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Today's Daf Yomi

February 22, 2017 | 讻状讜 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Batra 31

More cases are brought concerning claims on property. 聽Within the discussion of the cases, various issues come up – is one’s claim believed if he could have made a better claim (ma li lshaker)? 聽That works as long as there aren’t witnesses against him. 聽If part of the testimony in court is cancelled out because contradictory testimony is brought against it, do we throw out the entire claim or do we leave the part that wasn’t contradicted? 聽If new evidence is brought which contradicts the evidence upon which the court ruled in favor of one side, should the court reverse its decision and take the land away or should they stick with the original decision because if they don’t, it will that cause people to lose respect for the courts?

讗讘诇 砖讬转 讗讬谉 诇讱 诪讞讗讛 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讝讜

But if he profited from the land for only six years, so that the sale to the claimant took place before the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership were completed, you can have no greater protest than this, that the purported seller then sold the land to another. By doing so he indicated that he does not concede that the possessor was the rightful owner, and the possessor should have been careful to hold on to his bill of sale for even longer than three years.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛

There was an incident where two people disputed the ownership of land. This one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them, and that one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them. This one brings witnesses that the land belonged to his ancestors, and that one brings witnesses that he currently possesses the land and that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讛 诇讜 诇砖拽专 讗讬 讘注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讱 讝讘谞转讛 讜讗讻诇转讬讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讛 诇讬 诇砖拽专 讘诪拽讜诐 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

Rabba said: The judgment is in favor of the possessor, due to the legal principle that if the judgment would have been decided in one鈥檚 favor had he advanced a certain claim, and he instead advanced a different claim that leads to the same ruling, he has credibility, as why would he lie and state this claim? If the possessor wanted to lie, he could have said to the claimant: I purchased the land from you and I worked and profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership, in which case he would have been awarded the land. Abaye said to Rabba: We do not say the principle of: Why would I lie, in a case where there are witnesses contradicting his current claim, as they testify that the land belonged to the ancestors of the claimant. Therefore, he should not be awarded the land.

讛讚专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讚讗讘讛转讱 讛讬讗 讜讝讘谞转讛 诪讬谞讱 讜讛讗讬 讚讗诪专讬 诇讱 讚讗讘讛转讬 讚住诪讬讱 诇讬 注诇讛 讻讚讗讘讛转讬

The possessor then said to the claimant: Yes, it is true that it had belonged to your ancestors, but I purchased it from you, and by stating that which I said to you: It belonged to my ancestors, I merely meant that I rely upon my ownership of it as if it belonged to my ancestors, as I purchased it and then profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 谞讛专讚注讬 讗诪专讬 讗讬谞讜 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉

The Gemara asks: Can he state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, or can he not state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim? Ulla said: He can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim. The Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say: He cannot state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim.

讜诪讜讚讬 注讜诇讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜诇讗 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬讱 讚讗讬谞讜 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛讬讻讗 讚讛讜讛 拽讗讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讟注谉 讜讗转讗 诪讗讘专讗讬 讜讟注谉 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讟注谞转讬讛 讗讙诪专讬讛

The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions: And Ulla concedes that in a case where he had initially said to him: The land belonged to my ancestors and did not belong to your ancestors, that he cannot state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, as Ulla allows the litigant only to reinterpret his initial claim, not to replace it with a contradictory claim. And Ulla also concedes that in a case where he was standing in court and did not state a particular claim, and he later came in from outside and back into the court and he stated that claim, that he cannot return and state that claim. What is the reason for this? It is because it is apparent that these claims of his were taught to him by someone after he left the court.

讜诪讜讚讜 谞讛专讚注讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 砖诇拽讞讜讛 诪讗讘讜转讬讱 讚讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬砖转注讬 诪讬诇讬 讗讘专讗讬 讜诇讗 讟注谉 讜讗转讗 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜讟注谉 讚讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚诇讗 诪讙诇讬 讟注谞转讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗

And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 concede that in a case where the litigant who changed his claim said to the other litigant that when he had initially claimed: The land belonged to my ancestors, he had actually meant: It belonged to my ancestors, who purchased it from your ancestors, that he can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, as this serves only to clarify, and not negate, his initial claim. And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 also concede that in a case where he discussed the matter outside of the court and did not state a particular claim, and then he came in to the court and stated that claim, that he can return and state that claim. What is the reason for this? Because a person is apt not to reveal his claims except to the court.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讗谞讗 谞讛专讚注讗 讗谞讗 讜住讘讬专讗 诇讬 讚讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉

Ameimar said: I am from Neharde鈥檃, but I nevertheless hold that a litigant can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that a litigant can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讜讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛 讜讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛

In an incident where two people dispute the ownership of land, this one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them, and that one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them. The first one brings witnesses that the land belonged to his ancestors, and that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership. And the second one brings witnesses only that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗讜拽讬 讗讻讬诇讛 诇讘讛讚讬 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讗专注讗 讘讞讝拽转 讗讘讛转讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讛讗 注讚讜转 诪讜讻讞砖转 讛讬讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚讗讬转讻讞砖 讘讗讻讬诇转讛

Rav Na岣an said: Establish the testimony with regard to the profiting by the first litigant alongside the testimony with regard to the profiting by the second, and the two testimonies cancel each other out, leaving the testimony with regard to ownership by the ancestors of the first litigant. And therefore, establish the land in the presumptive ownership of the litigant who brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors. Rava objected and said to him: This testimony cannot be relied on, as it is contradicted by the other testimony. Rav Na岣an responded and said to him: Although it is so that the testimony was contradicted with regard to profiting from the land,

讘讗讘讛转讗 诪讬 讗转讻讞砖

was the testimony contradicted with regard to ownership of the ancestors?

诇讬诪讗 专讘讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rava and Rav Na岣an disagree in the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav 岣sda?

讚讗讬转诪专 砖转讬 讻转讬 注讚讬诐 讛诪讻讞讬砖讜转 讝讜 讗转 讝讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讝讜 讘讗讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讜诪注讬讚讛 讜讝讜 讘讗讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讜诪注讬讚讛 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讘讛讚讬 住讛讚讬 砖拽专讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讬诪讗 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 讻专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘讗 讻专讘 讞住讚讗

As it was stated concerning two groups of witnesses that contradict each other, that Rav Huna says: This one comes to court on its own and testifies, and that one comes to court on its own and testifies. Despite the fact that one group certainly testified falsely, which should serve to disqualify one of the groups, each group is able to testify in another case. And Rav 岣sda says: Why do I need these lying witnesses? In other words, they are all disqualified to testify in another case until it is clarified which of them had testified falsely. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Na岣an is the one who says his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, and Rava says his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rav 岣sda?

讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诇讗 诇注讚讜转 讗讞专转 讗讘诇 诇讗讜转讛 注讚讜转 诇讗

The Gemara explains: According to the opinion of Rav 岣sda, who holds that the witnesses are disqualified, everyone agrees that the testimony concerning ancestral ownership is not accepted, as the witnesses were contradicted concerning their testimony of usage of the land, and Rav Na岣an鈥檚 ruling cannot accord with his opinion. When Rav Na岣an and Rava disagree it is according to the opinion of Rav Huna, who does not disqualify the witnesses. The ruling of Rav Na岣an is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, and he therefore accepts the testimony with regard to ancestral ownership, and Rava would say: Rav Huna says that the witnesses are accepted only for another testimony, i.e., in a different case. But they are not accepted for the same testimony, as in this incident, where both testimonies concerned ownership of the same land.

讛讚专 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讛讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗谞谉 讗讞转讬谞讬讛 讗谞谉 诪住拽讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇讝讬诇讜转讗 讚讘讬 讚讬谞讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

The Gemara relates the continuation of the case above. The one who had brought witnesses only to his having profited from the land then brought witnesses that it had belonged to his ancestors, thereby balancing the evidence for the two litigants. Therefore, Rav Na岣an said: We previously brought down to the land the one who initially had evidence of ancestral ownership to take possession of it, and we now bring him up from it, removing him from the land. And we are not concerned about the possible contempt of court that might result from perceived indecisiveness.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讝注讬专讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗

Rava, and some say it is Rabbi Zeira, raises an objection from a baraita. If there was a married man whose fate was unknown, and two witnesses say: This married man died, and two witnesses say: He did not die; or if two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not marry, as there is not unequivocal testimony that she is no longer married, but if she marries, the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: She must leave her husband.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转讬 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 讗讘诇 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: When do I say that she must leave her husband? She must leave him in a case where witnesses came to testify that she is still married and she then married despite their testimony. But if she married and the witnesses then came to testify that she is still married, this woman is not required to leave her husband based on the uncertainty created by contradictory witnesses. The fact that she is not required to leave her marriage in light of the new testimony seems to indicate an unwillingness to reverse the court鈥檚 ruling that she may marry, contrary to the ruling of Rav Na岣an.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 住讘专讬 诇诪注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讛砖转讗 讚讗讜转讬讘转谉 讗转 讜讗讜转讘谉 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讘住讜专讬讗 诇讗 注讘讚讬谞谉 讘讛 注讜讘讚讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: I had thought to perform an action and reverse the court鈥檚 ruling, but now that you raised an objection against me, and Rav Hamnuna also raised a similar objection against me in Syria, I will not perform an action in this matter.

谞驻拽 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 诪讗谉 讚讞讝讗 住讘专 讟注讜转讗 讛讬讗 讘讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚转诇讬讗 讘讗砖诇讬 专讘专讘讬

The Gemara relates that Rav Na岣an then went out and performed an action, taking away the land from the litigant in whose favor he had previously ruled. One who saw what he did thought that he made a mistake, but that is not so. Rather, he performed an action despite the objections that had been raised because the matter depends on great authorities [ashlei ravrevei]. Since, as the Gemara will demonstrate, this issue is subject to dispute between great authorities, he relied on those that supported his opinion.

讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讬诪转讬 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 注讜专专讬谉 讗讘诇 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 注讜专专讬谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讛住讙谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚

As we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 23b): Rabbi Yehuda says: One is not elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Two witnesses are required for that purpose. Rabbi Elazar says: When is that the halakha? In a case where there are challengers to his claim that he is a priest. But in a case where there are no challengers, one is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: One is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness.

专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 注专注专 讞讚 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 注专注专 讞讚

The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as they agree that one is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of one witness when there are no challengers. What is their dispute? And if you would say that there is a practical difference between them in a case where there is a challenge posed by one person, as Rabbi Elazar holds: A challenge posed by one person is sufficient to undermine one鈥檚 presumptive status of priesthood, and two witnesses are required to overcome that challenge;

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Batra 31

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Batra 31

讗讘诇 砖讬转 讗讬谉 诇讱 诪讞讗讛 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讝讜

But if he profited from the land for only six years, so that the sale to the claimant took place before the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership were completed, you can have no greater protest than this, that the purported seller then sold the land to another. By doing so he indicated that he does not concede that the possessor was the rightful owner, and the possessor should have been careful to hold on to his bill of sale for even longer than three years.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讛讬讗 讜讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛

There was an incident where two people disputed the ownership of land. This one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them, and that one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them. This one brings witnesses that the land belonged to his ancestors, and that one brings witnesses that he currently possesses the land and that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讛 诇讜 诇砖拽专 讗讬 讘注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬谞讱 讝讘谞转讛 讜讗讻诇转讬讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讛 诇讬 诇砖拽专 讘诪拽讜诐 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

Rabba said: The judgment is in favor of the possessor, due to the legal principle that if the judgment would have been decided in one鈥檚 favor had he advanced a certain claim, and he instead advanced a different claim that leads to the same ruling, he has credibility, as why would he lie and state this claim? If the possessor wanted to lie, he could have said to the claimant: I purchased the land from you and I worked and profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership, in which case he would have been awarded the land. Abaye said to Rabba: We do not say the principle of: Why would I lie, in a case where there are witnesses contradicting his current claim, as they testify that the land belonged to the ancestors of the claimant. Therefore, he should not be awarded the land.

讛讚专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讚讗讘讛转讱 讛讬讗 讜讝讘谞转讛 诪讬谞讱 讜讛讗讬 讚讗诪专讬 诇讱 讚讗讘讛转讬 讚住诪讬讱 诇讬 注诇讛 讻讚讗讘讛转讬

The possessor then said to the claimant: Yes, it is true that it had belonged to your ancestors, but I purchased it from you, and by stating that which I said to you: It belonged to my ancestors, I merely meant that I rely upon my ownership of it as if it belonged to my ancestors, as I purchased it and then profited from it for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 谞讛专讚注讬 讗诪专讬 讗讬谞讜 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉

The Gemara asks: Can he state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, or can he not state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim? Ulla said: He can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim. The Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say: He cannot state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim.

讜诪讜讚讬 注讜诇讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜诇讗 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬讱 讚讗讬谞讜 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛讬讻讗 讚讛讜讛 拽讗讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讟注谉 讜讗转讗 诪讗讘专讗讬 讜讟注谉 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讟注谞转讬讛 讗讙诪专讬讛

The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions: And Ulla concedes that in a case where he had initially said to him: The land belonged to my ancestors and did not belong to your ancestors, that he cannot state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, as Ulla allows the litigant only to reinterpret his initial claim, not to replace it with a contradictory claim. And Ulla also concedes that in a case where he was standing in court and did not state a particular claim, and he later came in from outside and back into the court and he stated that claim, that he cannot return and state that claim. What is the reason for this? It is because it is apparent that these claims of his were taught to him by someone after he left the court.

讜诪讜讚讜 谞讛专讚注讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 砖诇拽讞讜讛 诪讗讘讜转讬讱 讚讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬砖转注讬 诪讬诇讬 讗讘专讗讬 讜诇讗 讟注谉 讜讗转讗 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜讟注谉 讚讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚诇讗 诪讙诇讬 讟注谞转讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讘讬 讚讬谞讗

And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 concede that in a case where the litigant who changed his claim said to the other litigant that when he had initially claimed: The land belonged to my ancestors, he had actually meant: It belonged to my ancestors, who purchased it from your ancestors, that he can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim, as this serves only to clarify, and not negate, his initial claim. And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 also concede that in a case where he discussed the matter outside of the court and did not state a particular claim, and then he came in to the court and stated that claim, that he can return and state that claim. What is the reason for this? Because a person is apt not to reveal his claims except to the court.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讗谞讗 谞讛专讚注讗 讗谞讗 讜住讘讬专讗 诇讬 讚讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 讟讜注谉 讜讞讜讝专 讜讟讜注谉

Ameimar said: I am from Neharde鈥檃, but I nevertheless hold that a litigant can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that a litigant can state a claim and return and state a modified version of his claim.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇 讗讘讜转讬 讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讜讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛 讜讛讗讬 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讻诇讛 砖谞讬 讞讝拽讛

In an incident where two people dispute the ownership of land, this one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them, and that one says: The land belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them. The first one brings witnesses that the land belonged to his ancestors, and that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership. And the second one brings witnesses only that he worked and profited from the land for the years necessary for establishing the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗讜拽讬 讗讻讬诇讛 诇讘讛讚讬 讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讜拽讬 讗专注讗 讘讞讝拽转 讗讘讛转讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讛讗 注讚讜转 诪讜讻讞砖转 讛讬讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚讗讬转讻讞砖 讘讗讻讬诇转讛

Rav Na岣an said: Establish the testimony with regard to the profiting by the first litigant alongside the testimony with regard to the profiting by the second, and the two testimonies cancel each other out, leaving the testimony with regard to ownership by the ancestors of the first litigant. And therefore, establish the land in the presumptive ownership of the litigant who brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors. Rava objected and said to him: This testimony cannot be relied on, as it is contradicted by the other testimony. Rav Na岣an responded and said to him: Although it is so that the testimony was contradicted with regard to profiting from the land,

讘讗讘讛转讗 诪讬 讗转讻讞砖

was the testimony contradicted with regard to ownership of the ancestors?

诇讬诪讗 专讘讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rava and Rav Na岣an disagree in the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav 岣sda?

讚讗讬转诪专 砖转讬 讻转讬 注讚讬诐 讛诪讻讞讬砖讜转 讝讜 讗转 讝讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讝讜 讘讗讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讜诪注讬讚讛 讜讝讜 讘讗讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛 讜诪注讬讚讛 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讘讛讚讬 住讛讚讬 砖拽专讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讬诪讗 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 讻专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘讗 讻专讘 讞住讚讗

As it was stated concerning two groups of witnesses that contradict each other, that Rav Huna says: This one comes to court on its own and testifies, and that one comes to court on its own and testifies. Despite the fact that one group certainly testified falsely, which should serve to disqualify one of the groups, each group is able to testify in another case. And Rav 岣sda says: Why do I need these lying witnesses? In other words, they are all disqualified to testify in another case until it is clarified which of them had testified falsely. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Na岣an is the one who says his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, and Rava says his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rav 岣sda?

讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诇讗 诇注讚讜转 讗讞专转 讗讘诇 诇讗讜转讛 注讚讜转 诇讗

The Gemara explains: According to the opinion of Rav 岣sda, who holds that the witnesses are disqualified, everyone agrees that the testimony concerning ancestral ownership is not accepted, as the witnesses were contradicted concerning their testimony of usage of the land, and Rav Na岣an鈥檚 ruling cannot accord with his opinion. When Rav Na岣an and Rava disagree it is according to the opinion of Rav Huna, who does not disqualify the witnesses. The ruling of Rav Na岣an is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, and he therefore accepts the testimony with regard to ancestral ownership, and Rava would say: Rav Huna says that the witnesses are accepted only for another testimony, i.e., in a different case. But they are not accepted for the same testimony, as in this incident, where both testimonies concerned ownership of the same land.

讛讚专 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚讗讘讛转讬讛 讛讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗谞谉 讗讞转讬谞讬讛 讗谞谉 诪住拽讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇讝讬诇讜转讗 讚讘讬 讚讬谞讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

The Gemara relates the continuation of the case above. The one who had brought witnesses only to his having profited from the land then brought witnesses that it had belonged to his ancestors, thereby balancing the evidence for the two litigants. Therefore, Rav Na岣an said: We previously brought down to the land the one who initially had evidence of ancestral ownership to take possession of it, and we now bring him up from it, removing him from the land. And we are not concerned about the possible contempt of court that might result from perceived indecisiveness.

诪转讬讘 专讘讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讝注讬专讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗

Rava, and some say it is Rabbi Zeira, raises an objection from a baraita. If there was a married man whose fate was unknown, and two witnesses say: This married man died, and two witnesses say: He did not die; or if two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not marry, as there is not unequivocal testimony that she is no longer married, but if she marries, the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband. Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: She must leave her husband.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转讬 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 讗讘诇 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

Rabbi Mena岣m, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: When do I say that she must leave her husband? She must leave him in a case where witnesses came to testify that she is still married and she then married despite their testimony. But if she married and the witnesses then came to testify that she is still married, this woman is not required to leave her husband based on the uncertainty created by contradictory witnesses. The fact that she is not required to leave her marriage in light of the new testimony seems to indicate an unwillingness to reverse the court鈥檚 ruling that she may marry, contrary to the ruling of Rav Na岣an.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 住讘专讬 诇诪注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讛砖转讗 讚讗讜转讬讘转谉 讗转 讜讗讜转讘谉 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讘住讜专讬讗 诇讗 注讘讚讬谞谉 讘讛 注讜讘讚讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: I had thought to perform an action and reverse the court鈥檚 ruling, but now that you raised an objection against me, and Rav Hamnuna also raised a similar objection against me in Syria, I will not perform an action in this matter.

谞驻拽 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 诪讗谉 讚讞讝讗 住讘专 讟注讜转讗 讛讬讗 讘讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚转诇讬讗 讘讗砖诇讬 专讘专讘讬

The Gemara relates that Rav Na岣an then went out and performed an action, taking away the land from the litigant in whose favor he had previously ruled. One who saw what he did thought that he made a mistake, but that is not so. Rather, he performed an action despite the objections that had been raised because the matter depends on great authorities [ashlei ravrevei]. Since, as the Gemara will demonstrate, this issue is subject to dispute between great authorities, he relied on those that supported his opinion.

讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗讬诪转讬 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 注讜专专讬谉 讗讘诇 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 注讜专专讬谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讛住讙谉 诪注诇讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚 讗讞讚

As we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 23b): Rabbi Yehuda says: One is not elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Two witnesses are required for that purpose. Rabbi Elazar says: When is that the halakha? In a case where there are challengers to his claim that he is a priest. But in a case where there are no challengers, one is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: One is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of the testimony of one witness.

专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 注专注专 讞讚 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 住讘专 注专注专 讞讚

The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as they agree that one is elevated to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of one witness when there are no challengers. What is their dispute? And if you would say that there is a practical difference between them in a case where there is a challenge posed by one person, as Rabbi Elazar holds: A challenge posed by one person is sufficient to undermine one鈥檚 presumptive status of priesthood, and two witnesses are required to overcome that challenge;

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