Bava Batra 57

ההוא שטרא דהוה חתימי עליה בי תרי שכיב חד מינייהו אתא אחוה דהאי דקאי וחד אחרינא לאסהודי אחתימת ידיה דאידך

The Gemara relates: There was a certain document that had the signatures of two individuals on it. One of the signatory witnesses died, and when the court sought to ratify the document, which requires either that the witnesses personally attest to the validity of their signatures or that two other witnesses attest to the validity of the signatures, the brother of the witness who remained alive and one other individual came to testify with regard to the signature of the other, deceased, witness, while the living witness attested to his own signature.

סבר רבינא למימר היינו מתניתין שלשה אחין ואחד מצטרף עמהן

Ravina thought to say that this case is the same as the halakha in the mishna, which states that if testimony was given by three brothers, each of whom testify about one year, and another, unrelated individual joined with each of the brothers as the second witness, these are considered to be three distinct testimonies. Similarly, in this case, one brother attests to his own signature, while the other brother attests to the signature of the deceased witness.

אמר ליה רב אשי מי דמי התם לא נפיק נכי ריבעא דממונא אפומא דאחי הכא נפיק נכי ריבעא דממונא אפומא דאחי:

Rav Ashi said to him: Are these cases comparable? There, the property less one-quarter, i.e., three-quarters of the property in question, is not removed from the possession of the prior owner based upon the mouth, i.e., the testimony, of brothers. Each brother provides only half of the testimony for each year about which he testifies. Here, the property less one-quarter is removed from the possession of the debtor detailed in the document based upon the mouth of brothers. One brother attests to his own signature, which constitutes half of the testimony, while the other signature is authenticated by the testimony of the other brother and another individual. It follows that three-quarters of the testimony is given by brothers, and it is therefore invalid.

מתני׳ אלו דברים שיש להן חזקה ואלו דברים שאין להן חזקה היה מעמיד בהמה בחצר תנור ריחים וכיריים ומגדל תרנגולים ונותן זבלו בחצר אינה חזקה אבל עשה מחיצה לבהמתו גבוה עשרה טפחים וכן לתנור וכן לכיריים וכן לריחים הכניס תרנגולין לתוך הבית ועשה מקום לזבלו עמוק שלשה או גבוה שלשה הרי זו חזקה:

MISHNA: These are uses of property that have the means to establish the presumption of ownership, and these are uses of property that do not have the means to establish the presumption of ownership: If one would stand an animal in a courtyard; or if one would place an oven, a millstone, or a stove there; or if one raises chickens in a courtyard, or places his fertilizer in a courtyard, these actions are not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. But if one constructed a partition ten handbreadths high to contain his animal, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his oven, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his stove, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his millstone; or if one brought chickens into the house, or if he fashioned a place in the ground for his fertilizer that is three handbreadths deep or three handbreadths high, these actions are sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership.

גמ׳ מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause, where having an animal stand in a courtyard is insufficient to establish the presumption of ownership, and what is different in the latter clause, where constructing a partition is sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership?

אמר עולא כל שאילו בנכסי הגר קנה בנכסי חבירו קנה כל שאילו בנכסי הגר לא קנה בנכסי חבירו לא קנה

Ulla says: With regard to any act which, if one were to perform it on ownerless property such as the property of a convert who dies without heirs he would acquire that property, that same act is sufficient for him to acquire the property of another if he performed it over the course of three years, provided it is accompanied by the claim that the property had been purchased. Conversely, any act that if one were to perform it on the property of a convert who died without heirs he would not acquire that property, that same act is sufficient for him to acquire the property of another. Taking possession of ownerless property requires an act to be done with regard to the property itself, such as constructing a partition, but merely having an animal stand there is not sufficient. Therefore, it does not establish the presumption of ownership.

מתקיף לה רב ששת וכללא הוא והרי ניר דבנכסי הגר קנה בנכסי חבירו לא קנה והרי אכילת פירות דבנכסי חבירו קנה בנכסי הגר לא קנה

Rav Sheshet objects to this explanation: And is this an established principle? But there is plowing, which, if performed on the property of a convert who died without heirs one acquires it, but if performed on the property of another one does not acquire it. And additionally, there is consumption of produce for the duration of three years, which, if performed on the property of another one acquires it by establishing the presumption of ownership, but if performed on the property of a convert who died without heirs one does not acquire it. These cases contradict Ulla’s claim that the modes of acquisition are analogous.

אלא אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה

Rather, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said:

הכא בחצר השותפין עסקינן דבהעמדה כדי לא קפדי אמחיצה קפדי

Here we are dealing with a courtyard belonging to partners, where they are not particular with regard to the mere placing of items in the courtyard, but are particular with regard to the construction of a partition. The presumption of ownership is established only where the lack of a protest indicates that the prior owner concedes that the property is no longer his. The co-owner’s silence in the face of his partner using the courtyard for a temporary purpose does not indicate a concession, but silence in the face of one who constructed a partition is a concession.

ובהעמדה כדי לא קפדי והא תנן השותפין שנדרו הנאה זה מזה אסורין ליכנס לחצר

The Gemara asks: And are they not particular with regard to the mere placing of items? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 45b): Partners who through vows prohibited themselves from deriving benefit from one another are forbidden to enter into a courtyard jointly owned by them, since each one has a portion in it, and it would be considered a violation of one’s vow if one were to benefit from any part of the other’s property? This indicates that partners are particular even with regard to passage through the field; all the more so are they particular with regard to placing animals or vessels in the field.

אלא אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה הכא ברחבה של אחורי בתים עסקינן דבהעמדה כדי לא קפדי ואמחיצה קפדי

Rather, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Here we are dealing with a fenced-in yard located behind a group of houses that is used to store items not in regular use, where they are not par-ticular with regard to the mere placing of items but are particular with regard to the construction of a partition.

רב פפא אמר אידי ואידי בחצר השותפין ואיכא דקפדי ואיכא דלא קפדי גבי ממונא לקולא גבי איסורא לחומרא

Rav Pappa said: This and that, i.e., the rulings of the mishna in tractate Nedarim as well as the rulings of the mishna here, are stated with regard to a courtyard belonging to partners, and the reason for the difference in the rulings is that there are those who are particular with regard to the other partner placing items in or passing through the courtyard, and there are those who are not particular. Therefore, in the mishna here, which issues a ruling concerning monetary matters, the halakha is to be lenient, and it is assumed that the partner is not particular about placing items in the courtyard, and the presumption of ownership is established. In the mishna in tractate Nedarim, which issues a ruling concerning ritual matters, the halakha is to be stringent, to prevent one from violating a vow.

רבינא אמר לעולם לא קפדי והא מני רבי אליעזר היא דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר אפילו ויתור אסור במודר הנאה

Ravina said: Actually, partners are not particular about placing items in the courtyard, and in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna in tractate Nedarim? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even negligible benefits ordinarily waived are forbidden in the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another. In other words, one prohibited by a vow may not derive any benefit from the other, even a benefit that people commonly are not particular about and allow others to enjoy without first receiving permission. Therefore, although people are ordinarily not particular about others passing through their property, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his partner is prohibited from walking on the property.

אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי בנאה בכל שותפין מעכבין זה את זה חוץ מן הכביסה שאין דרכן של בנות ישראל להתבזות על הכביסה

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bena’a: Partners may prevent each other from using their courtyard for any purpose except for washing laundry. This is because it is not the way of Jewish women to be degraded over washing laundry by laundering their clothing in a public area. Therefore, they must be allowed to launder in the courtyard.

ועצם עיניו מראות ברע אמר רבי חייא בר אבא זה שאין מסתכל בנשים בשעה שעומדות על הכביסה

In connection with the matter of laundry being washed in public, the Gemara quotes the homiletic interpretation of a verse: “He that walks righteously, and speaks uprightly; he that despises the gain of oppressions, that shakes his hands from holding of bribes, that stops his ears from hearing of blood, and shuts his eyes from looking upon evil” (Isaiah 33:15). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: This is referring to one who does not gaze at women while they are standing over the laundry, as it was common for them to stand in the water and raise the hems of their garments while laundering their clothing.

היכי דמי אי דאיכא דרכא אחריתא רשע הוא אי דליכא דרכא אחריתא אנוס הוא לעולם דליכא דרכא אחריתא ואפילו הכי מיבעי ליה למינס נפשיה

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a case where there is another way by which the one walking could reach his destination, then one who walks past the women, consequently placing himself in a situation where he will be tempted to gaze at them, is wicked. Alternatively, if it is referring to a case where there is no other way by which he can reach his destination, then he is a victim of circumstance, so why is he required to shut his eyes? The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is no other way by which he can reach his destination, and even so, he is required to compel himself to avoid gazing at the women.

בעא מיניה רבי יוחנן מרבי בנאה חלוק של תלמיד חכם כיצד כל שאין בשרו נראה מתחתיו טלית של תלמיד חכם כיצד כל שאין חלוקו נראה מתחתיו טפח שלחן של תלמיד חכם כיצד שני שלישי גדיל ושליש גלאי ועליו קערות וירק וטבעתו מבחוץ

§ The Gemara quotes additional matters that Rabbi Yoḥanan learned from Rabbi Bena’a. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Bena’a: How should the garment of a Torah scholar worn under his clothes be fashioned? He replied: He can wear any garment long enough that his flesh is not visible from beneath it. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: How should the cloak of a Torah scholar be fashioned? He replied: He can wear any garment long enough that a handbreadth of his garment worn under his clothes is not visible from beneath it. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: How should the table of a Torah scholar appear? He replied: Two-thirds of the table is covered with a cloth, and one-third is uncovered, and upon that third are dishes and vegetables. And its ring, used to hang the table, should be positioned on the outside, not on the side that faces the one who is eating.

והא תניא טבעתו מבפנים לא קשיא הא דאיכא ינוקא הא דליכא ינוקא

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that its ring should be positioned on the inside? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to a case where there is a child who may play with the ring and overturn the table, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to a case where there is no child present.

ואי בעית אימא הא והא דליכא ינוקא ולא קשיא הא דאיכא שמעא הא דליכא שמעא

And if you wish, say instead that both this and that refer to a case where there is no child present, and this is not difficult: This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to a case where there is an attendant who may bump into the ring, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to a case where there is no attendant.

ואי בעית אימא הא והא דאיכא שמעא ולא קשיא הא ביממא הא בליליא

And if you wish, say instead that both this and that refer to a case where there is an attendant, and this is not difficult: This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to when the meal is eaten during the day, when the attendant can see the ring and avoid it, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to when the meal is eaten during the night.

ושל עם הארץ דומה

The Gemara continues: All of the above is referring to the table of a Torah scholar, but the table of an ignoramus is similar