Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
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Summary
The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid.
The Gemara questions the Mishna’s phrasing: the opening phrase “all may slaughter” implies an ab initio (l’chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase “their slaughtering is kosher” suggests the act is only valid post facto (b’dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term “all” can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that “all” is a term typically used for ab initio rulings.
While both ultimately concede that “all” can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara’s original difficulty, Raba bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Raba bar Ulla’s interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times. Thank you for your strength and steady presence.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Mark Baker in honor of Shoshana Bluma. “Shabbat Shalom. With much love.”
Chullin 2
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה.
MISHNA: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid.
גְּמָ׳ ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״ – לְכַתְּחִלָּה, ״וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ – דִּיעֲבַד!
GEMARA: There is an apparent contradiction between the first two phrases of the mishna. The tanna begins: Everyone slaughters an animal, indicating that their performing slaughter is permitted ab initio, and then teaches: And their slaughter is valid, indicating that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה: הַכֹּל מְמִירִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים – הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אֹתוֹ טוֹב בְּרָע אוֹ רַע בְּטוֹב״!
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And does every use of the term: Everyone, indicate that the action in question is permitted ab initio? If that is so, in the mishna (Temura 2a), where it says: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, both men and women, is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “He shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10)?
הָתָם, כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: לֹא שֶׁהָאָדָם רַשַּׁאי לְהָמִיר, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם הֵמִיר – מוּמָר, וְסוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
Rav Ashi answers: There, the reason the mishna uses the word everyone is that it immediately teaches: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to substitute; rather, it means that if one did substitute a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs [vesofeg] the forty lashes that are the punishment for violating the prohibition “Nor substitute it.” But here, since the mishna does not similarly qualify its statement, it indicates that everyone may perform the slaughter ab initio.
אֶלָּא הַכֹּל מַעֲרִיכִין וְנֶעֱרָכִין, נוֹדְרִין וְנִידָּרִין, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְכִי תֶחְדַּל לִנְדֹּר לֹא יִהְיֶה בְךָ חֵטְא״!
Rav Aḥa challenges: But a mishna teaches (Arakhin 2a): Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah based on the age and gender of the person valuated; and everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay; everyone vows to donate the market value of a person as a slave to the Temple treasury and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his market value. Is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But it is written: “And if you shall cease to vow, there shall be no sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:23), indicating that it is preferable not to vow.
וּכְתִיב: ״טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר מִשֶּׁתִּדּוֹר וְלֹא תְשַׁלֵּם״, וְתַנְיָא: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹדֵר כׇּל עִיקָּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה נוֹדֵר וּמְשַׁלֵּם. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ״,
And it is written: “It is better that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4); and it is taught in a baraita with regard to that verse: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who vows and pays, is one who does not take a vow at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who does not vow at all, is one who vows and pays in fulfillment of that vow. Rav Aḥa comments: And even Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only in a case where one vows and says: This animal is designated for sacrifice, as in that case there is no concern that he will fail to fulfill his commitment, since even if the animal is stolen or lost, he is not required to bring another in its place.
אֲבָל אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״ – לֹא.
But in the case of one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that no, it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so ab initio.
וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִים בְּסוּכָּה״, ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִין בְּצִיצִית״, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה?
Rav Ashi responded: And is that to say that every use of the term: Everyone, is an indication that the action in question is not permitted ab initio? Rather, is the term: Everyone, in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka, and in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, also an indication that they are not permitted ab initio?
חַיָּיבִין – לָא קָאָמֵינָא. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״הַכֹּל סוֹמְכִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ … וְנִרְצָה״!
Rav Aḥa answered: I am not speaking about cases where it is stated: Everyone is obligated, as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi asked: If that is so, that which was stated: Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the animal, both men and women (see Menaḥot 93a), is that also an expression indicating that it is not permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4)?
אִין, אִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְאִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דִּיעֲבַד. אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דְּהָכָא, מִמַּאי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא דְּתִקְשֵׁי לָךְ? דִּלְמָא דִּיעֲבַד הוּא, וְלָא תִּקְשֵׁי לָךְ.
Rav Aḥa answered: Indeed, there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates ab initio, and there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates after the fact. Rather, concerning the term: Everyone, that appears here in the mishna, from where can it be determined that it is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio, creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you? Perhaps it is an expression indicating that everyone’s slaughter is valid after the fact, and there will not be a contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא ״שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ קַשְׁיָא לִי, מִדְּקָתָנֵי שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה דִּיעֲבַד, מִכְּלָל דְּ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא, דְּאִי דִּיעֲבַד – תַּרְתֵּי דִּיעֲבַד לְמָה לִי?
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa: I find the phrase: And their slaughter is valid, to be difficult for me. From the fact that the tanna teaches: And their slaughter is valid, which is an expression indicating that it is valid after the fact, conclude by inference that the initial phrase in the mishna: Everyone slaughters, is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio. As, if it indicated that it is valid after the fact, why do I need two phrases teaching that it is valid after the fact?
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין. טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? בְּחוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ, וְקָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
Rabba bar Ulla said, in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio. The Gemara interjects: What is the purpose of stating that a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is to non-sacred animals that were being prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food, and the tanna holds that the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is like that of sacrificial food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.
כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר.
The Gemara asks: How does an impure person act in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: He brings a long knife and slaughters the animal with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh of the slaughtered animal.
וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁים לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר, וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאוֹמֵר ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נָגַעְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: And the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter ab initio is that with regard to sacrificial animals, he may not slaughter them ab initio even with a long knife, lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered the sacrificial animal and says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, his slaughter is valid after the fact.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּחוּלִּין גְּרֵידֵי, דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אַטָּמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי שָׁחֵיט!
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since it stands adjacent to that halakha, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered. Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. But didn’t you say in that case: He slaughters the animal even ab initio?
וְאֶלָּא, אַטָּמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים – בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דִּנְשַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
And rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is sufficient, and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case where the ritually impure person is not before us so that we can ask him whether he came into contact with the flesh.
הַאי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים, בְּנָשִׁים, וּבַעֲבָדִים, וּבִטְמֵאִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִין נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר.
The Gemara asks: Is this halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal learned from an analysis of the mishna here? It is learned explicitly from the mishna there (Zevaḥim 31b): With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.
הָכָא עִיקָּר. הָתָם, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁאָר פְּסוּלִין – תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי. הָכָא, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – תָּנֵי נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים.
The Gemara answers: The mishna here is the primary source. There, since the tanna taught the rest of those disqualified for Temple service, he taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal as well. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals. Here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, he also teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal.
הַאי טָמֵא, דְּאִיטַּמָּא בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, ״בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא,
The Gemara asks: This ritually impure person mentioned in the mishna is one who became impure with what form of impurity? If we say that he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, this is difficult, as the Merciful One states: “And whosoever in the open field touches one slain with a sword” (Numbers 19:16).
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Hullin 2: Everyone Can Shecht, Except for Those Who Should Not
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Jerusalem, Israel
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Chullin 2
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה.
MISHNA: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid.
גְּמָ׳ ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״ – לְכַתְּחִלָּה, ״וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ – דִּיעֲבַד!
GEMARA: There is an apparent contradiction between the first two phrases of the mishna. The tanna begins: Everyone slaughters an animal, indicating that their performing slaughter is permitted ab initio, and then teaches: And their slaughter is valid, indicating that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה: הַכֹּל מְמִירִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים – הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אֹתוֹ טוֹב בְּרָע אוֹ רַע בְּטוֹב״!
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And does every use of the term: Everyone, indicate that the action in question is permitted ab initio? If that is so, in the mishna (Temura 2a), where it says: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, both men and women, is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “He shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10)?
הָתָם, כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: לֹא שֶׁהָאָדָם רַשַּׁאי לְהָמִיר, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם הֵמִיר – מוּמָר, וְסוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
Rav Ashi answers: There, the reason the mishna uses the word everyone is that it immediately teaches: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to substitute; rather, it means that if one did substitute a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs [vesofeg] the forty lashes that are the punishment for violating the prohibition “Nor substitute it.” But here, since the mishna does not similarly qualify its statement, it indicates that everyone may perform the slaughter ab initio.
אֶלָּא הַכֹּל מַעֲרִיכִין וְנֶעֱרָכִין, נוֹדְרִין וְנִידָּרִין, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְכִי תֶחְדַּל לִנְדֹּר לֹא יִהְיֶה בְךָ חֵטְא״!
Rav Aḥa challenges: But a mishna teaches (Arakhin 2a): Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah based on the age and gender of the person valuated; and everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay; everyone vows to donate the market value of a person as a slave to the Temple treasury and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his market value. Is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But it is written: “And if you shall cease to vow, there shall be no sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:23), indicating that it is preferable not to vow.
וּכְתִיב: ״טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר מִשֶּׁתִּדּוֹר וְלֹא תְשַׁלֵּם״, וְתַנְיָא: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹדֵר כׇּל עִיקָּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה נוֹדֵר וּמְשַׁלֵּם. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ״,
And it is written: “It is better that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4); and it is taught in a baraita with regard to that verse: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who vows and pays, is one who does not take a vow at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who does not vow at all, is one who vows and pays in fulfillment of that vow. Rav Aḥa comments: And even Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only in a case where one vows and says: This animal is designated for sacrifice, as in that case there is no concern that he will fail to fulfill his commitment, since even if the animal is stolen or lost, he is not required to bring another in its place.
אֲבָל אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״ – לֹא.
But in the case of one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that no, it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so ab initio.
וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִים בְּסוּכָּה״, ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִין בְּצִיצִית״, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה?
Rav Ashi responded: And is that to say that every use of the term: Everyone, is an indication that the action in question is not permitted ab initio? Rather, is the term: Everyone, in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka, and in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, also an indication that they are not permitted ab initio?
חַיָּיבִין – לָא קָאָמֵינָא. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״הַכֹּל סוֹמְכִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ … וְנִרְצָה״!
Rav Aḥa answered: I am not speaking about cases where it is stated: Everyone is obligated, as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi asked: If that is so, that which was stated: Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the animal, both men and women (see Menaḥot 93a), is that also an expression indicating that it is not permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4)?
אִין, אִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְאִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דִּיעֲבַד. אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דְּהָכָא, מִמַּאי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא דְּתִקְשֵׁי לָךְ? דִּלְמָא דִּיעֲבַד הוּא, וְלָא תִּקְשֵׁי לָךְ.
Rav Aḥa answered: Indeed, there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates ab initio, and there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates after the fact. Rather, concerning the term: Everyone, that appears here in the mishna, from where can it be determined that it is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio, creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you? Perhaps it is an expression indicating that everyone’s slaughter is valid after the fact, and there will not be a contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא ״שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ קַשְׁיָא לִי, מִדְּקָתָנֵי שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה דִּיעֲבַד, מִכְּלָל דְּ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא, דְּאִי דִּיעֲבַד – תַּרְתֵּי דִּיעֲבַד לְמָה לִי?
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa: I find the phrase: And their slaughter is valid, to be difficult for me. From the fact that the tanna teaches: And their slaughter is valid, which is an expression indicating that it is valid after the fact, conclude by inference that the initial phrase in the mishna: Everyone slaughters, is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio. As, if it indicated that it is valid after the fact, why do I need two phrases teaching that it is valid after the fact?
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין. טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? בְּחוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ, וְקָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
Rabba bar Ulla said, in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio. The Gemara interjects: What is the purpose of stating that a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is to non-sacred animals that were being prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food, and the tanna holds that the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is like that of sacrificial food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.
כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר.
The Gemara asks: How does an impure person act in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: He brings a long knife and slaughters the animal with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh of the slaughtered animal.
וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁים לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר, וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאוֹמֵר ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נָגַעְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: And the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter ab initio is that with regard to sacrificial animals, he may not slaughter them ab initio even with a long knife, lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered the sacrificial animal and says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, his slaughter is valid after the fact.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּחוּלִּין גְּרֵידֵי, דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אַטָּמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי שָׁחֵיט!
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since it stands adjacent to that halakha, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered. Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. But didn’t you say in that case: He slaughters the animal even ab initio?
וְאֶלָּא, אַטָּמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים – בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דִּנְשַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
And rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is sufficient, and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case where the ritually impure person is not before us so that we can ask him whether he came into contact with the flesh.
הַאי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים, בְּנָשִׁים, וּבַעֲבָדִים, וּבִטְמֵאִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִין נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר.
The Gemara asks: Is this halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal learned from an analysis of the mishna here? It is learned explicitly from the mishna there (Zevaḥim 31b): With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.
הָכָא עִיקָּר. הָתָם, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁאָר פְּסוּלִין – תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי. הָכָא, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – תָּנֵי נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים.
The Gemara answers: The mishna here is the primary source. There, since the tanna taught the rest of those disqualified for Temple service, he taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal as well. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals. Here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, he also teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal.
הַאי טָמֵא, דְּאִיטַּמָּא בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, ״בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא,
The Gemara asks: This ritually impure person mentioned in the mishna is one who became impure with what form of impurity? If we say that he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, this is difficult, as the Merciful One states: “And whosoever in the open field touches one slain with a sword” (Numbers 19:16).
