Bava Kamma 101

כפרא דודי

The sediments of dye in the cauldrons, that is, the dyer took the dye remaining in the cauldron from previous use, and used that dye for this garment, leading to an inferior result.

תנו רבנן הנותן עצים לחרש לעשות מהן כסא ועשה מהן ספסל ספסל ועשה מהן כסא רבי מאיר אומר נותן לו דמי עציו רבי יהודה אומר אם השבח יתר על היציאה נותן לו את היציאה ואם היציאה יתירה על השבח נותן לו את השבח

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 10:8): With regard to one who gives wood to a carpenter to fashion a chair from it and he fashioned a bench from it instead, or one who gives him wood to fashion a bench and he fashioned a chair from it instead, Rabbi Meir says: The carpenter gives him the value of his wood and keeps the chair or bench, as he has acquired it due to the change. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not acquire the item. Rather, if the value of the wood’s enhancement exceeds the carpenter’s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement of the wood he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter deviated from the customer’s order, he is entitled to either his expenses or the enhancement, the smaller amount of the two.

ומודה רבי מאיר אם נתן עצים לחרש לעשות מהן כסא נאה ועשה מהן כסא כעור ספסל נאה ועשה ספסל כעור אם השבח יתר על היציאה נותן לו דמי היציאה ואם היציאה יתירה על השבח נותן לו דמי השבח

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Meir concedes that if he gave wood to a carpenter to fashion a beautiful chair from it and he fashioned an ugly chair from it, or to fashion a beautiful bench from it and he fashioned an ugly bench from it, then if the value of the wood’s enhancement exceeds the carpenter’s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the value of the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter did not deviate significantly from the customer’s instructions, Rabbi Meir concedes that the carpenter does not acquire the item due to the change.

איבעיא להו יש שבח סמנין על הצמר או אין שבח סמנין על הצמר

§ In connection with the discussion of the halakhic implications of the enhancement of a garment quoted above, the Gemara records that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha? That the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, i.e., the dye is considered a separate entity from the wool it dyed? Or is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, i.e., the dye does not remain an independent entity, and it is viewed as if there is only colored wool?

היכי דמי אילימא דגזל סמנין ודקינהו ותרנהו וצבע בהן תיפוק ליה משום דקנינהו בשינוי

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which this dilemma is relevant? If we say that the dilemma arises where one robbed another of pigments, and ground them up and soaked them in water, converting them into dye, and then dyed wool with them, then the dilemma would be concerning how the robber returns the pigments. In this case, derive the halakha due to the fact that the robber acquired the pigments due to a change of form, which occurred when he ground the pigments, and in any event will be obligated to return the value of the pigments at the time of the robbery.

לא צריכא דגזל סמנין שרויין וצבע בהו מאי יש שבח סמנין על גבי צמר דאמר ליה הב לי סמנאי דשקלתינהו או דלמא אין שבח סמנין על גבי הצמר דאמר ליה לית לך גבאי ולא מידי

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where one robbed another of pigments that had already been soaked in water, and then dyed wool with them. What is the halakha here? Is the enhancement which dye provides to the wool substantive, i.e., a separate entity, so that the owner can say to the robber: Give me my dyes that you took? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, but becomes one with the wool, so that the robber can say to the owner: I have nothing at all of yours, since the dyes are no longer considered extant.

אמרי ואי אין שבח סמנין על גבי צמר מי מצי אמר ליה לית לך גבאי ולא מידי נימא ליה הב לי סמנאי דאפסדתינהו

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma. The Sages say: And even if the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, can the robber really say to him: I have nothing at all of yours? Let the owner say to him: Give me my dyes that you have caused to be lost. Even if the dyes are no longer considered extant, the owner is still entitled to monetary compensation for the robbery.

אלא להך גיסא אין שבח סמנין על גבי הצמר ובעי שלומי ליה או דלמא יש שבח סמנין על גבי צמר ואמר ליה הא מנחי קמך שקלינהו שקלינהו במאי שקליה בצפון צפון עבורי מיעבר השבה לא עביד

Rather, the dilemma is relevant to that other side of the question: Is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and therefore the robber needs to pay him? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and the robber can say to him: The dyes absorbed into the wool lie before you; take them. The Gemara rejects this as well: Take them? With what should he take the dyes, with soap? While soap does remove dye from the wool, it does not return the dye to the robbery victim, as the dye cannot be recovered.

אלא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דגזל צמר וסמנין דחד וצבעיה לההוא צמר בהנך סמנין וקא מהדר ליה ניהליה לצמר יש שבח סמנין על גבי הצמר וקא מהדר ליה סמנין וצמר או דלמא אין שבח סמנין על גבי צמר וצמר מהדר ליה סמנין לא מהדר ליה

The Gemara suggests another scenario: Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he robbed one person of wool and dyes, and dyed that wool with those dyes, and he is returning the dyed wool to him. The dilemma is: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and he is therefore returning both the dye and the wool to him? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and it is only the wool that he is returning to him, but he is not returning the dye to him, since it is no longer extant.

אמרי תיפוק ליה דאייקר ליה ניהליה בדמי לא צריכא דזל ציבעא ואיבעית אימא כגון שצבע בהו קופא

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma as well. The Sages say: Derive the halakha in this case based on the fact that he increased the value of the wool for him, as dyed wool is more expensive than undyed wool. Consequently, even if the robber has not returned the dye, he reimburses the owner for it when he returns the appreciated wool. The Gemara suggests: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where the cost of the dye has depreciated. If the dye is viewed as an independent entity the robber is returning both the wool and the dye. If it is not, he must reimburse the robbery victim for the value of the dye at the time of the robbery. And if you wish, say instead: The dilemma is relevant in a case where he robbed another of dye and a basket, and dyed the basket with the dye, in which case the dye does not increase the value of the dyed item.

רבינא אמר הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דצמר דחד וסמנין דחד וקאתי קוף וצבעיה לההוא צמר בהנך סמנין יש שבח סמנין על גבי צמר דאמר ליה הב לי סמנאי דגבך נינהו או דלמא אין שבח סמנין על גבי צמר ואמר ליה לית לך גבאי כלום

The Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case where the dilemma applies. Ravina said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where there was wool that belonged to one person and dyes that belonged to one other person, and a monkey came and dyed that wool with those dyes. The dilemma is as follows: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, so that the owner of the dye can say to the owner of the wool: Give me my dyes that are with you? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive and the owner of the wool can say to the owner of the dye: There is nothing of yours with me, and he is exempt from liability because the dyes are no longer extant.

תא שמע בגד שצבעו בקליפי ערלה ידלק אלמא חזותא מילתא היא

Having determined the scenario in which the dilemma is relevant, the Gemara proceeds to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a solution from a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla, i.e., fruit that grows on a tree during its first three years, must be burned, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla. Apparently, the enhancement of an item’s appearance is considered a significant matter, and the dye therefore remains an independent substance even after having been absorbed by the wool.

אמר רבא הנאה הנראה לעינים אסרה תורה דתניא ערלים לא יאכל אין לי אלא איסור אכילה מנין שלא יהנה ממנו ולא יצבע [בו] ולא ידליק בו את הנר

The Gemara rejects this resolution. Rava said: The reason the garment must be burned is not because the dye remains an independent substance. Rather, it is because the Torah prohibited benefit that is visible to the eye, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse I have derived only a prohibition against eating it; from where is it derived that one may not even derive benefit from it, and that one may not dye with dyes extracted from the fruit, and that one may not light a lamp with oil extracted from the fruit?

תלמוד לומר וערלתם ערלתו את פריו ערלים לא יאכל לרבות את כולם

The baraita answers: The verse states: “Then you shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as forbidden [araltem]. Three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23), to include all these types of benefit in the prohibition. Consequently, there is an explicit derivation that an item dyed with orla dye is forbidden.

תא שמע בגד שצבעו בקליפי שביעית ידלק שאני התם דאמר קרא תהיה בהויתה תהא

The Gemara attempts another resolution of the dilemma. Come and hear a resolution from that which was taught in a baraita: A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from the peels of produce from the Sabbatical Year must be burned when the time for the elimination of Sabbatical Year produce arrives. This indicates that the dye evidently remains an independent substance. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there, as the verse states: “Shall all the increase thereof be” (Leviticus 25:7), and the phrase: “Shall be,” teaches that it will always remain as it is, i.e., it retains its status as Sabbatical Year produce despite any change to its form.

רבא רמי תנן בגד שצבעו בקליפי ערלה ידלק אלמא חזותא מילתא היא ורמינהי רביעית דם שנבלעה בבית הבית טמא ואמרי לה הבית טהור ולא פליגי הא בכלים דהוו מעיקרא הא בכלים דאתו לבסוף

The Gemara states that Rava raises a contradiction: We learned in a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla must be burned. Apparently, the change in appearance precipitated by the orla peels is considered a significant matter, and the dye retains its status as orla. And raise a contradiction from another mishna (Oholot 3:2): With regard to a quarter–log of blood from a corpse that was absorbed in the floor of a house, every vessel in the house is ritually impure by virtue of being under the same roof as the blood. And some say that any vessel in the house is ritually pure. And these two statements do not disagree, as this first statement was in reference to vessels that were in the house at the outset, before the blood was absorbed; and this second statement was in reference to vessels that came into the house at the end, after the blood had already been absorbed.

נבלעה בכסות רואין אם מתכבסת הכסות ויוצא ממנה רביעית דם טמאה ואם לאו טהורה

The mishna continues: If the blood was absorbed in a garment, it is examined, and if the garment is washed and a quarter–log of blood emerges from it, it is ritually impure, and the garment imparts ritual impurity to the vessels in the house as well. But if not, i.e., if less than a quarter-log of blood emerges, then it is pure, and it does not impart impurity. Apparently, only the blood that can be removed from the garment is considered blood, while the blood absorbed in the garment is insignificant. If this is the case, the change in appearance precipitated by the blood is not considered a significant matter, and the blood absorbed in the garment does not remain an independent substance.

אמר רב כהנא מקולי רביעיות שנו כאן בדם תבוסה דרבנן

The Gemara presents an answer. Rav Kahana said: A halakha from among the leniencies applied to the measurements of a quarter–log was taught here, as the mishna is written in reference to the blood of submission that is discharged from a body at the time of death, and such blood is ritually impure by rabbinic law, but in general, a change in appearance precipitated by blood is significant.

רבא רמי תנן ממין הצובעין ספיחי סטים וקוצה יש להן שביעית ולדמיהן שביעית יש להן ביעור ולדמיהן ביעור אלמא עצים יש בהן משום קדושת שביעית

§ Having cited a contradiction raised by Rava, the Gemara proceeds to cite another. Rava raises another contradiction. We learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 7:1): Concerning plants from among the species that are used as dyes, for example the sefiḥin, i.e., produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad and safflower; they have sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and money exchanged for them has sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they are subject to the halakha of eradication, and money exchanged for them is subject to the halakha of eradication. Apparently, wood, a type of inedible growth, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year despite the fact that it is not edible.

ורמינהי עלי קנים ועלי גפנים שגיבבן בחבא על פני השדה לקטן לאכילה יש בהן משום קדושת שביעית לעצים אין בהן משום קדושת שביעית

And raise a contradiction from a baraita: With regard to reed leaves and vine leaves that one piled for storage upon the field, if he gathered them for eating, they are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year; if he gathered them for use as wood, e.g., for kindling a fire, they are not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Apparently, wood or any other non-food product is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

ומשני אמר קרא לאכלה במי שהנאתו וביעורו שוין יצאו עצים שהנאתן אחר ביעורן

And Rava answers the contradiction, as the verse states: “And the Sabbath produce of the land shall be for food for you” (Leviticus 25:6), indicating that the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect only with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, as is the case with regard to food. Wood is excluded, as its benefit follows its consumption. The primary purpose of kindling wood is not accomplished with the burning of the wood; rather, it is with the charcoal that heats the oven. Therefore, wood is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

והא איכא עצים דמשחן דהנאתן וביעורן שוין

The Gemara objects: But isn’t there wood that is used to provide heat, whose benefit coincides with its consumption, as one enjoys the warmth provided by the fire while the wood is burned?

אמר רבא

Rava said: