Bava Kamma 40
אִי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – דַּעֲבַד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה, וְלָא עֲבַד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה מְעוּלָּה. אִי לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – דְּלָא עָבֵיד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה כְּלָל;
There are two scenarios in which the baraita could be interpreted as referring to an innocuous ox. If one wants to interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it can be discussing a case where he provided reduced safeguarding for it and did not provide superior safeguarding for it. If one wants to interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, it can be discussing a case where he did not provide safeguarding for it at all.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד תָּם וְאֶחָד מוּעָד שֶׁשְּׁמָרָן שְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה – פְּטוּרִין. וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב – דְּמַעֲמִידִין (לָהֶן) אַפּוֹטְרוֹפִּין לְתָם, לִגְבּוֹת מִגּוּפוֹ.
As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: With regard to both an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox whose owner provided reduced safeguarding for them, he is exempt. The owner is liable only if he did not safeguard them at all. And accordingly, Rabbi Ya’akov teaches us this, that the court appoints stewards for the owners of an innocuous ox to enable the injured party to collect damages from the proceeds of the sale of its body.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי קָאָמַר – חֲדָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תַּרְתֵּי טַעְמָא.
Ravina said to him that this is what Rava was saying by interpreting Rabbi Ya’akov’s statement with regard to a forewarned ox: Rabbi Ya’akov stated one matter containing two elements of reasoning [ta’ama] in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, namely, that a forewarned ox retains its element of innocuousness, and that reduced safeguarding is sufficient for a forewarned ox.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ – כְּגוֹן דַּהֲוָה מוּעָד; וְנִתְפַּקֵּחַ הַחֵרֵשׁ, וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה הַשּׁוֹטֶה, וְהִגְדִּיל הַקָּטָן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: הֲרֵי הוּא בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ, רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה.
Ravina himself said a different explanation of the baraita: The practical difference between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Ya’akov is with regard to whether a change of custody changes the status of the ox. For example, in a case where the ox was forewarned while in the custody of the steward and subsequently the deaf-mute regained his hearing, or the imbecile became halakhically competent, or the minor reached majority, and the ox returned to its owner’s custody. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is still in its previous status, the change of custody notwithstanding, and that therefore the owner is liable for the full cost of the damage. By contrast, Rabbi Ya’akov holds that the change of custody changes the status of the ox, which reverts to innocuousness, and so the owner pays only half the cost of the damage.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אַפּוֹטְרוֹפְּסִים מְשַׁלְּמִין מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה, וְאֵין מְשַׁלְּמִין כּוֹפֶר.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Stewards are liable to pay from their superior-quality property for damage caused by forewarned oxen under their custody, but they do not pay a ransom if the oxen killed a person.
מַאן תְּנָא כּוּפְרָא – כַּפָּרָה, וְיַתְמֵי לָאו בְּנֵי כַפָּרָה נִינְהוּ?
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that the purpose of ransom is atonement for the owner of the ox, and that therefore a minor orphan’s steward is exempt from liability to pay it, as orphans are not subject to the obligation of atonement since they are not morally responsible?
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנָתַן פִּדְיֹן נַפְשׁוֹ״ – דְּמֵי נִיזָּק. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: דְּמֵי מַזִּיק.
Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse: “If a ransom is imposed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life” (Exodus 21:30), is referring to the monetary value of the injured party. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: The ransom corresponds to the monetary value of the one liable for the damage.
מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: כּוּפְרָא מָמוֹנָא הוּא; וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה סָבַר: כּוּפְרָא כַּפָּרָה?
What, do they not disagree with regard to this very issue? In other words, the Rabbis hold that ransom is monetary restitution for the damage caused, and therefore the heirs of the victim must be paid the monetary value of the victim. And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, holds that ransom is atonement for causing the death of a person. Accordingly, the amount of the ransom is the monetary value of the one liable, since, from the perspective of his moral responsibility for the incident, he deserves to pay with his life. Although the court does not impose capital punishment, his atonement is through payment of his own value.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לָא; דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כּוּפְרָא כַּפָּרָה הוּא, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – רַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בִּדְנִיזָּק שָׁיְימִינַן, וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה סָבַר: בִּדְמַזִּיק שָׁיְימִינַן.
Rav Pappa said: No, it is possible that according to everyone ransom is atonement, and here they disagree with regard to this issue: The Rabbis hold that we evaluate the amount that is appropriate for atonement according to the monetary value of the injured party, and Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, holds that we evaluate it according to the value of the one liable for the damage. All agree that the purpose of the ransom is atonement.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? נֶאֶמְרָה ״שִׁיתָה״ לְמַטָּה, וְנֶאֶמְרָה ״שִׁיתָה״ לְמַעְלָה; מָה לְהַלָּן בִּדְנִיזָּק, אַף כָּאן בִּדְנִיזָּק.
The Gemara elaborates: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Imposing is stated in the later verse: “If ransom is imposed upon him” (Exodus 21:30), and imposing is stated in the earlier verse, concerning a person who injures a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry: “He shall be punished as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him” (Exodus 21:22). This verbal analogy indicates comparison of the two halakhot: Just as there, with regard to compensation for causing miscarriage, the evaluation is according to the monetary value of the injured party, i.e., the fetus, so too here, the ransom is according to the value of the injured party.
וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה סָבַר: ״וְנָתַן פִּדְיֹן נַפְשׁוֹ״ כְּתִיב.
And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, holds that the fact that it is written: “And he shall give for the redemption of his life,” indicates that the ransom is redemption of the life of the ox’s owner, and its amount should accordingly be the owner’s monetary value.
וְרַבָּנַן: אִין, ״פִּדְיוֹן נַפְשׁוֹ״ כְּתִיב; מִיהוּ כִּי שָׁיְימִינַן – בִּדְנִיזָּק שָׁיְימִינַן.
And the Rabbis would respond to this reasoning that indeed, the phrase: “For the redemption of his life,” is written, indicating that the purpose of the ransom is redemption of his life. Nevertheless, when we evaluate the amount he is liable to pay, we evaluate it according to the value of the injured party.
מְשַׁבַּח לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן בִּדְרַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב, דְּאָדָם גָּדוֹל הוּא. אָמַר לֵיהּ: לִכְשֶׁיָּבֹא לְיָדְךָ, הֲבִיאֵהוּ לְיָדִי.
§ Rava was praising Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov before Rav Naḥman, saying that he is a great man. Rav Naḥman said to him: When he happens to come to you, bring him to visit me.
כִּי אֲתָא לְגַבֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בָּעֵי מִינַּאי מִילְּתָא. בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ: שׁוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין, כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלְּמִין כּוֹפֶר?
When Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov eventually came to him, Rav Naḥman said to him: Ask me something. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov asked him: If an ox belonging to two partners kills a person, how do they pay the ransom?
מְשַׁלֵּם הַאי כּוֹפֶר וְהַאי כּוֹפֶר? כּוֹפֶר אֶחָד אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא שְׁנֵי כוּפְרִין! הַאי חֲצִי כוֹפֶר וְהַאי חֲצִי כוֹפֶר? כּוֹפֶר שָׁלֵם אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא חֲצִי כוֹפֶר!
If this partner pays the ransom in full and that partner also pays the ransom in full, it would seem incorrect, as the Merciful One states that one ransom shall be paid, but not two ransoms. If this partner pays half the ransom and that partner pays half the ransom, it would also seem incorrect, as the Merciful One states that a full ransom shall be paid, but not half a ransom.
אַדְּיָתֵיב וְקָא מְעַיֵּין בַּהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ – תְּנַן: חַיָּיבֵי עֲרָכִין – מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת – אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּיבֵי כוּפְרִין מַאי?
While Rav Naḥman was sitting and pondering this question, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov asked him another question. He said to him: We learned in a mishna: The court repossesses property from those liable to pay their valuations who are delaying their payments. But the court does not repossess property from those liable to bring sin-offerings and guilt-offerings; they are relied upon to bring their offerings of their own initiative, as it is assumed they want to atone for their transgressions (Arakhin 21a). In light of this mishna, what is the halakha with regard to those liable to pay ransom?
כֵּיוָן דְּכַפָּרָה הוּא – כְּחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם דָּמֵי,ּ מִחְמָר חֲמִיר עִילָּוֵיהּ וְלָא בָּעֵי מַשְׁכּוֹנֵיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דִּלְחַבְרֵיהּ הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִיתְּבָא לֵיהּ – מָמוֹנָא הוּא וְלָא לְגָבוֹהַּ הוּא, וְלָא חֲמִיר עֲלֵיהּ, וּבָעֵי מַשְׁכּוֹנֵיהּ?
Should it be reasoned that since it is atonement, it is similar to the cases of a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, which a person treats seriously, as it is in his interest to achieve atonement, and therefore the court does not need to repossess property from him? Or perhaps it should be reasoned that since he is required to give the ransom to another person, he considers it a financial liability and does not consider it an obligation toward the Most High, and consequently he does not treat it seriously enough; and therefore the court needs to repossess property from him, as he might not pay it.
אִי נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּהוּא לָא חֲטָא, וּמָמוֹנֵיהּ הוּא דְּאַזֵּיק – לָא חֲמִיר מִילְּתָא עִילָּוֵיהּ, וּבָעֵי מַשְׁכּוֹנֵיהּ.
Alternatively, it could be reasoned that since he himself did not sin but rather it is his property, i.e., his ox, that caused the damage, he does not treat the matter seriously enough, and therefore the court needs to repossess property from him to ensure payment.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שִׁבְקַן, אֶסְתַּגַּר בְּקַמַּיְיתָא.
Rav Naḥman said to him: Leave me alone. I am still stuck on the first question and have no solution, so you must not raise further difficult questions.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁאָלוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת תָּם, וְנִמְצָא מוּעָד – בְּעָלִים מְשַׁלְּמִין חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְשׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק.
The Sages taught: Even though one who borrows an ox from another is generally responsible for damage that it causes, if he borrowed it on the presumption that it was innocuous and it gored and caused damage, and it was then found to be forewarned, the owner pays half the cost of the damage and the borrower pays half the cost of the damage.
הוּעַד בְּבֵית שׁוֹאֵל, וְהֶחְזִירוֹ לַבְּעָלִים – בְּעָלִים מְשַׁלְּמִין חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְשׁוֹאֵל פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם.
If the ox was rendered forewarned in the house of the borrower, i.e., it gored three times while in his possession, and he was warned in court, and he then returned it to the owner and it subsequently gored, the owner pays half the cost of the damage, as with regard to him it is still considered innocuous, having become forewarned while not in his custody, and the borrower is exempt from paying any compensation, since the ox is no longer in his custody.
אָמַר מָר: שְׁאָלוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת תָּם, וְנִמְצָא מוּעָד – בְּעָלִים מְשַׁלְּמִין חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְשׁוֹאֵל חֲצִי נֶזֶק. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא לֵיהּ: תּוֹרָא שְׁאֵילִי, אַרְיָא לָא שְׁאֵילִי!
The Master said in the baraita: If one borrowed the ox on the presumption that it was innocuous and it was found to be forewarned, the owner pays half the cost of the damage and the borrower pays half the cost of the damage. The Gemara asks: But why should the borrower pay at all? Let him say to the owner: I borrowed an ox; I did not borrow a lion. I did not accept responsibility for safeguarding a forewarned ox, which behaves violently like a lion.
אָמַר רַב: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – שֶׁהִכִּיר בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא נַגְחָן.
Rav said: Here we are dealing with a case where the borrower was aware at the time he borrowed it that it was a goring ox and liable to cause damage.
וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ: תָּם שְׁאֵילִי, מוּעָד לָא שְׁאֵילִי!
The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, let him say to the owner: Even though I knew that it was a goring ox, nevertheless, I borrowed an innocuous ox. I did not intend to borrow a forewarned ox and thereby accept responsibility for safeguarding an ox for which one must pay the full cost of its damage.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: סוֹף סוֹף אִי תָּם הֲוָה – פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא בָּעֵית שַׁלּוֹמֵי; הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי, זִיל שַׁלֵּים פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא.
The Gemara answers that the borrower is liable because the owner can say to him: Ultimately, even if it was innocuous, you would be required to pay half the damages. Therefore, now too, go pay half the damages.
וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ: אִי תָּם – הֲוָה מִשְׁתַּלֵּם מִגּוּפוֹ!
The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, let the borrower say to the owner: If it was innocuous, the damages would be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the ox, not from my property.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: סוֹף סוֹף, אַתְּ – לָאו תּוֹרָא בָּעֵית שַׁלּוֹמֵי לְדִידִי?
The Gemara answers: The borrower cannot say this, because the owner can say to him: Ultimately, would you not have been required to pay me back the full value of my ox? As a borrower you are obligated to return the ox to me in the same condition that you borrowed it. Even if compensation was collected from the proceeds of its sale you would still have been required to return its full value to me. Therefore, in any event you would effectively be paying for the damage, so you are not losing anything from the fact that the ox is forewarned.
וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ:
The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, let the borrower say to him:
אִם תָּם – הֲוָה מוֹדֵינָא, וּמִפְּטַרְינָא!
If the ox was innocuous, I would have admitted my liability and would thereby have been exempt. A fine is imposed only as result of the testimony of two witnesses; if the offender admits his liability, no fine is imposed. Therefore, since the liability to pay half the cost of the damage for the act of an innocuous ox is a fine, the borrower could have rendered himself exempt from liability through admission.
וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא מָמוֹנָא, נֵימָא לֵיהּ: אִי תָּם הוּא – הֲוָה מַעֲרֵיקְנָא לֵיהּ לְאַגְמָא!
And even according to the one who says that payment of half the damage is considered monetary restitution, not a fine, and therefore his admission would not have rendered himself exempt from liability, let the borrower say to him: If the ox was innocuous, I would have smuggled it out to the marsh [agma] so that the injured party would not find it in my possession. He would then be unable to collect damages from me, since he can collect payment only from the proceeds of the sale of the ox. By contrast, compensation for damage caused by a forewarned ox can be collected from all of the owner’s property, and the borrower had no way of rendering himself exempt from liability. Therefore, it is unclear why the borrower is liable to pay half the cost of the damage.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּאַקְדֵּים בֵּי דִינָא, וְתַפְסֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Rather, here we are dealing with a case where the court seized the ox first, before the borrower had the chance to admit his liability or to smuggle the ox to the marsh. Therefore, the borrower cannot claim that he would have been able to render himself exempt from liability.
אִי הָכִי, בְּעָלִים אַמַּאי מְשַׁלְּמִים חֲצִי נֶזֶק? נֵימָא לֵיהּ: אַתְפַּסְתֵּיהּ לְתוֹרַאי – בִּידָא [דְּ]מַאן דְּלָא מָצֵינָא לְאִשְׁתַּעוֹיֵי דִּינָא בַּהֲדֵיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי אַהְדַּרְתֵּיהּ נִיהֲלָךְ, לָאו מִינָּךְ הֲווֹ שָׁקְלִי לֵיהּ?!
The Gemara asks: If so, why does the owner pay half the cost of the damage? Let him say to the borrower: You let my ox be seized by the court, with whom I cannot engage in litigation in an attempt to reach a compromise; the court collects full payment, and you are responsible for this situation. Therefore, you should pay the entire amount. The Gemara answers that the owner is liable to pay because the borrower can say to him: If I would have returned it to you, would the court not have taken it from you?
וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ: אִי אַהְדַּרְתֵּיהּ נִיהֲלִי, הֲוָה מַעֲרֵיקְנָא לֵיהּ לְאַגְמָא! מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: סוֹף סוֹף, לָאו מֵעֲלִיָּיה הֲווֹ מִשְׁתַּלְּמִי?!
The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, let the owner say to him in response: If you would have returned it to me I would have smuggled it to the marsh, and the court would not have been able to seize it. The Gemara answers: The owner cannot say this, because the borrower can say to him: Ultimately, would the injured party not then have received payment from your superior-quality property, as is the halakha in the case of a forewarned ox, where the compensation paid is not only from the proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox?
הָנִיחָא הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ נִכְסֵי, הֵיכָא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ נִכְסֵי מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara comments: This explanation works out well in a case where the owner has other property from which compensation can be collected, besides the ox. But where he does not have other property, what is there to say? In that case, the borrower has in fact caused him loss.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי הֵיכָא דְּמִשְׁתַּעְבַּדְנָא לְדִידָךְ, הָכִי נָמֵי מִשְׁתַּעְבַּדְנָא לְהַאיְךְ – מִדְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
The Gemara answers: The reason the borrower is exempt is because he can say to the owner: Just as I am indebted to you, to return your ox to you, so too, I am indebted to that injured party to whom you owe compensation. This is due to the ruling of Rabbi Natan.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, וַחֲבֵירוֹ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ – מִנַּיִן שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין מִזֶּה, וְנוֹתְנִים לָזֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ״.
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that if one is owed one hundred dinars by another, and the other person, i.e., the debtor, is owed one hundred dinars by another person, the court appropriates payment from that latter debtor and gives the money directly to this first creditor, without going through the middleman, who is both the first debtor and the second creditor? The verse states, with regard to returning stolen property: “And he gives it to the one with regard to whom he is guilty” (Numbers 5:7), indicating that there is a situation where the liable party pays a third party to whom his creditor owes money in turn.
הוּעַד בְּבֵית שׁוֹאֵל, וְהֶחְזִירוֹ לַבְּעָלִים – בְּעָלִים מְשַׁלְּמִין חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְשׁוֹאֵל פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם.
It is stated at the end of the baraita cited earlier (40a): If the ox was rendered forewarned in the house of the borrower, and the borrower then returned it to the owner and it subsequently gored, the owner pays half the cost of the damage and the borrower is exempt from paying any compensation.
סֵיפָא – רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה, רֵישָׁא – רְשׁוּת אֵינָהּ מְשַׁנָּה!
The Gemara asks: The last clause of that baraita indicates that a change of custody changes the status of the ox; if it was rendered forewarned while in the borrower’s possession and was then returned to its owner, the owner pays only half the cost of the damage for any subsequent damage it might cause, as it is no longer considered forewarned. By contrast, the first clause of the same baraita, which teaches that the ox retains its status as forewarned even after being borrowed, indicates that a change of custody does not change the status of the ox.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תִּבְרַהּ; מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This baraita is disjointed [tavra]. The tanna who taught this clause did not teach that clause.
רַבָּה אָמַר: מִדְּרֵישָׁא רְשׁוּת אֵינָהּ מְשַׁנָּה, סֵיפָא נָמֵי רְשׁוּת אֵינָהּ מְשַׁנָּה. וְסֵיפָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינָךְ דִּמְיַיעֲדַתְּ לֵיהּ לְתוֹרַאי.
Rabba said: From the fact that the first clause follows the opinion that a change of custody does not change the status of the ox, it is inferred that the last clause also follows the opinion that a change of custody does not change its status. And this is the reason that in the last clause the ox reverts to its status of innocuousness: It is because the owner can say to the borrower: It is not in your power to render my ox forewarned, as I did not give it to you with that intention and it was your negligence that caused the change in its status. Therefore, the owner is not liable to pay additional compensation that results from the status the ox acquired under the custody of the borrower.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: מִדְּסֵיפָא רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה; וְרֵישָׁא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוֹלֵךְ, שֵׁם בְּעָלָיו עָלָיו.
Rav Pappa said: From the fact that the last clause follows the opinion that a change of custody changes the status of the ox, it is inferred that the first clause also follows the opinion that a change of custody changes its status. And this is the reason that in the first clause the ox is considered forewarned even when in the custody of the borrower: It is because wherever it goes, the name of its owner is upon it. Since it was rendered forewarned under its owner’s custody, with whom it remains identified, it is not considered to have undergone a change of custody.
שׁוֹר הָאִצְטָדִין אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב מִיתָה. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ?
§ The mishna teaches that a stadium ox is not liable to be put to death, since it was trained to gore. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If an ox kills a person it may not be brought as an offering, even if it is not put to death. If a stadium ox kills a person, what is the halakha with regard to sacrificing it on the altar?
רַב אָמַר: כָּשֵׁר, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: פָּסוּל. רַב אָמַר כָּשֵׁר – אָנוּס הוּא. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר פָּסוּל – הֲרֵי נֶעֶבְדָ[ה] בּוֹ עֲבֵירָה.
Rav says that it is fit to be brought as an offering, and Shmuel says that it is disqualified. Rav says that the ox is fit because it acted due to circumstances beyond its control, as goring is what it was trained to do; and Shmuel says that it is disqualified as, in any event, a transgression was committed through it.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הָרוֹבֵעַ וְאֶת הַנִּרְבָּע. ״מִן הַבָּקָר״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנֶּעֱבָד. ״מִן הַצֹּאן״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַמּוּקְצֶה. ״וּמִן הַצֹּאן״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנּוֹגֵחַ.
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita that interprets the verse: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2). The phrase “from the cattle” is mentioned to exclude an animal that engaged in bestiality and an animal that was the object of bestiality from eligibility to be brought as an offering. The phrase “from the herd” is mentioned to exclude an animal that had been worshipped as a god. “From the flock” is mentioned to exclude an animal that had been set aside for idol worship. The additional conjunction “or,” in the phrase “or from the flock” is mentioned to exclude an animal that gores a person, killing him.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אִם נֶאֱמַר רוֹבֵעַ – לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר נוֹגֵחַ? וְאִם נֶאֱמַר נוֹגֵחַ – לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר רוֹבֵעַ?
The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon said: If it is stated that an animal that engaged in bestiality is disqualified from being brought as an offering, why is it stated that an animal that gores is disqualified? And if it is stated that an animal that gores is disqualified, why is it stated that an animal that engaged in bestiality is disqualified?
מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּרוֹבֵעַ שֶׁאֵין בַּנּוֹגֵחַ, וְיֵשׁ בַּנּוֹגֵחַ שֶׁאֵין בָּרוֹבֵעַ.
He explains: It is because there is a stringency pertaining to an animal that engaged in bestiality that does not pertain to one that gores, and, conversely, there is a stringency pertaining to an animal that gores that does not pertain to an animal that engaged in bestiality.
רוֹבֵעַ – עָשָׂה בּוֹ אוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן, נוֹגֵחַ – לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ אוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן. נוֹגֵחַ – מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר, רוֹבֵעַ – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכּוֹפֶר. לְפִיכָךְ הוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר רוֹבֵעַ, וְהוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר נוֹגֵחַ.
He clarifies: With regard to an animal that engaged in bestiality, the Torah renders a case where it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control like a case where it acted willfully, as it is disqualified in either case. By contrast, with regard to an animal that gores, the Torah does not render a case where it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control like a case where it acted willfully. Conversely, with regard to an animal that gores, its owner pays the ransom; whereas the owner of an animal that engaged in bestiality does not pay a ransom. Therefore, the Torah had to state that an animal that engaged in bestiality is disqualified and had to state that an animal that gores is disqualified.
קָתָנֵי מִיהַת, רוֹבֵעַ – עָשָׂה בּוֹ אוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן, נוֹגֵחַ – לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ אוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לָאו לְקׇרְבָּן?
The Gemara explains the objection: In any event, the baraita teaches that with regard to an animal that engaged in bestiality, the Torah renders a case where it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control like a case where it acted willfully. By contrast, with regard to an animal that gores, the Torah does not render a case where it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control like a case where it acted willfully. With regard to what halakha is this stated? Is it not with regard to the animal’s eligibility to be brought as an offering? Accordingly, a stadium ox, which is considered a victim of circumstances beyond its control, is fit to be brought as an offering, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion.
לָא, לִקְטָלָא.
The Gemara answers: No, it is with regard to the animal being put to death, i.e., the ox is not killed if it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא; דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ לְקׇרְבָּן, ״נוֹגֵחַ לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ אוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן״?! לָאו אוֹנֶס דִּידֵיהּ כְּתִיב, וְלָאו רָצוֹן דִּידֵיהּ כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא לָאו לִקְטָלָא?
So too, it is reasonable, as if you say that the ruling of the baraita is with regard to the animal’s eligibility to be brought as an offering, how can the baraita state the following: By contrast, with regard to an animal that gores, the Torah does not render a case where it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control like a case where it acted willfully. Neither are circumstances beyond its control written in that context, nor is its willingness written; the issue is not mentioned in the Torah at all. Rather, is the ruling of the baraita not stated with regard to the animal being put to death, where this distinction is indicated in the Torah? The mishna interprets the phrase: “And if an ox gores” (Exodus 21:28), as indicating that the ox is not put to death in a case where it is induced to gore; therefore, this distinction is mentioned in the Torah with regard to the animal being put to death. Accordingly, the baraita does not address the topic of dispute between Rav and Shmuel.
אָמַר מָר: נוֹגֵחַ – מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכּוֹפֶר, רוֹבֵעַ – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכּוֹפֶר. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּרַבְעַהּ וְקַטְלַהּ – מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ בְּקַרְנָא, מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ בִּרְבִיעָה?
§ The Master said in the same baraita: With regard to an animal that gores, its owner pays the ransom, whereas the owner of an animal that engaged in bestiality does not pay a ransom. What are the circumstances under which the owner of an animal that engaged in bestiality is not liable to pay the ransom? If we say that it is when the animal engaged in bestiality with a woman and killed her in the process, what is the difference to me whether it killed her with its horn, and what is the difference to me whether it killed her through bestiality?
וְאֶלָּא דְּרַבְעַהּ וְלָא קַטְלַהּ? הַאי דְּלָא מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא קַטְלַהּ הוּא!
And rather, if the baraita is referring to a case where the animal engaged in bestiality with her but did not kill her, in that case, this halakha that he does not pay a ransom is simply due to the fact that it did not kill her, so paying ransom is irrelevant; it is not a feature associated with the halakhot of an animal that engaged in bestiality.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם דְּרַבְעַהּ וְלָא קַטְלַהּ, דְּאַתְיוּהָ לְבֵי דִינָא וְקַטְלוּהָ; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא
Abaye said: Actually, it is referring to a case where the animal engaged in bestiality with her but did not kill her, and it is still noteworthy that its owner is not liable to pay ransom, as the woman was brought to court, and they executed her for her transgression. Lest you say
