Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain
There seem to be subtly conflicting approaches to the question of whether one’s oath to violate or to uphold a Torah law takes effect or not. And what about if someone makes a נדר rather than a שבועה? Is the law the same? Lastly, what if someone makes a shevua not to be truly binding, but in order to motivate themselves to do a mitzvah? What can we learn from these different opinions about our power to create binding legislation on ourselves with our own oaths versus the Torah’s power to bind us by default?
Shevuot 27 – מושבע ועומד מהר סיני
Dr. Elana Stein Hain – dinanddaf@hadran.org.il
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If you missed part one, find it here:
Din & Daf: Inherited Oaths- The Legacy of Har Sinai (P. 1) מושבע ועומד מהר סיני
Sources:
מושבע ועומד מהר סיני – Part 2 – Shevuot 27a-b
- ויקרא ה:ד
א֣וֹ נֶ֡פֶשׁ כִּ֣י תִשָּׁבַע֩ לְבַטֵּ֨א בִשְׂפָתַ֜יִם לְהָרַ֣ע ׀ א֣וֹ לְהֵיטִ֗יב לְ֠כֹ֠ל אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְבַטֵּ֧א הָאָדָ֛ם בִּשְׁבֻעָ֖ה וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֑נּוּ וְהוּא־יָדַ֥ע וְאָשֵׁ֖ם לְאַחַ֥ת מֵאֵֽלֶּה׃
Or when a person utters an oath to bad or good purpose (whatever a human being may utter in an oath) and, though having known about it, the fact has escaped notice, but later that person realizes guilt in any of these matters
- במדבר ל:א-ב
וַיְדַבֵּ֤ר מֹשֶׁה֙ אֶל־רָאשֵׁ֣י הַמַּטּ֔וֹת לִבְנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לֵאמֹ֑ר זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֖ר צִוָּ֥ה ה’
Moses spoke to the heads of the Israelite tribes, saying: This is what God has commanded:
אִישׁ֩ כִּֽי־יִדֹּ֨ר נֶ֜דֶר לַֽה’ אֽוֹ־הִשָּׁ֤בַע שְׁבֻעָה֙ לֶאְסֹ֤ר אִסָּר֙ עַל־נַפְשׁ֔וֹ לֹ֥א יַחֵ֖ל דְּבָר֑וֹ כְּכׇל־הַיֹּצֵ֥א מִפִּ֖יו יַעֲשֶֽׂה׃
If a householder makes a vow to יהוה or takes an oath imposing an obligation on himself, he shall not break his pledge; he must carry out all that has crossed his lips.
- משנה שבועות ג:ו
נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר. לְקַיֵּם וְלֹא קִיֵּם, פָּטוּר. שֶׁהָיָה בַדִּין, שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב, כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא, מָה אִם הָרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, הֲרֵי הוּא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ, מִצְוָה שֶׁהוּא מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִשְׁבוּעַת הָרְשׁוּת, שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת מִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, שֶׁאִם נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר:
If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If he takes an oath to perform a mitzva and he does not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to claim that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. The mishna explains: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it?The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable with regard to breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath, since if one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and did not refrain, he is exempt.
- משנה שבועות ג:ד
…שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל אֳכָלִים שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לַאֲכִילָה וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לִשְׁתִיָּה, פָּטוּר. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר.
…If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force.
- שבועות כז.-:
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, יְהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – מָה הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת, אַף הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת; אוֹצִיא נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he would be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and does not refrain, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.
יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְקַיֵּים אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא קִיֵּים, שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – מָה הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת, אַף הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת; אוֹצִיא נִשְׁבַּע לְקַיֵּים אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא קִיֵּים, שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.
The baraita continues: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, that he would be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.
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וּמִמַּאי דִּקְרָאֵי בִּדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת כְּתִיבִי? דִּלְמָא בִּדְבַר מִצְוָה כְּתִיבִי!
But from where do we know that these verses are written referring to optional matters? Perhaps they are written referring to matters involving a mitzva.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ; דְּבָעֵינַן הֲטָבָה דּוּמְיָא דַּהֲרָעָה, וַהֲרָעָה דּוּמְיָא דַּהֲטָבָה; דְּאַקֵּישׁ הֲרָעָה לַהֲטָבָה – מָה הֲטָבָה אֵינָהּ בְּבִיטּוּל מִצְוָה, אַף הֲרָעָה אֵינָהּ בְּבִיטּוּל מִצְוָה. הֲרָעָה גּוּפָהּ – הֲטָבָה הִיא.
This should not enter your mind, since we require that doing good be similar to doing evil, and doing evil be similar to doing good, as doing evil is juxtaposed to doing good in the verse. If one stipulates that the verse is referring to matters involving a mitzva, then just as doing good does not involve refraining from performing a mitzva, but must involve performing a mitzva, e.g., an oath to eat matza on Passover, so too, doing evil does not involve refraining from performing a mitzva, e.g., an oath not to eat leavened bread on Passover. The result of this reasoning is that doing evil in the verse is itself doing good, in that it will always involve taking oaths to keep mitzvot.
וְאַקֵּישׁ הֲטָבָה לַהֲרָעָה – מָה הֲרָעָה אֵינָהּ בְּקִיּוּם מִצְוָה, אַף הֲטָבָה אֵינָהּ בְּקִיּוּם מִצְוָה. הֲטָבָה גּוּפַהּ – הֲרָעָה הִיא.
And likewise, doing good is juxtaposed to doing evil; just as doing evil does not involve performing a mitzva, as it would then not be doing evil, so too, doing good does not involve performing a mitzva. Doing good in the verse is itself doing evil, in that it does not involve the fulfillment of mitzvot.
אִי הָכִי, בִּדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת נָמֵי לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ!
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that doing evil and doing good are compared in this manner, you do not find that the verse can be interpreted even with regard to optional matters, as the same sort of contradiction could be generated.
אֶלָּא מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ ״אוֹ״ לְרַבּוֹת הֲטָבַת אֲחֵרִים – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בִּדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת כְּתִיבִי. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בִּדְבַר מִצְוָה כְּתִיבִי; הַשְׁתָּא הֲרָעַת אֲחֵרִים אִיתְרַבַּי, הֲטָבַת אֲחֵרִים מִיבַּעְיָא?!
Rather, one may derive that the verse is referring to optional matters from the fact that it was necessary for the verse to write “or to do good,” in order to include liability for oaths that involve doing good to others. Conclude from it that these verses are written referring to optional matters. As, if it should enter your mind that the verses are written referring to matters involving a mitzva, there is a difficulty: Now that doing evil to others has been included, i.e., when one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva, is it necessary to mention doing good to others?
…
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אָמַר לָךְ: אַטּוּ הֲטָבַת אֲחֵרִים – לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיתַהּ בִּכְלַל הֲרָעַת אֲחֵרִים, וְרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא? הָכָא נָמֵי בְּקִיּוּם מִצְוָה – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּבִיטּוּל מִצְוָה, רַבְּיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
The Gemara responds: And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira could say to you: Isn’t there the case of an oath involving doing good to others, even though it does not include the possibility of being inverted to include liability for an oath concerning harming others, but nevertheless the Merciful One has amplified the halakha to include it? Here also, with regard to an oath to perform a mitzva, even though it does not include the possibility of being inverted to include liability for an oath concerning refraining from performing a mitzva, the Merciful One has amplified the halakha to include it.
וְרַבָּנַן – הָתָם, אִיתֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא אֵיטִיב״; הָכָא מִי אִיתֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא אֲקַיֵּים״?!
And how could the Rabbis respond? They could say that there, with regard to an oath to do good to others, there is the possibility of inverting the oath to: I will not do good. Here, with regard to an oath to perform a mitzva, is there any possibility of a valid oath: I will not perform a mitzva?
- נדרים טז:-יז.
חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת כֵּיצַד כּוּ׳. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב. וְרַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל. מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״, ״דְּבָרוֹ לֹא יַחֵל״ — אֲבָל מֵיחֵל הוּא לְחֶפְצֵי שָׁמַיִם.
- It is stated in the mishna that there is a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? Whereas a vow can override a mitzva, an oath cannot. Rav Kahana teaches that Rav Giddel said that Rav said, and Rav Tavyumei teaches the same statement with a different attribution, i.e., Rav Giddel said that Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot? The verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). It is inferred that his word, i.e., the prohibition he accepted upon himself, he shall not profane. However, he may profane it for the desires of Heaven. If he took an oath to act against the will of God, the oath does not take effect.
מַאי שְׁנָא נֶדֶר — דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה׳ … לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. שְׁבוּעָה נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לַה׳ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״!
The Gemara asks: What is different about a vow that enables it to override mitzvot? Granted, as it is written in the Torah: “When a man takes a vow to the Lord…he shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that even with regard to matters that pertain to the Lord, i.e., mitzvot, one shall not profane his word, as the vow takes effect. However, with regard to an oath it is also written in the same verse: “Or swears an oath” to God, “he shall not profane his word.”
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וְשֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב —
- The Gemara asks: And is the principle that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot derived from here, i.e., the above verse? It is derived from there, i.e., another verse, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it, one might have thought that he will be liable for violating an oath on a statement.
י״ז א
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״. מָה הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת, אַף הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת. יָצָא נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל — שֶׁאֵין הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ!
However, the verse states: “Or if anyone swears clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). From the juxtaposition of evil and good it is derived that just as the doing of good, which is interpreted as obligating himself to take a positive action, is referring to a permitted activity, e.g., to eat, so too, the doing of evil, which is interpreted as prohibiting himself from something, refers only to that which is permitted, e.g., not to eat. This excludes one who takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it; he is not liable for violating the oath, as the permission to nullify it is not in his power.
חַד קְרָא לְמִיפְטְרֵיהּ מִקׇּרְבַּן שְׁבוּעָה, וְחַד לְמִיפְטְרֵיהּ מִן לָאו דִּשְׁבוּעָה.
The Gemara answers that both verses are necessary. One verse: “To do evil or to do good,” which is stated in the context of the halakhot of offerings, is necessary to exempt him from bringing an offering for violating an oath, and one verse: “He shall not profane,” is necessary to exempt him from the prohibition for violating an oath.
- תהילים קיט:קו
נִשְׁבַּ֥עְתִּי וָאֲקַיֵּ֑מָה לִ֝שְׁמֹ֗ר מִשְׁפְּטֵ֥י צִדְקֶֽךָ׃
I have firmly sworn to keep Your just rules.
- נדרים ז:-ח.
וְאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב:
And Rav Giddel said that Rav said:
מִנַּיִן שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּעִין לְקַיֵּים אֶת הַמִּצְוָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וָאֲקַיֵּמָה לִשְׁמֹר מִשְׁפְּטֵי צִדְקֶךָ״.
From where is it derived that one may take an oath to fulfill a mitzva? It is as it is stated: “I have sworn and I have confirmed it, to observe Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106).
וַהֲלֹא מוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא. אֶלָּא הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּשָׁרֵי לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ לְזָרוֹזֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
The Gemara asks: Is he not already under oath from when each Jew took an oath at Mount Sinai to fulfill all the mitzvot? An oath cannot take effect if one is already bound by a different oath. Rather, it teaches us this: It is permitted for a man to motivate himself to fulfill the mitzvot in this manner, although the oath is not technically valid.
- משנה נדרים ב:ב
… זֶה חֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים. וְחֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת, כֵּיצַד, אָמַר, קוֹנָם סֻכָּה שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה, לוּלָב שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹטֵל, תְּפִלִּין שֶׁאֲנִי מֵנִיחַ, בַּנְּדָרִים אָסוּר, בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מֻתָּר, שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת:
…And there is also a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? With regard to one who said: Making a sukka is konam for me, or: Taking a lulav is konam for me, or: Donning phylacteries is konam for me, in the case of vows, the items are rendered forbidden, and he may not perform the mitzva until the vow is dissolved. However, in the case of similar oaths, these items are permitted, as one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot.
- ספרי במדבר קנג
ד”א לאסור אסר על נפשו – למה נאמר? לפי שהוא אומר ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה, אין לי אלא שהוציא בפיו; קיבל עליו בנדר ובשבועה מנין? ת”ל לאסור אסר על נפשו. יכול אפילו נשבע לאכול נבלות וטרפות ושקצים ורמשים, קורא אני עליו ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה? ת”ל לאסור אסר, לאסור את המותר ולא להתיר את האסור:
Variantly: What is the intent of “to bind a bond upon his soul”? Because it is written (Ibid.) “According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do,” I might think, even if he swore to eat neveiloth and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles. It is, therefore, written “to bind a bond” — to bind (i.e., to forbid) what is permitted, and not to permit what is forbidden. Variantly: What is the intent of “upon his soul”? From “According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do,” I might think, only if he spoke it. Whence do I derive (the same for) his accepting it upon himself (inwardly) by vow or oath? It is, therefore, written “upon his soul.”
- רמב”ם הלכות נדרים ג:ו-ט
כֵּיצַד חָלִים הַנְּדָרִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הַמַּצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו. הֲרֵי יְשִׁיבַת הַסֻּכָּה בֶּחָג הַסֻּכּוֹת אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו וַהֲרֵי הַתְּפִלִּין אֲסוּרוֹת בִּנְטִילָה עָלָיו הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו. וְאִם אָכַל אוֹ יָשַׁב אוֹ נָטַל לוֹקֶה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי קָרְבָּן אִם אֹכַל מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּקָרְבָּן. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one’s choice? When a person says: “Matzah is forbidden to me on Pesach night,” “Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me,” or “I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin,” they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: “I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night,” is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
וּמִפְּנֵי מָה נְדָרִים חָלִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה וּשְׁבוּעוֹת אֵין חָלוֹת עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה. שֶׁהַנִּשְׁבָּע אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע עָלָיו. וְהַנּוֹדֵר אוֹסֵר הַדָּבָר הַנָּדוּר עַל עַצְמוֹ. נִמְצָא הַנִּשְׁבָּע לְבַטֵּל מִצְוָה אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ וּכְבָר עַצְמוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע מֵהַר סִינַי וְאֵין שְׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁבוּעָה. וְהָאוֹסֵר דָּבָר זֶה בְּנֵדֶר זֶה הַדָּבָר הוּא שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר וְאוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר אֵינוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע מֵהַר סִינַי:
Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath. When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him. Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
כְּשֶׁאַתָּה מִתְבּוֹנֵן בַּכָּתוּב תִּמְצָא שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים מַרְאִין כֵּן כְּמוֹ שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ חֲכָמִים מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה. שֶׁהֲרֵי אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי (ויקרא ה ד) “לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב” בְּדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. שֶׁיֹּאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה הַיּוֹם אוֹ שֶׁיָּצוּם וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וּבִנְדָרִים הוּא אוֹמֵר (במדבר ל ג) “כְּכָל הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה” וְלֹא חִלֵּק בֵּין דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה לְדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת:
When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh’vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: “Whether he will do harm or do good,” i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained, e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: “He shall do everything uttered by his mouth,” without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁיָּצוּם בְּשַׁבָּת אוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב חַיָּב לָצוּם. שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים חָלִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וְכֵן הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁיָּצוּם יוֹם רִאשׁוֹן אוֹ יוֹם שְׁלִישִׁי כָּל יָמָיו וּפָגַע בּוֹ יוֹם זֶה וַהֲרֵי הוּא יוֹם טוֹב אוֹ עֶרֶב יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב לָצוּם וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ. פָּגַע בּוֹ חֲנֻכָּה וּפוּרִים יִדָּחֶה נִדְרוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַיָּמִים הָאֵלּוּ הוֹאִיל וְאִסּוּר הַצּוֹם בָּהֶם מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים הֲרֵי הֵן צְרִיכִין חִזּוּק וְיִדָּחֶה נִדְרוֹ מִפְּנֵי גְּזֵרַת חֲכָמִים:
When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained. Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary. Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
- הלכות שבועות ה:יח
נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל מַצָּה שָׁנָה אוֹ שְׁנָתַיִם. הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לֶאֱכל מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח וְאִם אָכַל חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי. וְאֵין זֶה שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח אֶלָּא כָּלַל עִתִּים שֶׁאֲכִילַת מַצָּה בָּהֶם רְשׁוּת עִם עֵת שֶׁאֲכִילָתָהּ בּוֹ מִצְוָה וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁחָלָה שְׁבוּעָה עַל שְׁאָר הַיָּמִים חָלָה עַל לֵיל הַפֶּסַח. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא יֵשֵׁב בְּצֵל סֻכָּה לְעוֹלָם אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲלֶה עָלָיו בֶּגֶד שָׁנָה אוֹ שְׁנָתַיִם:
One who takes an oath not to eat matzah for a year or two is forbidden to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach. If he eats it, he is liable, for violating a sh’vuat bitui. This is not considered as an oath taken in vain, since he did not take an oath [specifically] not to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach. Instead, he included the times when eating matzah is a matter of choice together with those when it is a mitzvah. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the other days, it also takes effect with regard to Pesach. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations, e.g., one took an oath not to sit in the shade of a sukkah forever, or not to wear a garment for a year or two.
- הלכות שבועות יא:ג
וּמֻתָּר לְאָדָם לְהִשָּׁבַע עַל הַמִּצְוָה לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ כְּדֵי לְזָרֵז אֶת עַצְמוֹ וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהילים קיט קו) “נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וָאֲקַיֵּמָה לִשְׁמֹר מִשְׁפְּטֵי צִדְקֶךָ”:
It is permitted for a person to take an oath to fulfill a mitzvah in order to encourage himself [toward its performance]. Although he is under oath [to observe] it from Mount Sinai [onward], [he may take an oath, as implied by Psalms 119:106]: “I took an oath and I will uphold it – to observe Your righteous judgments.”
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