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Today's Daf Yomi

November 29, 2018 | 讻状讗 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Chullin 2

Who is allowed to slaughter animals? Can women? Something in the mishna is problematic and the gemara聽starts to bring an alternate explanation of the mishna in order to resolve the problem.


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诪转谞讬壮 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 砖诪讗 讬拽诇拽诇讜 讗转 砖讞讬讟转谉 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讜讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转谉 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛

MISHNA: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid.

讙诪壮 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讚讬注讘讚

GEMARA: There is an apparent contradiction between the first two phrases of the mishna. The tanna begins: Everyone slaughters an animal, indicating that their performing slaughter is permitted ab initio, and then teaches: And their slaughter is valid, indicating that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讻诇 讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讻诇 诪诪讬专讬谉 讗讞讚 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讛谞砖讬诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇讬驻谞讜 讜诇讗 讬诪讬专 讗转讜 讟讜讘 讘专注 讗讜 专注 讘讟讜讘

Rav A岣, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And does every use of the term: Everyone, indicate that the action in question is permitted ab initio? If that is so, in the mishna (Temura 2a), where it says: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, both men and women, is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淗e shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good鈥 (Leviticus 27:10)?

讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 砖讛讗讚诐 专砖讗讬 诇讛诪讬专 讗诇讗 砖讗诐 讛诪讬专 诪讜诪专 讜住讜驻讙 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐

Rav Ashi answers: There, the reason the mishna uses the word everyone is that it immediately teaches: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to substitute; rather, it means that if one did substitute a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs [vesofeg] the forty lashes that are the punishment for violating the prohibition 鈥淣or substitute it.鈥 But here, since the mishna does not similarly qualify its statement, it indicates that everyone may perform the slaughter ab initio.

讗诇讗 讛讻诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜谞注专讻讬谉 谞讜讚专讬谉 讜谞讬讚专讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜讻讬 转讞讚诇 诇谞讚专 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讱 讞讟讗

Rav A岣 challenges: But a mishna teaches (Arakhin 2a): Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah based on the age and gender of the person valuated; and everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay; everyone vows to donate the market value of a person as a slave to the Temple treasury and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his market value. Is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But it is written: 鈥淎nd if you shall cease to vow, there shall be no sin in you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:23), indicating that it is preferable not to vow.

讜讻转讬讘 讟讜讘 讗砖专 诇讗 转讚专 诪砖转讚讜专 讜诇讗 转砖诇诐 讜转谞讬讗 讟讜讘 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讜讚专 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讟讜讘 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 谞讜讚专 讜诪砖诇诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讝讜

And it is written: 鈥淚t is better that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay鈥 (Ecclesiastes 5:4); and it is taught in a baraita with regard to that verse: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who vows and pays, is one who does not take a vow at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who does not vow at all, is one who vows and pays in fulfillment of that vow. Rav A岣 comments: And even Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only in a case where one vows and says: This animal is designated for sacrifice, as in that case there is no concern that he will fail to fulfill his commitment, since even if the animal is stolen or lost, he is not required to bring another in its place.

讗讘诇 讗诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 诇讗

But in the case of one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that no, it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so ab initio.

讜讻诇 讛讻诇 诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬诐 讘住讜讻讛 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘爪讬爪讬转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛

Rav Ashi responded: And is that to say that every use of the term: Everyone, is an indication that the action in question is not permitted ab initio? Rather, is the term: Everyone, in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka, and in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, also an indication that they are not permitted ab initio?

讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讻诇 住讜诪讻讬谉 讗讞讚 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讛谞砖讬诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜住诪讱 讬讚讜 讜谞专爪讛

Rav A岣 answered: I am not speaking about cases where it is stated: Everyone is obligated, as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi asked: If that is so, that which was stated: Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the animal, both men and women (see Mena岣t 93a), is that also an expression indicating that it is not permitted ab initio? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him鈥 (Leviticus 1:4)?

讗讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讗讬讻讗 讛讻诇 讚讬注讘讚 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讚讛讻讗 诪诪讗讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讚转拽砖讬 诇讱 讚诇诪讗 讚讬注讘讚 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 转拽砖讬 诇讱

Rav A岣 answered: Indeed, there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates ab initio, and there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates after the fact. Rather, concerning the term: Everyone, that appears here in the mishna, from where can it be determined that it is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio, creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you? Perhaps it is an expression indicating that everyone鈥檚 slaughter is valid after the fact, and there will not be a contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讚讬注讘讚 诪讻诇诇 讚讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬 讚讬注讘讚 转专转讬 讚讬注讘讚 诇诪讛 诇讬

Rav Ashi said to Rav A岣: I find the phrase: And their slaughter is valid, to be difficult for me. From the fact that the tanna teaches: And their slaughter is valid, which is an expression indicating that it is valid after the fact, conclude by inference that the initial phrase in the mishna: Everyone slaughters, is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio. As, if it indicated that it is valid after the fact, why do I need two phrases teaching that it is valid after the fact?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 讛拽讚砖 讜拽住讘专 讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 讛拽讚砖 讻拽讚砖 讚诪讜

Rabba bar Ulla said, in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio. The Gemara interjects: What is the purpose of stating that a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is to non-sacred animals that were being prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food, and the tanna holds that the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is like that of sacrificial food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.

讻讬爪讚 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 诪讘讬讗 住讻讬谉 讗专讜讻讛 讜砖讜讞讟 讘讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬讙注 讘讘砖专

The Gemara asks: How does an impure person act in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: He brings a long knife and slaughters the animal with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh of the slaughtered animal.

讜讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 砖诪讗 讬讙注 讘讘砖专 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讜讗讜诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞讙注转讬 砖讞讬讟转讜 讻砖专讛

Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: And the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter ab initio is that with regard to sacrificial animals, he may not slaughter them ab initio even with a long knife, lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered the sacrificial animal and says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, his slaughter is valid after the fact.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讙专讬讚讬 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.

讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讗讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讛讗 讗诪专转 诇讻转讞诇讛 谞诪讬 砖讞讬讟

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since it stands adjacent to that halakha, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered. Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. But didn鈥檛 you say in that case: He slaughters the animal even ab initio?

讜讗诇讗 讗讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 讘讘专讬 诇讬 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讚谞砖讬讬诇讬讛

And rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is sufficient, and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case where the ritually impure person is not before us so that we can ask him whether he came into contact with the flesh.

讛讗讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诪讛讻讗 谞驻拽讗 诪讛转诐 谞驻拽讗 讻诇 讛驻住讜诇讬谉 砖砖讞讟讜 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 砖讛砖讞讬讟讛 讻砖专讛 讘讝专讬诐 讘谞砖讬诐 讜讘注讘讚讬诐 讜讘讟诪讗讬诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬讛讬讜 讟诪讗讬谉 谞讜讙注讬谉 讘讘砖专

The Gemara asks: Is this halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal learned from an analysis of the mishna here? It is learned explicitly from the mishna there (Zeva岣m 31b): With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.

讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讛转诐 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 砖讗专 驻住讜诇讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讚讘拽讚砖讬诐 拽讗讬 讛讻讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 转谞讬 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara answers: The mishna here is the primary source. There, since the tanna taught the rest of those disqualified for Temple service, he taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal as well. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zeva岣m, which deals with sacrificial animals. Here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, he also teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal.

讛讗讬 讟诪讗 讚讗讬讟诪讗 讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘诪转 讘讞诇诇 讞专讘 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: This ritually impure person mentioned in the mishna is one who became impure with what form of impurity? If we say that he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, this is difficult, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd whosoever in the open field touches one slain with a sword鈥 (Numbers 19:16).

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Chullin 2

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Chullin 2

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 砖诪讗 讬拽诇拽诇讜 讗转 砖讞讬讟转谉 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讜讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转谉 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛

MISHNA: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid.

讙诪壮 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讚讬注讘讚

GEMARA: There is an apparent contradiction between the first two phrases of the mishna. The tanna begins: Everyone slaughters an animal, indicating that their performing slaughter is permitted ab initio, and then teaches: And their slaughter is valid, indicating that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讻诇 讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讻诇 诪诪讬专讬谉 讗讞讚 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讛谞砖讬诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇讬驻谞讜 讜诇讗 讬诪讬专 讗转讜 讟讜讘 讘专注 讗讜 专注 讘讟讜讘

Rav A岣, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And does every use of the term: Everyone, indicate that the action in question is permitted ab initio? If that is so, in the mishna (Temura 2a), where it says: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, both men and women, is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淗e shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good鈥 (Leviticus 27:10)?

讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 砖讛讗讚诐 专砖讗讬 诇讛诪讬专 讗诇讗 砖讗诐 讛诪讬专 诪讜诪专 讜住讜驻讙 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐

Rav Ashi answers: There, the reason the mishna uses the word everyone is that it immediately teaches: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to substitute; rather, it means that if one did substitute a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs [vesofeg] the forty lashes that are the punishment for violating the prohibition 鈥淣or substitute it.鈥 But here, since the mishna does not similarly qualify its statement, it indicates that everyone may perform the slaughter ab initio.

讗诇讗 讛讻诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜谞注专讻讬谉 谞讜讚专讬谉 讜谞讬讚专讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜讻讬 转讞讚诇 诇谞讚专 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讱 讞讟讗

Rav A岣 challenges: But a mishna teaches (Arakhin 2a): Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah based on the age and gender of the person valuated; and everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay; everyone vows to donate the market value of a person as a slave to the Temple treasury and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his market value. Is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But it is written: 鈥淎nd if you shall cease to vow, there shall be no sin in you鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:23), indicating that it is preferable not to vow.

讜讻转讬讘 讟讜讘 讗砖专 诇讗 转讚专 诪砖转讚讜专 讜诇讗 转砖诇诐 讜转谞讬讗 讟讜讘 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讜讚专 讻诇 注讬拽专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讟讜讘 诪讝讛 讜诪讝讛 谞讜讚专 讜诪砖诇诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讝讜

And it is written: 鈥淚t is better that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay鈥 (Ecclesiastes 5:4); and it is taught in a baraita with regard to that verse: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who vows and pays, is one who does not take a vow at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who does not vow at all, is one who vows and pays in fulfillment of that vow. Rav A岣 comments: And even Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only in a case where one vows and says: This animal is designated for sacrifice, as in that case there is no concern that he will fail to fulfill his commitment, since even if the animal is stolen or lost, he is not required to bring another in its place.

讗讘诇 讗诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 诇讗

But in the case of one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that no, it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so ab initio.

讜讻诇 讛讻诇 诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬诐 讘住讜讻讛 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘爪讬爪讬转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛

Rav Ashi responded: And is that to say that every use of the term: Everyone, is an indication that the action in question is not permitted ab initio? Rather, is the term: Everyone, in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka, and in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, also an indication that they are not permitted ab initio?

讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讻诇 住讜诪讻讬谉 讗讞讚 讛讗谞砖讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讛谞砖讬诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜住诪讱 讬讚讜 讜谞专爪讛

Rav A岣 answered: I am not speaking about cases where it is stated: Everyone is obligated, as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi asked: If that is so, that which was stated: Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the animal, both men and women (see Mena岣t 93a), is that also an expression indicating that it is not permitted ab initio? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him鈥 (Leviticus 1:4)?

讗讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讜讗讬讻讗 讛讻诇 讚讬注讘讚 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讚讛讻讗 诪诪讗讬 讚诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讚转拽砖讬 诇讱 讚诇诪讗 讚讬注讘讚 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 转拽砖讬 诇讱

Rav A岣 answered: Indeed, there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates ab initio, and there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates after the fact. Rather, concerning the term: Everyone, that appears here in the mishna, from where can it be determined that it is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio, creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you? Perhaps it is an expression indicating that everyone鈥檚 slaughter is valid after the fact, and there will not be a contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 讚讬注讘讚 诪讻诇诇 讚讛讻诇 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬 讚讬注讘讚 转专转讬 讚讬注讘讚 诇诪讛 诇讬

Rav Ashi said to Rav A岣: I find the phrase: And their slaughter is valid, to be difficult for me. From the fact that the tanna teaches: And their slaughter is valid, which is an expression indicating that it is valid after the fact, conclude by inference that the initial phrase in the mishna: Everyone slaughters, is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio. As, if it indicated that it is valid after the fact, why do I need two phrases teaching that it is valid after the fact?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 讛拽讚砖 讜拽住讘专 讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 讛拽讚砖 讻拽讚砖 讚诪讜

Rabba bar Ulla said, in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio. The Gemara interjects: What is the purpose of stating that a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is to non-sacred animals that were being prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food, and the tanna holds that the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is like that of sacrificial food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.

讻讬爪讚 讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 诪讘讬讗 住讻讬谉 讗专讜讻讛 讜砖讜讞讟 讘讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬讙注 讘讘砖专

The Gemara asks: How does an impure person act in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: He brings a long knife and slaughters the animal with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh of the slaughtered animal.

讜讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 砖诪讗 讬讙注 讘讘砖专 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讜讗讜诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞讙注转讬 砖讞讬讟转讜 讻砖专讛

Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: And the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter ab initio is that with regard to sacrificial animals, he may not slaughter them ab initio even with a long knife, lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered the sacrificial animal and says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, his slaughter is valid after the fact.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讙专讬讚讬 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.

讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讗讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讛讗 讗诪专转 诇讻转讞诇讛 谞诪讬 砖讞讬讟

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since it stands adjacent to that halakha, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered. Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. But didn鈥檛 you say in that case: He slaughters the animal even ab initio?

讜讗诇讗 讗讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 讘讘专讬 诇讬 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讚谞砖讬讬诇讬讛

And rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is sufficient, and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case where the ritually impure person is not before us so that we can ask him whether he came into contact with the flesh.

讛讗讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诪讛讻讗 谞驻拽讗 诪讛转诐 谞驻拽讗 讻诇 讛驻住讜诇讬谉 砖砖讞讟讜 砖讞讬讟转谉 讻砖专讛 砖讛砖讞讬讟讛 讻砖专讛 讘讝专讬诐 讘谞砖讬诐 讜讘注讘讚讬诐 讜讘讟诪讗讬诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬讛讬讜 讟诪讗讬谉 谞讜讙注讬谉 讘讘砖专

The Gemara asks: Is this halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal learned from an analysis of the mishna here? It is learned explicitly from the mishna there (Zeva岣m 31b): With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.

讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讛转诐 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 砖讗专 驻住讜诇讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讚讘拽讚砖讬诐 拽讗讬 讛讻讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 转谞讬 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara answers: The mishna here is the primary source. There, since the tanna taught the rest of those disqualified for Temple service, he taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal as well. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zeva岣m, which deals with sacrificial animals. Here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, he also teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal.

讛讗讬 讟诪讗 讚讗讬讟诪讗 讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘诪转 讘讞诇诇 讞专讘 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: This ritually impure person mentioned in the mishna is one who became impure with what form of impurity? If we say that he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, this is difficult, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd whosoever in the open field touches one slain with a sword鈥 (Numbers 19:16).

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