Zevachim 82

וניתיב לפנים והדר ניתיב לחוץ כיון דאיכא חטאת ואשם דכי נכנס דמן פסולין לא פסיקא ליה

And if you suggest that the priest should first place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary and again place blood outside, on the altar, although this resolution is applicable to most offerings whose blood is placed outside, nevertheless the tanna of the mishna chose to omit this case. The reason is that since there are a sin offering and a guilt offering, concerning which, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, when their blood enters the Sanctuary they are disqualified from being placed on the external altar, the tanna could not teach this halakha categorically. In other words, as the tanna could not issue a categorical ruling that applies to all types of offerings, he omitted the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer here.

שהיה רבי עקיבא אומר [וכו׳] אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל משל למה הדבר דומה לתלמיד שמזג לרבו בחמין ואמר לו מזוג לי אמר לו במה אמר לו לא בחמין אנו עסוקין עכשיו בין בחמין בין בצונן

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified. The Gemara discusses the source for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling. The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). How does Rabbi Akiva apply this halakha to all offerings whose blood is presented on the external altar? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Hear a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed wine with hot water for his teacher. And the teacher said to him: Mix another drink for me. The student said to him: With what should I mix the wine, hot or cold water? The teacher said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot water? Now that I requested that you mix me another cup, I mean that you should mix it either in hot water or in cold. Otherwise, the teacher would not have needed to say anything.

הכא נמי מכדי בחטאת עסקינן ואתי חטאת דכתב רחמנא למה לי אלא לאו חטאת קאמינא לה אלא כל קדשים

Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes in this verse? Even without this term it is clear that the Torah is referring to a sin offering. Rather, as in the parable, the Torah mentions a sin offering to teach: I do not say this halakha with regard to a sin offering alone, i.e., that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified when it is brought inside the Sanctuary, but the blood of all sacrificial animals is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary.

מתקיף לה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע מכדי איתרבו כל קדשים לגבי מזבח לענין מריקה ושטיפה חטאת דכתב רחמנא למה לי שמע מינה חטאת אין מידי אחרינא לא

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this explanation: Accordingly, one should reach the opposite conclusion: Since all sacrificial animals that are sacrificed on the altar are included in this passage of the Torah with regard to scouring and rinsing, as derived by the Sages, despite the fact that this requirement is stated in connection with a sin offering (see Leviticus 6:21), it is already established that this chapter is speaking of all offerings. Consequently, why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes with regard to the matter of blood that entered the Sanctuary? Learn from the verse that in the case of a sin offering whose blood entered the Sanctuary, yes, it is disqualified, but if the blood of any other offering entered the Sanctuary, no, it is not disqualified.

והא לא דמיא אלא לתלמיד שמזג לרבו בין בחמין בין בצונן אמר לו אל תמזוג לי אלא חמין

Rav Huna addresses Shmuel’s parable: And if you wish to provide a comparison, it is comparable only to a student who initially mixed wine for his teacher with both hot and cold water, and his teacher then said to him: Mix wine for me only with hot water.

אלא טעמא דרבי עקיבא מחטאת וכל חטאת דתניא חטאת אין לי אלא חטאת קדשי קדשים מנין תלמוד לומר כל חטאת קדשים קלים מנין תלמוד לומר וכל חטאת דברי רבי עקיבא

Rav Huna continues: Rather, the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva is from the fact that the verse does not state simply: “Sin offering,” but states: “Any sin offering”; this serves to include all other offerings. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). I have derived that this halakha applies only with regard to a sin offering; from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “And any sin offering.” This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

אמר לו רבי יוסי הגלילי אפילו אתה מרבה כל היום כולו איני שומע לך אלא חטאת אין לי אלא חטאת יחיד חטאת צבור מנין תלמוד לומר כל חטאת ואין לי אלא חטאת זכר חטאת נקבה מנין תלמוד לומר וכל

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to Rabbi Akiva: Even if you include offerings in this manner from the verse all day long, I will not listen to you. Rather, this verse is referring to a sin offering alone, and it should be expounded as follows: The verse states: “Sin offering”; I have derived only that this halakha applies to the sin offering of an individual. From where is it derived that the same applies to a communal sin offering? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And one can still say: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a male sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a female sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”

כלפי לייא אלא הכי קאמר אין לי אלא חטאת נקבה חטאת זכר מנין תלמוד לומר וכל חטאת

The Gemara asks: Why is it assumed that the application of this halakha to a male sin offering is more obvious than to a female sin offering? Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya], as the standard sin offering of an individual is a female? Rather, this is what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is saying: One can still ask: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a female sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a male sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”

וסבר רבי יוסי הגלילי האי קרא להכי הוא דאתא והתניא רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר (לפי שמצינו) כל הענין כולו אינו מדבר אלא בפרים הנשרפים ושעירים הנשרפים

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold that this verse comes for this purpose, to teach the halakha of sin offerings whose blood was brought inside the Sanctuary? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: As we have found the entire matter that is stated in the verse: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23), is not stated with regard to a standard sin offering improperly brought inside the Sanctuary; rather, it speaks only about bulls that are burned and goats that are burned.

לשרוף פסוליהן אבית הבירה ולעמוד בלא תעשה על אכילתו

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili elaborates: These are unique sin offerings, and the Torah states that their blood should be brought inside the Sanctuary. The verse is stated with regard to these sin offerings both in order to command the Jewish people to burn their disqualified ones in the Temple and in order to establish a prohibition with regard to their consumption.

אמרו לו חטאת שנכנס דמה לפני ולפנים מנין אמר להם הן לא הובא

The baraita continues: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If you expound the verse in this fashion, then from where is it derived that a standard sin offering whose blood entered the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies, must be burned? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to them that it is derived from the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the sin offering referred to in the verse been brought inside the Sanctuary, it should have been burned. In any event, with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse from Leviticus 6:23 in this manner, how can he interpret it differently in his dispute with Rabbi Akiva?

לדבריו דרבי עקיבא קאמר

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili spoke according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, i.e., although Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse in a different manner, according to Rabbi Akiva’s explanation it should be understood as referring only to a sin offering, not to other offerings.

מתני׳ חטאת שקבל דמה בשני כוסות יצא אחד מהן לחוץ הפנימי כשר נכנס אחד מהם לפנים רבי יוסי הגלילי מכשיר בחיצון וחכמים פוסלין

MISHNA: In the case of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar whose blood the priest collected in two cups, if one of them left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, the cup that remained inside the courtyard is fit to be presented. If one of the cups entered inside the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems the blood in the cup that remained outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, fit to be presented, and the Rabbis deem it disqualified from being presented.

אמר רבי יוסי הגלילי מה אם במקום שהמחשבה פוסלת בחוץ לא עשה את המשויר כיוצא מקום שאין המחשבה פוסלת בפנים אינו דין שלא נעשה את המשויר כנכנס

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said in support of his opinion: The halakha is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. Just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it does not render the status of the remaining blood disqualified like that of blood that leaves the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that we will not deem the status of the remaining blood like that of blood that entered the Sanctuary?

נכנס לכפר אף על פי שלא כפר פסול דברי רבי אליעזר רבי שמעון אומר עד שיכפר רבי יהודה אומר אם הכניס שוגג כשר

The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, despite the fact that the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood to atone, the offering is disqualified; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is disqualified only when he atones and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit to be presented.

כל הדמים פסולין שנתנו על גבי המזבח לא הרצה הציץ אלא על הטמא שהציץ מרצה על הטמא ואינו מרצה על היוצא

With regard to all the blood disqualified for presentation that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure. Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is because the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacri-ficed that are ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave the courtyard.

גמ׳ תניא אמר רבי יוסי הגלילי קל וחומר ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת בחוץ לא פסל דם שבחוץ את שבפנים מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בפנים אינו דין שלא יפסול דם שבפנים את שבחוץ

GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis as to whether the blood of a sin offering in a second cup is disqualified if the blood in the first cup entered the Sanctuary, it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said: This is an a fortiori inference: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet that blood that was taken outside does not disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that the blood that was taken inside will not disqualify the blood that is still outside the Sanctuary?

אמרו לו הרי הוא אומר אשר יובא מדמה אפילו מקצת דמה

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that even if part of its blood is brought inside the Sanctuary, the sin offering is disqualified.

אמר להם קל וחומר ליוצא מעתה ומה במקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בפנים פוסל דם שבפנים את שבחוץ מקום שמחשבה פוסלת בחוץ אינו דין שיפסול דם שבחוץ את שבפנים

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to the Rabbis: If you expound the verse in that manner, then from now one can derive an a fortiori inference with regard to the blood that leaves the courtyard: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, the blood that was taken inside disqualifies the blood that is still outside, i.e., in the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, is it not logical that the blood that was taken outside will disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard? Why do the Rabbis deem this blood fit?

אמרו לו הרי הוא אומר אשר יובא הנכנס פוסל ואין היוצא פוסל

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in response: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This teaches that only blood that enters the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood in the courtyard, but the blood that leaves the courtyard does not disqualify the blood in the courtyard.

ותהא מחשבה בפנים פוסלת מקל וחומר ומה במקום שלא פסל דם שבחוץ את שבפנים מחשבה פוסלת בחוץ מקום שפסל דם שבפנים את דם שבחוץ אינו דין שתהא מחשבה פוסלת בפנים

In light of this discussion, the Gemara asks: And let intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood in this place disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the courtyard, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood in this place will disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the courtyard?

הרי הוא אומר ביום השלישי

The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), and the Sages expounded this verse with regard to the halakha of intent while slaughtering an offering.

מקום שיהא משולש בדם בבשר באימורים

This verse teaches that the place where improper intent disqualifies the offering must be triply functional: For the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar. In other words, it must be outside its designated place with regard to all three of these issues. Consequently, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary does not disqualify the blood.

ולא תהא מחשבה פוסלת בחוץ מקל וחומר ומה מקום שפסל דם שבפנים את שבחוץ אין מחשבה פוסלת בפנים מקום שלא פסל דם שבחוץ את שבפנים אינו דין שלא יהא פוסל מחשבה בחוץ

The Gemara suggests the opposite: And if so, let intent to present the blood outside the Sanctuary not disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside in the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary does not disqualify the offering, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood outside the courtyard does not disqualify the offering?

תלמוד לומר שלישי חוץ לזמנו פגול חוץ למקומו

The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as follows: “On the third day” is referring to intent to perform its rites beyond its designated time; “it is piggul” is referring to intent to perform its rites outside its designated area.

בשר [היוצא לחוץ פסול] הנכנס לפנים כשר

A baraita teaches: The meat of offerings that left its designated area and was taken to a place that is outside its designated area for consumption, which is outside the wall of Jerusalem in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity and outside the wall of the Temple courtyard in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, is disqualified from being eaten. By contrast, meat of offerings that entered inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified and remains fit to be eaten.

שיהא בדין שפסול ומה במקום שלא פסל דם שבחוץ את שבפנים בשר היוצא לחוץ פסול מקום שפסל דם שבפנים את שבחוץ בשר הנכנס בפנים אינו דין שיפסול

One might have thought that it should be derived based on a logical inference that this meat is disqualified, as follows: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that remained inside the courtyard, yet meat that leaves and is taken outside the courtyard is disqualified, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, is it not right that meat that enters the Sanctuary should be disqualified?

הרי הוא אומר מדמה דמה ולא בשר

The baraita explains that one does not derive this inference, as the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), which indicates that the blood of an offering that is brought inside is disqualified, but not meat that enters the Sanctuary.

קל וחומר מעתה ומה במקום שפסל דם שבפנים את שבחוץ בשר הנכנס לפנים כשר מקום שלא פסל דם שבחוץ את שבפנים בשר היוצא לחוץ אינו דין שכשר

The baraita continues: From now, as it has been established that the meat of offerings that is brought inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified, one can suggest an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood that remained outside in the courtyard, and yet meat that enters the Sanctuary is fit, therefore, in a place where the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that meat that left and was taken outside the courtyard should be fit?

הרי הוא אומר ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו כיון שיצא בשר חוץ למחיצתו נאסר

The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field” (Exodus 22:30). The apparently superfluous term “in the field” teaches a general halakha: Once meat has left and been removed outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted to consume it, it has become prohibited.

תנו רבנן פנימה אין לי אלא פנימה היכל מנין תלמוד לומר אל הקדש פנימה

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the blood of a sin offer-ing that entered the Sanctuary. The Sages taught: It is stated that when Moses questioned Aaron as to why a sin offering was not consumed, he said: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the blood been brought within, Moses would have understood that the offering would have been disqualified and rendered prohibited for consumption. The baraita comments: I have derived only that the offering is disqualified if the blood is brought within, i.e., into the Holy of Holies; from where is it derived that the same applies if it was merely brought into the Sanctuary? The verse states: “Into the sacred place within,” and this sacred place is the Sanctuary.

ויאמר קדש ואל יאמר פנימה אמר רבא בא זה ולימד על זה מידי דהוה אתושב ושכיר

The Gemara questions this derivation: And let the verse state only “sacred place,” and it need not state “within.” If blood that entered the Sanctuary is already disqualified, this halakha certainly applies if it was brought farther inside, to the Holy of Holies. Rava says: This verse comes and teaches about that verse. In other words, had the verse stated only “sacred place,” it would have been interpreted as referring to the Holy of Holies. The addition of “within” indicates that this sacred place is the Sanctuary, while the term “within” is referring to the Holy of Holies. The Gemara cites a similar example: This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker.

דתניא תושב זה קנוי קנין עולם שכיר זה קנוי קנין שנים

As it is taught in a baraita concerning teruma: The verse states: “A tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated” (Leviticus 22:10). “A tenant”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. “A hired worker”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years, the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.

יאמר תושב ואל יאמר שכיר ואני אומר קנוי קנין עולם אינו אוכל קנוי קנין שנים לא כל שכן

The baraita asks: Let the verse say “tenant” and let it not say “hired worker,” and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his master’s, i.e., the priest’s, teruma, as despite his status as a slave he is not considered his master’s property, is it not all the more so logical that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of teruma?

אילו כן הייתי אומר תושב זה קנוי קנין שנים אבל קנוי קנין עולם יהא אוכל בא שכיר ולימד על תושב שזה קנוי קנין עולם וזה קנוי קנין שנים ואינו אוכל

The baraita answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: “A tenant”; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous, but one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of teruma. Therefore, the term “hired worker,” which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term “tenant,” that this one was acquired as a permanent acquisition and that one was acquired for an acquisition of six years, and both this one and that one may not partake of teruma. Similar reasoning applies in the above case concerning the terms “sacred place” and “within.”

אמר ליה אביי בשלמא התם תרי גופי נינהו ואף על גב דהוה ליה לקרא למכתב נרצע לא יאכל ואידך אתי בקל וחומר מילתא דאתי בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא אלא הכא כיון (דאיכא) דאיפסל בהיכל (הכא) לפני ולפנים מאי בעי

Abaye said to Rava: Are these cases comparable? Granted, there, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. And this is significant, as even though the verse could have written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of teruma, from which the halakha of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and the other case, that of a slave for six years, is therefore a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, it need not be stated explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a principle: At times, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. But here, the same blood enters the Holy of Holies via the Sanctuary, and once it is disqualified in the Sanctuary, why is it necessary for the verse to teach that this blood is disqualified when it enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies?

אלא אמר אביי לא נצרכא אלא לדרך משופש אמר ליה רבא והא הבאה כתיב ביה אלא אמר רבא כל מידי דחשיב עליה לפני ולפנים לא מיפסל בהיכל

Rather, Abaye says: This mention of “within” is necessary only for a case where the blood entered the Holy of Holies not via the Sanctuary but in a roundabout manner, e.g., from the roof or the loft of the Holy of Holies, without having entered the Sanctuary. Rava said to Abaye: But an expression of bringing is written in the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within,” which indicates a standard manner of bringing it into the Holy of Holies. Rather, Rava says: In any circumstance where the priest intended to bring the blood inside the innermost sanctum, it is not disqualified when it is only in the Sanctuary, and therefore it was necessary for the verse to teach both disqualifications.

בעי רבא פר העלם דבר של צבור ושעיר עבודה זרה שהכניס דמן לפני ולפנים מהו

§ Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat for a sin of idol worship, whose blood should be presented in the Sanctuary, if it occurred that the priest brought their blood into the innermost sanctum, what is the halakha?

מי אמרינן אל הקדש פנימה כל היכא דקרינן אל הקדש קרינן ליה פנימה כל היכא דלא קרינן אל הקדש לא קרינן פנימה או דלמא שלא במקומן הוא

Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the verse states: “Into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18) as a single phrase, and therefore anywhere that we read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” i.e., that the blood is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary, we also read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within,” i.e., that it is likewise disqualified when it is brought into the Holy of Holies; but anywhere that we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” such as with regard to these offerings, whose blood is supposed to be brought into the Sanctuary, we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within” the Holy of Holies? Or perhaps, since in any event the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings, it is disqualified.

ואם תימצי לומר שלא במקומן הוא פר ושעיר של יום הכיפורים שהזה מדמן על הבדים והוציאן להיכל והכניסן מהו

And if you say that the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings and they are therefore disqualified, one can raise another dilemma: In the case of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, where the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the staves of the Ark, as required (see Leviticus 16:14), and he brought their remaining blood out to the Sanctuary and subsequently brought it in again to the Holy of Holies, what is the halakha? Is the blood disqualified by this improper second entrance into the Holy of Holies?

מי אמרינן מקומן הוא או דלמא הואיל ונפק נפק

Rava explains the sides of the question: Do we say that it is its place, as the High Priest is supposed to bring this blood into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur at some point? Or perhaps one should say that since the High Priest has performed the mitzva and the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, and the Holy of Holies is no longer considered its place.

ואם תימצי לומר הואיל ונפק נפק הזה מדמן על הפרכת

And if you say that since the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, one can raise another dilemma: If the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the Sanctuary Curtain