Bava Batra 143

וכרכיש בה רישיה בי מדרשא אזל לגביה אמר ליה אילו אמר ליה קני כחמור מי קני

and he nodded [vekharkeish] his head in the study hall in approval of this explanation. Rabbi Yirmeya went to Rabbi Avin, who said to him: Rabbi Abbahu’s reasoning is that if a father said to his son: Acquire an item as a donkey does, does he acquire it? In the same manner that the son would not acquire anything if his acquisition were likened to that of a donkey, which possesses no ability to acquire an item, so too, since the father compared the son’s acquisition to the acquisition effected by his unborn children, who possess no ability to acquire property, the son did not acquire any property.

דאיתמר קני כחמור לא קנה את וחמור רב נחמן אמר קנה מחצה ורב המנונא אמר לא אמר כלום ורב ששת אמר קנה הכל

This is as it was stated: With regard to one who says to another: Acquire an item as a donkey does, he does not acquire any property, as a donkey cannot acquire property. But with regard to one who says: You and a donkey shall both acquire my property, there is a disagreement. Rav Naḥman says: The person acquires his half of the property, and Rav Hamnuna says: It is as though the giver does not say anything. Since the beneficiary was included with the donkey in the same acquisition, he does not acquire any property, just as the donkey does not acquire any property. Rav Sheshet says: The person acquires all the property. As the giver knew that a donkey cannot acquire property, he intended for the person, who was capable of acquiring property, to acquire all the property.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא רבי יוסי אומר אין לך מר בקישות אלא פנימי שבו לפיכך כשהוא תורם מוסיף על החיצון שבו ותורם

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: There is nothing bitter in the cucumber other than its inner part, which is sometimes bitter and inedible and unfit to be separated as teruma. Therefore, since one does not know if the cucumber he separates as teruma is bitter inside, when he separates teruma, he adds part of another cucumber as teruma, in addition to the outer part of the cucumber, which is edible. And he separates both as teruma, thereby ensuring that the teruma consists of sufficient edible cucumber.

אמאי את וחמור הוא

Rav Sheshet asks: Why does the separation of teruma take effect? Is it not analogous to one who states: You and a donkey shall acquire an item, since he designated as teruma both the outer part of the cucumber, which is fit to become teruma, and the inedible inner part, which is not fit to become teruma? Since this does not invalidate the separation of teruma with regard to the edible outer part, one can infer that although the donkey cannot acquire property, this does not prevent the person from acquiring the property.

שאני התם דמדאורייתא תרומה מעלייתא היא

The Gemara replies: It is different there, as by Torah law the bitter inner part is also properly considered teruma, even though by rabbinic law if one separated inferior produce as teruma he must again separate produce of superior quality as teruma. Therefore, when one designates the entire cucumber as teruma, he is not designating both fit and unfit produce.

דאמר רבי אילעא מנין לתורם מן הרע על היפה שתרומתו תרומה שנאמר ולא תשאו עליו חטא בהרימכם את חלבו ממנו ואם אינו קדוש נשיאות חטא למה מכאן לתורם מן הרע על היפה שתרומתו תרומה

This is as Rabbi Ile’a says: From where is it derived that the halakha with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce is that his teruma is valid teruma? It is as it is stated with regard to teruma: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it the best thereof” (Numbers 18:32). By inference, this indicates that it is a transgression to separate the inferior part of the produce as teruma. Rabbi Ile’a explains the proof: And if the inferior produce is not sanctified as teruma, why does it involve the bearing of sin, as it is a meaningless act? From here one can derive that that the halakha with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce is that although he acted improperly, his teruma is valid teruma.

אמר ליה רב מרדכי לרב אשי מתיב רב אויא תיובתא מעשה בחמש נשים ובהן שתי אחיות וליקט אחד כלכלה של תאנים ושלהן היתה ושל שביעית היתה ואמר הרי כולכן מקודשות לי בכלכלה זאת וקבלה אחת מהן על ידי כולן אמרו חכמים אין אחיות מקודשות

§ The Gemara cited Rav Hamnuna’s opinion that if one says: You and a donkey shall acquire my property, he did not say anything. Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Rav Avya raises an objection to Rav Hamnuna’s opinion from a mishna (Kiddushin 50b): An incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that belonged to them, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. The Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed, as it is prohibited to marry the sister of one’s wife during her lifetime.

אחיות הוא דאין מקודשות הא נכריות מקודשות ואמאי את וחמור היא

One can infer from the mishna: It is only the sisters who are not betrothed, but the unrelated women are betrothed. But why is that so? It is analogous to one who states: You and a donkey shall acquire an item. Since he tried to betroth two women ineligible for betrothal together with the eligible women, the betrothal should not take effect even with regard to the eligible women.

אמר ליה היינו דחזאי רב הונא בר אויא בחלמא דמותיב רב אויא תיובתא לאו מי אוקימנא דאמר הראויה מכם לביאה תתקדש לי

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mordekhai: This is why I saw Rav Huna bar Avya in a dream, because you were going to tell me that Rav Avya raised an objection to Rav Hamnuna’s opinion. But as for this objection, didn’t we interpret the mishna in Kiddushin as referring to where he says: Those of you who are eligible for engaging in sexual intercourse with me shall be betrothed to me? Since the sisters were forbidden to him, they were not included in the betrothal in the first place, and there was no impediment to the betrothal of the eligible women taking effect. The case is therefore not comparable to the case discussed by Rav Hamnuna.

ההוא דאמר לה לדביתהו נכסיי ליך ולבניך אמר רב יוסף קנתה מחצה ואמר רב יוסף מנא אמינא לה דתניא רבי אומר והיתה לאהרן ולבניו מחצה לאהרן מחצה לבניו

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to his wife: My property is given to you and to your sons. Rav Yosef says: In such a case, the wife acquires half of the property, even though the man did not specify how much of his property he was giving her. And Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states with regard to the shewbread: “And it shall be for Aaron and his sons” (Leviticus 24:9). This means half for Aaron and half for his sons. One can infer from the baraita that when it is specified that a gift is to be divided between an individual and a group, the intention is that the individual receives half.

אמר ליה אביי בשלמא התם אהרן בר חלוקה הוא להכי פרט ביה רחמנא למשקל פלגא אשה לאו בת ירושה היא דיה שתטול כאחד מן הבנים

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted, there, in the case of the shewbread, Aaron is eligible to receive a share of the shewbread as a priest; it is for this reason that the Merciful One specified him separately, so that he should take more than other priests, i.e., half. But with regard to a woman, who is not eligible to inherit her husband’s property, it is sufficient for her to receive a portion of the inheritance as one of the sons, not half of all the property.

איני והא עובדא הוה בנהרדעא ואגביה שמואל פלגא בטבריא ואגביה רבי יוחנן פלגא ותו כי אתא רב יצחק בר יוסף אמר ההוא דמי כלילא דשדו דבי מלכא אאבולי ואאיסטרוגי אמר רבי ניתבו אבולי פלגא ואיסטרוגי פלגא

The Gemara raises an objection: Is that so? But there was an incident in Neharde’a where a man gave a gift to an individual and to a group of people, and Shmuel collected half the sum for the individual. There was a similar case in Tiberias, and Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half the sum for the individual. And furthermore, when Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael he said: There was a certain coronation tax that was placed by the royal house on the city councilmen [a’abulei] and on the prominent citizens [ve’a’isterugei]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Let the city councilmen give half and the prominent citizens half. This indicates that when two groups are mentioned together, the intent is that each one represents half.

הכי השתא התם מעיקרא כי הוו כתבי אאבולי הוו כתבי ואיסטרוגי הוו מסייעי בהדייהו וידע מלכא דהוו קא מסייעי השתא מאי דקא כתבי אאבולי ואאיסטרוגי למימרא דהני פלגא והני פלגא

The Gemara rejects this argument: How can the case concerning the tax be compared to the other cases? There, initially, when they would write the writ of assessment, they would write that it was placed on the city councilmen alone. And the prominent citizens would assist them in raising the sum, and the king knew that they were assisting them. Therefore, now, the meaning of what they wrote: It is placed on the city councilmen and on the prominent citizens, is to say that these should give half of the tax, and those should give half.

מתיב רבי זירא האומר הרי עלי מנחה מאה עשרון להביא בשני כלים מביא ששים בכלי אחד וארבעים בכלי אחד

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rav Yosef’s ruling from a baraita (Tosefta, Menaḥot 12:7): With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of one hundred tenths of an ephah in two vessels, he brings sixty-tenths in one vessel, and the remaining forty-tenths in one vessel, as no more than sixty-tenths may be brought in a single vessel.

ואם הביא חמשים בכלי אחד וחמשים בכלי אחד יצא אם הביא אין לכתחלה לא ואי סלקא דעתך כל כי האי גוונא פלגא ופלגא הוא אפילו לכתחלה נמי

And if he brought fifty-tenths in one vessel and fifty in one vessel, he fulfilled his obligation. One can infer from the baraita that after the fact, if he had brought fifty-tenths in each vessel, yes, he fulfilled his obligation, but he may not do so ab initio. And if it should enter your mind to say that every case like this is divided half and half, it should be permitted to divide the meal-offering into equal halves even ab initio.

הכי השתא התם אנן סהדי דהאי גברא מעיקרא לקרבן גדול קא מכוין והאי דקאמר בשני כלים דידע דלא אפשר לאתויי בכלי אחד כמה דאפשר לאיתויי מייתינן

The Gemara dismisses Rabbi Zeira’s objection: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the meal-offering, it is clear to us that this person initially intended to bring a large offering, and the reason that he said he will bring the offering in two vessels was that he knew that it is not possible to bring the entire offering in a single vessel. Therefore, we bring, in a single vessel, as much as it is possible to bring, which is sixty-tenths. In any other case it is possible that the division should be into two equal portions.

והלכתא כוותיה דרב יוסף בשדה ענין ומחצה

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef in three matters where he disagreed with Rabba: In the matter of dividing a field between brothers (see 12b); in the matter of whether certain actions are limited by the court session or by the topic of discussion in the court (see 114a); and in the matter of half, i.e., this matter, whether an unspecified division into two parts is divided into two equal halves.

ההוא דשדר פיסקי דשיראי לביתיה אמר רבי אמי הראויין לבנים לבנים ראויין לבנות לבנות ולא אמרן אלא דלית ליה כלתא אבל אית ליה כלתא לכלתיה שדר ואי בנתיה לא נסיבן לא שבק בנתיה ומשדר לכלתיה

§ The Gemara cites additional incidents concerning a gift whose method of division was not specified: There was a certain man who sent swaths of silk to his home as a gift. Rabbi Ami says that in such a case, those swaths that are suitable for the sons’ garments are given to the sons, and those that are suitable for the daughters’ garments are given to the daughters. The Gemara comments: We said this only when he does not have daughters-in-law, but if he has daughters-in-law, it is presumed that he sent it for his daughters-in-law. And if his daughters are not married, it is presumed that he does not forsake his daughters and send to his daughters-in-law, so the silk is given to his daughters.

ההוא דאמר להו נכסיי לבניי הוה ליה ברא וברתא מי קרו אינשי לברא בניי ולסלוקי לברתא מעישור קאתי או דלמא לא קרו אינשי לברא בניי ולמושכה לברתא במתנה קאתי

There was a certain man who said to those surrounding him: I leave my property to my sons [levanai], and he had only a son and a daughter. The question was raised: Do people call a single son in the plural: My sons, and in his will he came to remove his daughter even from the tenth of his property that would rightfully be her dowry? Or perhaps people do not call a single son: My sons, and he came to include his daughter in the gift?

אמר אביי תא שמע ובני דן חשים אמר ליה רבא דלמא כדתנא דבי חזקיה שהיו מרובין כחושים של קנה אלא אמר רבא ובני פלוא אליאב רב יוסף אמר ובני איתן עזריה

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof that one does refer to a single son using the plural term sons, as it is written: “And the sons of Dan: Hushim” (Genesis 46:23). Rava said to Abaye: Perhaps this verse should be understood as the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, that Hushim is not the name of Dan’s son but that they, Dan’s sons, were as numerous as the groups [ḥushim] of reeds. Rather, Rava said: One can prove this usage of the term sons in the verse: “And the sons of Pallu: Eliab” (Numbers 26:8). Rav Yosef said: This can be proven from another verse: “And the sons of Ethan: Azariah” (I Chronicles 2:8).

ההוא דאמר להו נכסאי לבנאי הוה ליה ברא ובר ברא קרו אינשי לבר ברא ברא או לא רב חביבא אמר קרו אינשי לבר ברא ברא מר בר רב אשי אמר לא קרו אינשי לבר ברא ברא תניא כוותיה דמר בר רב אשי המודר הנאה מבנים מותר בבני בנים:

There was a certain man who said to those surrounding him: I leave my property to my sons, and he had a son and a grandson, i.e., his son’s son. The question was raised: Do people call a grandson a son, or do they not? Rav Ḥaviva said: People call a grandson a son. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: People do not call a grandson a son. The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from a certain person’s sons, it is permitted for him to derive benefit from the sons of that person’s sons, as they are not included in the term sons.

מתני׳ הניח בנים גדולים וקטנים השביחו גדולים את הנכסים השביחו לאמצע אם אמרו ראו מה שהניח אבא הרי אנו עושין ואוכלים השביחו לעצמן וכן האשה שהשביחה את הנכסים השביחה לאמצע אם אמרה ראו מה שהניח לי בעלי הרי אני עושה ואוכלת השביחה לעצמה:

MISHNA: In the case of one who died and left behind adult and minor sons, if the adult sons enhanced the property, they enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is distributed among all the heirs. If the adult sons said from the outset: See that which our father left behind; we are going to engage in business with our share of the property and profit from it, then they enhanced the property for themselves. And similarly, with regard to a wife who enhanced the property of her deceased husband, she enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is divided between her and the heirs. If she said: See that which my husband left me; I am going to engage in business with my share and profit from it, then she enhanced the property for herself.

גמ׳ אמר רב חביבא בריה דרב יוסף בריה דרבא משמיה דרבא לא שנו אלא ששבחו נכסים מחמת נכסים אבל שבחו נכסים מחמת עצמן השביחו לעצמן

GEMARA: Rav Ḥaviva, son of Rav Yosef, son of Rava, says in the name of Rava: They taught this halakha only with regard to where the property was enhanced on account of the property, i.e., the heirs invested money from the common inheritance in order to enhance the property, and their input was only in the management of its investment. But if the property was enhanced on their account, i.e., on account of the efforts or expenditure of the adult sons, the halakha is that they enhanced it for themselves.

איני והא אמר רבי חנינא אפילו לא הניח להם אביהם אלא

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say: Even if their father left them nothing but