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Today's Daf Yomi

June 23, 2019 | 讻壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Arakhin 7

诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 谞讬转谉 诇讞讝专转 注诪讬讚转 讘讬转 讚讬谉

The Gemara asks: If so, can one conclude by inference that the first tanna holds that one who is being taken to be executed can be brought back to stand before the court for judgment? This is clearly erroneous, as the court is not permitted to delay his execution.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉

Rav Yosef says: Everyone agrees that his execution may not be delayed. Rather, they disagree as to whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs, and therefore the injured party can collect from the heirs after the execution. But Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and therefore the heirs are exempt from payment for the injury.

专讘讛 讗诪专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 讜讛讻讗 讘诪诇讜讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘转讜专讛 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 讚诪讬讗

Rabba said: Actually, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to whether a loan that is written in the Torah, e.g., one鈥檚 obligation to pay if he causes damage, is considered as though it is written in a document. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is considered as though it is written in a document, and may be collected from the heirs. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that it is not considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may not be collected.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜谞驻诇 注诇讬讜 砖讜专 讜讛专讙讜 驻讟讜专 讜诇讗 注讜讚 讗诇讗 砖讗诐 诪转 讛砖讜专 讬讜专砖讬 讘注诇 讛讘讜专 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇砖诇诐 讚诪讬 砖讜专 诇讘注诇讬讜

The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion that one cannot collect a loan that is written in the Torah from the heirs, from a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 6:2): If one was digging a pit in the public thoroughfare, and an ox fell on the digger of the pit and killed him, the owner of the ox is exempt from paying damages, as the digger of the pit should not have dug the pit. Moreover, if the ox died as a result of the fall, the heirs of the owner of the pit are liable to pay the value of the ox to its owner. This shows that an obligation that is written in the Torah, such as compensation for damage, is collected from heirs.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻砖注诪讚 讘讚讬谉 讜讛讗 讛专讙讜 拽转谞讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讻砖注砖讗讜 讟专讬驻讛

Rabbi Ila said that Rav said: The baraita is dealing with a case where the digger of the pit stood trial for the damage before he died, and once judgment is rendered by a court the resulting financial obligation is comparable to a written loan, not one that is written in the Torah. The Gemara raises an objection: But it is taught in the baraita that the ox killed him. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The baraita does not mean that the ox literally killed him, rather, that it rendered him as one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa], and there was enough time before his death to sentence him to pay damages.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 转谞讬 讞讙讗 诪转 讜拽讘专讜 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讚讬讬转讘讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讘讬专讗

The Gemara raises an objection: But doesn鈥檛 Rav Na岣an say that 岣gga teaches a slightly different version of the baraita, that if the digger of the pit died from the impact of the ox, and the ox effectively buried him in the ground at the bottom of the pit, his heirs have to pay damages to the owner of the ox? In this scenario, how could it be possible for the digger to stand trial? The Gemara answers: The halakha in the baraita, that the owner of the ox collects from the heirs of the digger, is dealing with a case where judges sat at the opening of the pit and rendered the digger liable to pay damages before he died.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讬讜爪讗 诇讬讛专讙 诪讝讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 讜诪讚诐 讗砖诪讜 讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 诪注谞讬谉 讗转 讚讬谞讜

The Sages taught another baraita on the same topic: With regard to one taken to be executed, they sprinkle for his sake on the altar from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering, which he brought earlier. But if he sinned at that time, obligating him to bring a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, and his execution is not delayed so that he can sacrifice the offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef said: It is because the court may not afflict him by forcing him to wait for his judgment, his execution, until the offering is sacrificed.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞讜 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If so, if the offering is not sacrificed in order to avoid afflicting the sentenced by delaying his execution, then this should apply even in the first clause as well, where he had already brought the offering. Why does the court delay his execution until the blood is sprinkled? Rav Yosef answered: The first clause is referring to a case where his offering was already slaughtered at that time, and all that remained to be done was the sprinkling of the blood. Delaying the execution for such a short time is not a problem.

讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞讜 讝讘讜讞 诪讗讬 诇讗 讗讚转谞讬 讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 诇讬驻诇讜讙 讜诇讬转谞讬 讘讚讬讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 诇讗

The Gemara asks: But then in a case where he set aside his offering but it was not yet slaughtered, what is the halakha? Is it true that they do not delay his execution in order to sacrifice the offering? If so, instead of teaching a new case and stating: But if he sinned at that time and thereby became obligated to sacrifice a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, let the baraita distinguish and teach a distinction within the case of where he already brought the offering itself: In what case is this statement, that the blood is sprinkled, said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, his execution is not delayed.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讜讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜

The Gemara answers: That is indeed what he is saying: In what case is this statement said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, it is considered as though he sinned at that time, and therefore the court does not attend to his obligation.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讬爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 讗讬谉 诪诪转讬谞讬谉 诇讛 注讚 砖转诇讚 讛讗砖讛 砖讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 诪诪转讬谞讬谉 诇讛 注讚 砖转诇讚 讛讗砖讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 谞讛谞讬谉 讘砖注专讛 讘讛诪讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗讛

MISHNA: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, the court does not wait to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, she is killed immediately. But with regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair [hamashber] in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. But in the case of an animal that was killed through court-imposed execution, e.g., for goring a person, deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited.

讙诪壮 驻砖讬讟讗 讙讜驻讛 讛讬讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讻转讬讘 讻讗砖专 讬砖讬转 注诇讬讜 讘注诇 讛讗砖讛 诪诪讜谞讗 讚讘注诇 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 诇讬驻住讚讬讛 诪讬谞讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

GEMARA: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that the court executes the pregnant woman rather than waiting? After all, it is part of her body. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to teach this, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: 鈥淎nd if men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that her offspring depart鈥e shall be fined, as the woman鈥檚 husband shall place upon him鈥 (Exodus 21:22), the fetus is considered to be the property of the husband. If so, the court should wait until she gives birth before executing her, and not cause him to lose the fetus. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that the court does not take this factor into account.

讜讗讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜诪转讜 讙诐 砖谞讬讛诐 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讜讜诇讚

The Gemara asks: But why not say that indeed the court should delay her execution until she gives birth? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The verse states: 鈥淚f a man be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall also both of them die, the man that lay with the woman, and the woman鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:22). The amplifying term 鈥渂oth of them鈥 serves to add her fetus, teaching that it dies together with her.

讜讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注讚 砖讬讛讜 砖谞讬讛谉 砖讜讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讻讬 拽讗诪专转 诪讙诐

The Gemara asks: But this phrase is required for the following halakha: Neither of the two adulterers mentioned in the verse is punished until both of them are equal, i.e., they have both reached majority. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. The Gemara answers: When you say that the child also dies, it is derived from the word 鈥渁lso,鈥 whereas the halakha that they must be equal is learned from the term 鈥渂oth of them.鈥

讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚注拽专 讙讜驻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for delaying the execution in this case? The Gemara answers: Once the fetus uproots from its place and begins to leave the woman鈥檚 body, it is considered an independent body and may not be killed together with the mother.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 讛讬讜爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 诪讻讬谉 讗讜转讛 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛专讬讜谉 讻讚讬 砖讬诪讜转 讛讜讜诇讚 转讞讬诇讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讘讗 诇讬讚讬 谞讬讜讜诇 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讛讬讗 拽讚诪讛 讜诪转讛 讘专讬砖讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讜讜诇讚 诪讬讬转 讘专讬砖讗

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, one strikes her opposite the womb, i.e., on the abdomen, so that the fetus dies first and so that she not suffer disgrace as a result of publicly bleeding from labor. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that according to Shmuel if a pregnant woman dies, she dies first, before the fetus? It is clear that this is Shmuel鈥檚 assumption, as he mandates killing the fetus before the mother, lest the live fetus bring about the onset of labor as a reaction to the woman鈥檚 death. Were the fetus to perish first, before the woman, there would be no need for this. But this is difficult, as we maintain that the fetus dies first.

讚转谞谉 转讬谞讜拽 讘谉 讬讜诪讜 谞讜讞诇 讜诪谞讞讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 谞讜讞诇 讘谞讻住讬 讛讗诐 诇讛谞讞讬诇 诇讗讞讬谉 诪谉 讛讗讘

As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 43b鈥44a): A baby boy, one day old, inherits the estate of his relatives who died on the day of his birth, and if he dies, he bequeaths that inheritance to his relatives. And Rav Sheshet says: This mishna is teaching that a day-old child inherits his mother鈥檚 property when she died after he was born, to bequeath it to his heirs who are not the mother鈥檚 heirs, e.g., to his paternal brothers.

讚讜讜拽讗 讘谉 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 注讜讘专 诇讗 讚讛讜讗 诪讬讬转 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬谉 讛讘谉 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗诪讜 讘拽讘专 诇讛谞讞讬诇 诇讗讞讬谉 诪谉 讛讗讘

The Gemara explains the difficulty: It is specifically in a case where the boy is one day old that he inherits and bequeaths, but a fetus who died while still in the womb does not inherit and bequeath. The reason is that we presume that the fetus died first, before its mother, and a son does not inherit through his mother while in the grave, in order to bequeath her property to his paternal brothers.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讬转讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讜讜诇讚 讝讜讟专讗 讞讬讜转讬讛 注讬讬诇讗 讟讬驻讛 讚诪诇讗讱 讛诪讜转 讜诪讞转讱 诇讛讜 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讗讘诇 谞讛专讙讛 讛讬讗 诪转讛 讘专讬砖讗

The Gemara answers: This matter, i.e., the presumption that the fetus dies first, applies only in a case of natural death. In such a situation, since the fetus鈥檚 vitality is minimal, the Angel of Death鈥檚 drop of poison enters his body and cuts the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., the windpipe and the gullet [simanim], thereby killing him before his mother. But in a case where the mother was killed, e.g., if she was executed, she dies first.

讜讛讗 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讜驻专讻讬住 注讚 转诇转 驻专讻讜住讬 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讬 讗讝谞讘 讛诇讟讗讛 讚诪驻专讻住转

The Gemara asks: Is it true that the fetus always dies first when the mother dies naturally? But there was an incident where the mother died naturally and the fetus made three spasmodic motions afterward. The Gemara answers: That is just as it is with the tail of the lizard, which jerks after being severed from the lizard; it is just a spasmodic motion, which does not indicate that it is still alive.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 砖讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 讜诪转讛 讘砖讘转 诪讘讬讗讬谉 住讻讬谉 讜诪拽专注讬诐 讗转 讻专讬住讛 讜诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗转 讛讜讜诇讚 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚

Rav Na岣an says that Shmuel says: In the case of a woman who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, and died on Shabbat, one brings a knife, and tears open her abdomen, and removes the fetus, as it might still be alive, and it could be possible to save its life. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it obvious that this is permitted? After all, what is the person who cuts her abdomen doing?

诪讞转讱 讘讘砖专 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 诇讛讘讬讗 住讻讬谉 讚专讱 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

It is merely cutting flesh, and there is no reason why it should be prohibited. Rabba said: No, the halakha concerning cutting open her abdomen is necessary only to teach that it is permitted to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.

讜诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪住驻讬拽讗 诪讞诇诇讬谞谉 砖讘转讗 转谞讬谞讗 诪讬 砖谞驻诇讛 注诇讬讜 诪驻讜诇转 住驻拽 讛讜讗 砖诐 住驻拽 讗讬谞讜 砖诐 住驻拽 讞讬 住驻拽 诪转 住驻拽 谞讻专讬 住驻拽 讬砖专讗诇 诪驻拽讞讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗转 讛讙诇

The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us? Does it teach that even in a case of uncertainty we desecrate Shabbat for the chance of saving a life? But we already learned this in a mishna (Yoma 83a): With regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty as to whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there, and there is also uncertainty as to whether he is still alive or whether he is dead, and finally there is uncertainty as to whether the person under the debris is a gentile or a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him on Shabbat.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讝拽讛 讚讞讬讜转讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讝拽讛 讚讞讬讜转讗 诪注讬拽专讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach that one may bring a knife in the case of a woman, lest you say that it is specifically there that one may desecrate Shabbat, as the person who was buried under the rockslide had a presumptive status of being alive and therefore he is assumed to still be alive. But here, where the child had no prior presumptive status of being alive, as he was not yet born, you might say that one may not desecrate Shabbat in order to save his life. Therefore, it is necessary for Shmuel to teach us that even here one may desecrate Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus鈥檚 life.

讛讗砖讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讜讻讜壮 讜讗诪讗讬 讗讬住讜专讬 讛谞讗讛 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 专讘 讘讗讜诪专转 转谞讜 砖注专讬 诇讘转讬 讗讬诇讜 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讬讚讬 诇讘转讬 诪讬 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讛

搂 The mishna taught: In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. The Gemara asks: But why is it permitted? After all, a corpse and its hair are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Rav said that this is referring to a case where she says before she dies: Give my hair to my daughter. The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition contingent on the deceased鈥檚 wishes? Were she to say: Give my hand to my daughter, would we give the hand to her?

讗诪专 专讘 讘驻讗讛 谞讻专讬转 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讙讜驻讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讬转住专

Rather, Rav said: This is not referring to the actual hair of the deceased, but to a wig [pe鈥檃 nokhrit], which is not part of the deceased鈥檚 body. The Gemara infers from Rav鈥檚 statement that the reason it is permitted is that she said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered part of her body, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 砖注专 谞砖讬诐 爪讚拽谞讬讜转 诪讛讜

The Gemara explains why this implication is problematic: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raise this as a dilemma? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina raised a dilemma: With regard to the hair of righteous women in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry and, therefore, all of their property must be burned, what is the halakha? Is it considered their property and burned, or part of their body and not burned?

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讘驻讗讛 谞讻专讬转 (诇讗) 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚转诇讬 讘住讬讻转讗

And Rava said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, was not referring to actual hair, but rather he raised his dilemma with regard to a wig. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, as his ruling indicates that a wig should be considered part of a woman鈥檚 body unless she stipulated otherwise. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raised his dilemma as to whether a wig is considered part of the body, he was referring specifically to a case where the wig was hanging on a peg. The dilemma is whether it is considered part of her clothing, which, like her body, is not burned, or whether it is considered like any other property of hers, since she was not wearing it at the time.

讛讻讗 讚诪讞讘专 讘讛 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讙讜驻讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讬转住专

On the other hand, here Rav is referring to a wig that is actually attached to her. In such a case, one may correctly infer that the reason that it is permitted is that the deceased said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered to be part of her body and is prohibited.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讗 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讘讛诪讛 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛转诐 讙讜驻讬讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讙讜驻讬讛

This claim, that the mishna is dealing with a wig rather than natural hair, is difficult for Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k. He explains the difficulty: The mishna teaches the issue of the prohibition of the woman鈥檚 hair as being similar to the other prohibition it mentions, that of the animal. Just as there, in the case of the animal, it is referring to deriving benefit from its body, so too here, it must be referring to benefit from her body itself, not from a wig.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讜 诪讬转转讛 讗讜住专转讛 讜讝讜 讙诪专 讚讬谞讛 讗讜住专转讛

Rather, Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: The mishna is referring to natural hair, and there is a distinction between the hair of an animal and that of a woman. In the case of this woman, it is her death that causes her to be forbidden. Therefore, the hair, which does not undergo any change when she dies, remains permitted. But in the case of that animal, the verdict causes it to be forbidden, even before it is killed. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal as soon as the verdict is issued. Therefore, the hair that is attached to the animal is forbidden as well.

转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讛讗砖讛 砖讬讜爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 讜讗诪专讛 转谞讜 砖注专讬 诇讘转讬 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪转讛 讗讬谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛诪转 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛

Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and Levi also teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k. The Gemara elaborates: Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: In the case of a woman who was being taken to be killed and who said: Give my hair to my daughter, one gives it to the daughter. If she died without instructing that it be given to her daughter, one does not give it to the daughter, because it is forbidden to derive benefit from a corpse.

驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 砖谞讜讬讬 讛诪转 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that this is the reason her hair is prohibited? The Gemara explains that this is referring not to the hair itself, but rather to a wig, and the baraita is teaching that it is forbidden to derive benefit even from the adornments of the deceased, such as a wig.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讛讗砖讛 砖诪转讛 谞讛谞讬谉 讘砖注专讛 讘讛诪讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗讛 讜诪讛 讛驻专砖 讘讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讝讜 诪讬转转讛 讗讜住专转讛 讜讝讜 讙诪专 讚讬谞讛 讗讜住专转讛

The Gemara further explains: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k, as follows: Whereas in the case of a woman who died, one may derive benefit from her hair, with regard to an animal that was put to death, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. And what is the difference between this case and that one? In this case it is her death that causes her to be forbidden, but in that case the verdict causes the animal to be forbidden.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讻诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉

 

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注 讻讬爪讚 谞转谉 住诇注 讜讛注砖讬专 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 讻诇讜诐 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜讛注砖讬专 谞讜转谉 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注

MISHNA: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela, nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. How so? If one gave one sela and became wealthy, he is not required to give anything more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave less than a sela and became wealthy, he is required to give fifty sela, as he has not fulfilled his obligation.

讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜转谉 讗转 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注

If there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, and the valuation he undertook is more than five sela, how much should he pay? Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation. And the Rabbis say: He gives all five. One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela; nor can one be charged more than fifty sela.

讙诪壮 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜讻诇 注专讻讱 讬讛讬讛 讘砖拽诇 讛拽讚砖 讻诇 注专讻讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪注专讬讱 诇讗 讬讛讜 驻讞讜转讬谉 诪砖拽诇

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this principle? The Gemara answers: As it is written: 鈥淎nd all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary鈥 (Leviticus 27:25). This verse indicates that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, which is the equivalent of a sela. One does not fulfill his obligation by giving less than this amount.

讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注讬诐 讚讻转讬讘 讞诪砖讬诐

The mishna further teaches: Nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. This is the highest valuation specified in the Torah, as it is written: 鈥淭hen your valuation shall be for the male from twenty years old unto sixty years old, your valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver鈥 (Leviticus 27:3).

讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖讛 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻转讬讘 讞诪砖讬诐 讜讻转讬讘 砖拽诇 讗讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讗讜 砖拽诇

搂 The mishna teaches that if there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation, and the Rabbis say: He gives all five. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to a male between the ages of twenty and sixty: 鈥淵our valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver鈥 (Leviticus 27:3), and the verses likewise specify the valuations for other individuals. And it is also written: 鈥淵our valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary鈥 (Leviticus 27:25). This teaches that the valuation is either fifty shekels for one who vows to donate the valuation of a man between twenty and sixty, or one shekel, if he cannot afford to pay fifty.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讛讜讗 诇讻诇 注专讻讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪注专讬讱 诇讗 讬讛讜 驻讞讜转讬诐 诪砖拽诇 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗砖专 转砖讬讙 讬讚 讛谞讜讚专 讜讛专讬 讬讚讜 诪砖讙转

And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? According to the Rabbis, that second verse comes to teach that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, but in a case where the individual has more than a shekel, the verse states: 鈥淎ccording to the means of him that vowed shall the priest value him鈥 (Leviticus 27:8), and as he has the means to pay more than a shekel, he is required to pay the maximum that he can afford.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讛讜讗 讬讚 讛谞讜讚专 讜诇讗 讬讚 讛谞讬讚专 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜专讘谞谉 诇讗讜 诪诪讬诇讗 砖诪注转 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讬讻讗 讚讬讚讜 诪砖讙转 砖拽讜诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And how does Rabbi Meir respond to this reasoning? According to Rabbi Meir, that verse comes to teach that the charge is calculated according to the means of one who took the vow and not according to the means of the one about whom the vow was made. Consequently, if a poor man vowed to donate the valuation of a rich man, the amount to be paid is calculated according to what the poor man, not the rich man, can afford. And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would say: Doesn鈥檛 it emerge by itself that you also learn from this verse that in a case where he has the means to pay more than a shekel, you should take from him the maximum that he can afford?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讜讗诪专 注专讻讬 注诇讬 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 注专讻讬 注诇讬 讜谞转谉 讗专讘注 诇砖谞讬讛 讜讗讞讚 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 砖转讬讛谉

搂 The Gemara cites a ruling based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If one had five sela in his possession and said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he then said again: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he gave four sela for the second vow and one sela for the first vow, he has fulfilled his obligation to pay for both of the vows. Consequently, even if he becomes wealthy, he is not required to make any further payments.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘 诪讗讜讞专 砖拽讚诐 讜讙讘讛 诪讛 砖讙讘讛 讙讘讛

What is the reason for this? There is a principle that with regard to a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors, who collected his debt before the other creditors collected theirs, whatever he has collected he has collected, and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.

讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讬讛讬讘 诇砖谞讬讛 诪砖注讘讚 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讬讛讬讘 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 转讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛

In this case, since at the time that he gave the four sela for the second vow, his possessions were liened for the payment of his first vow, it is as though he had no possessions at all with which to pay the second vow, and he therefore fulfilled the second vow even though he paid less than the full amount of money in his possession. Then, at the time he gave one sela for payment of the first vow, he in fact had no more than one sela, as he had given the other four sela in payment of the second vow, and therefore he fulfills his obligation by paying one sela.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Arakhin 7

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Arakhin 7

诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 谞讬转谉 诇讞讝专转 注诪讬讚转 讘讬转 讚讬谉

The Gemara asks: If so, can one conclude by inference that the first tanna holds that one who is being taken to be executed can be brought back to stand before the court for judgment? This is clearly erroneous, as the court is not permitted to delay his execution.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉

Rav Yosef says: Everyone agrees that his execution may not be delayed. Rather, they disagree as to whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs, and therefore the injured party can collect from the heirs after the execution. But Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and therefore the heirs are exempt from payment for the injury.

专讘讛 讗诪专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讬讜专砖讬谉 讜讛讻讗 讘诪诇讜讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘转讜专讛 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 讚诪讬讗 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讟专 讚诪讬讗

Rabba said: Actually, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to whether a loan that is written in the Torah, e.g., one鈥檚 obligation to pay if he causes damage, is considered as though it is written in a document. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is considered as though it is written in a document, and may be collected from the heirs. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that it is not considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may not be collected.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜谞驻诇 注诇讬讜 砖讜专 讜讛专讙讜 驻讟讜专 讜诇讗 注讜讚 讗诇讗 砖讗诐 诪转 讛砖讜专 讬讜专砖讬 讘注诇 讛讘讜专 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇砖诇诐 讚诪讬 砖讜专 诇讘注诇讬讜

The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion that one cannot collect a loan that is written in the Torah from the heirs, from a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 6:2): If one was digging a pit in the public thoroughfare, and an ox fell on the digger of the pit and killed him, the owner of the ox is exempt from paying damages, as the digger of the pit should not have dug the pit. Moreover, if the ox died as a result of the fall, the heirs of the owner of the pit are liable to pay the value of the ox to its owner. This shows that an obligation that is written in the Torah, such as compensation for damage, is collected from heirs.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻砖注诪讚 讘讚讬谉 讜讛讗 讛专讙讜 拽转谞讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讻砖注砖讗讜 讟专讬驻讛

Rabbi Ila said that Rav said: The baraita is dealing with a case where the digger of the pit stood trial for the damage before he died, and once judgment is rendered by a court the resulting financial obligation is comparable to a written loan, not one that is written in the Torah. The Gemara raises an objection: But it is taught in the baraita that the ox killed him. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The baraita does not mean that the ox literally killed him, rather, that it rendered him as one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa], and there was enough time before his death to sentence him to pay damages.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 转谞讬 讞讙讗 诪转 讜拽讘专讜 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讚讬讬转讘讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讘讬专讗

The Gemara raises an objection: But doesn鈥檛 Rav Na岣an say that 岣gga teaches a slightly different version of the baraita, that if the digger of the pit died from the impact of the ox, and the ox effectively buried him in the ground at the bottom of the pit, his heirs have to pay damages to the owner of the ox? In this scenario, how could it be possible for the digger to stand trial? The Gemara answers: The halakha in the baraita, that the owner of the ox collects from the heirs of the digger, is dealing with a case where judges sat at the opening of the pit and rendered the digger liable to pay damages before he died.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讬讜爪讗 诇讬讛专讙 诪讝讬谉 注诇讬讜 诪讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 讜诪讚诐 讗砖诪讜 讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 诪注谞讬谉 讗转 讚讬谞讜

The Sages taught another baraita on the same topic: With regard to one taken to be executed, they sprinkle for his sake on the altar from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering, which he brought earlier. But if he sinned at that time, obligating him to bring a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, and his execution is not delayed so that he can sacrifice the offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef said: It is because the court may not afflict him by forcing him to wait for his judgment, his execution, until the offering is sacrificed.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞讜 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If so, if the offering is not sacrificed in order to avoid afflicting the sentenced by delaying his execution, then this should apply even in the first clause as well, where he had already brought the offering. Why does the court delay his execution until the blood is sprinkled? Rav Yosef answered: The first clause is referring to a case where his offering was already slaughtered at that time, and all that remained to be done was the sprinkling of the blood. Delaying the execution for such a short time is not a problem.

讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞讜 讝讘讜讞 诪讗讬 诇讗 讗讚转谞讬 讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 诇讬驻诇讜讙 讜诇讬转谞讬 讘讚讬讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 诇讗

The Gemara asks: But then in a case where he set aside his offering but it was not yet slaughtered, what is the halakha? Is it true that they do not delay his execution in order to sacrifice the offering? If so, instead of teaching a new case and stating: But if he sinned at that time and thereby became obligated to sacrifice a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, let the baraita distinguish and teach a distinction within the case of where he already brought the offering itself: In what case is this statement, that the blood is sprinkled, said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, his execution is not delayed.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讬讛 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讝讘讞 讝讘讜讞 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讞讟讗 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛 讜讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜

The Gemara answers: That is indeed what he is saying: In what case is this statement said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, it is considered as though he sinned at that time, and therefore the court does not attend to his obligation.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讬爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 讗讬谉 诪诪转讬谞讬谉 诇讛 注讚 砖转诇讚 讛讗砖讛 砖讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 诪诪转讬谞讬谉 诇讛 注讚 砖转诇讚 讛讗砖讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 谞讛谞讬谉 讘砖注专讛 讘讛诪讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗讛

MISHNA: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, the court does not wait to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, she is killed immediately. But with regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair [hamashber] in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. But in the case of an animal that was killed through court-imposed execution, e.g., for goring a person, deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited.

讙诪壮 驻砖讬讟讗 讙讜驻讛 讛讬讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讻转讬讘 讻讗砖专 讬砖讬转 注诇讬讜 讘注诇 讛讗砖讛 诪诪讜谞讗 讚讘注诇 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 诇讬驻住讚讬讛 诪讬谞讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

GEMARA: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that the court executes the pregnant woman rather than waiting? After all, it is part of her body. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to teach this, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: 鈥淎nd if men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that her offspring depart鈥e shall be fined, as the woman鈥檚 husband shall place upon him鈥 (Exodus 21:22), the fetus is considered to be the property of the husband. If so, the court should wait until she gives birth before executing her, and not cause him to lose the fetus. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that the court does not take this factor into account.

讜讗讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜诪转讜 讙诐 砖谞讬讛诐 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讜讜诇讚

The Gemara asks: But why not say that indeed the court should delay her execution until she gives birth? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The verse states: 鈥淚f a man be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall also both of them die, the man that lay with the woman, and the woman鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:22). The amplifying term 鈥渂oth of them鈥 serves to add her fetus, teaching that it dies together with her.

讜讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注讚 砖讬讛讜 砖谞讬讛谉 砖讜讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讻讬 拽讗诪专转 诪讙诐

The Gemara asks: But this phrase is required for the following halakha: Neither of the two adulterers mentioned in the verse is punished until both of them are equal, i.e., they have both reached majority. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. The Gemara answers: When you say that the child also dies, it is derived from the word 鈥渁lso,鈥 whereas the halakha that they must be equal is learned from the term 鈥渂oth of them.鈥

讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚注拽专 讙讜驻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for delaying the execution in this case? The Gemara answers: Once the fetus uproots from its place and begins to leave the woman鈥檚 body, it is considered an independent body and may not be killed together with the mother.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 讛讬讜爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 诪讻讬谉 讗讜转讛 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛专讬讜谉 讻讚讬 砖讬诪讜转 讛讜讜诇讚 转讞讬诇讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讘讗 诇讬讚讬 谞讬讜讜诇 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讛讬讗 拽讚诪讛 讜诪转讛 讘专讬砖讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讜讜诇讚 诪讬讬转 讘专讬砖讗

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, one strikes her opposite the womb, i.e., on the abdomen, so that the fetus dies first and so that she not suffer disgrace as a result of publicly bleeding from labor. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that according to Shmuel if a pregnant woman dies, she dies first, before the fetus? It is clear that this is Shmuel鈥檚 assumption, as he mandates killing the fetus before the mother, lest the live fetus bring about the onset of labor as a reaction to the woman鈥檚 death. Were the fetus to perish first, before the woman, there would be no need for this. But this is difficult, as we maintain that the fetus dies first.

讚转谞谉 转讬谞讜拽 讘谉 讬讜诪讜 谞讜讞诇 讜诪谞讞讬诇 讜讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 谞讜讞诇 讘谞讻住讬 讛讗诐 诇讛谞讞讬诇 诇讗讞讬谉 诪谉 讛讗讘

As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 43b鈥44a): A baby boy, one day old, inherits the estate of his relatives who died on the day of his birth, and if he dies, he bequeaths that inheritance to his relatives. And Rav Sheshet says: This mishna is teaching that a day-old child inherits his mother鈥檚 property when she died after he was born, to bequeath it to his heirs who are not the mother鈥檚 heirs, e.g., to his paternal brothers.

讚讜讜拽讗 讘谉 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讗讘诇 注讜讘专 诇讗 讚讛讜讗 诪讬讬转 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬谉 讛讘谉 讬讜专砖 讗转 讗诪讜 讘拽讘专 诇讛谞讞讬诇 诇讗讞讬谉 诪谉 讛讗讘

The Gemara explains the difficulty: It is specifically in a case where the boy is one day old that he inherits and bequeaths, but a fetus who died while still in the womb does not inherit and bequeath. The reason is that we presume that the fetus died first, before its mother, and a son does not inherit through his mother while in the grave, in order to bequeath her property to his paternal brothers.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讬转讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讜讜诇讚 讝讜讟专讗 讞讬讜转讬讛 注讬讬诇讗 讟讬驻讛 讚诪诇讗讱 讛诪讜转 讜诪讞转讱 诇讛讜 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讗讘诇 谞讛专讙讛 讛讬讗 诪转讛 讘专讬砖讗

The Gemara answers: This matter, i.e., the presumption that the fetus dies first, applies only in a case of natural death. In such a situation, since the fetus鈥檚 vitality is minimal, the Angel of Death鈥檚 drop of poison enters his body and cuts the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., the windpipe and the gullet [simanim], thereby killing him before his mother. But in a case where the mother was killed, e.g., if she was executed, she dies first.

讜讛讗 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讜驻专讻讬住 注讚 转诇转 驻专讻讜住讬 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讬 讗讝谞讘 讛诇讟讗讛 讚诪驻专讻住转

The Gemara asks: Is it true that the fetus always dies first when the mother dies naturally? But there was an incident where the mother died naturally and the fetus made three spasmodic motions afterward. The Gemara answers: That is just as it is with the tail of the lizard, which jerks after being severed from the lizard; it is just a spasmodic motion, which does not indicate that it is still alive.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 砖讬砖讘讛 注诇 讛诪砖讘专 讜诪转讛 讘砖讘转 诪讘讬讗讬谉 住讻讬谉 讜诪拽专注讬诐 讗转 讻专讬住讛 讜诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗转 讛讜讜诇讚 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚

Rav Na岣an says that Shmuel says: In the case of a woman who sat on the travailing chair in the throes of labor, and died on Shabbat, one brings a knife, and tears open her abdomen, and removes the fetus, as it might still be alive, and it could be possible to save its life. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it obvious that this is permitted? After all, what is the person who cuts her abdomen doing?

诪讞转讱 讘讘砖专 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 诇讛讘讬讗 住讻讬谉 讚专讱 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

It is merely cutting flesh, and there is no reason why it should be prohibited. Rabba said: No, the halakha concerning cutting open her abdomen is necessary only to teach that it is permitted to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.

讜诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪住驻讬拽讗 诪讞诇诇讬谞谉 砖讘转讗 转谞讬谞讗 诪讬 砖谞驻诇讛 注诇讬讜 诪驻讜诇转 住驻拽 讛讜讗 砖诐 住驻拽 讗讬谞讜 砖诐 住驻拽 讞讬 住驻拽 诪转 住驻拽 谞讻专讬 住驻拽 讬砖专讗诇 诪驻拽讞讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗转 讛讙诇

The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us? Does it teach that even in a case of uncertainty we desecrate Shabbat for the chance of saving a life? But we already learned this in a mishna (Yoma 83a): With regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty as to whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there, and there is also uncertainty as to whether he is still alive or whether he is dead, and finally there is uncertainty as to whether the person under the debris is a gentile or a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him on Shabbat.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讝拽讛 讚讞讬讜转讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讝拽讛 讚讞讬讜转讗 诪注讬拽专讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach that one may bring a knife in the case of a woman, lest you say that it is specifically there that one may desecrate Shabbat, as the person who was buried under the rockslide had a presumptive status of being alive and therefore he is assumed to still be alive. But here, where the child had no prior presumptive status of being alive, as he was not yet born, you might say that one may not desecrate Shabbat in order to save his life. Therefore, it is necessary for Shmuel to teach us that even here one may desecrate Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus鈥檚 life.

讛讗砖讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讜讻讜壮 讜讗诪讗讬 讗讬住讜专讬 讛谞讗讛 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 专讘 讘讗讜诪专转 转谞讜 砖注专讬 诇讘转讬 讗讬诇讜 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讬讚讬 诇讘转讬 诪讬 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讛

搂 The mishna taught: In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. The Gemara asks: But why is it permitted? After all, a corpse and its hair are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Rav said that this is referring to a case where she says before she dies: Give my hair to my daughter. The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition contingent on the deceased鈥檚 wishes? Were she to say: Give my hand to my daughter, would we give the hand to her?

讗诪专 专讘 讘驻讗讛 谞讻专讬转 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讙讜驻讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讬转住专

Rather, Rav said: This is not referring to the actual hair of the deceased, but to a wig [pe鈥檃 nokhrit], which is not part of the deceased鈥檚 body. The Gemara infers from Rav鈥檚 statement that the reason it is permitted is that she said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered part of her body, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 砖注专 谞砖讬诐 爪讚拽谞讬讜转 诪讛讜

The Gemara explains why this implication is problematic: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raise this as a dilemma? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina raised a dilemma: With regard to the hair of righteous women in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry and, therefore, all of their property must be burned, what is the halakha? Is it considered their property and burned, or part of their body and not burned?

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讘驻讗讛 谞讻专讬转 (诇讗) 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚转诇讬 讘住讬讻转讗

And Rava said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, was not referring to actual hair, but rather he raised his dilemma with regard to a wig. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, as his ruling indicates that a wig should be considered part of a woman鈥檚 body unless she stipulated otherwise. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raised his dilemma as to whether a wig is considered part of the body, he was referring specifically to a case where the wig was hanging on a peg. The dilemma is whether it is considered part of her clothing, which, like her body, is not burned, or whether it is considered like any other property of hers, since she was not wearing it at the time.

讛讻讗 讚诪讞讘专 讘讛 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专讛 转谞讜 讙讜驻讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讬转住专

On the other hand, here Rav is referring to a wig that is actually attached to her. In such a case, one may correctly infer that the reason that it is permitted is that the deceased said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered to be part of her body and is prohibited.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讗 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讘讛诪讛 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛转诐 讙讜驻讬讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讙讜驻讬讛

This claim, that the mishna is dealing with a wig rather than natural hair, is difficult for Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k. He explains the difficulty: The mishna teaches the issue of the prohibition of the woman鈥檚 hair as being similar to the other prohibition it mentions, that of the animal. Just as there, in the case of the animal, it is referring to deriving benefit from its body, so too here, it must be referring to benefit from her body itself, not from a wig.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讝讜 诪讬转转讛 讗讜住专转讛 讜讝讜 讙诪专 讚讬谞讛 讗讜住专转讛

Rather, Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: The mishna is referring to natural hair, and there is a distinction between the hair of an animal and that of a woman. In the case of this woman, it is her death that causes her to be forbidden. Therefore, the hair, which does not undergo any change when she dies, remains permitted. But in the case of that animal, the verdict causes it to be forbidden, even before it is killed. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal as soon as the verdict is issued. Therefore, the hair that is attached to the animal is forbidden as well.

转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讛讗砖讛 砖讬讜爪讗讛 诇讬讛专讙 讜讗诪专讛 转谞讜 砖注专讬 诇讘转讬 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪转讛 讗讬谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛诪转 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛

Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and Levi also teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k. The Gemara elaborates: Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: In the case of a woman who was being taken to be killed and who said: Give my hair to my daughter, one gives it to the daughter. If she died without instructing that it be given to her daughter, one does not give it to the daughter, because it is forbidden to derive benefit from a corpse.

驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 砖谞讜讬讬 讛诪转 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that this is the reason her hair is prohibited? The Gemara explains that this is referring not to the hair itself, but rather to a wig, and the baraita is teaching that it is forbidden to derive benefit even from the adornments of the deceased, such as a wig.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讛讗砖讛 砖诪转讛 谞讛谞讬谉 讘砖注专讛 讘讛诪讛 砖谞讛专讙讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗讛 讜诪讛 讛驻专砖 讘讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讝讜 诪讬转转讛 讗讜住专转讛 讜讝讜 讙诪专 讚讬谞讛 讗讜住专转讛

The Gemara further explains: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k, as follows: Whereas in the case of a woman who died, one may derive benefit from her hair, with regard to an animal that was put to death, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. And what is the difference between this case and that one? In this case it is her death that causes her to be forbidden, but in that case the verdict causes the animal to be forbidden.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讻诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉

 

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注 讻讬爪讚 谞转谉 住诇注 讜讛注砖讬专 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 讻诇讜诐 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜讛注砖讬专 谞讜转谉 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注

MISHNA: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela, nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. How so? If one gave one sela and became wealthy, he is not required to give anything more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave less than a sela and became wealthy, he is required to give fifty sela, as he has not fulfilled his obligation.

讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讜转谉 讗转 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注

If there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, and the valuation he undertook is more than five sela, how much should he pay? Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation. And the Rabbis say: He gives all five. One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela; nor can one be charged more than fifty sela.

讙诪壮 讗讬谉 谞注专讻讬谉 驻讞讜转 诪住诇注 诪谞诇谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜讻诇 注专讻讱 讬讛讬讛 讘砖拽诇 讛拽讚砖 讻诇 注专讻讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪注专讬讱 诇讗 讬讛讜 驻讞讜转讬谉 诪砖拽诇

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this principle? The Gemara answers: As it is written: 鈥淎nd all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary鈥 (Leviticus 27:25). This verse indicates that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, which is the equivalent of a sela. One does not fulfill his obligation by giving less than this amount.

讜诇讗 讬转专 注诇 讞诪砖讬诐 住诇注讬诐 讚讻转讬讘 讞诪砖讬诐

The mishna further teaches: Nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. This is the highest valuation specified in the Torah, as it is written: 鈥淭hen your valuation shall be for the male from twenty years old unto sixty years old, your valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver鈥 (Leviticus 27:3).

讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖讛 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻转讬讘 讞诪砖讬诐 讜讻转讬讘 砖拽诇 讗讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讗讜 砖拽诇

搂 The mishna teaches that if there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation, and the Rabbis say: He gives all five. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to a male between the ages of twenty and sixty: 鈥淵our valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver鈥 (Leviticus 27:3), and the verses likewise specify the valuations for other individuals. And it is also written: 鈥淵our valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary鈥 (Leviticus 27:25). This teaches that the valuation is either fifty shekels for one who vows to donate the valuation of a man between twenty and sixty, or one shekel, if he cannot afford to pay fifty.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讛讜讗 诇讻诇 注专讻讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪注专讬讱 诇讗 讬讛讜 驻讞讜转讬诐 诪砖拽诇 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗砖专 转砖讬讙 讬讚 讛谞讜讚专 讜讛专讬 讬讚讜 诪砖讙转

And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? According to the Rabbis, that second verse comes to teach that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, but in a case where the individual has more than a shekel, the verse states: 鈥淎ccording to the means of him that vowed shall the priest value him鈥 (Leviticus 27:8), and as he has the means to pay more than a shekel, he is required to pay the maximum that he can afford.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讛讜讗 讬讚 讛谞讜讚专 讜诇讗 讬讚 讛谞讬讚专 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜专讘谞谉 诇讗讜 诪诪讬诇讗 砖诪注转 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讬讻讗 讚讬讚讜 诪砖讙转 砖拽讜诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And how does Rabbi Meir respond to this reasoning? According to Rabbi Meir, that verse comes to teach that the charge is calculated according to the means of one who took the vow and not according to the means of the one about whom the vow was made. Consequently, if a poor man vowed to donate the valuation of a rich man, the amount to be paid is calculated according to what the poor man, not the rich man, can afford. And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would say: Doesn鈥檛 it emerge by itself that you also learn from this verse that in a case where he has the means to pay more than a shekel, you should take from him the maximum that he can afford?

讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛讬讜 讘讬讚讬讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讜讗诪专 注专讻讬 注诇讬 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 注专讻讬 注诇讬 讜谞转谉 讗专讘注 诇砖谞讬讛 讜讗讞讚 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 砖转讬讛谉

搂 The Gemara cites a ruling based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If one had five sela in his possession and said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he then said again: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he gave four sela for the second vow and one sela for the first vow, he has fulfilled his obligation to pay for both of the vows. Consequently, even if he becomes wealthy, he is not required to make any further payments.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘 诪讗讜讞专 砖拽讚诐 讜讙讘讛 诪讛 砖讙讘讛 讙讘讛

What is the reason for this? There is a principle that with regard to a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors, who collected his debt before the other creditors collected theirs, whatever he has collected he has collected, and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.

讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讬讛讬讘 诇砖谞讬讛 诪砖注讘讚 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讬讛讬讘 诇专讗砖讜谞讛 转讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛

In this case, since at the time that he gave the four sela for the second vow, his possessions were liened for the payment of his first vow, it is as though he had no possessions at all with which to pay the second vow, and he therefore fulfilled the second vow even though he paid less than the full amount of money in his possession. Then, at the time he gave one sela for payment of the first vow, he in fact had no more than one sela, as he had given the other four sela in payment of the second vow, and therefore he fulfills his obligation by paying one sela.

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