Zevachim 91

ואף על גב דמוספין קדישי אטו שבת למוספין אהנאי לתמידין לא אהנאי

And even though the additional offerings are of greater sanctity, as they are sacrificed due to the sanctity of Shabbat, the frequent offering precedes the offering of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional offerings but does not affect the daily offerings brought on Shabbat? Rather, the sanctity of Shabbat elevates the sanctity of the daily offerings as well, and as both are of equal sanctity, the frequent daily offering precedes the additional offerings.

תא שמע מוספי שבת קודמין למוספי ראש חודש אטו ראש חודש למוספין דידיה אהני למוספי שבת לא אהני

The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings because they are more frequent, despite the fact that the New Moon elevates the sanctity of its additional offerings. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Moon affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of Shabbat? These additional offerings are also imbued with the sanctity of the New Moon.

תא שמע מוספי ראש חודש קודמין למוספי ראש השנה אף על גב דראש השנה קדשה אטו ראש השנה למוספי דידיה אהני למוספי ראש חודש לא אהני

The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings because they are more frequent, even though the New Year is of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Year affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of the New Moon?

תא שמע דבר אחר ברכת היין תדירה וברכת היום אינה תדירה ותדיר ושאינו תדיר תדיר קודם אף על גב דברכת היום קדישה אטו שבת לברכת היום אהנאי לברכת היין לא אהנאי

The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear a baraita (Tosefta, Berakhot 5:25) that discusses the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the order of blessings in kiddush. After stating one reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel that one recites the blessing on the wine before the blessing of the sanctity of the day, the Tosefta adds: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: The blessing over wine is recited frequently, and the blessing over the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. This applies even though the blessing of the day is of greater sanctity, as it is recited due to the sanctity of Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the blessing of the day but does not affect the sanctity of the blessing on the wine?

תא שמע דאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה מתפלל אדם של מנחה ואחר כך של מוספין אטו שבת לתפלת מוספין אהנאי לתפלת מנחה לא אהנאי

The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one did not recite the additional prayer on Shabbat until the time of the afternoon prayer arrived, the halakha is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, as the afternoon prayer is more frequent. This ruling applies despite the fact that the additional prayer is of greater sanctity. Once again the Gemara rejects the proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional prayer but does not affect the sanctity of the afternoon prayer?

תא שמע שלמים של אמש חטאת ואשם של יום שלמים של אמש קודמין הא אידי ואידי דיום חטאת ואשם קדמי ואף על גב דשלמים תדירי

The Gemara cites yet another proof. Come and hear the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. One can infer from this that if both this offering and that offering are from today, the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, and this is the halakha even though the peace offering is more frequent, as people sacrifice voluntary peace offerings more often than sin offerings or guilt offerings.

אמר רבא מצוי קאמרת תדיר קמיבעיא לן מצוי לא קמיבעיא לן

Rava said in response: Are you speaking of a common offering? Although peace offerings are sacrificed more often than sin offerings, there is no obligation to sacrifice them at any particular frequency. We raise the dilemma only with regard to a clash between a frequent offering and one of greater sanctity, but we do not raise the dilemma with regard to a common offering.

אמר ליה רב הונא בר יהודה לרבא אטו מצוי לאו תדיר והתניא אוציא את הפסח שאינו תדיר ולא אוציא את המילה שהיא תדירה

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Is that to say that a common obligation is not considered tantamount to a frequent obligation? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to positive mitzvot whose intentional neglect results in the punishment of karet but whose unwitting transgression does not entail the sacrifice of a sin offering: I should exclude the neglect of the Paschal offering from the obligation to sacrifice a sin offering, as it is not frequent, and I should not exclude the neglect of the mitzva of circumcision, as it is frequent? Circumcision is considered a frequent mitzva, as it is performed more often than the Paschal offering, despite the fact that there is no obligation to perform circumcisions at any particular frequency.

מאי תדירה תדירה במצות ואיבעית אימא מילה לגבי פסח כי תדיר דמיא

Rava answers: What is the meaning of frequent in that context? It means that circumcision is frequent in terms of the numerous mitzvot commanded with regard to its fulfillment. And if you wish, say instead that circumcision in relation to the Paschal offering is considered like a frequent obligation, as it is occurs far more often, whereas peace offerings are brought only somewhat more often than sin offerings. In sum, one cannot infer from the mishna that an offering of greater sanctity precedes a frequent offering.

איבעיא להו תדיר ושאינו תדיר וקדים ושחט לשאינו תדיר מאי מי אמרינן כיון דשחטיה מקריב ליה או דלמא יהיב לאחר דממרס בדמו עד דמקריב ליה לתדיר והדר מקריב לשאינו תדיר

§ An additional dilemma with regard to precedence was raised before the Sages: If the priest had two offerings to sacrifice, a frequent offering and an infrequent offering, and although he should have initially sacrificed the frequent offering he slaughtered the infrequent offering first, what is the halakha? Do we say that since he already slaughtered the infrequent offering he also proceeds to sacrifice it? Or perhaps he does not yet sacrifice it but gives it to another priest, who stirs its blood to prevent it from congealing, until he sacrifices the frequent offering; and then he sacrifices the infrequent offering.

אמר רב הונא מסורא תא שמע שלמים של אמש חטאת ואשם של יום של אמש קודם לשל יום הא דיום דומיא דאמש

Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear an answer from the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the sin offering from today. It can be assumed that the mishna is not discussing a case where none of the offerings have been slaughtered, as the peace offering would not take precedence in this situation. Rather, it is discussing a peace offering from yesterday that was slaughtered but its blood has not yet been presented. One can infer from this that only a peace offering from yesterday takes precedence in this situation, but in the case of a peace offering from today that is similar in other aspects to a peace offering from yesterday, the peace offering does not take precedence.

והיכי דמי דקדים שחטיה לשלמים חטאת ואשם קדמי

The Gemara explains: And what are the circumstances of this case? This is a situation where one first slaughtered the peace offering from today. In this case the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, although the peace offering is already slaughtered, as both of them are of greater sanctity. The same should apply to an infrequent offering that was slaughtered before a frequent offering: The frequent offering is slaughtered before the blood of the infrequent offering is presented.

דלמא שלמים דאמש וחטאת ואשם דיום היכי משכחת לה דשחטינהו לתרוייהו אבל לא שחטינהו לתרוייהו תיבעי לך

The Gemara rejects this answer: Perhaps when the mishna makes reference to a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the circumstances should be understood differently. How can you find these other circumstances? The mishna discusses a case where the priest already slaughtered both of them, the peace offering and the sin- or guilt offering, and the blood of both awaits presentation on the altar. But had he not yet slaughtered both of them, but only the peace offering, you can still raise the dilemma of whether the priest should set aside the blood of the peace offering in order to slaughter the sin offering first, due to its greater sanctity.

תא שמע דבר אחר ברכת היין תדירה וברכת היום אינה תדירה ותדיר ושאינו תדיר תדיר קודם

The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the aforementioned baraita: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: With regard to the order of blessings in kiddush, the blessing on wine is recited frequently and the blessing of the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. The obligation to recite the blessing of the day is due to the sanctity of Shabbat and applies at the start of Shabbat, before wine is placed on the table. Nevertheless, the blessing on the wine takes precedence due to its frequency. So too, the slaughtering of the frequent offering should take precedence, even if the priest had already commenced the sacrificial rites of the infrequent offering.

הכא נמי דכיון דאתיין כמאן דשחיטי תרוייהו דמי

The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, with regard to kiddush, the circumstances are different, since wine is available when one recites kiddush, and therefore the obligation of both blessings come together. This means that it is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.

תא שמע דאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה מתפלל אדם של מנחה ואחר כך של מוספין הכא נמי כיון דמטי זמן תפלת מנחה כמאן דשחיטי תרוייהו דמי

The Gemara cites yet another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, despite the fact that the obligation of the additional prayer applies first, which is similar to an offering slaughtered first. The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, since the time of the afternoon prayer has now arrived, one is obligated in both prayers, and again this is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.

אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרב אשי לרבינא שחטו קודם חצות פסול מפני שנאמר בו בין הערבים קודם לתמיד כשר ויהא ממרס בדמו עד שיזרוק הדם

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina that an answer to this dilemma can be found in a mishna (Pesaḥim 61a): If one slaughtered the Paschal offering before midday it is disqualified, because it is stated in its regard: “In the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering was slaughtered it is valid, even though the daily offering should be sacrificed first, but someone should stir its blood to prevent it from congealing until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood of the daily offering. Although the infrequent Paschal offering is already slaughtered, the priest first slaughters the frequent daily offering and then sprinkles the blood of the Paschal offering.

הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דקדים שחטיה לתמיד ברישא אמר ליה רב אחא סבא לרב אשי מתניתין נמי דיקא דקתני עד שיזרק הדם (תמיד) ולא קתני עד שישחוט ויזרק דם שמע מינה

The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Here we are dealing with a case where he gave precedence to the daily offering and slaughtered it first, and then slaughtered the Paschal offering before sprinkling the blood of the daily offering. Since the blood of both offerings requires sprinkling on the altar, the blood of the daily offering takes precedence. Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi that the wording of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled, and does not teach: Until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood. This indicates that the daily afternoon offering has already been slaughtered. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from its wording that this is the meaning of the mishna.

ובכולן כהנים רשאין כו׳ מאי טעמא אמר קרא למשחה לגדולה כדרך שהמלכים אוכלין

§ The mishna teaches: And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this halakha? The Gemara answers: The verse states, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood: “Of all the consecrated items of the children of Israel to you have I given them lemoshḥa” (Numbers 18:8). Targum Onkelos renders this term as: For greatness, indicating that the flesh of the offerings should be eaten in the manner that kings eat their food, i.e., prepared in any way they want.

מתני׳ אמר רבי שמעון אם ראית שמן שהוא מתחלק בעזרה אין צריך לשאול מהו אלא מותר רקיקי מנחות ישראל ולוג שמן של מצורע

MISHNA: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard for consumption by the priests and you seek to ascertain its nature, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites after they smeared a bit of oil on them, or it is left over from the log of oil of a leper after a small amount of the oil was placed on him.

אם ראית שמן שהוא ניתן על גבי האישים אין צריך לשאול מהו אלא מותר רקיקי מנחת כהנים ומנחת כהן משיח שאין מתנדבין שמן רבי טרפון אומר מתנדבין שמן

If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar in the manner of an offering, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests, or it is the leftover oil from the meal offering of the anointed priest, which requires a great deal of oil and which is burned in its entirety on the altar. The mishna adds: One can-not say that the oil distributed to priests or burned on the altar was brought as a gift offering, as one may not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may contribute oil as a gift offering.

גמ׳ אמר שמואל לדברי רבי טרפון המתנדב שמן קומצו ושיריו נאכלין מאי טעמא אמר קרא קרבן מנחה מלמד שמתנדבין שמן וכי מנחה מה מנחה קומצה ושיריה נאכלין אף שמן קומצו ושיריו נאכלין

GEMARA: Shmuel says: According to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that oil may be sacrificed as a gift offering, in the case of one who contributes oil, a priest removes a handful of the oil and sacrifices it on the altar, and its remainder is eaten by the priests. What is the reason for the ruling of Shmuel? The verse states: “And when one brings a meal offering [korban minḥa]” (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word korban teaches that one may contribute oil, and its status is like that of a meal offering: Just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.

אמר רבי זירא אף אנן נמי תנינא אמר רבי שמעון אם ראית שמן שמתחלק בעזרה אי אתה צריך לשאול מהו אלא מותר רקיקי מנחות ישראל ולוג שמן של מצורע שאין מתנדבין מכלל דמאן דאמר מתנדבין מתחלק

Rabbi Zeira said that we learn this halakha in the mishna as well: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites, or it is left over from the log of oil of a leper, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Zeira learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is distributed to the priests for consumption and it is not sacrificed entirely.

אמר ליה אביי אימא סיפא אם ראית שמן שניתן על גבי אישים אי אתה צריך לשאול מהו אלא מותר רקיקי מנחת כהנים ומנחת כהן משיח שאין מתנדבין שמן מכלל דלמאן דאמר מתנדב כולן לאישים לאביי קשיא רישא לרבי זירא קשיא סיפא

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Say the last clause of the mishna: If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests or it is left over from the meal offering of the anointed priest, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Abaye learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is burned in its entirety in the flames on the altar. This contradicts Shmuel’s statement that according to Rabbi Tarfon only a handful of the oil is burned on the altar. The Gemara comments: For Abaye the inference from the first clause of the mishna is difficult, while for Rabbi Zeira the inference from the last clause is difficult.

בשלמא לרבי זירא רישא בשירים סיפא בקומץ אלא לאביי קשיא תנא רישא אטו סיפא

The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Zeira, the inference from the first clause that the oil is distributed for consumption by the priests can be explained as referring to the remainder of the oil, whereas the inference from the last clause that the oil is burned on the altar is referring to the handful removed from the oil. But according to Abaye, the contradictory inferences pose a difficulty. The Gemara answers: One cannot infer anything from the first clause, as the mishna taught the first clause due to the last clause. That is, as the tanna of the mishna wishes to teach the last clause in a certain manner, he teaches the first clause in a similar style, despite the fact that one might come to an erroneous conclusion from the wording of the first clause.

בשלמא סיפא תני משום רישא אלא רישא משום סיפא מי תני אין אמרי במערבא תנא רישא משום סיפא

The Gemara asks: Granted, a tanna may teach the last clause of a mishna due to the first clause, i.e., a tanna might teach in a similar formulation to one he had already used. But would a tanna teach the first clause of a mishna due to the last clause? The Gemara answers: Yes; they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that a tanna taught the first clause due to the last clause.

תא שמע יין כדברי רבי עקיבא לספלים שמן כדברי רבי טרפון לאישים מאי לאו מדיין כולו לספלים שמן כולו לאישים מידי איריא הא כדאיתא והא כדאיתא

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear a baraita: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins adjacent to the corner of the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is burned in the flames of the altar. What, is it not possible to infer from the fact that the wine is poured in its entirety into the basins that the oil is likewise burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar, contrary to Shmuel’s statement? The Gemara rejects this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is and that case is as it is, i.e., the donations of wine and the oil are separate cases, and the two statements of the baraita need not accord with each other.

אמר רב פפא כתנאי שמן לא יפחות מלוג רבי אומר שלשת לוגין במאי קמיפלגי אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרב פפא דון מינה ומינה דון מינה ואוקי באתרה איכא בינייהו

Rav Pappa said: Shmuel’s statement is like one side of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One who contributes oil should not bring less than a log. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Three log. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? The Sages said this before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the nature of an inference by means of verbal analogy or juxtaposition: Is the secondary case equated to the primary case in all aspects, in accordance with the exegetical principle: Infer from it and again from it; or does the comparison extend only to one specific issue derived from the primary case, in accordance with the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., in all other aspects the cases are not equated?

דרבנן סברי מה מנחה מתנדבין אף שמן מתנדבין [ומינה מה מנחה לוג שמן אף כאן לוג שמן ומה מנחה קומצה ושיריה נאכלין אף שמן קומצו ושיריו נאכלין

The Gemara explains that this is the difference between them, as the Rabbis hold by the principle: Infer from it and again from it. The Gemara explains the application of this principle: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed, as inferred from the verse addressing the meal offering. And again one infers from this source: Just as a meal offering requires a log of oil, so too here, an offering of oil alone must be a log of oil. And just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.

ואידך ממנחה מה מנחה מתנדבין אף שמן מתנדבין ואוקי באתרה] כנסכים מה נסכים שלשת לוגין [אף שמן שלש לוגין ומה נסכים כולן לספלין] אף שמן כולן לאישים

And the other, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds by the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The Gemara explains that here too, one infers from the case of a meal offering: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed. But with regard to all other aspects of this halakha, interpret the halakha according to its own place, and its status is like that of wine libations, which are similar to oil in that they are also poured onto the altar: Just as one contributes libations of three log, so too, when one contributes oil one contributes three log; and just as libations are poured in their entirety into the basins, so too, the oil is burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar.

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי אי ממנחה מייתי לה [ רבי] דכולי עלמא דון מינה ומינה אלא רבי מאזרח גמר לה

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cited the source of the gift offering of oil from the verse addressing the meal offering he would not disagree with the Rabbis, as everyone employs the principle of: Infer from it and again from it. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the gift offering of oil from a verse that deals with libations: “All that are homeborn shall do these things after this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire” (Numbers 15:13). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from here that just as one may contribute wine libations, so too, one may contribute oil. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi compares oil to wine libations: Just as one contributes libations of three log, so too, one contributes three log of oil.

אמר ליה רב הונא בריה דרב נתן לרב פפא מי מצית אמרת הכי והתניא קרבן מנחה מלמד שמתנדבין שמן וכמה שלשה לוגין ומאן שמעת ליה דאמר שלשה לוגין רבי היא וקא מייתי לה מקרבן אמר ליה אי תניא תניא

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that, i.e., that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the source of the gift offering of oil is not from the meal offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And when one brings a meal offering [korban minḥa]” (Leviticus 2:1), that the superfluous word korban teaches that one may contribute oil? The baraita continues: And how much must one contribute? Three log. The Gemara explains the question: And whom did you hear who says the gift offering of oil is three log? This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and yet he cites the source of the gift offering of oil from the word korban, which is referring to a meal offering. Rav Pappa said to him: If this baraita is taught, it is taught; and I cannot take issue with it.

אמר שמואל המתנדב יין מביא ומזלפו על גבי האישים מאי טעמא אמר קרא ויין תקריב לנסך חצי ההין אשה ריח ניחח לה׳ והא קא מכבי כיבוי במקצת לא שמיה כיבוי

§ Shmuel says: One who contributes wine brings it and sprinkles it on the flames of the altar. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “And you shall present for the libation half a hin of wine, for an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 15:10). The verse indicates that there is a type of wine libation which is an offering made by fire. The Gemara challenges: But he thereby extinguishes the fire on the altar, and the Torah states: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). The Gemara explains: Extinguishing in a partial manner is not called extinguishing; in other words, this act is not included in the prohibition.

איני והאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה המוריד גחלת מעל גבי המזבח וכיבה חייב דליכא אלא האי איבעית אימא כיבוי דמצוה שאני

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh says: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable for violating the prohibition: “It shall not go out”? The Gemara answers: This statement is referring to a situation where there is only this coal on the altar, and therefore the fire is entirely extinguished. If you wish, say instead that even if partial extinguishing is prohibited, extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, as in the case of sprinkling wine on the altar, is different, and is permitted.

תא שמע דתנא רבי אליעזר בן יעקב כלפי שנתנה תורה לתרום יכול יכבה ויתרום אמרת לא יכבה שאני התם אפשר דיתיב ונטר

The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov teaches: Since the Torah gave a mitzva to remove the ashes of the offerings from the altar, one might have thought that it is permitted to extinguish the coals so that they become ashes and then to remove them. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish, in accordance with the verse: “It shall not go out.” Although this is a case of extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, the baraita deems it prohibited. The Gemara explains: It is different there, as it is possible for the priest to sit and wait until some of the coals become ashes, and then remove them. By contrast, with regard to wine, there is no alternative to sprinkling the wine on the fire, and therefore it is permitted.

תא שמע יין כדברי רבי עקיבא לספלים שמן כדברי רבי טרפון לאישים ועוד תניא יין נסך לספלים או אינו אלא לאישים אמרת לא יכבה

The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a baraita that prohibits sprinkling wine on the fire of the altar: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins on the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is poured onto the flames of the altar. And it is furthermore taught in a baraita: The wine libation is poured into the basins. The baraita suggests: Or perhaps it is not so; rather, it is poured onto the flames. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish.

לא קשיא הא רבי יהודה הא רבי שמעון למימרא דשמואל כרבי שמעון סבירא ליה והאמר שמואל מכבין גחלת של מתכת ברשות הרבים בשביל שלא יזוקו בה רבים

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that even an unintentional action, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues, is prohibited; and this statement of Shmuel is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues is permitted. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? But doesn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public thoroughfare on Shabbat so that the masses will not be injured by it;