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Today's Daf Yomi

September 9, 2016 | ื•ืณ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Kamma 101

The gemara asks whether the value of wool that is dyed is considered like it is wool with dye in it or do we say that since the dye isn’t tangible, we don’t view it as being made up of dye and wool. ย The gemara then proceeds to explain in what case there is relevance to the question. ย A number of attempts are rejected and then a number of cases are brought in which the question is relevant. ย They attempt to answer the question by bringing in sources relating to dyeing using shmita and orla produce, but in the end these proofs are rejected. ย Rava then raises a contradiction of the orla case and a tumah case and it is resolved. ย And in a tangent, Rava brings two contradictory sources relating to whether or not kedushat shviit applies to tree not used to eating. ย That contradiction is also resolved.

ื›ืคืจื ื“ื•ื“ื™

The sediments of dye in the cauldrons, that is, the dyer took the dye remaining in the cauldron from previous use, and used that dye for this garment, leading to an inferior result.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ืกืคืกืœ ืกืคืกืœ ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ืขืฆื™ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื•ืื ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืฉื‘ื—

ยง The Sages taught (Tosefta 10:8): With regard to one who gives wood to a carpenter to fashion a chair from it and he fashioned a bench from it instead, or one who gives him wood to fashion a bench and he fashioned a chair from it instead, Rabbi Meir says: The carpenter gives him the value of his wood and keeps the chair or bench, as he has acquired it due to the change. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not acquire the item. Rather, if the value of the woodโ€™s enhancement exceeds the carpenterโ€™s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement of the wood he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter deviated from the customerโ€™s order, he is entitled to either his expenses or the enhancement, the smaller amount of the two.

ื•ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื ื ืชืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื ืื” ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื›ืขื•ืจ ืกืคืกืœ ื ืื” ื•ืขืฉื” ืกืคืกืœ ื›ืขื•ืจ ืื ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื•ืื ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ื”ืฉื‘ื—

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Meir concedes that if he gave wood to a carpenter to fashion a beautiful chair from it and he fashioned an ugly chair from it, or to fashion a beautiful bench from it and he fashioned an ugly bench from it, then if the value of the woodโ€™s enhancement exceeds the carpenterโ€™s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the value of the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter did not deviate significantly from the customerโ€™s instructions, Rabbi Meir concedes that the carpenter does not acquire the item due to the change.

ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฆืžืจ ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฆืžืจ

ยง In connection with the discussion of the halakhic implications of the enhancement of a garment quoted above, the Gemara records that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha? That the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, i.e., the dye is considered a separate entity from the wool it dyed? Or is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, i.e., the dye does not remain an independent entity, and it is viewed as if there is only colored wool?

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ื“ืงื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืชืจื ื”ื• ื•ืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ืŸ ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืงื ื™ื ื”ื• ื‘ืฉื™ื ื•ื™

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which this dilemma is relevant? If we say that the dilemma arises where one robbed another of pigments, and ground them up and soaked them in water, converting them into dye, and then dyed wool with them, then the dilemma would be concerning how the robber returns the pigments. In this case, derive the halakha due to the fact that the robber acquired the pigments due to a change of form, which occurred when he ground the pigments, and in any event will be obligated to return the value of the pigments at the time of the robbery.

ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืจื•ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืžืื™ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ืฉืงืœืชื™ื ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where one robbed another of pigments that had already been soaked in water, and then dyed wool with them. What is the halakha here? Is the enhancement which dye provides to the wool substantive, i.e., a separate entity, so that the owner can say to the robber: Give me my dyes that you took? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, but becomes one with the wool, so that the robber can say to the owner: I have nothing at all of yours, since the dyes are no longer considered extant.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ืื™ ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ืžื™ ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื ื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ืืคืกื“ืชื™ื ื”ื•

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma. The Sages say: And even if the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, can the robber really say to him: I have nothing at all of yours? Let the owner say to him: Give me my dyes that you have caused to be lost. Even if the dyes are no longer considered extant, the owner is still entitled to monetary compensation for the robbery.

ืืœื ืœื”ืš ื’ื™ืกื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื•ื‘ืขื™ ืฉืœื•ืžื™ ืœื™ื” ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื ืžื ื—ื™ ืงืžืš ืฉืงืœื™ื ื”ื• ืฉืงืœื™ื ื”ื• ื‘ืžืื™ ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื‘ืฆืคื•ืŸ ืฆืคื•ืŸ ืขื‘ื•ืจื™ ืžื™ืขื‘ืจ ื”ืฉื‘ื” ืœื ืขื‘ื™ื“

Rather, the dilemma is relevant to that other side of the question: Is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and therefore the robber needs to pay him? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and the robber can say to him: The dyes absorbed into the wool lie before you; take them. The Gemara rejects this as well: Take them? With what should he take the dyes, with soap? While soap does remove dye from the wool, it does not return the dye to the robbery victim, as the dye cannot be recovered.

ืืœื ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืฆื‘ืขื™ื” ืœื”ื”ื•ื ืฆืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ืš ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ืœืฆืžืจ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื•ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืฆืžืจ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืฆืžืจ ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื”

The Gemara suggests another scenario: Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he robbed one person of wool and dyes, and dyed that wool with those dyes, and he is returning the dyed wool to him. The dilemma is: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and he is therefore returning both the dye and the wool to him? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and it is only the wool that he is returning to him, but he is not returning the dye to him, since it is no longer extant.

ืืžืจื™ ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ื“ืื™ื™ืงืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื–ืœ ืฆื™ื‘ืขื ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืงื•ืคื

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma as well. The Sages say: Derive the halakha in this case based on the fact that he increased the value of the wool for him, as dyed wool is more expensive than undyed wool. Consequently, even if the robber has not returned the dye, he reimburses the owner for it when he returns the appreciated wool. The Gemara suggests: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where the cost of the dye has depreciated. If the dye is viewed as an independent entity the robber is returning both the wool and the dye. If it is not, he must reimburse the robbery victim for the value of the dye at the time of the robbery. And if you wish, say instead: The dilemma is relevant in a case where he robbed another of dye and a basket, and dyed the basket with the dye, in which case the dye does not increase the value of the dyed item.

ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ื“ืฆืžืจ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืงืืชื™ ืงื•ืฃ ื•ืฆื‘ืขื™ื” ืœื”ื”ื•ื ืฆืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ืš ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ื’ื‘ืš ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื›ืœื•ื

The Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case where the dilemma applies. Ravina said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where there was wool that belonged to one person and dyes that belonged to one other person, and a monkey came and dyed that wool with those dyes. The dilemma is as follows: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, so that the owner of the dye can say to the owner of the wool: Give me my dyes that are with you? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive and the owner of the wool can say to the owner of the dye: There is nothing of yours with me, and he is exempt from liability because the dyes are no longer extant.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืขืจืœื” ื™ื“ืœืง ืืœืžื ื—ื–ื•ืชื ืžื™ืœืชื ื”ื™ื

Having determined the scenario in which the dilemma is relevant, the Gemara proceeds to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a solution from a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla, i.e., fruit that grows on a tree during its first three years, must be burned, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla. Apparently, the enhancement of an itemโ€™s appearance is considered a significant matter, and the dye therefore remains an independent substance even after having been absorbed by the wool.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ื ืื” ื”ื ืจืื” ืœืขื™ื ื™ื ืืกืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ืขืจืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืื›ืœ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืกื•ืจ ืื›ื™ืœื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืœื ื™ื”ื ื” ืžืžื ื• ื•ืœื ื™ืฆื‘ืข [ื‘ื•] ื•ืœื ื™ื“ืœื™ืง ื‘ื• ืืช ื”ื ืจ

The Gemara rejects this resolution. Rava said: The reason the garment must be burned is not because the dye remains an independent substance. Rather, it is because the Torah prohibited benefit that is visible to the eye, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eatenโ€ (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse I have derived only a prohibition against eating it; from where is it derived that one may not even derive benefit from it, and that one may not dye with dyes extracted from the fruit, and that one may not light a lamp with oil extracted from the fruit?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืขืจืœืชื ืขืจืœืชื• ืืช ืคืจื™ื• ืขืจืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืื›ืœ ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื›ื•ืœื

The baraita answers: The verse states: โ€œThen you shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as forbidden [araltem]. Three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eatenโ€ (Leviticus 19:23), to include all these types of benefit in the prohibition. Consequently, there is an explicit derivation that an item dyed with orla dye is forbidden.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื™ื“ืœืง ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืชื”ื™ื” ื‘ื”ื•ื™ืชื” ืชื”ื

The Gemara attempts another resolution of the dilemma. Come and hear a resolution from that which was taught in a baraita: A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from the peels of produce from the Sabbatical Year must be burned when the time for the elimination of Sabbatical Year produce arrives. This indicates that the dye evidently remains an independent substance. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there, as the verse states: โ€œShall all the increase thereof beโ€ (Leviticus 25:7), and the phrase: โ€œShall be,โ€ teaches that it will always remain as it is, i.e., it retains its status as Sabbatical Year produce despite any change to its form.

ืจื‘ื ืจืžื™ ืชื ืŸ ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืขืจืœื” ื™ื“ืœืง ืืœืžื ื—ื–ื•ืชื ืžื™ืœืชื ื”ื™ื ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื“ื ืฉื ื‘ืœืขื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื˜ืžื ื•ืืžืจื™ ืœื” ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื˜ื”ื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื”ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ื ื“ื”ื•ื• ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื”ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ื ื“ืืชื• ืœื‘ืกื•ืฃ

The Gemara states that Rava raises a contradiction: We learned in a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla must be burned. Apparently, the change in appearance precipitated by the orla peels is considered a significant matter, and the dye retains its status as orla. And raise a contradiction from another mishna (Oholot 3:2): With regard to a quarterlog of blood from a corpse that was absorbed in the floor of a house, every vessel in the house is ritually impure by virtue of being under the same roof as the blood. And some say that any vessel in the house is ritually pure. And these two statements do not disagree, as this first statement was in reference to vessels that were in the house at the outset, before the blood was absorbed; and this second statement was in reference to vessels that came into the house at the end, after the blood had already been absorbed.

ื ื‘ืœืขื” ื‘ื›ืกื•ืช ืจื•ืื™ืŸ ืื ืžืชื›ื‘ืกืช ื”ื›ืกื•ืช ื•ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื” ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื“ื ื˜ืžืื” ื•ืื ืœืื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

The mishna continues: If the blood was absorbed in a garment, it is examined, and if the garment is washed and a quarterlog of blood emerges from it, it is ritually impure, and the garment imparts ritual impurity to the vessels in the house as well. But if not, i.e., if less than a quarter-log of blood emerges, then it is pure, and it does not impart impurity. Apparently, only the blood that can be removed from the garment is considered blood, while the blood absorbed in the garment is insignificant. If this is the case, the change in appearance precipitated by the blood is not considered a significant matter, and the blood absorbed in the garment does not remain an independent substance.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืžืงื•ืœื™ ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ื•ืช ืฉื ื• ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื ืชื‘ื•ืกื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ

The Gemara presents an answer. Rav Kahana said: A halakha from among the leniencies applied to the measurements of a quarterlog was taught here, as the mishna is written in reference to the blood of submission that is discharged from a body at the time of death, and such blood is ritually impure by rabbinic law, but in general, a change in appearance precipitated by blood is significant.

ืจื‘ื ืจืžื™ ืชื ืŸ ืžืžื™ืŸ ื”ืฆื•ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืกืคื™ื—ื™ ืกื˜ื™ื ื•ืงื•ืฆื” ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื•ืœื“ืžื™ื”ืŸ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจ ื•ืœื“ืžื™ื”ืŸ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจ ืืœืžื ืขืฆื™ื ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช

ยง Having cited a contradiction raised by Rava, the Gemara proceeds to cite another. Rava raises another contradiction. We learned in a mishna (Sheviโ€™it 7:1): Concerning plants from among the species that are used as dyes, for example the sefiแธฅin, i.e., produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad and safflower; they have sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and money exchanged for them has sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they are subject to the halakha of eradication, and money exchanged for them is subject to the halakha of eradication. Apparently, wood, a type of inedible growth, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year despite the fact that it is not edible.

ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืขืœื™ ืงื ื™ื ื•ืขืœื™ ื’ืคื ื™ื ืฉื’ื™ื‘ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื‘ื ืขืœ ืคื ื™ ื”ืฉื“ื” ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืœืื›ื™ืœื” ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ืœืขืฆื™ื ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช

And raise a contradiction from a baraita: With regard to reed leaves and vine leaves that one piled for storage upon the field, if he gathered them for eating, they are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year; if he gathered them for use as wood, e.g., for kindling a fire, they are not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Apparently, wood or any other non-food product is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

ื•ืžืฉื ื™ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืื›ืœื” ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื”ื ืืชื• ื•ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจื• ืฉื•ื™ืŸ ื™ืฆืื• ืขืฆื™ื ืฉื”ื ืืชืŸ ืื—ืจ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจืŸ

And Rava answers the contradiction, as the verse states: โ€œAnd the Sabbath produce of the land shall be for food for youโ€ (Leviticus 25:6), indicating that the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect only with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, as is the case with regard to food. Wood is excluded, as its benefit follows its consumption. The primary purpose of kindling wood is not accomplished with the burning of the wood; rather, it is with the charcoal that heats the oven. Therefore, wood is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

ื•ื”ื ืื™ื›ื ืขืฆื™ื ื“ืžืฉื—ืŸ ื“ื”ื ืืชืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจืŸ ืฉื•ื™ืŸ

The Gemara objects: But isnโ€™t there wood that is used to provide heat, whose benefit coincides with its consumption, as one enjoys the warmth provided by the fire while the wood is burned?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื

Rava said:

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Bava Kamma 101

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 101

ื›ืคืจื ื“ื•ื“ื™

The sediments of dye in the cauldrons, that is, the dyer took the dye remaining in the cauldron from previous use, and used that dye for this garment, leading to an inferior result.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ืกืคืกืœ ืกืคืกืœ ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ืขืฆื™ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื•ืื ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืฉื‘ื—

ยง The Sages taught (Tosefta 10:8): With regard to one who gives wood to a carpenter to fashion a chair from it and he fashioned a bench from it instead, or one who gives him wood to fashion a bench and he fashioned a chair from it instead, Rabbi Meir says: The carpenter gives him the value of his wood and keeps the chair or bench, as he has acquired it due to the change. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not acquire the item. Rather, if the value of the woodโ€™s enhancement exceeds the carpenterโ€™s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement of the wood he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter deviated from the customerโ€™s order, he is entitled to either his expenses or the enhancement, the smaller amount of the two.

ื•ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื ื ืชืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื—ืจืฉ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื ืื” ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ื›ืกื ื›ืขื•ืจ ืกืคืกืœ ื ืื” ื•ืขืฉื” ืกืคืกืœ ื›ืขื•ืจ ืื ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื™ืชืจ ืขืœ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื•ืื ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืฉื‘ื— ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื“ืžื™ ื”ืฉื‘ื—

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Meir concedes that if he gave wood to a carpenter to fashion a beautiful chair from it and he fashioned an ugly chair from it, or to fashion a beautiful bench from it and he fashioned an ugly bench from it, then if the value of the woodโ€™s enhancement exceeds the carpenterโ€™s expenses the owner gives the carpenter the value of the expenses, and if the expenses exceed the enhancement he gives him the value of the enhancement. Since the carpenter did not deviate significantly from the customerโ€™s instructions, Rabbi Meir concedes that the carpenter does not acquire the item due to the change.

ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฆืžืจ ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฆืžืจ

ยง In connection with the discussion of the halakhic implications of the enhancement of a garment quoted above, the Gemara records that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha? That the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, i.e., the dye is considered a separate entity from the wool it dyed? Or is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, i.e., the dye does not remain an independent entity, and it is viewed as if there is only colored wool?

ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ื“ืงื™ื ื”ื• ื•ืชืจื ื”ื• ื•ืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ืŸ ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืงื ื™ื ื”ื• ื‘ืฉื™ื ื•ื™

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which this dilemma is relevant? If we say that the dilemma arises where one robbed another of pigments, and ground them up and soaked them in water, converting them into dye, and then dyed wool with them, then the dilemma would be concerning how the robber returns the pigments. In this case, derive the halakha due to the fact that the robber acquired the pigments due to a change of form, which occurred when he ground the pigments, and in any event will be obligated to return the value of the pigments at the time of the robbery.

ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืจื•ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืžืื™ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ืฉืงืœืชื™ื ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where one robbed another of pigments that had already been soaked in water, and then dyed wool with them. What is the halakha here? Is the enhancement which dye provides to the wool substantive, i.e., a separate entity, so that the owner can say to the robber: Give me my dyes that you took? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, but becomes one with the wool, so that the robber can say to the owner: I have nothing at all of yours, since the dyes are no longer considered extant.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ืื™ ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ืžื™ ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื ื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ืืคืกื“ืชื™ื ื”ื•

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma. The Sages say: And even if the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, can the robber really say to him: I have nothing at all of yours? Let the owner say to him: Give me my dyes that you have caused to be lost. Even if the dyes are no longer considered extant, the owner is still entitled to monetary compensation for the robbery.

ืืœื ืœื”ืš ื’ื™ืกื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื•ื‘ืขื™ ืฉืœื•ืžื™ ืœื™ื” ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื ืžื ื—ื™ ืงืžืš ืฉืงืœื™ื ื”ื• ืฉืงืœื™ื ื”ื• ื‘ืžืื™ ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื‘ืฆืคื•ืŸ ืฆืคื•ืŸ ืขื‘ื•ืจื™ ืžื™ืขื‘ืจ ื”ืฉื‘ื” ืœื ืขื‘ื™ื“

Rather, the dilemma is relevant to that other side of the question: Is the halakha that the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and therefore the robber needs to pay him? Or perhaps the enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and the robber can say to him: The dyes absorbed into the wool lie before you; take them. The Gemara rejects this as well: Take them? With what should he take the dyes, with soap? While soap does remove dye from the wool, it does not return the dye to the robbery victim, as the dye cannot be recovered.

ืืœื ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ื“ื’ื–ืœ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืฆื‘ืขื™ื” ืœื”ื”ื•ื ืฆืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ืš ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ืœืฆืžืจ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืฆืžืจ ื•ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืฆืžืจ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืฆืžืจ ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืœื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื”

The Gemara suggests another scenario: Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he robbed one person of wool and dyes, and dyed that wool with those dyes, and he is returning the dyed wool to him. The dilemma is: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, and he is therefore returning both the dye and the wool to him? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive, and it is only the wool that he is returning to him, but he is not returning the dye to him, since it is no longer extant.

ืืžืจื™ ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ื“ืื™ื™ืงืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ื–ืœ ืฆื™ื‘ืขื ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืฆื‘ืข ื‘ื”ื• ืงื•ืคื

The Gemara rejects this understanding of the application of the dilemma as well. The Sages say: Derive the halakha in this case based on the fact that he increased the value of the wool for him, as dyed wool is more expensive than undyed wool. Consequently, even if the robber has not returned the dye, he reimburses the owner for it when he returns the appreciated wool. The Gemara suggests: No, it is necessary to resolve the dilemma in a case where the cost of the dye has depreciated. If the dye is viewed as an independent entity the robber is returning both the wool and the dye. If it is not, he must reimburse the robbery victim for the value of the dye at the time of the robbery. And if you wish, say instead: The dilemma is relevant in a case where he robbed another of dye and a basket, and dyed the basket with the dye, in which case the dye does not increase the value of the dyed item.

ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ื“ืฆืžืจ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื“ื—ื“ ื•ืงืืชื™ ืงื•ืฃ ื•ืฆื‘ืขื™ื” ืœื”ื”ื•ื ืฆืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ืš ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื‘ ืœื™ ืกืžื ืื™ ื“ื’ื‘ืš ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื‘ื— ืกืžื ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ืฆืžืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื™ืช ืœืš ื’ื‘ืื™ ื›ืœื•ื

The Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case where the dilemma applies. Ravina said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where there was wool that belonged to one person and dyes that belonged to one other person, and a monkey came and dyed that wool with those dyes. The dilemma is as follows: Is the halakha that enhancement which dye provides to the wool is substantive, so that the owner of the dye can say to the owner of the wool: Give me my dyes that are with you? Or perhaps enhancement which dye provides to the wool is not substantive and the owner of the wool can say to the owner of the dye: There is nothing of yours with me, and he is exempt from liability because the dyes are no longer extant.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืขืจืœื” ื™ื“ืœืง ืืœืžื ื—ื–ื•ืชื ืžื™ืœืชื ื”ื™ื

Having determined the scenario in which the dilemma is relevant, the Gemara proceeds to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a solution from a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla, i.e., fruit that grows on a tree during its first three years, must be burned, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla. Apparently, the enhancement of an itemโ€™s appearance is considered a significant matter, and the dye therefore remains an independent substance even after having been absorbed by the wool.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ื ืื” ื”ื ืจืื” ืœืขื™ื ื™ื ืืกืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ืขืจืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืื›ืœ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืกื•ืจ ืื›ื™ืœื” ืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืœื ื™ื”ื ื” ืžืžื ื• ื•ืœื ื™ืฆื‘ืข [ื‘ื•] ื•ืœื ื™ื“ืœื™ืง ื‘ื• ืืช ื”ื ืจ

The Gemara rejects this resolution. Rava said: The reason the garment must be burned is not because the dye remains an independent substance. Rather, it is because the Torah prohibited benefit that is visible to the eye, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eatenโ€ (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse I have derived only a prohibition against eating it; from where is it derived that one may not even derive benefit from it, and that one may not dye with dyes extracted from the fruit, and that one may not light a lamp with oil extracted from the fruit?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ืขืจืœืชื ืขืจืœืชื• ืืช ืคืจื™ื• ืขืจืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืื›ืœ ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื›ื•ืœื

The baraita answers: The verse states: โ€œThen you shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as forbidden [araltem]. Three years shall it be as forbidden [areilim] to you; it shall not be eatenโ€ (Leviticus 19:23), to include all these types of benefit in the prohibition. Consequently, there is an explicit derivation that an item dyed with orla dye is forbidden.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื™ื“ืœืง ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืชื”ื™ื” ื‘ื”ื•ื™ืชื” ืชื”ื

The Gemara attempts another resolution of the dilemma. Come and hear a resolution from that which was taught in a baraita: A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from the peels of produce from the Sabbatical Year must be burned when the time for the elimination of Sabbatical Year produce arrives. This indicates that the dye evidently remains an independent substance. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there, as the verse states: โ€œShall all the increase thereof beโ€ (Leviticus 25:7), and the phrase: โ€œShall be,โ€ teaches that it will always remain as it is, i.e., it retains its status as Sabbatical Year produce despite any change to its form.

ืจื‘ื ืจืžื™ ืชื ืŸ ื‘ื’ื“ ืฉืฆื‘ืขื• ื‘ืงืœื™ืคื™ ืขืจืœื” ื™ื“ืœืง ืืœืžื ื—ื–ื•ืชื ืžื™ืœืชื ื”ื™ื ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื“ื ืฉื ื‘ืœืขื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื˜ืžื ื•ืืžืจื™ ืœื” ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื˜ื”ื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื”ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ื ื“ื”ื•ื• ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื”ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ื ื“ืืชื• ืœื‘ืกื•ืฃ

The Gemara states that Rava raises a contradiction: We learned in a mishna (Orla 3:1): A garment that one dyed with dye extracted from peels of orla must be burned. Apparently, the change in appearance precipitated by the orla peels is considered a significant matter, and the dye retains its status as orla. And raise a contradiction from another mishna (Oholot 3:2): With regard to a quarterlog of blood from a corpse that was absorbed in the floor of a house, every vessel in the house is ritually impure by virtue of being under the same roof as the blood. And some say that any vessel in the house is ritually pure. And these two statements do not disagree, as this first statement was in reference to vessels that were in the house at the outset, before the blood was absorbed; and this second statement was in reference to vessels that came into the house at the end, after the blood had already been absorbed.

ื ื‘ืœืขื” ื‘ื›ืกื•ืช ืจื•ืื™ืŸ ืื ืžืชื›ื‘ืกืช ื”ื›ืกื•ืช ื•ื™ื•ืฆื ืžืžื ื” ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื“ื ื˜ืžืื” ื•ืื ืœืื• ื˜ื”ื•ืจื”

The mishna continues: If the blood was absorbed in a garment, it is examined, and if the garment is washed and a quarterlog of blood emerges from it, it is ritually impure, and the garment imparts ritual impurity to the vessels in the house as well. But if not, i.e., if less than a quarter-log of blood emerges, then it is pure, and it does not impart impurity. Apparently, only the blood that can be removed from the garment is considered blood, while the blood absorbed in the garment is insignificant. If this is the case, the change in appearance precipitated by the blood is not considered a significant matter, and the blood absorbed in the garment does not remain an independent substance.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืžืงื•ืœื™ ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ื•ืช ืฉื ื• ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื ืชื‘ื•ืกื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ

The Gemara presents an answer. Rav Kahana said: A halakha from among the leniencies applied to the measurements of a quarterlog was taught here, as the mishna is written in reference to the blood of submission that is discharged from a body at the time of death, and such blood is ritually impure by rabbinic law, but in general, a change in appearance precipitated by blood is significant.

ืจื‘ื ืจืžื™ ืชื ืŸ ืžืžื™ืŸ ื”ืฆื•ื‘ืขื™ืŸ ืกืคื™ื—ื™ ืกื˜ื™ื ื•ืงื•ืฆื” ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื•ืœื“ืžื™ื”ืŸ ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื™ืฉ ืœื”ืŸ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจ ื•ืœื“ืžื™ื”ืŸ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจ ืืœืžื ืขืฆื™ื ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช

ยง Having cited a contradiction raised by Rava, the Gemara proceeds to cite another. Rava raises another contradiction. We learned in a mishna (Sheviโ€™it 7:1): Concerning plants from among the species that are used as dyes, for example the sefiแธฅin, i.e., produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad and safflower; they have sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and money exchanged for them has sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they are subject to the halakha of eradication, and money exchanged for them is subject to the halakha of eradication. Apparently, wood, a type of inedible growth, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year despite the fact that it is not edible.

ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื™ ืขืœื™ ืงื ื™ื ื•ืขืœื™ ื’ืคื ื™ื ืฉื’ื™ื‘ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื‘ื ืขืœ ืคื ื™ ื”ืฉื“ื” ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืœืื›ื™ืœื” ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ืœืขืฆื™ื ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืฉื•ื ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช

And raise a contradiction from a baraita: With regard to reed leaves and vine leaves that one piled for storage upon the field, if he gathered them for eating, they are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year; if he gathered them for use as wood, e.g., for kindling a fire, they are not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Apparently, wood or any other non-food product is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

ื•ืžืฉื ื™ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืื›ืœื” ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื”ื ืืชื• ื•ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจื• ืฉื•ื™ืŸ ื™ืฆืื• ืขืฆื™ื ืฉื”ื ืืชืŸ ืื—ืจ ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจืŸ

And Rava answers the contradiction, as the verse states: โ€œAnd the Sabbath produce of the land shall be for food for youโ€ (Leviticus 25:6), indicating that the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect only with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, as is the case with regard to food. Wood is excluded, as its benefit follows its consumption. The primary purpose of kindling wood is not accomplished with the burning of the wood; rather, it is with the charcoal that heats the oven. Therefore, wood is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

ื•ื”ื ืื™ื›ื ืขืฆื™ื ื“ืžืฉื—ืŸ ื“ื”ื ืืชืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ืขื•ืจืŸ ืฉื•ื™ืŸ

The Gemara objects: But isnโ€™t there wood that is used to provide heat, whose benefit coincides with its consumption, as one enjoys the warmth provided by the fire while the wood is burned?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื

Rava said:

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