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Today's Daf Yomi

June 7, 2017 | 讬状讙 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Bava Batra 136

What wording must be used to designate one’s聽property to others in his lifetime when he is healthy? 聽What is the status of the property in the interim? Can the son or father sell their rights to their share? 聽If the son sells his rights and he predeceases the father, does the buyer acquire the property upon the death of the father or does it revert to the father’s heirs?


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讻讚讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 诪转谞转讗 讚讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 讗祝 讻转讜讘讜 讜讞转讜诪讜 讜讛讘讜 诇讬讛

It is as Rav 岣sda says that if it is written in the will: And we acquired it from him through an act of acquisition in addition to this gift, this formulation does not cancel the will鈥檚 power to take effect after the person鈥檚 death, as the intention of referring to it as a gift is merely to enhance the legal power of the recipient by confirming the transfer through an act of acquisition. Here too, in a case where he says: Write and sign a document as well, and give it to him, it is apparent that his request is to enhance the legal power of the recipient by writing a document in addition to transferring the gift itself.

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉

It was stated that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case. And Rava says similarly that Rav Na岣an says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 爪专讬讱 砖讬讻转讜讘 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱

MISHNA: A healthy person who writes a document granting his property to his sons in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, must write: I give the property from today and after my death. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies.

讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 诇讘谉 讜讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘

If one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, the father cannot sell the property because it is written as granted to the son, and the son cannot sell it because it is still in the possession of the father with regard to using the property and consuming its produce.

诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 讘讛谉 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘

If the father sold the property, it is sold to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce until the father dies, at which point it belongs to the son. If the son sold it during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser has no right to use it until the father dies.

讙诪壮 讜讻讬 讻转讘 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讛讗 转谞谉 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

GEMARA: And if he wrote: I give the property from today and after my death, what of it? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Gittin 72a): If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is a bill of divorce but not a complete bill of divorce, and therefore if he dies without children his wife performs the ritual through which a woman is freed of her levirate bonds [岣litza], as perhaps the bill of divorce is invalid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing 岣litza. But she does not enter into levirate marriage, as perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is forbidden for a divorc茅e to marry her former husband鈥檚 brother.

讛转诐 诪住驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讙讜驻讗 拽谞讬 诪讛讬讜诐 驻讬专讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara answers: There, we are uncertain if the expression: And after my death, is meant as a condition, i.e., if I die you will be divorced retroactively from today, or if it is a retraction of the statement: From today, meaning that the divorce would take effect only after his death, which would render it invalid. But here, in the case of a deed of gift, there is no contradiction in the statement, as this is what the father is presumably saying to him: Acquire the property itself today, and the produce after my death.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讞诇砖 注诇 诇讙讘讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讗讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讗讬 诇讗 讜讟注诪讬讛 讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death. The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Avuh was sick, and Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: Ask him whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Na岣an said to Rav Huna: I do not know Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 reasoning; can I ask him about the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: You ask him if the halakha is in accordance with his opinion or not, and I will tell you his reasoning afterward.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘转专 讚谞驻拽讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诪驻谞讬 砖讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

Rav Na岣an asked Rabba bar Avuh. Rabba bar Avuh said to him that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After they left, Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an that this is Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 reasoning: He says that writing: From today and after my death, is unnecessary because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect. The Gemara adds: That is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death, because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讛拽谞讗讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讛拽谞讗讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱

Rava asked Rav Na岣an: In a case where the father performed an act of transfer, transferring his property to his son after his death, what is the halakha? Is it still necessary to write: From today and after my death? Rav Na岣an said to him: In a case where he performed an act of transfer, he need not write: From today and after my death.

专讘 驻驻讬 讗诪专 讗讬讻讗 讗拽谞讬转讗 讚爪专讬讱 讜讗讬讻讗 讗拽谞讬转讗 讚诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 爪专讬讱

Rav Pappi said: There is a case of transfer where he needs to write: From today and after my death, and there is a case of transfer where he does not need to do so. If it is written in the deed that he transferred it to him and we, the witnesses, acquired it from him, he does not need to write: From today and after my death. But if the statement is written in the opposite order: We acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he still needs to write: From today and after my death.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪住讜专讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗谞谉 诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讜住驻专讬 讬讚注讬 砖讗诇讜谞讛讜 诇住驻专讬 讚讗讘讬讬 讜讬讚注讬 讜诇住驻专讬 讚专讘讗 讜讬讚注讬

Rav 岣nina of Sura objects to this distinction: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes know? The distinction between the two opposite orderings of the above statement was unknown to the Sages. The Gemara relates that the Sages asked Abaye鈥檚 scribes and they knew the distinction, and they asked Rava鈥檚 scribes and they also knew the distinction.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讗诪专 讘讬谉 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讬谉 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讜讘讚讜讻专谉 驻转讙诪讬 讚讛讜讬 讘讗谞驻谞讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether it is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he need not write: From today and after my death, as the act of transfer is mentioned in any event. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei in the mishna disagree whether the phrase: From today and after my death, is necessary only with regard to a case where the deed merely states: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence, without any mention of an act of transfer.

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专讬转讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪谞讛专讚注讗 讜讗诪专 诇讬 讗转讜谉 讛讻讬 诪转谞讬转讜 诇讛 讗谞谉 讛讻讬 诪转谞讬谞谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讛拽谞讗讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讘讬谉 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讬谉 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讘讚讜讻专谉 驻转讙诪讬 讚讛讜讜 讘讗谞驻谞讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha in the presence of Rav Zevid of Neharde鈥檃, and he said to me: You teach it like this, i.e., as a question and answer followed by a dispute; we teach it like this, i.e., as a single, unbroken statement: Rava says that Rav Na岣an says that in a case where transfer is mentioned in the deed, the owner need not write: From today and after my death. This is the halakha whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether the wording is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him; he need not write: From today and after my death. They disagree only with regard to a case where the wording is: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence.

讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讗讬转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘

搂 The mishna teaches that if one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, neither he nor the son can sell the property. It was stated that in a case where the son sold the property during the father鈥檚 lifetime, and then the son died during the father鈥檚 lifetime, after which the father died as well,

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, and Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that the purchaser did not acquire the property because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, the son鈥檚 sale can take effect only after the father鈥檚 death. If the son dies first, since he never attained ownership, his sale can never come to fruition.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property, because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the father鈥檚 rights do not prevent the son, who owns the property itself, from selling it, and eventually the purchaser receives full rights to it.

讜讛讗 讗讬驻诇讬讙讜 讘讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 砖讚讛讜 诇驻讬专讜转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 they already engage in a dispute concerning this issue one time? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field for just its produce, meaning that he retains ownership over the field itself and he sells the rights to all of its produce to someone else, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser brings first fruits from this field to the Temple and recites the verses in the Torah associated with the bringing of the first fruits, in which he thanks God for: 鈥淭he land that You, Lord, have given me鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:10). And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits, but he does not recite the verses, since it is not his field.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 拽住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains the reason behind the dispute: Rabbi Yo岣nan says he brings the first fruits and recites the verses because he maintains that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Even though the field itself does not belong to him, it is as if he acquired the field because all of the produce belongs to him in practice. And Reish Lakish says that he brings the first fruits and does not recite the verses because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Why was it necessary for them to engage in a dispute concerning this issue twice?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讘讗 诇讙讘讬 讘专讬讛 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞讬诇 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the dispute to be stated also in the context of one who sells his father鈥檚 property and then dies. This is because Rabbi Yo岣nan could have said to you that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, because it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a father and son, the father presumably waived his rights in the property itself. Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that even in this case, the father鈥檚 ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘诪拽讜诐 讘专讬讛 谞驻砖讬讛 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, as one who sells the produce of his field retains full ownership of the land itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, as it might enter your mind to say that in any sale concerning oneself, even vis-脿-vis his son, one grants preference to himself. Accordingly, if one grants the property itself to his son, reserving the rights to the produce for himself, he retains the rights to the property itself as well. Reish Lakish teaches us that he does not retain the rights to the property.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 讬讬专砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 讬讬专砖 驻诇讜谞讬 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛 砖谞讬 诪转 砖谞讬 拽谞讛 砖诇讬砖讬

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it.

诪转 砖谞讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讜谉 讬讞讝专讜 谞讻住讬诐 诇讬讜专砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

If the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second, who never received it.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 谞讜转谉 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And if it is so that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself, the baraita should have stated that the property returns to the heirs of the giver, as the first and second recipients received only the right to use the property and enjoy its profits during their lifetimes, after which it was designated to be transferred to others. Therefore, in a case where the transfer does not apply, the property should return to the possession of the one who owns the property itself, namely the giver and his heirs.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讘专 转专讙诪讛 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘讘讘诇 讗讞专讬讱 砖讗谞讬 讜讻谉 专诪讬 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讜讗诪专 讗讞专讬讱 砖讗谞讬

Reish Lakish said to him: Rav Hoshaya already interpreted in Babylonia that a case of after you, i.e., where the owner said to the recipient: After you die so-and-so will inherit the property, is different, as the giver intended to grant full ownership of the property to the first recipient as well, including both the rights to the produce and the property itself. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also raised this contradiction before Rav, and Rav said in response: After you, is different.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讞讝专讜 诇讬讜专砖讬 谞讜转谉

The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita that if the second designated recipient dies before the first, after the death of the first the property returns to the heirs of the giver?

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Bava Batra 136

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Bava Batra 136

讻讚讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 诪转谞转讗 讚讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 讗祝 讻转讜讘讜 讜讞转讜诪讜 讜讛讘讜 诇讬讛

It is as Rav 岣sda says that if it is written in the will: And we acquired it from him through an act of acquisition in addition to this gift, this formulation does not cancel the will鈥檚 power to take effect after the person鈥檚 death, as the intention of referring to it as a gift is merely to enhance the legal power of the recipient by confirming the transfer through an act of acquisition. Here too, in a case where he says: Write and sign a document as well, and give it to him, it is apparent that his request is to enhance the legal power of the recipient by writing a document in addition to transferring the gift itself.

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诇讻讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉

It was stated that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case. And Rava says similarly that Rav Na岣an says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 爪专讬讱 砖讬讻转讜讘 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱

MISHNA: A healthy person who writes a document granting his property to his sons in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, must write: I give the property from today and after my death. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies.

讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 诇讘谉 讜讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘

If one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, the father cannot sell the property because it is written as granted to the son, and the son cannot sell it because it is still in the possession of the father with regard to using the property and consuming its produce.

诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 讘讛谉 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘

If the father sold the property, it is sold to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce until the father dies, at which point it belongs to the son. If the son sold it during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser has no right to use it until the father dies.

讙诪壮 讜讻讬 讻转讘 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讛讗 转谞谉 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

GEMARA: And if he wrote: I give the property from today and after my death, what of it? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Gittin 72a): If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is a bill of divorce but not a complete bill of divorce, and therefore if he dies without children his wife performs the ritual through which a woman is freed of her levirate bonds [岣litza], as perhaps the bill of divorce is invalid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing 岣litza. But she does not enter into levirate marriage, as perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is forbidden for a divorc茅e to marry her former husband鈥檚 brother.

讛转诐 诪住驻拽讗 诇谉 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讙讜驻讗 拽谞讬 诪讛讬讜诐 驻讬专讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara answers: There, we are uncertain if the expression: And after my death, is meant as a condition, i.e., if I die you will be divorced retroactively from today, or if it is a retraction of the statement: From today, meaning that the divorce would take effect only after his death, which would render it invalid. But here, in the case of a deed of gift, there is no contradiction in the statement, as this is what the father is presumably saying to him: Acquire the property itself today, and the produce after my death.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讞诇砖 注诇 诇讙讘讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讗讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讗讬 诇讗 讜讟注诪讬讛 讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death. The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Avuh was sick, and Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: Ask him whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Na岣an said to Rav Huna: I do not know Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 reasoning; can I ask him about the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: You ask him if the halakha is in accordance with his opinion or not, and I will tell you his reasoning afterward.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘转专 讚谞驻拽讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诪驻谞讬 砖讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

Rav Na岣an asked Rabba bar Avuh. Rabba bar Avuh said to him that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After they left, Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an that this is Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 reasoning: He says that writing: From today and after my death, is unnecessary because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect. The Gemara adds: That is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death, because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讛拽谞讗讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讛拽谞讗讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱

Rava asked Rav Na岣an: In a case where the father performed an act of transfer, transferring his property to his son after his death, what is the halakha? Is it still necessary to write: From today and after my death? Rav Na岣an said to him: In a case where he performed an act of transfer, he need not write: From today and after my death.

专讘 驻驻讬 讗诪专 讗讬讻讗 讗拽谞讬转讗 讚爪专讬讱 讜讗讬讻讗 讗拽谞讬转讗 讚诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 爪专讬讱

Rav Pappi said: There is a case of transfer where he needs to write: From today and after my death, and there is a case of transfer where he does not need to do so. If it is written in the deed that he transferred it to him and we, the witnesses, acquired it from him, he does not need to write: From today and after my death. But if the statement is written in the opposite order: We acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he still needs to write: From today and after my death.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪住讜专讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗谞谉 诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讜住驻专讬 讬讚注讬 砖讗诇讜谞讛讜 诇住驻专讬 讚讗讘讬讬 讜讬讚注讬 讜诇住驻专讬 讚专讘讗 讜讬讚注讬

Rav 岣nina of Sura objects to this distinction: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes know? The distinction between the two opposite orderings of the above statement was unknown to the Sages. The Gemara relates that the Sages asked Abaye鈥檚 scribes and they knew the distinction, and they asked Rava鈥檚 scribes and they also knew the distinction.

专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讗诪专 讘讬谉 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讬谉 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讜讘讚讜讻专谉 驻转讙诪讬 讚讛讜讬 讘讗谞驻谞讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether it is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he need not write: From today and after my death, as the act of transfer is mentioned in any event. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei in the mishna disagree whether the phrase: From today and after my death, is necessary only with regard to a case where the deed merely states: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence, without any mention of an act of transfer.

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专讬转讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪谞讛专讚注讗 讜讗诪专 诇讬 讗转讜谉 讛讻讬 诪转谞讬转讜 诇讛 讗谞谉 讛讻讬 诪转谞讬谞谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讛拽谞讗讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讘讬谉 讗拽谞讬讬讛 讜拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讬谉 拽谞讬谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讗拽谞讬讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讘讚讜讻专谉 驻转讙诪讬 讚讛讜讜 讘讗谞驻谞讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha in the presence of Rav Zevid of Neharde鈥檃, and he said to me: You teach it like this, i.e., as a question and answer followed by a dispute; we teach it like this, i.e., as a single, unbroken statement: Rava says that Rav Na岣an says that in a case where transfer is mentioned in the deed, the owner need not write: From today and after my death. This is the halakha whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether the wording is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him; he need not write: From today and after my death. They disagree only with regard to a case where the wording is: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence.

讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讗讬转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘

搂 The mishna teaches that if one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, neither he nor the son can sell the property. It was stated that in a case where the son sold the property during the father鈥檚 lifetime, and then the son died during the father鈥檚 lifetime, after which the father died as well,

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, and Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that the purchaser did not acquire the property because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, the son鈥檚 sale can take effect only after the father鈥檚 death. If the son dies first, since he never attained ownership, his sale can never come to fruition.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property, because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the father鈥檚 rights do not prevent the son, who owns the property itself, from selling it, and eventually the purchaser receives full rights to it.

讜讛讗 讗讬驻诇讬讙讜 讘讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 砖讚讛讜 诇驻讬专讜转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 they already engage in a dispute concerning this issue one time? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field for just its produce, meaning that he retains ownership over the field itself and he sells the rights to all of its produce to someone else, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser brings first fruits from this field to the Temple and recites the verses in the Torah associated with the bringing of the first fruits, in which he thanks God for: 鈥淭he land that You, Lord, have given me鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:10). And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits, but he does not recite the verses, since it is not his field.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 拽住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains the reason behind the dispute: Rabbi Yo岣nan says he brings the first fruits and recites the verses because he maintains that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Even though the field itself does not belong to him, it is as if he acquired the field because all of the produce belongs to him in practice. And Reish Lakish says that he brings the first fruits and does not recite the verses because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Why was it necessary for them to engage in a dispute concerning this issue twice?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讘讗 诇讙讘讬 讘专讬讛 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞讬诇 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the dispute to be stated also in the context of one who sells his father鈥檚 property and then dies. This is because Rabbi Yo岣nan could have said to you that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, because it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a father and son, the father presumably waived his rights in the property itself. Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that even in this case, the father鈥檚 ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘诪拽讜诐 讘专讬讛 谞驻砖讬讛 注讚讬驻讗 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, as one who sells the produce of his field retains full ownership of the land itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, as it might enter your mind to say that in any sale concerning oneself, even vis-脿-vis his son, one grants preference to himself. Accordingly, if one grants the property itself to his son, reserving the rights to the produce for himself, he retains the rights to the property itself as well. Reish Lakish teaches us that he does not retain the rights to the property.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 讬讬专砖 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 讬讬专砖 驻诇讜谞讬 诪转 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛 砖谞讬 诪转 砖谞讬 拽谞讛 砖诇讬砖讬

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it.

诪转 砖谞讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讜谉 讬讞讝专讜 谞讻住讬诐 诇讬讜专砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

If the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second, who never received it.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 谞讜转谉 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And if it is so that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself, the baraita should have stated that the property returns to the heirs of the giver, as the first and second recipients received only the right to use the property and enjoy its profits during their lifetimes, after which it was designated to be transferred to others. Therefore, in a case where the transfer does not apply, the property should return to the possession of the one who owns the property itself, namely the giver and his heirs.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讘专 转专讙诪讛 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘讘讘诇 讗讞专讬讱 砖讗谞讬 讜讻谉 专诪讬 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讜讗诪专 讗讞专讬讱 砖讗谞讬

Reish Lakish said to him: Rav Hoshaya already interpreted in Babylonia that a case of after you, i.e., where the owner said to the recipient: After you die so-and-so will inherit the property, is different, as the giver intended to grant full ownership of the property to the first recipient as well, including both the rights to the produce and the property itself. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also raised this contradiction before Rav, and Rav said in response: After you, is different.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讞讝专讜 诇讬讜专砖讬 谞讜转谉

The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita that if the second designated recipient dies before the first, after the death of the first the property returns to the heirs of the giver?

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