Bava Kamma 112

לפני יאוש

it is referring to a case where it is before the owners have despaired of retrieving their property. Consequently, the heirs have not acquired the stolen property, and it must be returned.

רב אדא בר אהבה מתני להא דרמי בר חמא אהא הניח להן אביהן מעות של רבית אף על פי שיודעין שהן של רבית אין חייבין להחזיר אמר רמי בר חמא זאת אומרת רשות יורש כרשות לוקח דמי

Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches that statement of Rami bar Ḥama cited above with regard to this baraita: If their father left them money that he obtained by taking interest, which is prohibited, even if they are aware that the money is from interest, they are not obligated to return the money to the debtor who paid it. Rami bar Ḥama said: That is to say that the domain of an heir is comparable to the domain of a purchaser, and because the money has changed domains, the heirs have acquired it.

רבא אמר לעולם אימא לך רשות יורש לאו כרשות לוקח דמי ושאני הכא דאמר קרא אל תקח מאתו נשך ותרבית אהדר ליה כי היכי דנחי בהדך לדידיה קא מזהר ליה רחמנא לבריה לא מזהר ליה רחמנא

Rava said: Actually, I will say to you that the domain of an heir is not comparable to the domain of a purchaser. And the reason they do not have to return the money is because it is different here, as the verse states: “Take no interest of him or increase, but fear your God, that your brother may live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), which teaches that you must return the interest to him so that he may live with you. Since the interest is returned for this reason and not because it is considered stolen goods, it is apparent that the Merciful One is cautioning him, the lender, to return it, but the Merciful One is not cautioning his son to return it.

מאן דמתני לה אברייתא כל שכן אמתניתין מאן דמתני לה אמתניתין אבל אברייתא רמי בר חמא כרבא מתני לה

The Gemara points out: The one who teaches Rami bar Ḥama’s statement with regard to the baraita, i.e., Rav Adda bar Ahava, all the more so would apply it to the mishna, since there is no other explanation for why the heirs are exempt from payment. Conversely, according to the one who teaches Rami bar Ḥama’s statement with regard to the mishna, it is limited to that case. But with regard to the baraita, he holds that Rami bar Ḥama teaches it as explained by Rava, that the heirs are not exempt from payment because the domain of an heir is comparable to the domain of a purchaser, but rather because heirs are never required to return interest.

תנו רבנן הגוזל ומאכיל את בניו פטורין מלשלם הניח לפניהם גדולים חייבין לשלם קטנים פטורין מלשלם ואם אמרו גדולים אין אנו יודעין חשבונות שחשב אבינו עמך פטורין

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 10:21): With regard to one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying the owner. In a case where he left the stolen items to them as an inheritance, if the heirs are adults they are obligated to pay, and if they are minors they are exempt from paying. If the adult heirs said: We do not know what calculations our father made with you and whether he paid you for the stolen goods, they are exempt.

משום דאמרי אין אנו יודעין פטורים אמר רבא הכי קאמר גדולים שאמרו יודעים אנו חשבונות שחשב אבינו עמך ולא פש לך גביה ולא מידי פטורין

The Gemara expresses surprise: Because they say: We do not know, they are exempt? Since it is clear that they are in possession of stolen property, how can they be exempt due to the uncertain claim that perhaps their father repaid the owner after the theft? Rava said that the heirs are certain about their claim and that the baraita should be formulated differently, and this is what the baraita is saying: In the case of adult heirs who said to the claimant: We know the calculations our father made with you and there is nothing of yours left with him, as he paid his debt to you, they are exempt.

תניא אידך הגוזל ומאכיל בניו פטורין מלשלם הניח לפניהם ואכלום בין גדולים בין קטנים חייבין קטנים מי מיחייבי לא יהא אלא דאזיק אזוקי אמר רב פפא הכי קאמר הניח לפניהם ועדיין לא אכלום בין גדולים בין קטנים חייבין

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying. If he left stolen items to them as an inheritance and they consumed them, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to pay the owner. The Gemara asks: Are minors obligated to pay? Let it be only like a case where one caused damage, and a minor who causes damage is exempt. Rav Pappa said that the baraita should be formulated differently, and this is what the baraita is saying: If he left the stolen items to them as an inheritance and they did not yet consume them, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to return the stolen items, since the items are still extant.

אמר רבא הניח להם אביהם פרה שאולה משתמשין בה כל ימי שאלתה מתה אין חייבין באונסיה כסבורים של אביהם היא וטבחוה ואכלוה משלמין דמי בשר בזול הניח להם אביהם אחריות נכסים חייבין לשלם

Rava says: In the case of children whose father died and left them a cow that he had borrowed, they may use it for the entire duration of its loan. Nevertheless, if it died, they are not liable to pay if its death was caused by an unavoidable accident, despite the fact that a borrower is liable for damage caused by an unavoidable accident. This is because liability for accidental damage pertains only to the actual borrower, i.e., the deceased father. If the children thought that it actually belonged to their father and they slaughtered it and ate it, they are liable to pay the owner the value of inexpensive meat. Rava adds: If their father left them guaranteed property, i.e., land, they are liable to pay.

איכא דמתני לה ארישא ואיכא דמתני לה אסיפא

The Gemara comments: Some teach this final statement of Rava with regard to the first clause, which states that the heirs are exempt from payment for accidental damage. According to this interpretation, if the father left them land, they are obligated to pay for the cow if it dies due to unavoidable accident. And some teach it with regard to the latter clause, which states that heirs who slaughter and consume a cow must pay the owner the value of inexpensive meat. According to this interpretation, if the father left them land, they must pay for the full value of the cow.

מאן דמתני לה ארישא כל שכן אסיפא ופליגא דרב פפא מאן דמתני לה אסיפא אבל ארישא לא והיינו דרב פפא

The one who teaches it with regard to the first clause holds it to be true all the more so with regard to the latter clause, where the heirs actually consumed the meat themselves. And, accordingly, this understanding differs with the forthcoming opinion of Rav Pappa. By contrast, the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause holds it to be true in that clause exclusively, but with regard to the first clause, it is not true. And this is consistent with the forthcoming opinion of Rav Pappa.

דאמר רב פפא היתה פרה גנובה לו וטבחה בשבת חייב שכבר חייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת היתה פרה שאולה לו וטבחה בשבת פטור שאיסור שבת ואיסור גניבה באין כאחד

As Rav Pappa says: If he had a stolen cow in his possession, and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay because he was already rendered liable for the theft before he came to transgress the Shabbat prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat. But if he had a borrowed cow in his possession and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from payment, as the transgression of the Shabbat prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat and the prohibition against theft occur as one, as the act of slaughter is tantamount to the theft of the animal. This indicates that according to Rav Pappa, a borrower’s liability to pay for accidental damage is initiated only when the damage is inflicted. Accordingly, in the case discussed by Rava, since the damage was not inflicted during the father’s lifetime, the deceased’s property was never liened to the cow’s owner, and consequently the heirs are not obligated to pay for any accidental damage.

תנו רבנן והשיב את הגזילה אשר גזל מה תלמוד לומר אשר גזל יחזיר כעין שגזל

After having cited two baraitot that express different opinions with regard to the obligation of heirs to pay for property stolen by their deceased father, the Gemara cites a third baraita that presents both opinions. The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “Then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed” (Leviticus 5:23); what is the meaning when the verse states “that he robbed”? It means that the robber must return the same item that he robbed.

מכאן אמרו הגוזל ומאכיל את בניו פטורין מלשלם הניח לפניהן בין גדולים בין קטנים חייבין משום סומכוס אמרו גדולים חייבין קטנים פטורין

From here, based on this exposition, the Sages stated: In a case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying the owner. If he left stolen goods to them as an inheritance, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to return the stolen goods. They said in the name of Sumakhos: If the heirs are adults they are obligated, but if they are minors they are exempt.

בר חמוה דרבי ירמיה טרק גלי באפיה דרבי ירמיה אתא לקמיה דרבי אבין

The Gemara recounts a related incident: The son of Rabbi Yirmeya’s father-in-law, i.e., his wife’s brother, who was a minor, shut the doors of his father’s house before Rabbi Yirmeya in order to prevent Rabbi Yirmeya from establishing legal possession of the house or a chamber that he claimed belonged to him. Rabbi Yirmeya came before Rabbi Avin to file a legal claim against his brother-in-law.

אמר שלו הוא תובע אמר ליה והא מייתינא סהדי דאחזקי ביה בחיי דאבוה אמר ליה וכי מקבלין עדים

Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Your brother-in-law is claiming ownership of that which is his, since he retains the presumptive ownership of his father’s house upon his father’s death. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: But I can bring witnesses who can testify that I took possession of it during his father’s lifetime. Rabbi Avin said to him: But does the court accept witnesses

שלא בפני בעל דין ולא והא קתני בין גדולים בין קטנים חייבין אמר ליה הרי מחלוקת סומכוס בצידך אמר איכפל כולי עלמא וקאי כסומכוס לאפקוען לדידי

who testify in the absence of a litigant? Since the defendant is a minor his presence is not legally recognized, and the court does not accept testimony against him. Rabbi Yirmeya questioned this assertion: And is it so that the court does not accept such testimony? But isn’t it taught that if a robber leaves stolen goods to his children, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to pay the owner? If the court obligates minors to pay, it must accept testimony about them. Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Sumakhos’s dispute is at your side, i.e., Sumakhos disagrees with this ruling and holds that the minors are exempt from paying. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Did the whole world go to the effort to hold in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos in order to seize what is mine?

אדהכי איגלגל מילתא אתא ומטא לקמיה דרבי אבהו אמר לא שמיע לכו הא דרב יוסף בר חמא אמר רבי אושעיא דאמר רב יוסף בר חמא אמר רבי אושעיא תינוק שתקף בעבדיו וירד לתוך שדה של חבירו ואמר שלי הוא אין אומרים נמתין עד שיגדיל אלא מוציאין מידו מיד ולכשיגדיל יביא עדים ונראה

In the meantime, the matter circulated and eventually came before Rabbi Abbahu, who said: Did you not hear that which Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says? As Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a child who took his slaves and descended into the field of another and said: It is mine, the court does not say: Let us wait until he matures before we assess his claims. Rather, the court removes it from his possession immediately, and when he matures he may bring witnesses to attest to his claim and we will see how to judge the case. Similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya should be awarded the disputed property until his minor brother-in-law may litigate in court.

מי דמי התם הוא דמפקינן מיניה דלא קיימא ליה אחזקה דאבוה אבל היכא דאית ליה חזקה דאבוה לא

The Gemara rejects Rabbi Abbahu’s assertion: Is the case that Rav Yosef bar Ḥama discusses comparable to the case of Rabbi Yirmeya? It is there, in Rav Yosef bar Ḥama’s case, that we seize the property from him, because there is no presumption of ownership from his father; but where he does have a presumption of ownership from his father, no, we do not seize his property. Since Rabbi Yirmeya’s brother-in-law has a presumption of ownership due to the fact that the property belonged to his father, he retains control of the property.

אמר רב אשי אמר רבי שבתאי מקבלין עדים שלא בפני בעל דין תהי בה רבי יוחנן וכי מקבלין עדים שלא בפני בעל דין

§ Having mentioned the issue of testimony in the absence of a litigant, the Gemara discusses this matter in greater detail. Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Shabbtai says: The court accepts witnesses even in the absence of a litigant. Rabbi Yoḥanan wondered at this statement of Rav Ashi, and said: Does the court in fact accept witnesses in the absence of a litigant?

קיבלה מיניה רבי יוסי בר חנינא כגון שהיה הוא חולה או עדיו חולים או שהיו עדיו מבקשין לילך למדינת הים ושלחו לו ולא בא

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina received the following guideline from Rabbi Yoḥanan: The court accepts testimony in the absence of the defendant only in a case where the plaintiff was ill, or his witnesses were ill, or his witnesses wished to travel overseas and the judges sent for the defendant and he did not come. Since there is a concern that the plaintiff will not be able to present his claims at a later date, the testimony is accepted even in the absence of the defendant.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מקבלין עדים שלא בפני בעל דין אמר מר עוקבא לדידי מיפרשא לי מיניה דשמואל כגון דפתחו ליה בדיניה ושלחו ליה ולא אתא אבל לא פתחו ליה בדינא מצי אמר ליה אנא לבית דין הגדול אזילנא

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The court accepts witnesses in the absence of a litigant. Mar Ukva said: This statement was explained to me personally by Shmuel himself, and he said that it applies in a case where the court opened his case and sent for him, but he did not appear. But if it did not yet open the case for him, he may say to the plaintiff: I am going to the High Court to resolve this case and will not appear in the local court.

אי הכי כי פתחו ליה נמי מצי אמר ליה לבית דין הגדול אזילנא אמר רבינא כגון דנקט דיסקא מבית דין הגדול

The Gemara asks: If so, then even when the court already opened the case for him, he should also be able to say to them: I am going to the High Court to resolve this case. The Gemara answers that Ravina said: The defendant may not defer an opened case to the High Court if, for example, the local court obtained a license from the High Court authorizing it to adjudicate the case.

אמר רב מקיימין את השטר שלא בפני בעל דין ורבי יוחנן אמר אין מקיימין את השטר שלא בפני בעל דין אמר ליה רב ששת לרבי יוסי בר אבהו אסברה לך טעמיה דרבי יוחנן אמר קרא והועד בבעליו ולא ישמרנו אמרה תורה יבא בעל השור ויעמוד על שורו

§ Having discussed testimony in the absence of a litigant, the Gemara addresses a similar matter. Rav says: The court ratifies a document in the absence of a litigant. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court does not ratify a document in the absence of a litigant. Rav Sheshet said to Rabbi Yosei bar Abbahu: I will explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reasoning to you. The verse states with regard to an ox that gored: “And warning has been given to its owner and he has not secured it” (Exodus 21:29). The Torah means to say: Let the owner of the ox come and stand by his ox when the testimony about the ox is provided. Similarly, a document may be ratified only in the presence of the individual it implicates.

אמר רבא הלכתא מקיימין את השטר שלא בפני בעל דין ואפילו עומד וצווח ואי אמר נקיטו לי זימנא עד דמייתינא סהדי ומרענא ליה לשטרא נקטינן ליה אי אתא אתא אי לא אתא נטרינן ליה שני וחמישי ושני

Rava said: The halakha is that the court ratifies a document in the absence of a litigant, and this is the case even if the other litigant stands and screams in protest that the document is a forgery. And if he said: Give me time until I bring witnesses and disqualify the document, we give him time before forcing him to pay. If he has come with witnesses within the time allotted to him, he has come, and the court reviews the case accordingly. If he does not come within the time allotted to him, we give him an additional three days on which to bring witnesses, when the court is in session: Monday, Thursday, and Monday.

אי לא אתא כתבינן פתיחא עלויה תשעין יומין תלתין קמאי לא נחתינן לנכסיה דאמר קא טרח בזוזי וניזוף מציעאי נמי לא נחתינן ליה לנכסיה דאמר דלמא לא אשכח למיזף וקא טרח ומזבין בתראי נמי לא נחתינן לנכסיה דאמר לוקח גופיה קא טרח בזוזי

If he still has not come, we write a document of ostracism against him for ninety days. During the first thirty days we do not descend to his property to collect his debt, as the court says: Perhaps he is occupied with borrowing money to pay his debt. During the middle period of thirty days as well, we do not descend to his property, as the court says: Perhaps he did not find someone to borrow from and he is now occupied with selling his property in order to pay his debt. During the final thirty days as well, we do not descend to his property, as the court says: Perhaps the debtor has found a purchaser and the purchaser himself is occupied with obtaining the money so that he can pay the debtor for the sale, and the debtor will then pay his debt.

לא אתא כתבינן אדרכתא אניכסיה והני מילי דאמר אתינא אבל אמר לא אתינא לאלתר כתבינן

If the debtor still did not come to pay his debt after ninety days, we write a document of authorization [adrakhta] allowing the creditor to collect his due from any property belonging to the debtor. And this statement applies only in a case where the debtor said: I am coming to pay and then he does not actually make an appearance. But if he said: I am not coming, we immediately write a document of authorization without waiting for ninety days to pass.

והני מילי במלוה אבל בפקדון לאלתר כתבינן

Furthermore, this matter of a ninety-day waiting period applies only with regard to a loan, as the debtor requires time in order to obtain the money to pay it back. But with regard to a deposit that the owner demands back from a bailee, we write a document of authorization immediately. Since a bailee should have immediate access to the deposit, there is no reason to grant him an extension.

וכי כתבינן אמקרקעי אבל אמטלטלי לא דלמא שמיט ואכיל להו מלוה למטלטלי וכי אתי לוה ומייתי סהדי ומרע ליה לשטרא לא משכח מידי למיגבה

The Gemara adds: When we write a document of authorization, the document applies only to the borrower’s land, but with regard to movable property, the court does not draft such a document. The reason for this is that perhaps the creditor will seize and consume the borrower’s movable property, and when the borrower later comes and brings witnesses and thereby invalidates the creditor’s document, he will not find anything to collect in order to retrieve his money.

ואי אית ליה מקרקעי למלוה כתבינן ולא היא אדרכתא אמטלטלי לא כתבינן אף על גב דאית ליה מקרקעי חיישינן שמא תכסיף

And if the creditor owns land, we write a document authorizing the creditor to collect from any property that belongs to the borrower, including movable property. Since the creditor owns land, there is no concern that if the borrower manages to overturn the ruling he will have nothing from which to collect. The Gemara comments: And that is not so. The court does not draft a document of authorization with regard to movable property even if the creditor has land. This is because we are concerned lest the creditor’s land depreciate in value and the borrower will be unable to retrieve his money.

וכי כתבינן אדרכתא מודעינן ליה והני מילי דמיקרב אבל מירחק לא

The Gemara teaches another halakha with regard to this matter: When we write the document of authorization, we inform the party that is liable to pay, as a final warning before authorizing a creditor to locate and take possession of his property in repayment of the debt. And this matter applies only when he is nearby, but if he is distant, the court does not notify him before authorizing the creditor.

ואי מירחק ואיכא קרובים אי נמי איכא שיירתא דאזלי ואתו התם משהינן ליה תריסר ירחי שתא עד דאזלא ואתי שיירתא כי הא דרבינא שהא למר אחא תריסר ירחי שתא עד דאזלא ואתייא שיירתא מבי חוזאי

And if he is distant but there are relatives of his nearby, or if there are caravans that go to the borrower’s current location and return, we delay issuing his document of authorization for the twelve months of the year, until the caravan goes and returns, so that if he wishes to make a claim, he can do so. This is like that incident where Ravina delayed for the twelve months of the year before issuing a document of authorization for Mar Aḥa, until a caravan went to and returned from Bei Ḥozai.

ולא היא התם איניש אלימא הוה אי הויא מטיא אדרכתא לידיה לא הוה אפשר לאפוקי מיניה אבל הכא לא נטרינן ליה אלא עד דאזיל שליחא בתלתא בשבתא ואתא בארבעה בשבתא ולחמשא בשבתא קאי בדיניה

The Gemara comments: And that is not so. There, Ravina delayed issuing the document because the creditor was a violent man, and if a document of authorization would come into his possession, it would not be possible to take it from him if the borrower would prove that the original document was invalid. But here, i.e., in general, we wait for the defendant to be informed only if he is close enough to be informed within a day. Consequently, if the court decided the issue on Monday, a messenger would go inform the defendant on Tuesday, and he could come from his location to the court on Wednesday and stand trial on Thursday. If a debtor is more than a day’s travel away, however, the court does not trouble itself to notify him.

אמר רבינא האי שלוחא דרבנן מהימנינן ליה כבי תרי והני מילי לשמתא אבל לפתיחא כיון דממונא קא מחסר ליה דקא בעי ליה למיתב ליה זוזי לספרא לא

§ Apropos the Gemara’s discussion of summoning an individual to court by means of a messenger, the Gemara discusses this issue in a more general manner. Ravina said: We deem the agent of the Rabbis, who was sent to summon an individual to court, as credible as two witnesses if he says that the defendant refuses to come to court. And this matter applies only with regard to excommunication, but with regard to issuing a document of ostracism, since it causes the defendant loss of money, as he must give money to the scribe for drafting the document, no, the agent is not deemed credible.

אמר רבינא יהבינן זימנא אפומא דאיתתא ואפומא דשיבבי ולא אמרן אלא דליתיה במתא

Additionally, Ravina said: We may give a defendant a particular time to appear in court by informing him of the trial by word of mouth from a woman or from his neighbors, as these people are trusted to notify the defendant of the court’s summons. The Gemara comments: And we said this only when the defendant is not in the city.