if slaughtered animals were then intermingled, i.e., their blood became mixed together in one container, the priest places four placements from all of them together, only one set of four.

ואם נתן מתנה אחת מכולן יצא רבי אומר רואין את המתנה אם יש בה כדי לזה וכדי לזה כשרה ואם לאו פסולה

And in any case, if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the blood of all these offerings is placed on the outer altar, and with regard to all of them one fulfills the obligation after the fact with a single placement. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that one, it is fit, but if not, the offering is disqualified.

קתני יחיד דומיא דציבור מה ציבור גברי אף יחיד גברי

The Gemara explains the difficulty: This baraita indicates that if live offerings became intermingled, each is sacrificed for its owner, despite the fact that these offerings are owned by men and therefore require placing of the hands. It is evident that the baraita is referring to offerings of men, as it teaches the case of the offering of an individual adjacent to, and therefore similar to, the case of a communal offering: Just as a communal offering is sacrificed by men, so too, the offering of an individual that is being discussed here also belongs to men. This presents a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Yosef.

אמר רבא ותסברא הא מתרצתא היא דקתני במה דברים אמורים כשנתערבו חיין אבל נתערבו שחוטין לא מה לי חיים מה לי שחוטין

Rava says: And can you understand the baraita in this manner? Is this baraita accurate as it stands? There is another difficulty with the baraita, as it teaches: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled when they were still alive. But if slaughtered animals were intermingled it is not said. This is problematic, as what difference is it to me whether the animals are alive or whether they are slaughtered? This is not the decisive factor, as even if the animals were slaughtered, if the blood of each is in a separate vessel the priest should perform separate placements from the blood of each.

אלא הכי קאמר במה דברים אמורים שנתערבו שחוטין כעין חיים בכוסות אבל בבולל נותן ארבע מתנות לכולן ואם נתן מתנה אחת לכולן יצא

Rava continues: Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled after they were slaughtered, but they were similar to living animals, i.e., the blood of each animal was in separate cups. But in a situation where the blood of these animals was mixed together in a single cup, the priest places four placements of blood from all of them. And if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation. If so, this baraita has no bearing on the issue of offerings that became intermingled while they were still alive, as it deals exclusively with the blood of animals that have been slaughtered.

רבי אומר רואין את המתנה אם יש בה כדי לזה וכדי לזה כשרה ואם לא פסולה ומי אית ליה לרבי האי סברא והא תניא אמר רבי לדברי רבי אליעזר

§ The baraita cited teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that offering, it is fit, but if not, the offerings are disqualified. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in accordance with this line of reasoning, that there must be a minimum amount of blood placed from each offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Para 9:5) with regard to the water of purification into which water that is invalid for sprinkling fell that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,

הזאה כל שהיא מטהרת הזאה אינה צריכה שיעור הזאה מחצה כשר ומחצה פסול

a sprinkling of any amount of the water of purification on someone rendered impure by impurity imparted by a corpse purifies him from his ritual impurity, as sprinkling does not require a minimum measure to purify him. Likewise, a sprinkling of water that is half fit and half unfit for sprinkling serves to purify the individual. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that no minimum amount is required for the sprinkling of the water of purification, and the same should apply to the sprinkling of blood on the altar.

לדבריו דרבי אליעזר קאמר ואיבעית אימא הזאה לחוד ונתינה לחוד

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, but he himself does not agree with this opinion. And if you wish, say instead that sprinkling of water of purification is discrete and placement of blood on the altar is discrete, i.e., these are two separate halakhot that have no bearing on each other.

נתערבו בבכור ומעשר כו׳ אמר רמי בר חמא בכור לבית שמאי אין מאכילין לנדות תמורתו מהו

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. This means that one may not sell them in the marketplace nor sell their meat by weight, so as not to degrade consecrated animals. Rami bar Ḥama says: With regard to a firstborn offering, according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, who hold (Bekhorot 33a) that even after a firstborn offering develops a blemish the priest may not eat it in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore one may not feed it to menstruating women, what is the halakha with regard to its substitute? That is, if the owner of a firstborn animal stated with regard to a non-sacred animal in his possession: This animal is a substitute for the firstborn offering, is a menstruating woman permitted to eat that substitute after it develops a blemish?

בכור אינו נפדה תמורתו מהו בכור אינו נשקל בליטרא תמורתו מהו אמר רבא תניא בכור ומעשר משהוממו עושין תמורה ותמורתן כיוצא בהן

Rami bar Ḥama further asks: A firstborn offering itself may not be redeemed, even after it develops a blemish, but what is the halakha with regard to redeeming its substitute? He likewise inquired: A firstborn offering itself, even after it develops a blemish, may not be weighed and sold by the litra, in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold. What is the halakha of its substitute in this regard? Rava says that an answer to these questions is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering or an animal tithe offering, from when they develop a blemish they can be used to render another animal a substitute, and their substitute has the same status as them. Their substitutes have the same halakhot as they do.

בעי רמי בר חמא התפיס בכור לבדק הבית מהו שישקול בליטרא רווחא דהקדש עדיף או דלמא זילותא דבכור עדיף

Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If the priest who received a firstborn offering dedicated the firstborn offering to the Temple maintenance, i.e., he vowed to give the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple, what is the halakha with regard to the matter that he may weigh its meat by the litra? The Gemara explains the dilemma: In this case, is consideration of the profit of the Temple treasury preferable, or perhaps avoidance of the demeaning of the firstborn offering is preferable. If the profit of the Temple treasury is preferable, the firstborn offering should be weighed in the normal manner so as to increase its price; a buyer will pay more for meat he is able to resell it afterward by exact weight. If avoidance of demeaning the firstborn offering is preferable, it should not be weighed by the litra, even though a loss to the Temple would result.

אמר רבי יוסי בר זבידא תא שמע נתערבו בבכור ובמעשר ירעו עד שיסתאבו ויאכלו כבכור וכמעשר לאו למימרא דאינו נשקל בליטרא

Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida says: Come and hear a proof from the ruling of the mishna: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. Is this not meaning to say that the sacrificial animal that became intermingled with a firstborn offering is also not weighed by the litra, despite the fact that this causes a slight loss to the Temple?

רב הונא ורבי חזקיה תלמידי רבי ירמיה אמרי מי דמי התם שתי קדושות ושני גופין הכא שתי קדושות וגוף אחד

Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥizkiyya, the students of Rabbi Yirmeya, say: Are these cases comparable? There, the mishna is referring to two separate sanctities, the sanctity of a firstborn offering and that of another offering, and two separate bodies, i.e., two different animals, and in such a case one may not degrade the sanctity of the firstborn due to the other animal with which it is intermingled. Conversely, here, with regard to one who vows to give the value of a firstborn to the Temple, there are two sanctities, a firstborn offering and the Temple maintenance, but they are both found in one body. In this case, as the sanctity of the Temple maintenance itself is in the firstborn offering, it may be weighed by the litra, because of the profit the Temple will gain.

מתקיף לה רבי יוסי בר אבין מה אילו אמר הפדו לי בכור שהתפיסו לבדק הבית כלום שומעין לו הפדו רחמנא אמר לא תפדה

Rav Yosei bar Avin objects to this: What would be the halakha if one says: Redeem for me, i.e., I wish to redeem, a firstborn offering that he had previously dedicated as the object of his vow to the Temple maintenance? Does the court listen to him? His request is certainly not granted, as by Torah law a firstborn offering may not be redeemed. Similarly, the fact that he dedicated the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple should not negate the prohibition of weighing it by the litra. The Gemara questions this comparison: One cannot raise a difficulty from a case where someone says: Redeem the firstborn offering for me, as the Merciful One states with regard to a firstborn offering: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). But the weighing of the offering by the litra is not prohibited by Torah law.

אלא אמר רבי אמי כלום הקנה זה אלא מה שקנו לו

Rather, the Gemara suggests a different resolution of Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma: Rabbi Ami says: Can this priest transfer to the Temple maintenance anything other than that which was transferred to him? In other words, just as the priest who took the vow may not weigh the firstborn by the litra and gain a profit, the same applies to the Temple treasury, the recipient of his vow.

הכל יכולין להתערב כו׳ מאי שנא חטאת ואשם דהאי זכר והאי נקבה

§ The mishna teaches: All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering. The Gemara asks: What is different about a sin offering and a guilt offering, that they cannot become intermingled? Is the reason that this, a guilt offering, is always a male, and that, a sin offering, is always a female?

חטאת ועולה נמי איכא שעיר נשיא האי שיער והאי צמר

The Gemara questions this explanation: A sin offering and a burnt offering are also like this, as a sin offering is always female while a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara answers that although the standard sin offering is always female, there is the goat of the Nasi, which is a male sin offering, and therefore it can become intermingled with a male goat burnt offering. And as to the statement of the mishna that a sin offering cannot become intermingled with a guilt offering despite the male sin offering of the Nasi, that is because this goat has straight hair and that guilt offering comes only from sheep or rams, which have wool, and the wool is curly.

פסח ואשם נמי לא מיערב האי בן שנה והאי בן שתי שנים איכא אשם נזיר ואשם מצורע ואיבעית אימא איכא בן שנה דמיחזי כבן שתי שנים ואיכא בן שתים דמיחזי כבן שנה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: A Paschal offering and a guilt offering also cannot become intermingled, as this Paschal offering is in its first year, and that guilt offering is in its second year. The Gemara answers that there is the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, which must be in their first year. And if you wish, say instead that an animal in its first year can become intermingled with an animal in its second year, as there is an animal in its first year that looks like an animal in its second year, and likewise there is an animal in its second year that looks like an animal in its first year.

מתני׳ אשם שנתערב בשלמים רבי שמעון אומר שניהם ישחטו בצפון ויאכלו כחמור שבהן

MISHNA: In the case of a guilt offering that was intermingled with a peace offering, Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them should be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north while a peace offering may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. And they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them, i.e., the guilt offering, with the following halakhot: They may be eaten only in the courtyard rather than throughout Jerusalem; by male priests and not by any ritually pure Jew; and on the day they were sacrificed and the following night, and not on the day they were sacrificed, the following day, and the intervening night.

אמרו לו אין מביאין קדשים לבית הפסול

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: One may not limit the time of the consumption of an offering, as one may not bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness. According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the peace offering becomes leftover, notar, the morning after it is sacrificed, and not at the end of that day, as is the halakha concerning peace offerings. Rather, the Rabbis hold, the owner shall wait until these animals become blemished, redeem them, and bring an offering of each type that is worth the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them.

נתערבו חתיכות בחתיכות קדשי קדשים בקדשים קלים הנאכלין ליום אחד בנאכלין לשני ימים ולילה יאכלו כחמור שבהן

The mishna adds: Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if pieces of the meat of one offering were intermingled with pieces of the meat of another offering, e.g., meat from offerings of the most sacred order with meat from offerings of lesser sanctity; or if pieces of meat from offerings eaten for one day and the following night were intermingled with pieces of meat from offerings eaten for two days and one night, since in that case the remedy with regard to offerings that were intermingled cannot be implemented, they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them.

גמ׳ תני תנא קמיה דרב שביעית אין לוקחין בדמיה תרומה מפני שממעטין באכילתה

GEMARA: In connection to the principle cited by the Rabbis in the mishna that one may not bring consecrated animals to the status of unfitness, a tanna taught a baraita (Tosefta, Shevi’it 6:29) before Rav: With regard to produce of the Sabbatical Year, one may not purchase produce of teruma from a previous year with its money, i.e., money received in its sale, because one thereby reduces the time of eating the teruma. The produce of the Sabbatical Year may be eaten only until the time of the removal of that type of produce from the field, whereas teruma may be consumed at any time.

אמרוה רבנן קמיה (דרבא) [דרבה] הא דלא כרבי שמעון דאי כרבי שמעון האמר מביאין קדשים לבית הפסול

The Sages said this baraita before Rabba, and they explained that this baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna. Their reasoning was that if you would say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say, as can be inferred from the mishna, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness? Similarly, one can limit the time allowed for the consumption of the Sabbatical Year produce.

אמר להו אפילו תימרו רבי שמעון הני מילי דאיעבד לכתחילה לא ולכתחילה לא איתיביה אביי

Rabba said to them: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. That statement, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, applies only in a case that is after the fact, as in the mishna, where offerings became intermingled. Rabbi Shimon did not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness ab initio. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness ab initio? Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna that discusses the manner of eating the meat of offerings (Zevachim 90b):