Bava Batra 65

הלכה כדברי חכמים ורב ירמיה בר אבא אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי עקיבא אמר ליה רב ירמיה בר אבא לרב הונא והא זמנין סגיאין אמריתה קמיה דרב הלכתא כרבי עקיבא ולא אמר לי ולא מידי אמר ליה היכי תניתה אמר ליה איפכא תנינא משום הכי לא אמר לך ולא מידי

The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, while Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to Rav Huna: But many times I said before Rav that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and never did he say anything to me, which indicates that he holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and not that of the Rabbis. Rav Huna said to him: How did you teach the mishna before Rav? Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to him: I taught it with the opposite attributions, that is to say, the opinion that is attributed in the mishna to Rabbi Akiva, I would teach in the name of the Rabbis. Rav Huna said to him: Due to that reason, he never said anything to you, as Rav agreed with the version that you attributed to Rabbi Akiva.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי לימא אזדו לטעמייהו

With regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel, in their opinions stated with regard to this matter, each follow their general lines of reasoning, as they appear to have disagreed about this same issue in another context as well?

דאמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל האחין שחלקו אין להן לא דרך זה על זה ולא סולמות זה על זה ולא חלונות זה על זה ולא אמת המים זה על זה

As Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to brothers who divided their father’s estate between them, they do not have a right of way against each other, i.e., to walk through the other’s property to reach his own, even though this is how the place was used in their father’s lifetime; nor do they have the right of ladders against each other, i.e., the right to set up a ladder in the other’s property in order to get to his own; nor do they have the right of windows against each other, i.e., the right to prevent the other from building a wall facing his windows; nor do they have the right of a water channel against each other, i.e., the right to pass a water channel through the other’s property.

והזהרו בהן שהלכות קבועות הן ורב אמר יש להן

Rav Naḥman continues: And be careful with these rulings, since they are established halakhot. And Rav says: They do retain all of these privileges. Consequently, Rav and Shmuel appear to be following their general lines of reasoning here, as Shmuel holds that when the brothers, who are like sellers, divide their father’s estate, they transfer property to each other generously without retaining privileges in each other’s property, while Rav holds that they transfer the property sparingly.

צריכא דאי אשמועינן בההיא בההיא קאמר רב משום דאמר ליה בעינא למידר ביה כי היכי דדרו ביה אבהתי תדע דכתיב תחת אבתיך יהיו בניך אבל בהא אימא מודי ליה לשמואל

The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, it was necessary to teach this disagreement in both cases, as the halakha in the one case cannot be derived from the halakha in the other. As had we been taught this dispute only in that case, of the brothers who divided their father’s estate, I would have said that only in that case does Rav say that they retain all of the earlier privileges, because one brother can say to the other: I wish to live in this house just as my ancestors, who had all of those privileges, lived in it. Know that there is substance to this claim, as it is written: “Instead of your fathers shall be your sons” (Psalms 45:17). But in this case of an ordinary house sale, say that he concedes to Shmuel that a seller sells generously.

ואי איתמר בהא בהך קאמר שמואל אבל בהא אימא מודי ליה לרב צריכא

And if the dispute was stated only in this case of an ordinary house sale, I would have said that only in this case does Shmuel say that a seller sells generously and does not withhold a path for himself, but in that case, of the brothers who divided their father’s estate, say that he concedes to Rav that the desire to live there just as his ancestors did supersedes the seller’s general tendency to sell generously. Therefore, it was necessary to teach this dispute in both cases.

אמר ליה רב נחמן לרב הונא הלכתא כוותין או הלכתא כוותייכו אמר ליה הלכתא כוותייכו דמקרביתו לבבא דריש גלותא דשכיחי דייני

As for the ruling itself, Rav Naḥman, who was a disciple of Shmuel, said to Rav Huna: Is the halakha in accordance with our opinion, or is the halakha in accordance with your opinion? Rav Huna said to him: The halakha is in accordance with your opinion, as you are near the gate of the Exilarch, where the judges are frequently found, and therefore you are more proficient in monetary law.

איתמר שני בתים זה לפנים מזה שניהם במכר שניהם במתנה אין להן דרך זה על זה כל שכן חיצון במתנה ופנימי במכר

§ It was stated: If there are two residences, one situated behind the other, and the owner transferred ownership of the two of them, each one to a different person, by means of a sale, or if he transferred ownership of the two of them, each to a different person, as a gift, they do not have a right of way against each other. That is, the one who acquired the inner residence may not pass through the outer residence, since each of them received equal privileges from the previous owner. And all the more so is this the halakha if the outer residence was transferred by means of a gift, and the inner residence was transferred by means of a sale, as it may be assumed that a gift is made in a more generous manner than is a sale.

חיצון במכר ופנימי במתנה סבור מינה אין להן דרך זה על זה

As for the case where the outer residence was transferred by means of a sale, and the inner residence was transferred by means of a gift, some Sages at first understood from here that they do not have a right of way against each other, that is, that the recipient of the inner residence may not pass through the outer residence.

ולא היא מי לא תנן במה דברים אמורים במוכר אבל בנותן מתנה נותן את כולן אלמא מאן דיהיב מתנה בעין יפה יהיב הכא נמי מאן דיהיב מתנה בעין יפה יהיב

But that is not so, as didn’t we learn in a mishna (71a): In what case is this statement, that these items are excluded, said? It is said with regard to one who sells a field, but with regard to one who gives it away as a gift, it is assumed that he gives all of it, including everything found in the field. Apparently, one who gives property as a gift gives it more generously than does one who sells it, as gifts are generally given to friends to whom one wishes to transfer as many privileges as possible. Here too, then, one who gives property as a gift gives it more generously than does one who sells it, and so the recipient of the inner residence acquires a right of way through the outer apartment.

מתני׳ המוכר את הבית מכר את הדלת אבל לא את המפתח מכר את המכתשת קבועה אבל לא את המיטלטלת מכר את האיצטרוביל אבל לא את הקלת ולא את התנור ולא את הכירים בזמן שאמר לו הוא וכל מה שבתוכו

MISHNA: One who sells a house has, as part of the sale, sold also the door, but not the key. He has sold the mortar that is fixed in the ground, but not the portable one. He has sold the immovable lower millstone [ha’itzterobil], but not the portable upper stone [hakelet], the funnel into which one pours the grain to be ground. And he has sold neither the oven nor the double stove, as they are deemed movable. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it, and everything that is in it,

הרי כולן מכורין

all these components are sold as part of the sale of the house.

גמ׳ לימא מתניתין דלא כרבי מאיר דאי רבי מאיר הא אמר מכר את הכרם מכר תשמישי כרם

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna that distinguishes between different types of household items is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, doesn’t he say in a baraita (78b): If one sold a vineyard, he has sold all of the utensils of the vineyard, including the movable ones? The same should be true for the sale of a house.

אפילו תימא רבי מאיר התם קביע הכא לא קביע והא מפתח דומיא דדלת קתני מה דלת דקביעא אף מפתח דקביע אלא מחוורתא מתניתין דלא כרבי מאיר

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as a distinction can be made between the two cases. There, in the case of a vineyard, the reference is to utensils that are fixed in the vineyard and never removed from it, and therefore they are included in the sale, while here, in the case of a house, the mishna is referring to utensils that are not fixed in the house, and therefore they are not part of the sale. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t the mishna teach the halakha governing a key in similar fashion to the halakha governing the door, indicating that just as a door is fixed in the house, so too, a key is fixed in the house? Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

תנו רבנן המוכר את הבית מכר את הדלת ואת הנגר ואת המנעול אבל לא את המפתח מכר את המכתשת החקוקה אבל לא את הקבועה מכר האיצטרוביל אבל לא את הקלת לא את התנור ולא את הכירים ולא את הריחים רבי אליעזר אומר כל המחובר לקרקע הרי הוא כקרקע

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:1): One who sells a house has sold the door and the door bolt and the lock, but he has not sold the key. He has sold the mortar that was hollowed out of the ground but not the mortar that was fixed to the ground after its construction. He has sold the immovable lower millstone but not the portable upper stone. And he has sold neither the oven, nor the double stove, nor the hand mill. Rabbi Eliezer says: The principle is that any item attached to the ground is considered like the ground and included in the sale.

בזמן שאמר לו הוא וכל מה שבתוכו הרי כולן מכורין בין כך ובין כך לא מכר לא את הבור ולא את הדות ולא את היציע

When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the house. Both in this case and in that case he did not sell the pit or the cistern or the gallery, as they are considered separate entities that are not at all part of the house.

תנו רבנן צינור שחקקו ולבסוף קבעו פוסל את המקוה קבעו ולבסוף חקקו אינו פוסל את המקוה מני לא רבי אליעזר ולא רבנן

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: A duct that one hollowed out and afterward attached to the ground or to a building invalidates a ritual bath through the water it channels to the bath. The water in a ritual bath must be gathered directly from rain or a stream, not drawn with vessels. If one hollowed out a log and used it to channel water into the bath, this is considered drawn water, as he used a vessel. By contrast, if one attached it first and afterward hollowed it out, it does not invalidate the ritual bath. Before the log was hollowed out, it was already attached to and considered part of the ground, and therefore the act of hollowing it out does not turn it into a vessel. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is this? It appears to be neither the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, nor that of the Rabbis.

הי רבי אליעזר אילימא רבי אליעזר דבית דלמא היינו טעמא דרבי אליעזר סבר מוכר בעין יפה מוכר ורבנן סברי מוכר בעין רעה מוכר

The Gemara clarifies the question: To which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is this referring? If we say it is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the aforementioned baraita with regard to the sale of a house, that any item attached to the ground is considered part of the house and is sold along with it, there is a difficulty. As perhaps this is the reasoning employed in the dispute with regard to the sale of a house, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who sells, sells generously anything that is attached to the ground, while the Rabbis hold that one who sells, sells sparingly, selling only utensils that serve an intrinsic function in the house and nothing else, even if they are attached to the ground. But this teaches us nothing about the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with respect to a ritual bath.

ואלא רבי אליעזר דכוורת דבורים דתנן כוורת דבורים רבי אליעזר אומר הרי היא כקרקע וכותבין עליה פרוזבול

But rather, the reference must be to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer concerning a beehive. As we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 10:7): With regard to a beehive attached to the ground by clay, Rabbi Eliezer says: It is like land, and therefore one may write a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from canceling an outstanding debt [prosbol] based upon it. Such a document cannot be written unless the borrower owns some land, and a beehive is considered like land for this purpose.