Bava Kamma 115

לא צריך לאהדורי עליה כולי האי

one does not need to pursue the matter in all this detail.

ודלמא איצטריך ליה זוזי וזבין אמר רב אשי הרי יצא לו שם גניבה בעיר

The Gemara questions this ruling: Perhaps he needed money, and he therefore sold the items despite the fact that he does not generally sell his personal belongings. The Gemara answers that Rav Ashi said: A rumor spread in the city that he had been a victim of theft. It is reasonable to assume that he is the rightful owner, as he does not usually sell his belongings and it is common knowledge that he was the victim of theft.

איתמר גנב ומכר ואחר כך הוכר הגנב רב משמיה דרבי חייא אמר הדין עם הראשון רבי יוחנן משמיה דרבי ינאי אמר הדין עם השני

§ Having assessed the mishna’s ruling with regard to a case where the thief remained unidentified, the Gemara discusses a case where the thief was found. It was stated: In a case where a thief stole an item and sold it, and later the thief was identified, Rav says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The homeowner’s claim can be pursued only with the first one, i.e., the thief, but he has no claim against the purchaser. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The homeowner’s claim can also be pursued with the second one, i.e., with the purchaser.

אמר רב יוסף לא פליגי כאן לפני יאוש הדין עם השני כאן לאחר יאוש הדין עם הראשון

Rav Yosef said: Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan do not disagree. Here, in the case about which Rabbi Yoḥanan issues his ruling, the item was purchased from the thief before the victim of the theft despaired of recovering the stolen item. Consequently, the claim can be pursued even with the second one, i.e., the purchaser. Conversely, there, in the case about which Rav issues his ruling, the item was purchased after the victim despaired, and therefore the claim can be pursued only with the first one, i.e., the thief.

ותרוייהו אית להו דרב חסדא

Rav Yosef continues: And both Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan have accepted as halakha the ruling of Rav Ḥisda (111b), that if the owner had not yet despaired of retrieving his item, he can press his claim against either the thief or the purchaser.

אמר ליה אביי ולא פליגי הא מתנות כהונה כלפני יאוש דמי ופליגי דתנן אמר לו מכור לי מעיה של פרה והיו בהן מתנות נותנן לכהן ואינו מנכה לו מן הדמים לקח הימנו במשקל נותנו לכהן ומנכה לו מן הדמים

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And is it so that Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan do not disagree? Isn’t a case involving gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled comparable to a case of a stolen item that was sold before the onset of the owner’s despair, as the priest still hopes to receive the gifts, and yet Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to their legal status? This is as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 132a): If one said to a butcher: Sell me the innards of a cow, and the gifts of the priesthood were in them, the purchaser must give the gifts to a priest, and he may not deduct the value of the gifts from the money he agreed to pay the butcher. By contrast, if he purchased the innards from the butcher by weight, he must give the gifts to a priest and he may deduct the value of the gifts from the money he agreed to pay the butcher.

ואמר רב לא שנו אלא ששקל לעצמו אבל שקל לו הטבח הדין עם הטבח

And Rav says: They taught this halakha only where the purchaser weighed the innards for himself, but if the butcher weighed the innards for him, the priest’s claim may be pursued only with the butcher. The butcher is comparable to a thief when he sells the gifts of the priesthood to a non-priest, and Rav holds that the priest can press his claim only against the butcher. Similarly, in the case of the mishna he would hold that the owner can press his claim only against the thief and not against the purchaser.

אימא אף דין עם הטבח מהו דתימא אין מתנות כהונה נגזלות קא משמע לן

The Gemara refutes Abaye’s objection: Say that Rav meant that the priest can even pursue his claim with the butcher, although he is certainly able to claim the gifts from the purchaser. And Rav had to teach this lest you say that gifts of the priesthood are not considered to have been stolen even if the butcher sells them, because wherever they are they remain the legal property of the priests. Rav therefore teaches us that they are considered to have been stolen in this case, and therefore the priest can press his claim against the butcher.

ולאביי דאמר פליגי במאי פליגי בדרב חסדא

The Gemara asks: And according to Abaye, who said that Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree, with regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. Rav disagrees with Rav Ḥisda and rules that one is entitled to collect only from the thief, while Rabbi Yoḥanan accepts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda and allows one to collect from either the thief or the purchaser.

רב זביד אמר כגון שנתייאשו הבעלים ביד לוקח ולא נתייאשו ביד גנב

The Gemara presents another explanation of the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rav Zevid said that both agree that if the owner has not yet despaired of retrieving his item, he can press his claim against either party. They disagree in a case where the owners despaired of retrieving it only after the item was already in the possession of the purchaser, but they did not yet despair when it was in the possession of the thief.

ובהא פליגי מר סבר יאוש ואחר כך שינוי רשות קני שינוי רשות ואחר כך יאוש לא קני ומר סבר לא שנא

And it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that if there is despair on the part of the owner and afterward there is a change in possession of a stolen item, e.g., it leaves the possession of the thief and enters the possession of a purchaser, the purchaser acquires the item. By contrast, if there is first a change in possession of a stolen item and afterward there is despair on the part of the owner, then the purchaser does not acquire the item. Since in this case the owner did not despair until after the change of possession from the thief to the purchaser, the purchaser did not legally acquire the item, and the owner can press his claim against him. And one Sage, Rav, holds that there is no difference whether the despair or change of possession came first. As long as the owner has despaired of recovering his item, it becomes the property of the purchaser, and the owner cannot demand that he return it.

רב פפא אמר בגלימא דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דהדר למריה והכא בעשו בו תקנת השוק קמיפלגי

The Gemara presents a third explanation of the dispute: Rav Pappa said that with regard to a stolen cloak itself, everyone agrees that it must be returned by the purchaser to its owner. But here, it is with regard to whether the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case that Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree.

רב משמיה דרבי חייא אמר הדין עם הראשון דינא דלוקח דלישקול זוזי מגנב ולא עשו בו תקנת השוק ורבי יוחנן משום דרבי ינאי אמר הדין עם השני דינא דלוקח דלישקול מבעל הבית ועשו בו תקנת השוק

Rav says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya that the claim can be pursued only with the first one, i.e., the thief, meaning that the law with regard to the purchaser is that, after returning the item to its owner, he can collect money only from the thief, and the Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai that the claim of the purchaser can be pursued with the second one, meaning that the law with regard to the purchaser is that he can also collect the money from the owner when he returns the item to him, and the Sages did implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case.

וסבר רב לא עשו בו תקנת השוק והא רב הונא תלמידיה דרב הוה וחנן בישא גנב גלימא וזבנה אתא לקמיה דרב הונא אמר ליה לההוא גברא זיל שרי עביטך

The Gemara questions this answer: And did Rav hold that the Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case? But wasn’t Rav Huna a student of Rav, and yet when a certain thief known as Ḥanan the Wicked stole a cloak and then sold it, and the case came before Rav Huna, he said to that man from whom the cloak was stolen: Go redeem your pledge from the purchaser, i.e., reimburse the purchaser for the garment that he returned to you. Evidently, Rav’s own student held that the Sages did allow a purchaser to claim reimbursement from the owner.

שאני חנן בישא כיון דליכא לאישתלומי מיניה כלא הוכר דמי

The Gemara answers that Ḥanan the Wicked is different. Since he has no money, there is no way for the purchaser to collect payment from him, and the case is therefore comparable to a case where the thief was not identified, with regard to which case the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace.

אמר רבא אם גנב מפורסם הוא לא עשו בו תקנת השוק והא חנן בישא דמפורסם הוה ועשו בו תקנת השוק נהי דמפורסם לבישותא לגניבותא לא מפורסם

Rava says: If he is a well-known thief, the Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case. The purchaser should have been aware that the item may be stolen and should not have purchased it. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Ḥanan the Wicked well known, and yet, according to Rav Huna, the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case? The Gemara answers: Although he was well known for villainy, he was not well known for theft.

איתמר גנב ופרע בחובו גנב ופרע בהיקיפו לא עשו בו תקנת השוק דאמרי לא אדעתא דהנהו יהיבת ליה מידי

§ The Gemara continues to examine the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace. It was stated: With regard to one who stole and repaid his debt with the stolen item, or one who stole and repaid his debt from credit that was extended to him with the stolen item, the Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case, as they say to the creditor: It was not with the expectation of receiving these stolen items that you gave the debtor anything.

משכנתא שוי מאתן במאה עשו בו תקנת השוק שוה בשוה אמימר אמר לא עשו בו תקנת השוק מר זוטרא אמר עשו בו תקנת השוק

With regard to the integrity of the marketplace, it was also stated that if a thief provided a stolen item worth two hundred dinars as collateral for a loan of one hundred dinars, the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case. Consequently, the creditor is entitled to reimbursement from the owner for returning the collateral. If the collateral and the loan were of equal value, Ameimar said: The Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case, while Mar Zutra said: The Sages did implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case.

והלכתא עשו בו תקנת השוק

The Gemara comments: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Mar Zutra that the Sages did implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case.

זבינא שוה בשוה עשו בו תקנת השוק שוה מאה במאתן רב ששת אמר לא עשו בו תקנת השוק רבא אמר עשו בו תקנת השוק

The Gemara examines other applications of this provision: In a sale, if the stolen item was purchased for an amount equal to its actual market value, the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case. If a stolen item worth one hundred dinars was purchased at the price of two hundred dinars, Rav Sheshet says: The Sages did not implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case, while Rava says: The Sages did implement the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case.

והלכתא בכולהו עשו בו תקנת השוק לבר מגנב ופרע בחובו גנב ופרע בהיקיפו

The Gemara states: And the halakha is that in all these cases the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace, except with regard to one who stole and repaid his debt with the stolen item and one who stole and repaid his debt from credit that was extended to him with the stolen item.

אבימי בר נאזי חמוה דרבינא הוה מסיק בההוא גברא ארבעה זוזי גנב גלימא אתיא ניהליה אוזפיה ארבעה זוזי אחריני לסוף הוכר הגנב אתא לקמיה דרבינא

The Gemara recounts a related incident: Avimi bar Nazi, the father-in-law of Ravina, was owed four dinars by a certain man, who then stole a cloak and brought it to Avimi as repayment for the loan. Avimi then lent him four additional dinars. In the end, the thief was identified as the debtor, and the case came before Ravina to determine whether or not the owner would have to pay Avimi for returning the cloak.

אמר קמאי גנב ופרע בחובו ולא בעי למיתב ליה ולא מידי הנך ארבעה זוזי אחריני שקול זוזך והדר גלימי

Ravina said to Avimi: With regard to the first four dinars that were lent, the thief is viewed as one who stole and repaid his debt, and the owner is not required to give anything in exchange for the garment’s return as the Sages’ ordinance ensuring the integrity of the marketplace does not apply in such a case. With regard to those four additional dinars, take your money from the owner of the cloak and return the cloak to him. Since Avimi lent the second set of dinars only because he had received the cloak, Ravina ruled that the Sages’ ordinance applied to him.

מתקיף לה רב כהן ודלמא גלימא בהני זוזי קמאי יהבה ניהליה גנב ופרע בחובו גנב ופרע בהיקיפו וארבעה זוזי בתראי הימוני הימניה כי היכי דהימניה מעיקרא איגלגל מילתא מטא לקמיה דרבי אבהו אמר הלכתא כרב כהן

Rav Kohen objects to this: But perhaps the cloak was given to Avimi only in payment for these first four dinars, and it was a case of a thief who stole and repaid his debt or who stole and repaid his debt from credit that was extended to him with the stolen item. And the latter four dinars were loaned because Avimi trusted the debtor, just as he trusted him initially, when he lent the first four dinars. The cloak was not collateral for the second loan, and therefore the Sages’ ordinance should not apply. The matter circulated until it came before Rabbi Abbahu, who said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kohen.

נרשאה גנב ספרא זבניה לפפונאה בתמנן זוזי אזל פפונאה זבניה לבר מחוזאה במאה ועשרין זוזי לסוף הוכר הגנב אמר אביי ליזיל מרי דספרא ויהב ליה לבר מחוזא תמנן זוזי ושקיל ספריה ואזיל בר מחוזאה ושקיל ארבעין מפפונאה

The Gemara recounts another incident: A resident of Naresh stole a scroll and sold it to a resident of Pappunya for eighty dinars. The resident of Pappunya then went and sold it to a resident of Meḥoza for one hundred and twenty dinars. In the end, the thief was identified and Abaye said: The original owner of the scroll should go and give the resident of Meḥoza eighty dinars and take his scroll in return. And afterward, the resident of Meḥoza should go and take the remaining forty dinars from the resident of Pappunya.

מתקיף לה רבא השתא לוקח מגנב עשו בו תקנת השוק לוקח מלוקח מיבעיא

Rava objects to this: Now that it has been established that with regard to one who purchases from a thief, the Sages implemented the provision ensuring the integrity of the marketplace in this case despite the fact that he dealt with the thief directly, is it necessary to teach that the same would apply to one who purchased a stolen item from a purchaser? Accordingly, the final purchaser is entitled to receive from the original owner the full amount that he paid for the item.

אלא אמר רבא ליזיל מריה דספרא ויהיב ליה לבר מחוזאה מאה ועשרין זוזי ושקיל ספריה וליזיל מרי דספרא ולישקול ארבעין מפפונאה ותמנן מנרשאה

Rather, Rava said that the original owner of the scroll should go and give the resident of Meḥoza one hundred and twenty dinars and take his scroll in return. And afterward the original owner of the scroll should go and collect forty dinars from the resident of Pappunya and eighty dinars from the resident of Naresh, as each profited from the sale in these amounts, respectively.

מתני׳ זה בא בחביתו של יין וזה בא בכדו של דבש נסדקה חבית של דבש ושפך זה את יינו והציל את הדבש לתוכו

MISHNA: In a situation where this individual came with his barrel of wine, and that individual came with his jug of honey, if the barrel of honey cracked and this first individual poured out his wine and salvaged the other’s honey, which is worth more than the wine, by collecting it into his wine barrel,

אין לו אלא שכרו ואם אמר אציל את שלך ואתה נותן לי דמי שלי חייב ליתן לו

the owner of the wine has the right to collect only his wage, i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging the honey. He is not, however, entitled to compensation for the wine itself. But if the owner of the wine said: I will salvage your honey and you will pay me the value of my wine, the owner of the honey is obligated to pay him compensation for the wine.

שטף נחל חמורו וחמור חבירו שלו יפה מנה ושל חבירו מאתים והניח זה את שלו והציל את של חבירו אין לו אלא שכרו ואם אמר לו אני אציל את שלך ואתה נותן לי את שלי חייב ליתן לו

Similarly, if a river washed away his donkey and the donkey of another, and his donkey was worth one hundred dinars and the donkey of the other was worth two hundred, and the individual with the less valuable donkey abandoned his donkey and instead salvaged the donkey of the other, he has the right to collect only his wage, i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging his fellow’s donkey. But if he said to the owner of the more valuable donkey: I will salvage your donkey and you will pay me the monetary value of mine in exchange, the owner of the more valuable donkey is obligated to pay the rescuer compensation for his donkey.

גמ׳ ואמאי לימא ליה מהפקירא קא זכינא מי לא תניא הרי שהיה טעון כדי יין וכדי שמן וראה שהן משתברות לא יאמר הרי זה תרומה ומעשר על פירות שיש לי בתוך ביתי ואם אמר לא אמר כלום

GEMARA: And why does one who pours out wine have the right to collect only this wage? Let him say to the owner of the honey: I have acquired your honey from ownerless property. Isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who was laden with jugs of wine and jugs of oil and saw that they were breaking and their contents were leaking out should not say: This is hereby separated as teruma and tithe for the produce that I have in my house. And even if he said this, it is as though he did not say anything. The fact that one cannot separate produce that is about to be lost as teruma or tithe indicates that such property is considered ownerless.

כדאמר רבי ירמיה כשעקל בית הבד כרוך עליה הכי נמי כשעקל בית הבד כרוך עליה

The Gemara answers that it is as Rabbi Yirmeya says in a different context, that the ruling discussed there is referring to a case where the basket of the olive press was wrapped around it so that the barrel would not break completely, and some of the contents would remain inside. So too, here, the mishna issued its ruling only when the basket of the olive press was wrapped around the honey barrel so that it would not break completely, and the contents are therefore not rendered ownerless.

ואם אמר לא אמר כלום והתניא מי שבא בדרך ומעות בידו ואנס כנגדו לא יאמר הרי פירות שיש לי בתוך ביתי מחוללים על מעות הללו ואם אמר דבריו קיימין

The Gemara challenges the baraita that stated: And even if he said that the wine or oil is separated as teruma or tithe, it is as though he did not say anything. But isn’t it taught in a different baraita: If one was traveling on the road and had money in his possession, and he saw a ruffian moving toward him, he should not say: The second-tithe produce that I have in my house is hereby desacralized onto these coins, i.e., the sanctity of the produce is hereby transferred to the coins. But if he said so, his statement stands, and the produce is desacralized while the coins attain the sanctity of the second tithe.

הכא במאי עסקינן בשיכול להציל אי בשיכול להציל לכתחלה אמאי לא יאמר בשיכול להציל על ידי הדחק

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he is capable of saving his money from the ruffian and that is why he may transfer the sanctity of the second tithe to the coins. The Gemara asks: If it is a case where he is capable of saving the money, why should he not say that the produce should be desacralized ab initio? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he is capable of saving the money only with difficulty. Consequently, he should not transfer the sanctity of the second tithe to the coins, as it may be lost; but if he does so, the transfer takes effect, as it is not certain that the money will be lost.

וכל היכא דאיכא הפסידא לכתחלה לא יאמר והתניא הרי שהיו לו עשר חביות של טבל טמא וראה אחת מהן שנשברה או שנתגלתה אומר הרי היא תרומת מעשר על תשע חברותיה ובשמן לא יעשה כן מפני הפסד כהן

The Gemara asks: And is it so that wherever there is a potential loss one should not say that the sanctity is transferred to the money ab initio? But isn’t it taught otherwise in the following baraita: If one had ten barrels of ritually impure, untithed wine, i.e., first-tithe wine from which the teruma of the tithe had not yet been separated, and he saw that one of them had broken and that its contents were leaking out, or that it had been exposed and is forbidden for consumption, he may say: This barrel is hereby separated as the teruma of the tithe for the other nine barrels. But with regard to oil, he should not do so due to the priest’s loss.

אמר רבי ירמיה כשעקל בית הבד כרוך עליה בשלמא שנשברה חזיא אלא נתגלתה למאי חזיא

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yirmeya said: The baraita issued its ruling only when the basket of the olive press was wrapped around the barrel so that some of its contents would remain inside. The Gemara asks: Granted, this rationale applies to a barrel that was broken, as the remaining contents are still fit for use, but with regard to a barrel that was exposed, for what use is it fit?

וכי תימא חזיא לזילוף והתניא מים שנתגלו הרי זה לא ישפכם ברשות הרבים ולא יגבל בהן את הטיט ולא ירבץ בהן את הבית ולא ישקה מהם את בהמתו ולא בהמת חבירו

And if you would say that the exposed wine is fit for sprinkling, in order to spread its pleasant aroma, isn’t it taught otherwise in the following baraita? With regard to water that was exposed, one may not pour it out in the public domain, nor mix clay with it, nor settle dust with it by sprinkling it in a house, nor give it to his animal to drink, nor give it to the animal of another. This proves that exposed liquids may not be used even for sprinkling.

דעבר לה במסננת כרבי נחמיה דתניא מסננת יש בה משום גילוי אמר רבי נחמיה אימתי בזמן שהתחתונה מגולה אבל בזמן שהתחתונה מכוסה אף על פי שהעליונה מגולה אין בה משום גילוי לפי שארס של נחש דומה לספוג וצף ועומד במקומו

The Gemara answers: The wine is fit for use because he passed it through a strainer, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as it is taught in a baraita: A vessel covered with a strainer is subject to the halakha of exposure if the vessel is left unsupervised. Rabbi Neḥemya said: When is this so? It is so when the lower vessel, in which the liquid collects after passing through the strainer, is exposed. But when the lower vessel is covered, even if the upper vessel is exposed, it is not subject to the halakha of exposure, because the venom of a snake is like a sponge in that it floats and stays in place.

לאו איתמר עלה אמר רבי סימון אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי לא שנו אלא שלא טרקו אבל טרקו אסור

The Gemara questions this explanation: Wasn’t it stated with regard to Rabbi Neḥemya’s ruling that Rabbi Simon says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: They taught Rabbi Neḥemya’s ruling only where one did not mix it, but if one mixed the wine, any venom found in it becomes capable of penetrating the strainer? Consequently, the wine remains forbidden even if it is passed through a strainer.

התם נמי אפשר דמנח מידי אפומא דחביתא דשפי ליה

The Gemara answers: There, too, it is possible to prevent the venom from mixing with the wine by placing something upon the mouth of a barrel that will filter it slowly so that the venom will not penetrate the strainer, and the wine may therefore be used.

ורבי נחמיה (מטמא אטמא) מי תרמינן

It has now been established that the baraita, which states that if one’s barrel of untithed, impure wine is breaking, he may separate it as teruma of the tithe for other barrels of untithed, impure wine, may be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Neḥemya, may we separate teruma from impure produce for other impure produce?

והתניא תורמין מן הטמא על הטמא ומן הטהור על הטהור ומן הטהור על הטמא אבל לא מן הטמא על הטהור רבי נחמיה אומר אף מן הטמא על הטמא לא התירו לתרום אלא בשל דמאי הכא נמי בשל דמאי

But isn’t it taught in another baraita: One may separate teruma from produce that is impure for other produce that is impure, and from produce that is pure for other produce that is pure, and from produce that is pure for produce that is impure, but not from produce that is impure for produce that is pure. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Even with regard to separating from produce that is impure for produce that is impure, the Sages permitted one to separate teruma in this manner only in the case of doubtfully tithed produce [demai]. Consequently, how can the aforementioned baraita unequivocally permit one to separate impure wine as teruma of the tithe for other impure wine? The Gemara answers: Here too, in the baraita, it is discussing a case of demai.

אמר מר ובשמן לא יעשה כן מפני הפסד כהן מאי שנא שמן דראוי להדליק יין נמי ראוי לזילוף וכי תימא זילוף לאו מילתא היא והאמר שמואל משום רבי חייא שותין מלוג בסלע ומזלפין מלוג בשתים

The Gemara discusses the continuation of the baraita cited previously: The Master said in the baraita: But with regard to oil, he should not do so, due to the priest’s loss. The Gemara asks: What is different about a leaking barrel of impure oil, which one may not separate as teruma, because if he does so the priest will suffer a loss? That case is different because the impure teruma oil is fit to be used to kindle a fire, and the priest will now not receive that oil. The Gemara challenges: But wine is also fit to be used, as the priest is able to sprinkle it in order to impart a pleasant aroma. Why is there is no concern that the priest will suffer a loss? And if you would say that sprinkling is nothing, i.e., it is insignificant, doesn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One drinks from a log of wine worth one sela, and one sprinkles from a log of wine worth two sela, which indicates that there is greater benefit in sprinkling wine than in drinking it?

הכא במאי עסקינן בחדש והא ראוי לישנו אתי ביה לידי תקלה

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with new wine that has not yet developed an aroma and is therefore not fit for sprinkling. The Gemara counters: But isn’t it fit to allow it to age so that it will become fit for sprinkling? The Gemara responds: If one waits for it to age, he might come to experience a mishap with it, as he will forget that it is impure teruma, which is forbidden for consumption.

שמן נמי אתי ביה לידי תקלה דמנח בכלי מאוס יין נמי מנח ליה בכלי מאוס השתא לזילוף קא בעי ליה בכלי מאוס קא מנח ליה

The Gemara asks: Oil should also be subject to the concern that one might come to experience a mishap with it, as he might forget that it is forbidden and mistakenly drink it. The Gemara explains: The halakha is that the priest must place the oil in a foul vessel, and there is no concern that he will consume it, as such oil is used only for kindling. The Gemara asks: Let the wine also be placed in a foul vessel, in which case there would be no concern that he would drink it. The Gemara responds: Now that he desires to use it for sprinkling, would he place it in a foul vessel? This would ruin its aroma. Consequently, the wine may not be kept due to concern over a possible mishap, while the oil may be kept.

ותקלה עצמה תנאי היא דתניא חבית של יין של תרומה שנטמאת בית שמאי אומרים

The Gemara notes: And the concern with regard to a mishap itself is a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that became impure and is therefore forbidden for consumption, Beit Shammai say: