Bava Batra 49

Bava Batra 49

אֵין נֶאֱמָנִים; ״מוֹדָעָא הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ – אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין!

they are not deemed credible. And similarly, witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was accompanied by a preemptive declaration, are not deemed credible. They cannot negate the testimony of the document that they themselves signed by claiming that there had been a preemptive declaration. Similarly, how could Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s signing of the preemptive declaration override his signing the bill of sale?

הָנֵי מִילֵּי עַל פֶּה – דְּלָא אָתֵי עַל פֶּה וּמַרַע לִשְׁטָרָא, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָרָא – אָתֵי שְׁטָרָא וּמַרַע לִשְׁטָרָא.

The Gemara answers: That matter of witnesses not being deemed credible to nullify a document applies only when the witnesses attempt to nullify the document by means of an oral declaration, as an oral declaration cannot come and weaken a written document. But if the witnesses attempt to nullify the bill of sale by means of testimony in another document, e.g., by signing the preemptive declaration, then this preemptive document can come and weaken a written document, in this case, the bill of sale.

גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: ״אֲמָנָה הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ – אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין, ״מוֹדָעָא הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ – אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין.

The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Rav Naḥman says that witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was a document of trust, are not deemed credible. And similarly, witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was accompanied by a preemptive declaration, are not deemed credible.

וּמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״אֲמָנָה הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ – אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין, ״מוֹדָעָא הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ – נֶאֱמָנִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? שֶׁזֶּה נִיתַּן לִיכָּתֵב, וְזֶה לֹא נִיתַּן לִיכָּתֵב.

And Mar bar Rav Ashi says that witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was a statement of trust, are not deemed credible; but witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was accompanied by a preemptive declaration, are deemed credible. What is the reason for the difference between the cases? The reason is that this document that was accompanied by a preemptive declaration may be written, as it is merely written under duress, but that document of trust may not be written, as it is a false document. Testifying that they wrote it is self-incriminating, and the witnesses are not deemed credible to incriminate themselves.

וְלֹא לָאִישׁ חֲזָקָה בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ וְכוּ׳. פְּשִׁיטָא – כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְפֵירָא, פֵּירָא הוּא דְּקָאָכֵיל!

§ The mishna teaches that a man does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to his wife’s property and a wife does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to her husband’s property. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Since he has the right to enjoy the profits of her property while they are married, it is known that he is only enjoying the profits and that he has no claim to the field itself. On what grounds, then, would he establish the presumption of ownership?

לָא צְרִיכָא, דִּכְתַב לַהּ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״.

The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the husband wrote to his wife: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with your property, i.e., he forfeits his right to enjoy the profits of her property, and therefore if he subsequently did enjoy the profits of her field, one might assume that it is because he acquired the land from her. It was therefore necessary for the mishna to teach that this does not indicate that he owns the land, since it is possible that she does not prevent him from enjoying the profits, due to their relationship.

וְכִי כְּתַב לַהּ – מַאי הָוֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ״, וְ״אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּהּ״, וְ״יָדַי מְסוּלָּקוֹת מִמֶּנָּה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!

The Gemara asks: And if he wrote this to her, what of it? And isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says to another: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement concerning this field, or: I have no dealings with it, or: My hands are removed from it, has not said anything. That is to say, these statements have no legal standing.

אָמְרִי לַהּ דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: מַתְנִיתִין בְּכוֹתֵב לָהּ וְעוֹדָהּ אֲרוּסָה – וְכִדְרַב כָּהֲנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא:

The scholars of the school of Rabbi Yannai said with regard to this: The mishna states its ruling with regard to one who writes this formulation to her while she is still only betrothed, before he had any rights to her property. Therefore, he is able to prevent his rights from taking effect after the marriage. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says:

נַחֲלָה הַבָּאָה לוֹ לְאָדָם מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר, אָדָם מַתְנֶה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה. וְכִדְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים״ כְּגוֹן זֹאת, שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ.

With regard to an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., an inheritance one will receive in the future, a person can make a condition about it from the outset that he will not inherit it, since one can waive his future rights to property that is not currently his. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said that with regard to anyone who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages such as this one that was instituted for my benefit, one listens to him.

מַאי ״כְּגוֹן זֹאת״? כִּדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ: ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״.

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav says a certain ruling. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of wives, the wife is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may waive his rights to the profits from his wife’s land. It is in such a circumstance that the mishna rules that even if he relinquished his rights, he does not establish the presumption of ownership by enjoying the profits.

הָא רְאָיָה – יֵשׁ? תֵּימָא: ״נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי״!

§ The mishna teaches that a husband does not establish the presumption of ownership of his wife’s field by enjoying its profits. The Gemara suggests: By inference, the husband has the ability to bring proof that he purchased the field from his wife or received it as a gift from her and consequently be regarded as the owner of the field. The Gemara asks: Why is this proof decisive? Let her say: I did it, i.e., I gave or sold the field to my husband, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it.

מִי לָא תְּנַן: לָקַח מִן הָאִישׁ, וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִן הָאִשָּׁה – מִקָּחוֹ בָּטֵל; אַלְמָא אָמְרָה: ״נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי״, הָכָא נָמֵי תֵּימָא: ״נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי״!

The Gemara quotes a source for this claim: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one first purchased land from the husband and afterward returned and purchased it from the wife, i.e., he purchased her rights to this land for after the death of her husband or in the event of their divorce, as stipulated in her marriage contract, then his transaction is void. Apparently, she said: I did it, i.e., signed this bill of sale, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it. Here too let her say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean to give or sell the field to him.

הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָן שָׁלֹשׁ שָׂדוֹת – אַחַת שֶׁכָּתַב לָהּ בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ,

The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha that a woman can claim that she acted only in order to please her husband is not stated with regard to all of her property, but is necessary only with regard to those three types of fields that have special status: One field about which he wrote to her in her marriage contract that it would serve as payment of her marriage contract;