Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

June 19, 2017 | 讻状讛 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Batra 148

Study Guide Bava Batra 148. One cannot transfer intangible items – like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree. 聽Even on one’s deathbed. 聽However, the question is asked – if one transfers the tree to one person and the fruits to another, does that work – as he is potentially just “leaving over” the fruits and not including them in his sale. 聽And if that doesn’t work, would it work in a case where he sells the tree but retains rights for himself to the fruits? 聽If one divides up one’s property聽and possessions on one’s deathbed聽and then becomes healthy again, even if those were all of that person’s known possessions, one should be concerned that maybe the person has other possessions in another country and therefore the gift is a good gift. 聽This seems to contradict the mishna. 聽How can this be explained? 聽If one gives away money on one’s deathbed and then changes one’s mind about part of the funds, does that cancel the entire first gift or only part?

砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 讛诇讜讗转讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛诇讜讗转讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘讘专讬讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讬讜专砖 讬讜专砖讛

With regard to a person on his deathbed who says: Give the loan owed to me to so-and-so as a gift, the loan owned to him is acquired by so-and-so. And this is the halakha despite the fact that this does not apply in the case of a healthy person, as one cannot transfer a loan to a third party without a promissory note. Rav Pappa says: In this case the halakha of transferring loans differs with regard to a person on his deathbed, since an heir inherits loans without a promissory note, and the Sages accorded the gift of a person on his deathbed the halakhic status of an inheritance.

专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗诪专 讛诇讜讗讛 讗讬转讗 讘讘专讬讗 讜讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 转谞讛讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讘诪注诪讚 砖诇砖转谉 拽谞讛

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: A loan without a promissory note can be conferred as a gift by a healthy person. And this is in accordance with that which Rav Huna says that Rav says, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, give it to so-and-so, if this was stated in the presence of all three of the parties, the third party acquires the money without an act of acquisition and without the need for witnesses.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇讗讞专 诪讛讜 诪讬 砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 讗讜 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 诇讗讞专 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 诇注爪诪讜 讞讜抓 诪驻讬专讜转讬讜 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to one who gave a palm tree to one person and its fruit to another, what is the halakha? Did he reserve the place of the fruit on the tree for the second person in order to give him a tangible object, and therefore the second person acquires the fruit, or did he not reserve it, and the second person does not acquire the fruit? Furthermore, if you say that giving the palm tree to one person and giving the fruit to another is not considered reserving the place of the fruit unless this is explicitly stipulated, then if he reserves the fruit for himself, stating that the tree is given to another except for its fruit, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇讗讞专 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜砖讬讬专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇驻谞讬讜 砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 讘注讬谉 讬驻讛 诪砖讬讬专

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: Even if you say that giving the palm tree to one person and its fruit to another is not considered reserving the place of the fruit for the second person, if he gave the palm tree to one person and reserved the fruit for himself, he also reserved the place of the fruit for himself. What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that anything that one reserves with regard to himself, he reserves generously, and therefore he reserves for himself not only the fruit itself, but also the place of the fruit.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗谞谉 讗讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 诪转谞讬谞谉 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讛诪讜讻专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讚讬讜讟讗 讛注诇讬讜谞讛 砖诇讬 讚讬讜讟讗 讛注诇讬讜谞讛 砖诇讜

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi: We learned the aforementioned statement of Rav Na岣an with regard to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish concerning a different matter, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: In the case of one who sells a house to another and says to him: I am selling the house on the condition that the upper story [deyota] remains mine, the upper story remains his.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诪讛讜 诪讬 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 诇讗 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讞讜抓 诪讚讬讜讟讗 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: If one sold a house, i.e., a lower story, to one person and stated that the upper story will be sold to one other person, what is the halakha? Is this considered reserving additional rights for the second person apart from the upper story, or not? If you say that in a case where one sells his house to one and the upper story to one, his stipulation is not considered reserving rights for the second person, there is another dilemma. If one sold a house except for the upper story, reserving the upper story for himself, what is the halakha? Is this considered reserving additional rights for himself?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讞讜抓 诪讚讬讜讟讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讝讘讬讚 讚讗诪专 砖讗诐 专爪讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讘讛 讝讬讝讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: Even if you say that where one sells the house to one person and the upper story to one other person, he is not considered to be reserving rights for the second person, if one sold a house except for the upper story, he is considered to be reserving additional rights for himself. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Zevid, who says that the reason the seller reserves additional rights is that if he wants to extend projections from the upper story into the space of the courtyard, he may extend them.

讗诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚砖讬讬专 讚讬讜讟讗 诪拽讜诐 讝讬讝讬谉 谞诪讬 砖讬讬专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 诪驻讬专讜转讬讜 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 砖讬讬专

The Gemara concludes: Evidently, since he reserved the upper story, he also reserved the place of the projections. Here too, with regard to the one who gave a palm tree to another and reserved the fruit for himself, since he said that the tree is given to another except for its fruit, he reserved the place of the fruit for himself as well.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗诐 讘诪讞诇拽 诪转 拽谞讜 讻讜诇谉 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 讘讻讜诇谉

搂 The mishna (146b) states that if a person on his deathbed granted all of his property to others but reserved for himself any amount of land, his gift is valid even if he recovers. If he did not reserve for himself any amount of land, his gift is not valid if he recovers. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: In the case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a deed granting all of his property to others, the manner in which he divided his property is examined. If it appears that he was intending to divide his entire estate among various recipients, then if he dies, all the recipients acquire their gifts. If he recovers, he can retract all of the gifts, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna.

讗诐 讘谞诪诇讱 诪转 拽谞讜 讻讜诇谉 注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讗诇讗 讘讗讞专讜谉 讜讚诇诪讗 注讬讜谞讬 拽讗 诪注讬讬谉 讜讛讚专 讬讛讬讘 住转诪讬讛 讚砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诪讬讚拽 讚讬讬拽 讜讛讚专 讬讛讬讘

But if it appears that he was reconsidering the matter, initially intending to give away only a portion of his property, and then reconsidering and distributing the rest, then if he dies, all of the recipients acquire their gifts. If he recovers, he can retract only the last gift, as the previous gifts were given with the intent to reserve part of the property for himself, and they are valid even if he recovers. The Gemara asks: Perhaps he was not reconsidering; rather, he initially intended to transfer ownership of all of his property, and he was considering to whom to give each portion and then giving it. The Gemara answers: The usual way of a person on his deathbed is to consider the matter carefully first and only then to confer his gifts. Therefore, if he pauses to consider in the interim, it appears that he did not initially intend to transfer ownership of his entire estate.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讗讞专转

Rav A岣 bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: With regard to a person on his deathbed who wrote a deed granting all of his generally known property to others, and he then recovered, he cannot retract it, as we are concerned that perhaps he has property in another province that he reserved for himself, in which case the gift is valid even if he recovered.

讜讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 诇讗 砖讬讬专 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讬谉 诪转谞转讜 拽讬讬诪转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞诪讗 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 谞讻住讬 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讘诪讜讞讝拽 诇谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: But as for the mishna, which teaches: If he did not reserve for himself any amount of land, and he recovered, his gift is not valid, how can you find these circumstances? Rav 岣ma said: The mishna is referring to a case where he says: All my property is given to so-and-so, in which case he clearly reserved nothing for himself. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where our presumption is that he does not have property elsewhere.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 讗讜 诇讗 转讗 砖诪注 讻讜诇谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诪拽爪转谉 诇砖谞讬 砖谞讬 拽谞讛 专讗砖讜谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘砖诪转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, is a partial retraction of the gift considered a retraction of the entire gift, or it is not considered a retraction of the entire gift? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one gave all of his property to the first recipient and then he partially retracted his gift and gave part of his property to the second recipient, the second acquired his gift, but the first did not acquire anything. What, is it not referring to a case where the giver died, and the reason that the first recipient does not acquire anything is that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift?

诇讗 讘砖注诪讚

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the giver recovered. The first gift was invalidated, because he left nothing for himself, whereas the second gift remained valid, since he gave only part of his property. Had he died, the first recipient would have received the remainder, as the giver retracted only part of the first gift, which he gave to the second recipient.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪拽爪转谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜讻讜诇谉 诇砖谞讬 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛 砖谞讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘砖注诪讚 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 砖谞讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诪转 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讬拽谞讜

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to understand the baraita in this manner. From the fact that the last clause of the baraita teaches: If he gave part of his property to the first recipient, and then he gave all of his property to the second recipient, the first recipient acquired his gift, but the second did not acquire anything. Granted, if you say that the baraita is referring to a case where the giver recovered, due to that reason the second recipient did not acquire the gift. But if you say that the baraita is referring to a case where he died, both of them should acquire their gifts.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜转讛讜讬 谞诪讬 讘砖注诪讚 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讚砖谞讬 诪讬讛转 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 谞讬讛讜讬 讻诪讞诇拽 讜诇讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讗 诇讬拽谞讜

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: And even if the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he recovered, one can prove that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift. Granted, if you say that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift, this is the reason that at least the second recipient acquired the gift, as the giver reserved part of his property for himself. But if you say that a partial retraction is not considered a retraction of the entire gift, the giver should be considered as one who was dividing all of his property between the two recipients, and neither of them should acquire their gifts.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 专讬砖讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讬谉 砖诪转 讘讬谉 砖注诪讚 住讬驻讗 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻砖注诪讚

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift. You find the halakha that is stated in the first clause of the baraita both in a case where the giver died and in a case where he recovered. You find the halakha that is stated in the last clause only in a case where he recovered.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛拽讚讬砖 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讜注诪讚 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讛拽讚砖 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬

搂 A series of dilemmas were raised before the Sages: If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of his property to the Temple treasury and subsequently recovered, what is the halakha? Do we say that in any case that concerns consecrated property the assumption is that he resolves to transfer the property unconditionally, and therefore the consecration is valid even if he recovers? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally.

讛驻拽讬专 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讗祝 诇注谞讬讬诐 讻注砖讬专讬诐 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬

Furthermore, if a person on his deathbed declared all of his property ownerless, what is the halakha? Do we say that since declaring his property ownerless is for the benefit of the poor as well as the rich, it involves the potential mitzva of providing for the poor, and therefore the assumption is that he resolves to transfer the property, i.e., declare it ownerless, unconditionally? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally.

讞讬诇拽 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 爪讚拽讛 讜讚讗讬 诪讙诪专 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 转讬拽讜

Furthermore, if a person on his deathbed divided all of his property to be distributed to the poor, what is the halakha? Do we say that with regard to charity the assumption is that he certainly resolves to transfer the property unconditionally? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally. The Gemara concludes: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛拽讚讬砖 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 讛驻拽讬专 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 讞讬诇拽 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讛讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara presents another version of this series of dilemmas: If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of his property to the Temple treasury, what is the halakha? If he declared all of his property ownerless, what is the halakha? If he divided all of his property to be distributed to the poor, what is the halakha? These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讬讟讜诇 讜讬讝讻讛 讜讬讞讝讬拽 讜讬拽谞讛 讻讜诇谉 诇砖讜谉 诪转谞讛 讛谉 讘诪转谞讬转讗 转谞讗 讗祝 讬讞住讬谉 讜讬专转 讘专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讗 讛讬讗

Rav Sheshet says: If one says: So-and-so shall take my property, or: So-and-so shall gain possession of my property, or: So-and-so shall take possession of my property, or: He shall acquire my property, all of these are terms that denote the bestowal of gifts. It was taught in a baraita: If one says: So-and-so shall receive as an inheritance, or: So-and-so shall inherit, these are also valid terms denoting inheritance in the case of one who is fit to inherit from him. And this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, who holds that one can bequeath all of his property to one of his sons using terms that denote inheritance, not only using terms that denote the bestowal of a gift.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜

A series of dilemmas were raised before the Sages:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bava Batra 148

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Batra 148

砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 讛诇讜讗转讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛诇讜讗转讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘讘专讬讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讬讜专砖 讬讜专砖讛

With regard to a person on his deathbed who says: Give the loan owed to me to so-and-so as a gift, the loan owned to him is acquired by so-and-so. And this is the halakha despite the fact that this does not apply in the case of a healthy person, as one cannot transfer a loan to a third party without a promissory note. Rav Pappa says: In this case the halakha of transferring loans differs with regard to a person on his deathbed, since an heir inherits loans without a promissory note, and the Sages accorded the gift of a person on his deathbed the halakhic status of an inheritance.

专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讗诪专 讛诇讜讗讛 讗讬转讗 讘讘专讬讗 讜讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 转谞讛讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讘诪注诪讚 砖诇砖转谉 拽谞讛

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: A loan without a promissory note can be conferred as a gift by a healthy person. And this is in accordance with that which Rav Huna says that Rav says, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, give it to so-and-so, if this was stated in the presence of all three of the parties, the third party acquires the money without an act of acquisition and without the need for witnesses.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇讗讞专 诪讛讜 诪讬 砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 讗讜 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 诇讗讞专 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 诇注爪诪讜 讞讜抓 诪驻讬专讜转讬讜 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to one who gave a palm tree to one person and its fruit to another, what is the halakha? Did he reserve the place of the fruit on the tree for the second person in order to give him a tangible object, and therefore the second person acquires the fruit, or did he not reserve it, and the second person does not acquire the fruit? Furthermore, if you say that giving the palm tree to one person and giving the fruit to another is not considered reserving the place of the fruit unless this is explicitly stipulated, then if he reserves the fruit for himself, stating that the tree is given to another except for its fruit, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇讗讞专 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 讚拽诇 诇讗讞讚 讜砖讬讬专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 诇驻谞讬讜 砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 讘注讬谉 讬驻讛 诪砖讬讬专

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: Even if you say that giving the palm tree to one person and its fruit to another is not considered reserving the place of the fruit for the second person, if he gave the palm tree to one person and reserved the fruit for himself, he also reserved the place of the fruit for himself. What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that anything that one reserves with regard to himself, he reserves generously, and therefore he reserves for himself not only the fruit itself, but also the place of the fruit.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗谞谉 讗讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 诪转谞讬谞谉 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讛诪讜讻专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讚讬讜讟讗 讛注诇讬讜谞讛 砖诇讬 讚讬讜讟讗 讛注诇讬讜谞讛 砖诇讜

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi: We learned the aforementioned statement of Rav Na岣an with regard to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish concerning a different matter, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: In the case of one who sells a house to another and says to him: I am selling the house on the condition that the upper story [deyota] remains mine, the upper story remains his.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诪讛讜 诪讬 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讗讜 诇讗 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讞讜抓 诪讚讬讜讟讗 诪讛讜

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: If one sold a house, i.e., a lower story, to one person and stated that the upper story will be sold to one other person, what is the halakha? Is this considered reserving additional rights for the second person apart from the upper story, or not? If you say that in a case where one sells his house to one and the upper story to one, his stipulation is not considered reserving rights for the second person, there is another dilemma. If one sold a house except for the upper story, reserving the upper story for himself, what is the halakha? Is this considered reserving additional rights for himself?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讘讬转 诇讗讞讚 讜讚讬讜讟讗 诇讗讞讚 诇讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讞讜抓 诪讚讬讜讟讗 讛讜讬 砖讬讜专 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讝讘讬讚 讚讗诪专 砖讗诐 专爪讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讘讛 讝讬讝讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗

Rava said that Rav Na岣an said: Even if you say that where one sells the house to one person and the upper story to one other person, he is not considered to be reserving rights for the second person, if one sold a house except for the upper story, he is considered to be reserving additional rights for himself. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Zevid, who says that the reason the seller reserves additional rights is that if he wants to extend projections from the upper story into the space of the courtyard, he may extend them.

讗诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚砖讬讬专 讚讬讜讟讗 诪拽讜诐 讝讬讝讬谉 谞诪讬 砖讬讬专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 诪驻讬专讜转讬讜 诪拽讜诐 驻讬专讬 砖讬讬专

The Gemara concludes: Evidently, since he reserved the upper story, he also reserved the place of the projections. Here too, with regard to the one who gave a palm tree to another and reserved the fruit for himself, since he said that the tree is given to another except for its fruit, he reserved the place of the fruit for himself as well.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗诐 讘诪讞诇拽 诪转 拽谞讜 讻讜诇谉 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 讘讻讜诇谉

搂 The mishna (146b) states that if a person on his deathbed granted all of his property to others but reserved for himself any amount of land, his gift is valid even if he recovers. If he did not reserve for himself any amount of land, his gift is not valid if he recovers. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: In the case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a deed granting all of his property to others, the manner in which he divided his property is examined. If it appears that he was intending to divide his entire estate among various recipients, then if he dies, all the recipients acquire their gifts. If he recovers, he can retract all of the gifts, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna.

讗诐 讘谞诪诇讱 诪转 拽谞讜 讻讜诇谉 注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讗诇讗 讘讗讞专讜谉 讜讚诇诪讗 注讬讜谞讬 拽讗 诪注讬讬谉 讜讛讚专 讬讛讬讘 住转诪讬讛 讚砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诪讬讚拽 讚讬讬拽 讜讛讚专 讬讛讬讘

But if it appears that he was reconsidering the matter, initially intending to give away only a portion of his property, and then reconsidering and distributing the rest, then if he dies, all of the recipients acquire their gifts. If he recovers, he can retract only the last gift, as the previous gifts were given with the intent to reserve part of the property for himself, and they are valid even if he recovers. The Gemara asks: Perhaps he was not reconsidering; rather, he initially intended to transfer ownership of all of his property, and he was considering to whom to give each portion and then giving it. The Gemara answers: The usual way of a person on his deathbed is to consider the matter carefully first and only then to confer his gifts. Therefore, if he pauses to consider in the interim, it appears that he did not initially intend to transfer ownership of his entire estate.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞讛 讗讞专转

Rav A岣 bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: With regard to a person on his deathbed who wrote a deed granting all of his generally known property to others, and he then recovered, he cannot retract it, as we are concerned that perhaps he has property in another province that he reserved for himself, in which case the gift is valid even if he recovered.

讜讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 诇讗 砖讬讬专 拽专拽注 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讗讬谉 诪转谞转讜 拽讬讬诪转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞诪讗 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 谞讻住讬 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讘诪讜讞讝拽 诇谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: But as for the mishna, which teaches: If he did not reserve for himself any amount of land, and he recovered, his gift is not valid, how can you find these circumstances? Rav 岣ma said: The mishna is referring to a case where he says: All my property is given to so-and-so, in which case he clearly reserved nothing for himself. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where our presumption is that he does not have property elsewhere.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 讗讜 诇讗 转讗 砖诪注 讻讜诇谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诪拽爪转谉 诇砖谞讬 砖谞讬 拽谞讛 专讗砖讜谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘砖诪转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, is a partial retraction of the gift considered a retraction of the entire gift, or it is not considered a retraction of the entire gift? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one gave all of his property to the first recipient and then he partially retracted his gift and gave part of his property to the second recipient, the second acquired his gift, but the first did not acquire anything. What, is it not referring to a case where the giver died, and the reason that the first recipient does not acquire anything is that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift?

诇讗 讘砖注诪讚

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the giver recovered. The first gift was invalidated, because he left nothing for himself, whereas the second gift remained valid, since he gave only part of his property. Had he died, the first recipient would have received the remainder, as the giver retracted only part of the first gift, which he gave to the second recipient.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪拽爪转谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜讻讜诇谉 诇砖谞讬 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛 砖谞讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘砖注诪讚 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 砖谞讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诪转 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讬拽谞讜

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to understand the baraita in this manner. From the fact that the last clause of the baraita teaches: If he gave part of his property to the first recipient, and then he gave all of his property to the second recipient, the first recipient acquired his gift, but the second did not acquire anything. Granted, if you say that the baraita is referring to a case where the giver recovered, due to that reason the second recipient did not acquire the gift. But if you say that the baraita is referring to a case where he died, both of them should acquire their gifts.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜转讛讜讬 谞诪讬 讘砖注诪讚 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讚砖谞讬 诪讬讛转 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 谞讬讛讜讬 讻诪讞诇拽 讜诇讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讗 诇讬拽谞讜

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: And even if the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he recovered, one can prove that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift. Granted, if you say that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift, this is the reason that at least the second recipient acquired the gift, as the giver reserved part of his property for himself. But if you say that a partial retraction is not considered a retraction of the entire gift, the giver should be considered as one who was dividing all of his property between the two recipients, and neither of them should acquire their gifts.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讞讝专讛 讘诪拽爪转 讛讜讬讗 讞讝专讛 讘讻讜诇讛 专讬砖讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讬谉 砖诪转 讘讬谉 砖注诪讚 住讬驻讗 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻砖注诪讚

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that a partial retraction is considered a retraction of the entire gift. You find the halakha that is stated in the first clause of the baraita both in a case where the giver died and in a case where he recovered. You find the halakha that is stated in the last clause only in a case where he recovered.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛拽讚讬砖 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 讜注诪讚 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讛拽讚砖 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬

搂 A series of dilemmas were raised before the Sages: If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of his property to the Temple treasury and subsequently recovered, what is the halakha? Do we say that in any case that concerns consecrated property the assumption is that he resolves to transfer the property unconditionally, and therefore the consecration is valid even if he recovers? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally.

讛驻拽讬专 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讗祝 诇注谞讬讬诐 讻注砖讬专讬诐 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬

Furthermore, if a person on his deathbed declared all of his property ownerless, what is the halakha? Do we say that since declaring his property ownerless is for the benefit of the poor as well as the rich, it involves the potential mitzva of providing for the poor, and therefore the assumption is that he resolves to transfer the property, i.e., declare it ownerless, unconditionally? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally.

讞讬诇拽 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讗讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 爪讚拽讛 讜讚讗讬 诪讙诪专 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 谞驻砖讬讛 诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 转讬拽讜

Furthermore, if a person on his deathbed divided all of his property to be distributed to the poor, what is the halakha? Do we say that with regard to charity the assumption is that he certainly resolves to transfer the property unconditionally? Or perhaps in any matter that concerns himself he does not resolve to transfer the property unconditionally. The Gemara concludes: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛拽讚讬砖 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 讛驻拽讬专 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诪讛讜 讞讬诇拽 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇注谞讬讬诐 诪讛讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara presents another version of this series of dilemmas: If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of his property to the Temple treasury, what is the halakha? If he declared all of his property ownerless, what is the halakha? If he divided all of his property to be distributed to the poor, what is the halakha? These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讬讟讜诇 讜讬讝讻讛 讜讬讞讝讬拽 讜讬拽谞讛 讻讜诇谉 诇砖讜谉 诪转谞讛 讛谉 讘诪转谞讬转讗 转谞讗 讗祝 讬讞住讬谉 讜讬专转 讘专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讘专讜拽讗 讛讬讗

Rav Sheshet says: If one says: So-and-so shall take my property, or: So-and-so shall gain possession of my property, or: So-and-so shall take possession of my property, or: He shall acquire my property, all of these are terms that denote the bestowal of gifts. It was taught in a baraita: If one says: So-and-so shall receive as an inheritance, or: So-and-so shall inherit, these are also valid terms denoting inheritance in the case of one who is fit to inherit from him. And this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Beroka, who holds that one can bequeath all of his property to one of his sons using terms that denote inheritance, not only using terms that denote the bestowal of a gift.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜

A series of dilemmas were raised before the Sages:

Scroll To Top