Bava Batra 136

כדאמר רב חסדא וקנינא מיניה מוסיף על מתנתא דא הכא נמי דאמר אף כתובו וחתומו והבו ליה

It is as Rav Ḥisda says that if it is written in the will: And we acquired it from him through an act of acquisition in addition to this gift, this formulation does not cancel the will’s power to take effect after the person’s death, as the intention of referring to it as a gift is merely to enhance the legal power of the recipient by confirming the transfer through an act of acquisition. Here too, in a case where he says: Write and sign a document as well, and give it to him, it is apparent that his request is to enhance the legal power of the recipient by writing a document in addition to transferring the gift itself.

איתמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כותבין ונותנין וכן אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן הלכה כותבין ונותנין:

It was stated that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case. And Rava says similarly that Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case.

מתני׳ הכותב נכסיו לבניו צריך שיכתוב מהיום ולאחר מיתה דברי רבי יהודה רבי יוסי אומר אינו צריך

MISHNA: A healthy person who writes a document granting his property to his sons in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, must write: I give the property from today and after my death. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies.

הכותב נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו האב אינו יכול למכור מפני שהן כתובין לבן והבן אינו יכול למכור מפני שהן ברשות האב

If one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, the father cannot sell the property because it is written as granted to the son, and the son cannot sell it because it is still in the possession of the father with regard to using the property and consuming its produce.

מכר האב מכורים עד שימות מכר הבן אין ללוקח בהן כלום עד שימות האב:

If the father sold the property, it is sold to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce until the father dies, at which point it belongs to the son. If the son sold it during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser has no right to use it until the father dies.

גמ׳ וכי כתב מהיום ולאחר מיתה מאי הוי הא תנן מהיום ולאחר מיתה גט ואינו גט ואם מת חולצת ולא מתייבמת

GEMARA: And if he wrote: I give the property from today and after my death, what of it? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 72a): If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is a bill of divorce but not a complete bill of divorce, and therefore if he dies without children his wife performs the ritual through which a woman is freed of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], as perhaps the bill of divorce is invalid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing ḥalitza. But she does not enter into levirate marriage, as perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is forbidden for a divorcée to marry her former husband’s brother.

התם מספקא לן אי תנאה הוי אי חזרה הוי אבל הכא הכי קאמר ליה גופא קני מהיום פירא לאחר מיתה:

The Gemara answers: There, we are uncertain if the expression: And after my death, is meant as a condition, i.e., if I die you will be divorced retroactively from today, or if it is a retraction of the statement: From today, meaning that the divorce would take effect only after his death, which would render it invalid. But here, in the case of a deed of gift, there is no contradiction in the statement, as this is what the father is presumably saying to him: Acquire the property itself today, and the produce after my death.

רבי יוסי אומר אינו צריך: רבה בר אבוה חלש על לגביה רב הונא ורב נחמן אמר ליה רב הונא לרב נחמן בעי מיניה הלכה כרבי יוסי או אין הלכה כרבי יוסי אמר ליה טעמיה דרבי יוסי לא ידענא הלכה איבעי מיניה אמר ליה את בעי מיניה אי הלכה אי לא וטעמיה אנא אמינא לך

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death. The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Avuh was sick, and Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: Ask him whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: I do not know Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning; can I ask him about the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: You ask him if the halakha is in accordance with his opinion or not, and I will tell you his reasoning afterward.

בעא מיניה אמר ליה הכי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יוסי בתר דנפקו אמר ליה היינו טעמיה דרבי יוסי דאמר זמנו של שטר מוכיח עליו תניא נמי הכי רבי יוסי אומר אינו צריך מפני שזמנו של שטר מוכיח עליו

Rav Naḥman asked Rabba bar Avuh. Rabba bar Avuh said to him that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After they left, Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman that this is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning: He says that writing: From today and after my death, is unnecessary because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect. The Gemara adds: That is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death, because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן בהקנאה מהו אמר ליה בהקנאה אינו צריך

§ Rava asked Rav Naḥman: In a case where the father performed an act of transfer, transferring his property to his son after his death, what is the halakha? Is it still necessary to write: From today and after my death? Rav Naḥman said to him: In a case where he performed an act of transfer, he need not write: From today and after my death.

רב פפי אמר איכא אקניתא דצריך ואיכא אקניתא דלא צריך אקנייה וקנינא מיניה לא צריך קנינא מיניה ואקנייה צריך

Rav Pappi said: There is a case of transfer where he needs to write: From today and after my death, and there is a case of transfer where he does not need to do so. If it is written in the deed that he transferred it to him and we, the witnesses, acquired it from him, he does not need to write: From today and after my death. But if the statement is written in the opposite order: We acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he still needs to write: From today and after my death.

מתקיף לה רב חנינא מסורא מי איכא מידי דאנן לא ידעינן וספרי ידעי שאלונהו לספרי דאביי וידעי ולספרי דרבא וידעי

Rav Ḥanina of Sura objects to this distinction: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes know? The distinction between the two opposite orderings of the above statement was unknown to the Sages. The Gemara relates that the Sages asked Abaye’s scribes and they knew the distinction, and they asked Rava’s scribes and they also knew the distinction.

רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אמר בין אקנייה וקנינא מיניה בין קנינא מיניה ואקנייה לא צריך ובדוכרן פתגמי דהוי באנפנא פליגי

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether it is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he need not write: From today and after my death, as the act of transfer is mentioned in any event. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei in the mishna disagree whether the phrase: From today and after my death, is necessary only with regard to a case where the deed merely states: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence, without any mention of an act of transfer.

אמר רב כהנא אמריתה לשמעתא קמיה דרב זביד מנהרדעא ואמר לי אתון הכי מתניתו לה אנן הכי מתנינן לה אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן בהקנאה אינו צריך בין אקנייה וקנינא מיניה בין קנינא מיניה ואקנייה לא צריך בדוכרן פתגמי דהוו באנפנא פליגי:

Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha in the presence of Rav Zevid of Neharde’a, and he said to me: You teach it like this, i.e., as a question and answer followed by a dispute; we teach it like this, i.e., as a single, unbroken statement: Rava says that Rav Naḥman says that in a case where transfer is mentioned in the deed, the owner need not write: From today and after my death. This is the halakha whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether the wording is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him; he need not write: From today and after my death. They disagree only with regard to a case where the wording is: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence.

הכותב נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו: איתמר מכר הבן בחיי האב ומת הבן בחיי האב

§ The mishna teaches that if one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, neither he nor the son can sell the property. It was stated that in a case where the son sold the property during the father’s lifetime, and then the son died during the father’s lifetime, after which the father died as well,

אמר רבי יוחנן לא קנה לוקח וריש לקיש אמר קנה לוקח

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, and Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

רבי יוחנן אמר לא קנה לוקח קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the purchaser did not acquire the property because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, the son’s sale can take effect only after the father’s death. If the son dies first, since he never attained ownership, his sale can never come to fruition.

וריש לקיש אמר קנה לוקח קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property, because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the father’s rights do not prevent the son, who owns the property itself, from selling it, and eventually the purchaser receives full rights to it.

והא איפליגו בה חדא זימנא דאיתמר המוכר שדהו לפירות רבי יוחנן אמר מביא וקורא וריש לקיש אמר מביא ואינו קורא

The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already engage in a dispute concerning this issue one time? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field for just its produce, meaning that he retains ownership over the field itself and he sells the rights to all of its produce to someone else, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser brings first fruits from this field to the Temple and recites the verses in the Torah associated with the bringing of the first fruits, in which he thanks God for: “The land that You, Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10). And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits, but he does not recite the verses, since it is not his field.

רבי יוחנן אמר מביא וקורא קסבר קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי וריש לקיש אמר מביא ואינו קורא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

The Gemara explains the reason behind the dispute: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he brings the first fruits and recites the verses because he maintains that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Even though the field itself does not belong to him, it is as if he acquired the field because all of the produce belongs to him in practice. And Reish Lakish says that he brings the first fruits and does not recite the verses because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Why was it necessary for them to engage in a dispute concerning this issue twice?

אמר לך רבי יוחנן אף על גב דבעלמא קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי הכא אצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא אבא לגבי בריה אחולי אחיל קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the dispute to be stated also in the context of one who sells his father’s property and then dies. This is because Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, because it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a father and son, the father presumably waived his rights in the property itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that even in this case, the father’s ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself.

ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר אף על גב דבעלמא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי הכא אצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא כל לגבי נפשיה אפילו במקום בריה נפשיה עדיפא ליה קא משמע לן

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, as one who sells the produce of his field retains full ownership of the land itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, as it might enter your mind to say that in any sale concerning oneself, even vis-à-vis his son, one grants preference to himself. Accordingly, if one grants the property itself to his son, reserving the rights to the produce for himself, he retains the rights to the property itself as well. Reish Lakish teaches us that he does not retain the rights to the property.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש נכסי לך ואחריך יירש פלוני ואחריו יירש פלוני מת ראשון קנה שני מת שני קנה שלישי

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it.

מת שני בחיי ראשון יחזרו נכסים ליורשי ראשון

If the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second, who never received it.

ואם איתא ליורשי נותן מיבעי ליה

And if it is so that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself, the baraita should have stated that the property returns to the heirs of the giver, as the first and second recipients received only the right to use the property and enjoy its profits during their lifetimes, after which it was designated to be transferred to others. Therefore, in a case where the transfer does not apply, the property should return to the possession of the one who owns the property itself, namely the giver and his heirs.

אמר ליה כבר תרגמה רב הושעיא בבבל אחריך שאני וכן רמי רבה בר רב הונא קמיה דרב ואמר אחריך שאני

Reish Lakish said to him: Rav Hoshaya already interpreted in Babylonia that a case of after you, i.e., where the owner said to the recipient: After you die so-and-so will inherit the property, is different, as the giver intended to grant full ownership of the property to the first recipient as well, including both the rights to the produce and the property itself. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also raised this contradiction before Rav, and Rav said in response: After you, is different.

והתניא יחזרו ליורשי נותן

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita that if the second designated recipient dies before the first, after the death of the first the property returns to the heirs of the giver?