Zevachim 78

רבי יהודה אומר אין דם מבטל דם

Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar.

נתערב בדם פסולין ישפך לאמה בדם התמצית ישפך לאמה רבי אליעזר מכשיר אם לא נמלך ונתן כשר

If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, there is no remedy. Therefore, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, i.e., that exudes from the neck after the initial spurt following its slaughter concludes, which is unfit for presentation, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Rabbi Eliezer deems this mixture fit for presentation. Even according to the first tanna, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood on the altar, the offering is fit.

גמ׳ אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא שנפלו מים לתוך דם אבל נפל דם לתוך מים ראשון ראשון בטל

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in a case where water became mixed with the blood of an offering, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit, despite the fact that there is more water than blood. Concerning this Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the water fell into the blood. But in a case where the blood fell into the water, the first drop of blood, and then the next first drop of blood, is nullified in the water, i.e., each drop is nullified in turn. Consequently, the mixture is unfit for presentation, regardless of whether it has the appearance of blood.

אמר רב פפא ולענין כיסוי אינו כן לפי שאין דחוי במצות

Rav Pappa says: But with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood of birds or undomesticated animals that are slaughtered, it is not so. In this case, even if the blood fell into water, the mitzva of covering applies to it, provided that the mixture has the appearance of blood. The blood is not nullified by the water because there is no permanent rejection with regard to mitzvot, i.e., its nullification was merely temporary, but once there is enough blood in the water, it reassumes its status of blood.

אמר ריש לקיש הפיגול והנותר והטמא שבללן זה בזה ואכלן פטור אי אפשר שלא ירבה מין על חבירו ויבטלנו

§ The Gemara continues to discuss various mixtures. Reish Lakish says: With regard to meat of piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, and meat of notar, an offering whose designated time for consumption has passed, and ritually impure sacrificial meat, each of which was an olive-bulk, the minimum size for which one is liable to be flogged for its consumption, that one mixed together and ate them as a mixture, he is exempt from being flogged. The reason is that it is impossible that while eating them one type would not be greater than another type and nullify it. Since it is unknown which prohibition will nullify the other, one cannot forewarn the offender as to which prohibition he is about to transgress, and in order to be liable to be flogged one must receive a forewarning concerning a specific prohibition.

שמע מינה תלת שמע מינה איסורין מבטלין זה את זה ושמע מינה נותן טעם ברוב לאו דאורייתא ושמע מינה התראת ספק לא שמה התראה

The Gemara comments: Conclude three halakhot from this statement of Reish Lakish. Conclude from it that prohibitions nullify one another in a majority, just as permitted items nullify a prohibited item. And conclude from it that the halakha that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. The proof is that if this principle were applied by Torah law, then one should be flogged for this consumption, as the meats are of different types and therefore one of them must have imparted flavor to the other. And finally, conclude from it that an uncertain forewarning, e.g., one in which the witnesses cannot be sure which prohibition the transgressor is about to violate, is not considered a forewarning.

מתיב רבא עשה עיסה מן חיטין ומן אורז אם יש בה טעם דגן חייבת בחלה ואף על גב דרובא אורז

Concerning the inference that the halakha that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, Rava raises an objection from a mishna (Ḥalla 3:7): In a case where one prepared a dough from wheat and from rice, if this mixture has the taste of wheat, it is obligated in the separation of ḥalla, a portion of dough that must be given to a priest (see Numbers 15:17–21). Ḥalla is separated only from one of the five species of grain, not rice. Rava explains his objection: And this halakha applies even though the majority of the mixture is flour from rice. Apparently, the fact that the wheat imparts flavor to the dough renders it obligated in ḥalla even if the wheat is the minority.

מדרבנן אי הכי אימא סיפא אדם יוצא בה ידי חובתו בפסח

The Gemara answers: The obligation to set aside ḥalla in this case applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law. Rava raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A person can fulfill his obligation with matza from this type of dough on the first night of Passover. Since by Torah law this mitzva must be fulfilled with matza made from a grain, evidently the principle that one substance that imparts flavor to a greater amount of a different substance affects its status applies by Torah law.

אלא מין בשאינו מינו בטעמא מין במינו ברובא

Rather, one must say that according to Reish Lakish, in a case of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, such as wheat flour and rice flour, whose tastes are different, the status is determined by the flavor. Therefore, if the dough tastes like wheat, it has the halakha of a dough made from wheat. But if it is a type of food mixed with food of its own type, e.g., a mixture of piggul and notar meat, which is the case addressed by Reish Lakish, the status of the mixture is determined by the majority.

ונשער מין במינו כמין בשאינו מינו דתנן נתערב ביין רואין אותו כאילו הוא מים מאי לאו רואין אותו ליין כאילו הוא מים

The Gemara suggests: But let us estimate in a case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type as though it were a mixture of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, and if so, the minority is not nullified if it is substantial enough to impart flavor to the majority. As we learned in the mishna: If the blood of an offering was mixed with wine, one considers it as though it is water. Although blood and wine certainly have different flavors, in the case of the mishna the determinative factor is not the taste of the mixture, but the appearance. Since they share the same appearance, they are considered a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. What, is it not correct to explain the mishna as stating that one views the wine as though it is water, i.e., a substance of a different type, and if the mixture would have the appearance of blood if the wine were water it is fit for presentation, despite the fact that the blood is not the majority?

לא רואין אותו לדם כאילו הוא מים אי הכי בטל מיבעי ליה

The Gemara answers: No, this is not the explanation of the mishna. Rather, it means that one views the blood as though it is water, i.e., it is unfit for presentation, since it is as though one presented water on the altar. The Gemara questions this explanation: If so, the tanna of the mishna should have said: The blood is nullified.

ועוד תניא רבי יהודה אומר רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום אם דיהה מראהו כשר

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Mikvaot 7:4): With regard to a ritually impure bucket containing a certain amount of white wine or milk that one immersed in a ritual bath, Rabbi Yehuda says: Although the appearance of the white wine or milk is not discernible in the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket, one views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine, and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the wine or milk is nullified by the water. Therefore, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure.

ואם לאו פסול

Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure. This is a case in which a substance was mixed with another substance of similar appearance, as white wine and milk have a similar appearance to the water, and yet it is treated as a mixture of a substance with a different type of substance, and it is not nullified in a majority.

תנאי היא דתניא דלי שיש בו יין לבן או חלב והטבילו הולכין אחר הרוב רבי יהודה אומר רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום אם דיהה מראהו כשר ואם לאו פסול

The Gemara explains: One cannot cite a proof from the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as this is a dispute between tanna’im, and the ruling follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in that baraita: With regard to a ritually impure bucket in which there is white wine or milk, and one immersed it in a ritual bath, one follows the majority, i.e., if the majority of the contents of the bucket is now water from the ritual bath, it is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: One views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure. But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure.

ורמינהי דלי שהוא מלא רוקין והטבילו כאילו לא טבל

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda from a mishna (see Mikvaot 10:6): If one had an impure bucket that is filled with spittle and one immersed it in a ritual bath, the spittle is considered an interposition between the water of the ritual bath and that of the bucket, and therefore it is as though he did not immerse it.

מי רגלים רואין אותו כאילו הן מים

If the impure bucket was full of urine and he immersed it, although urine is slightly different in appearance than water, one views the urine as though it is water, and therefore once the urine is in contact with the ritual bath it is considered connected to the water, and it is not an interposition preventing the bucket from becoming ritually pure.

מלא מי חטאת עד שירבו המים על מי חטאת

The mishna continues: If the impure bucket was filled with water of purification, the bucket is not purified until the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket becomes greater in quantity than the water of purification it contains, thereby nullifying it in a majority.

מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה רואין רבי יהודה וקתני דסגי ליה ברובא

The Gemara explains the contradiction: Whom have you heard who accepts this reasoning of: One views, which appears in this mishna with regard to urine? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as stated in the baraita cited above. And yet the mishna teaches that a majority suffices to nullify the water of purification that became mixed with water, and it is not considered as though it is red wine. This conflicts with the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to white wine and milk.

אמר אביי לא קשיא

Abaye says: This is not difficult;