Gittin 66
דְּרָא רַבִּי אֲבִינָא לְסִילְּתֵיהּ, וַאֲזַל לְגַבֵּי דְּרַב הוּנָא רַבֵּיהּ – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: גִּיטּוֹ כְּמַתְּנָתוֹ, מַה מַתְּנָתוֹ, אִם עָמַד – חוֹזֵר, אַף גִּיטּוֹ, אִם עָמַד – חוֹזֵר.
Let Rabbi Avina lift his basket and go to Rav Huna his teacher, as in order to acquire the item he must rely on the opinion of his teacher, as Rav Huna said: The legal status of one’s bill of divorce is like that of his gift. Just as with regard to a gift given by one on his deathbed, if he recovered from his illness and arose from his deathbed, he revokes his gift, so too, with regard to his bill of divorce given by one on his deathbed, if he recovered from his illness and arose from his deathbed, he revokes the bill of divorce.
וּמָה גִּיטּוֹ, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ״ – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״; אַף מַתְּנָתוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קְנוֹ מִינֵּיהּ.
And just as with regard to the bill of divorce of one on his deathbed, even though he did not specify, once he said: Write the bill of divorce, even though he did not say: Give it to my wife, they write and give it to his wife, as it was taught in the mishna. So too, with regard to a gift given by one on his deathbed, once he said: Give the gift, even though the recipients did not acquire the item from him by means of an act of acquisition, the one on his deathbed has given the gift. Based on the parallel drawn by Rav Huna between a bill of divorce and a gift, Rabbi Avina can go and collect the gift given him by Geneiva.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: אִי – מָה מַתָּנָה יֶשְׁנָהּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה, אַף גֵּט יֶשְׁנוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה?! הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! בִּשְׁלָמָא מַתָּנָה – אִיתַהּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה, אֶלָּא גֵּט – לְאַחַר מִיתָה מִי אִיכָּא?!
Rabbi Abba objects to that conclusion. If that parallel is valid, extend it and say: Just as a gift is valid after death, so too, a bill of divorce is valid after death. The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, a gift is valid after death; however, is a bill of divorce valid after death? A bill of divorce severs the bond between husband and wife. After the husband dies, the bill of divorce is pointless. Therefore, the parallel certainly does not extend to after death.
אֶלָּא רַבִּי אַבָּא, הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: מַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע בְּמִקְצָת הִיא, וּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע בְּמִקְצָת בָּעֲיָא קִנְיָן! מִכְּלָל דְּרַב הוּנָא סָבַר לָא בָּעֲיָא קִנְיָן?! וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּבָעֲיָא קִנְיָן! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּמְצַוֶּה מֵחֲמַת מִיתָה הוּא.
Rather, this is what is difficult according to Rabbi Abba: Geneiva’s instruction is the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate, and the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate requires an act of acquisition. The Gemara asks: Is that to say, by inference, that Rav Huna, according to whose opinion Rabbi Avina acquired the gift, holds that the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate does not require an act of acquisition? But don’t we maintain that the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate requires an act of acquisition? The Gemara answers: It is different here, as this is not a standard case of the gift of a person on his deathbed. This is a case where one issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death. In that case, the principle: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the deceased, applies even if it is a gift of a portion of his estate.
מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא סָבַר: מְצַוֶּה מֵחֲמַת מִיתָה בָּעֲיָא קִנְיָן?! וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּלָא בָּעֵי קִנְיָן!
The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that Rabbi Abba holds that one who issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death requires an act of acquisition? But don’t we maintain that one who issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death does not require an act of acquisition? What, then, is difficult for Rabbi Abba?
אֶלָּא רַבִּי אַבָּא, הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: ״חַמְרָא״ – לָא קָאָמַר, ״דְּמֵי חַמְרָא״ – לָא קָאָמַר, ״מֵחַמְרָא״ קָאָמַר! וְאִידַּךְ, ״מֵחַמְרָא״ – כְּדֵי לְיַיפּוֹת אֶת כֹּחוֹ. שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: ״מֵחַמְרָא״ – כְּדֵי לְיַיפּוֹת אֶת כֹּחוֹ.
Rather, this is what is difficult according to Rabbi Abba: Geneiva did not say to give four hundred dinars of wine to Rabbi Avina, and he did not say: The monetary value of four hundred dinars of wine. He said: Four hundred dinars from wine. The question is: What did Geneiva seek to convey with that ambiguous expression? And the other amora, Rabbi Zeira, who does not find this difficult, holds that when Geneiva said: Four hundred dinars from wine, it was in order to enhance Rabbi Avina’s ability to collect the gift. Geneiva sought to give him a gift of value; in order to guarantee that Rabbi Avina would have access to his property and that the heirs would not be able to prevent him from receiving the gift with various claims, he specifically designated from which property Rabbi Avina could collect the gift. The Gemara notes: They sent a message from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, that the term: From wine, is in order to enhance Rabbi Avina’s ability to collect the gift.
מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ לְבוֹר, וְאָמַר: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אֶת קוֹלוֹ יִכְתּוֹב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to one who was thrown into a pit and thought that he would die there, and he said that anyone who hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, and he specified his name, her name, and all relevant details, those who hear him should write this bill of divorce and give it to his wife, even though they do not see the man and do not know him.
גְּמָ׳ וְלֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא שֵׁד הוּא! אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: כְּשֶׁרָאוּ לוֹ דְּמוּת אָדָם.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But let us be concerned that perhaps the source of the voice in the pit is a demon, as no one saw the person in the pit. Rav Yehuda says: It is referring to a case where they saw that the being in the pit has human form.
אִינְהוּ נָמֵי אִידְּמוֹיֵי אִידְּמוֹ! דַּחֲזוֹ לֵיהּ בָּבוּאָה. אִינְהוּ נָמֵי אִית לְהוּ בָּבוּאָה! דַּחֲזוֹ לֵיהּ בָּבוּאָה דְבָבוּאָה. וְדִלְמָא אִינְהוּ נָמֵי אִית לְהוּ? אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לִימְּדַנִי יוֹנָתָן בְּנִי: בָּבוּאָה אִית לְהוּ, בָּבוּאָה דְבָבוּאָה לֵית לְהוּ.
The Gemara objects: Demons too can appear in human form, and therefore the fact that the being looked human is not a proof that it is not a demon. The Gemara explains: It is a case where they saw that he has a shadow [bavua]. The Gemara objects: Demons also have a shadow. The Gemara explains: It is a case where they saw that he has the shadow of a shadow. The Gemara objects: And perhaps demons too have the shadow of a shadow? Rabbi Ḥanina says: Yonatan my son taught me that demons have a shadow but they do not have the shadow of a shadow.
וְדִלְמָא צָרָה הִיא! תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: בִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה, כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מַכִּירִין.
The Gemara asks: But perhaps the source of the voice in the pit is a rival wife of the woman who is to be divorced. She seeks to cause her rival to receive a bill of divorce under false pretenses, leading her to believe that she is divorced. Based on that mistaken belief, she will remarry without a divorce and will then be forbidden to both her first and second husband. The Gemara answers: A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: During a time of danger, when there is the likelihood that the wife would assume deserted wife status, one writes and gives a bill of divorce even though the people instructed to do so are not familiar with the man who gave the instructions. Here too, when a voice is heard from a pit, one writes and gives the bill of divorce, as there is no possibility of properly clarifying the issue.
מַתְנִי׳ הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – רָצָה לְשַׂחֶק בָּהּ.
MISHNA: A healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say to give it to her, presumably sought to mock her. Since he told them to write the bill of divorce and not to give it, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבָרִיא אֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לְרֹאשׁ הַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת; אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, אִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The mishna relates: There was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death and instructed those listening to write the bill of divorce with the intent of giving it to her. However, if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.
גְּמָ׳ מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?!
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the halakha stated in the mishna? The halakha is that in a case where a healthy man said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. From the incident it is clear that under certain circumstances when a healthy man said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט; וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לְרֹאשׁ הַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת, וְאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, אִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: In the case of a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but he did not say to give it to her, presumably sought to mock her. However, if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and he then ascended to the roof and fell and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce. However, if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּעָל לְבֵי כְנִישְׁתָּא, אַשְׁכַּח מַקְרֵי יָנוֹקָא וּבְרֵיהּ דְּיָתְבִי, וְיָתֵיב אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא גַּבַּיְיהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: בֵּי תְרֵי מִינַּיְיכוּ נִכְתְּבוּ גִּיטָּא לִדְבֵיתְהוּ. לְסוֹף שְׁכֵיב מַקְרֵי יָנוֹקָא, מִי מְשַׁוּוּ אִינָשֵׁי בְּרָא שְׁלִיחָא בִּמְקוֹם אַבָּא, אוֹ לָא?
The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who entered the synagogue and found a schoolteacher and his son who were sitting there, and another person also sat with them. The man said to them: Two of you should write a bill of divorce for my wife. Ultimately, the schoolteacher died. The Sages considered the following question: Do people designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father, even though the two of them could not serve together as witnesses because they are relatives, or not? As the man’s intent was to designate two people who could serve as witnesses, the schoolteacher and the other person, the question is whether the son of the schoolteacher and the other person are agents and eligible to write and give the bill of divorce.
רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: לָא מְשַׁוּוּ אִינָשֵׁי בְּרָא שְׁלִיחָא בִּמְקוֹם אַבָּא; וְרַב פַּפֵּי אָמַר: מְשַׁוּוּ אִינָשֵׁי בְּרָא שְׁלִיחָא בִּמְקוֹם אַבָּא. אָמַר רָבָא, הִילְכְתָא: מְשַׁוּוּ אִינָשֵׁי בְּרָא שְׁלִיחָא בִּמְקוֹם אַבָּא.
Rav Naḥman said: People do not designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father. And Rav Pappi said: People designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father. Rava said that the halakha is: People designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father.
מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״,
MISHNA: If a man said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife,
אוֹ לִשְׁלֹשָׁה: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט, וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי״, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. אָמַר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יֹאמְרוּ לַאֲחֵרִים וְיִכְתְּבוּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן בֵּית דִּין; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
or if a man said to three people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, these people should write the document themselves and give it to her. If he said to three people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, these people should tell others, and those others will write the document, because he designated the three people as a court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וְזוֹ הֲלָכָה הֶעֱלָה רַבִּי חֲנִינָא אִישׁ אוֹנוֹ מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִין: מְקוּבָּל אֲנִי בְּאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לַאֲחֵרִים וְיִכְתְּבוּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן בֵּית דִּין,
And it is that halakha that Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono brought up from prison in the name of Rabbi Akiva, who was incarcerated there: I received a tradition from my teachers that in a case where a man says to three people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, that these people should tell others and those others will write the document, because he designated the three people as a court.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, נוּמֵינוּ לַשָּׁלִיחַ: אַף אָנוּ מְקוּבָּלִין, שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ אָמַר לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – שֶׁיִּלְמְדוּ וְיִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ.
Rabbi Yosei said: We said [nomeinu] to the agent, Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono: We too received a tradition. However, it is a different one, that even if a man said to the High Court [Sanhedrin] in Jerusalem: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, that the members of the court should learn to write, and should write the document themselves, and give it to his wife.
אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה: ״כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב, וּשְׁנַיִם חוֹתְמִין. ״כּוּלְּכֶם כְּתוֹבוּ״ – אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב, וְכוּלָּם חוֹתְמִין; לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט בָּטֵל.
If a man said to ten people: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife, one of the ten writes the bill of divorce and two sign it. If he said: All of you write the document, one of them writes the bill of divorce and all of them sign it. Therefore, if one of them died, then this is a bill of divorce that is null and void, as he directed all of them to participate in the process.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא: שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ מִבֵּי רַב לִשְׁמוּאֵל: יְלַמְּדֵנוּ רַבֵּינוּ; אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְאָמְרוּ לְסוֹפֵר וְכָתַב, וְחָתְמוּ הֵן, מַהוּ? שְׁלַח לְהוּ: תֵּצֵא, וְהַדָּבָר צָרִיךְ תַּלְמוּד.
GEMARA: Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: After Rav’s death, they sent a question from the study hall of Rav to Shmuel: Let our teacher teach us: In a case where a man said to two people: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife, and they told the scribe and he wrote the bill of divorce and they signed it, what is the halakha? He sent this response to them: If the woman remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, she should leave her second husband, and the matter requires study. It is necessary to clarify the halakha, as there is fundamental uncertainty with regard to this matter.
מַאי ״הַדָּבָר צָרִיךְ תַּלְמוּד״? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָווּ לְהוּ מִילֵּי; וּמְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ מִילֵּי – אִי מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ, אִי לָא מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ;
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The matter requires study? What aspect of this question requires study? If we say that the uncertainty arises due to the fact that these are verbal directives, as the husband merely gave them instructions and did not hand them anything tangible, and Shmuel is uncertain whether verbal directives, instructions given to one agent, are transferred to another agent or whether verbal directives are not transferred to another agent; this leads to the question of whether the agents designated by the husband to write the bill of divorce can designate the scribe to write it. That cannot be the question.
וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר רַבִּי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר מִילֵּי לָא מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ!
The Gemara explains why not: But didn’t Shmuel say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, i.e., an agent cannot be deputized to give instructions on behalf of another. Shmuel was not uncertain concerning this issue.
אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל – הָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: הַאי ״כְּתוֹבוּ״ – אִי כְּתַב יָדָן, אִי כְּתַב הַגֵּט?
Rather, this is the dilemma that Shmuel is raising: When the man told the two people: Write the bill of divorce, the question is whether he was referring to their signatures, in which case they could designate the scribe to write the document, or whether he was referring to writing the text of the bill of divorce, in which case it would be incumbent upon them alone to write and sign the document.
וְתִיפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִמַּתְנִיתִין: אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, אוֹ לִשְׁלֹשָׁה: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ.
The Gemara asks: But let Shmuel resolve the dilemma from the mishna: If a man said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, or if a man said to three people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, these people should write the document themselves and give it to her. Apparently, they must write the bill of divorce themselves.
הִיא גּוּפָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, ״כְּתוֹבוּ״ – כְּתַב יָדָן הוּא, אוֹ כְּתַב הַגֵּט הוּא? פְּשִׁיטָא דִּכְתַב הַגֵּט הוּא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, נוּמֵינוּ לַשָּׁלִיחַ: אַף אָנוּ מְקוּבָּלִין, שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ אָמַר לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – שֶׁיִּלְמְדוּ וְיִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ לָהּ.
The Gemara answers: The proper interpretation of the mishna itself is the dilemma that Shmuel is raising: When the man told the two people: Write the bill of divorce, was he referring to their signatures, or was he referring to writing the text of the bill of divorce? The Gemara explains: It is obvious that it is referring to the writing of the bill of divorce, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei said: We said to the agent, Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono: We too received a tradition; that even if a man said to the High Court in Jerusalem: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, that the members of the court should learn to write, and should write the document themselves, and give it to his wife.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא כְּתַב הַגֵּט הוּא, שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּתַב יָדָן הוּא, מִי אִיכָּא בֵּי דִינָא דְּלָא יָדְעִי מִחְתָּם חֲתִימַת יְדַיְיהוּ?! אִין, אִיכָּא בֵּי דִינָא חַדְתָּא.
Granted, if you say it means the writing of the bill of divorce, that they must write the actual bill of divorce, this works out well, as a certain degree of expertise is necessary in order to write a bill of divorce correctly. However, if you say that it means their signatures, is there a court whose members do not know how to sign their signatures? The Gemara responds: Yes, there is a new court, whose members have not yet learned to sign a unique signature that will be recognizable to the public.
וְאִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּהַאי ״כְּתוֹבוּ״ – כְּתַב יָדָן הוּא; הָא כְּתַב הַגֵּט – כָּשֵׁר?! וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, אָמַר רַבִּי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר מִילֵּי לָא מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ!
The Gemara asks: But if we hold that this instruction: Write the bill of divorce, is a reference to their signatures, is the writing of the bill of divorce by a scribe valid? But didn’t Shmuel say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent.
אָמְרִי: אִי סְבִירִי לַן דִּ״כְתוֹבוּ״ – כְּתַב יָדָן הוּא; כְּתַב הַגֵּט – נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: ״אִמְרוּ״, וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר ״אִמְרוּ״. וּמִי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר: ״אִמְרוּ״?! וְהָתְנַן: ״כָּתַב סוֹפֵר וְעֵד – כָּשֵׁר״, וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: ״חָתַם סוֹפֵר״ שָׁנִינוּ;
The Sages say in response that if we hold that the phrase: Write the bill of divorce, is a reference to their signatures, the writing of the bill of divorce becomes as one who says to those agents: Tell another to write it. And Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it, that the agent can designate another to write the document. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei concede in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (87b): If a bill of divorce has the writing of a scribe, and the scribe identifies his handwriting, and one witness verifies his signature, it is valid as though two witnesses testified to ratify their signatures. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: We learned in the mishna that this is the halakha with regard to the scribe’s signature and not the scribe’s writing.
וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִילֵּי לָא מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ.
And Rav Ḥisda said: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is that of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and there is no concern that the scribe signed the document without the husband instructing him to do so.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר ״אִמְרוּ״, נָפֵיק מִינַּהּ חוּרְבָּה – דְּזִימְנִין דְּאָמַר לְהוּ לִשְׁנַיִם:
And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it, a pitfall will result from it. As sometimes, it happens that one said to two people:
