Bava Kamma 118

פרה רבוצה בו ושטפה נהר דרבי אלעזר לטעמיה ורבנן לטעמייהו

a prone cow in it, and a river washed it away. Rabbi Elazar conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he maintains that land is included in the category of items that are not subject to the halakhot of robbery. Consequently, the robber acquires the land and simultaneously becomes liable to return it. Since he acquires the land, he acquires the cow that is on the land as well, and is liable to compensate its owner when it gets washed away by the river. And the Rabbis conform to their standard line of reasoning, as they hold that land was excluded by the verse. Therefore, the robber does not acquire the land and also does not acquire the cow.

מתני׳ הגוזל את חבירו או שהלוה הימנו או שהפקיד לו בישוב לא יחזיר לו במדבר על מנת לצאת במדבר יחזיר לו במדבר

MISHNA: With regard to one who robs another or who borrowed money from him, or one with whom another had deposited an item, if any of these interactions took place in a settled area, he may not return the item to him in an unsettled area, where it is of little benefit to the owner and he cannot safeguard it. If the loan or deposit was given on the condition that the recipient may go out and return it to the owner in an unsettled area, he may return it to him in an unsettled area.

גמ׳ ורמינהו מלוה משתלמת בכל מקום אבידה ופקדון אין משתלמין אלא במקומן אמר אביי הכי קאמר מלוה ניתנה ליתבע בכל מקום אבידה ופקדון לא ניתנו ליתבע אלא במקומן

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction to the mishna from a baraita: A loan may be repaid in any location, while a lost item and a deposit are returned only in their location, i.e., the same type of place, settled or unsettled, where they were found or received. Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: A loan may be claimed by the creditor in any location. Yet, if the borrower initiates the process of repaying the loan in an unsettled area, the creditor may refuse to accept the repayment until they reach a settled area. Conversely, a lost item and a deposit may be claimed only in their location.

על מנת לצאת במדבר פשיטא לא צריכא דאמר ליה ליהוי האי פקדון גבך דאנא למדבר נפיקנא ואמר ליה איהו אנא למדבר נמי בעינא למיפק אי בעינא לאהדרינהו לך התם מהדרנא לך

The mishna teaches that if the loan or deposit was given on the condition that the recipient may go out and return it to the owner in an unsettled area, he may do so. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that an explicit stipulation to this effect is binding? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary, as the mishna is discussing a case where the depositor said to the bailee: Let this deposit be with you, as I am going out to an unsettled area, and the bailee said to him: I also need to go out to an unsettled area, so if I need to return the deposit to you there, I will return it to you there.

מתני׳ האומר לחבירו גזלתיך הלויתני הפקדת אצלי ואיני יודע אם החזרתי לך אם לא החזרתי לך חייב לשלם אבל אם אמר לו איני יודע אם גזלתיך אם הלויתני אם הפקדת אצלי פטור מלשלם

MISHNA: In the case of one who says to another: I robbed you, or: You lent me money, or: You deposited an item with me, and I do not know if I returned your property to you or if I did not return it to you, he is liable to pay the sum or item in question. But if he said to him: I do not know if I robbed you, or: I do not know if you lent me money, or: I do not know if you deposited an item with me, he is exempt from paying the sum or item in question.

גמ׳ איתמר מנה לי בידך והלה אומר איני יודע רב הונא ורב יהודה אמרי חייב ורב נחמן ורבי יוחנן אמרי פטור

GEMARA: The Gemara cites a related dispute: It was stated that if one individual says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says: I do not know whether or not this is true, Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda say that he is liable to pay the plaintiff, and Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is exempt from paying.

רב הונא ורב יהודה אמרי חייב ברי ושמא ברי עדיף רב נחמן ורבי יוחנן אמרי פטור אוקי ממונא בחזקת מריה

The Gemara explains the reason for each opinion: Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda say that he is liable to pay, because when there is a certain claim and an uncertain claim, the certain claim is superior. Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is exempt from paying because of the principle: Establish the money in the possession of its owner, i.e., money is not taken from one’s possession without clear proof that he is liable to pay it.

תנן אבל אם אמר לו איני יודע אם הלויתני פטור היכי דמי אילימא דלא קא תבע ליה רישא נמי דלא קא תבע ליה אמאי חייב אלא דקתבע ליה וקתני סיפא פטור מלשלם

The Gemara attempts to derive a proof: We learned in the mishna: But if he said to him: I do not know if you lent me money, he is exempt from paying. What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is discussing a case where the lender did not claim the money from him, the first clause must also discuss a situation where the lender did not claim the money from him. If so, why is the borrower liable to pay in the case discussed in the first clause? Rather, the mishna must be discussing a case where the lender did claim the money from him, and the latter clause nevertheless teaches that the borrower is exempt from paying, even though his claim is uncertain and that of the lender is certain. This supports the opinion of Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan.

לא לעולם דלא קא תבע ליה ורישא בבא לצאת ידי שמים

The Gemara answers: No, actually the mishna is referring to a case where the lender did not claim the money from him, and the first clause is discussing a case where the borrower comes to fulfill his obligation to Heaven.

איתמר נמי אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן האומר לחבירו מנה לי בידך והלה אומר איני יודע חייב בבא לצאת ידי שמים

The Gemara adds that it was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other individual says: I do not know whether or not this is true, the latter is liable to pay. This applies where he comes to fulfill his obligation to Heaven even though he cannot be forced to pay. This statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda.

מתני׳ הגונב טלה מן העדר והחזירו ומת או נגנב חייב באחריותו לא ידעו בעלים לא בגניבתו ולא בחזירתו ומנו את הצאן ושלימה היא פטור

MISHNA: In the case of one who stole a lamb from a flock and returned it without informing the owner that he had done so, and then it died or was stolen, the thief is liable to pay restitution for it. If the lamb’s owners did not know about the entire incident, i.e., they did not know that it was stolen and they did not know that it was returned, and they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, the thief is exempt from paying.

גמ׳ אמר רב לדעת צריך דעת שלא לדעת מנין פוטר וכי קתני ומנו את הצאן והיא שלימה אסיפא

GEMARA: The Gemara presents several ways to understand the mishna: Rav says: In a case where the owners had knowledge of the fact that their lamb was stolen, the thief is required to return it with the knowledge of the owners in order to be exempt from liability if the lamb is subsequently harmed. In a case where the owners had no knowledge that the lamb was taken, their count of the flock after the thief returned it exempts the thief from further liability. And when the mishna teaches: And they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, it is referring specifically to the latter clause, i.e., the case where the owners were unaware that the lamb was stolen, as it is specifically in that case that the count exempts the thief from liability.

ושמואל אמר בין לדעת בין שלא לדעת מנין פוטר וכי קתני ומנו והיא שלימה פטור אכולה

And Shmuel says: Whether the owners had knowledge of the theft or whether they did not have knowledge of it, their count of the flock exempts the thief from payment. And when the mishna teaches: And they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, the thief is exempt, it is referring to the entire mishna, as this exempts the thief from liability in both cases mentioned in the mishna.

ורבי יוחנן אומר לדעת מנין פוטר שלא לדעת אפילו מנין נמי לא צריך וכי קתני ומנו את הצאן והיא שלימה ארישא

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where the owners had knowledge of the theft, their count of the flock exempts the thief, and in a case where the owners had no knowledge of the theft, even counting is not required for the thief to be exempt. And when the mishna teaches: And they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, it is referring specifically to the first clause of the mishna, as it is particularly in that case that the count is relevant.

רב חסדא אמר לדעת מנין פוטר שלא לדעת צריך דעת וכי קתני ומנו את הצאן והיא שלימה ארישא

Rav Ḥisda says: In a case where the owners had knowledge of the theft, their count of the flock exempts the thief. In a case where the owners had no knowledge of the theft, the thief is required to return the lamb with their knowledge in order to become exempt from liability for future damage. And when the mishna teaches: And they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, it is referring specifically to the first clause of the mishna, where the owners were aware of the theft, as it is only in that case that counting the flock is sufficient to exempt the thief from further liability.

אמר רבא

Rava says:

מאי טעמא דרב חסדא הואיל ואנקטה נגרי ברייתא

What is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the requirement to return the animal with the owner’s knowledge is in the case where the owners did not know about the theft? Since the thief taught the lamb to take steps outside, i.e., to leave the owners’ property, it will now require greater supervision, which the owners can provide only if they are aware of the situation.

ומי אמר רבא הכי והאמר רבא האי מאן דחזייה לחבריה דאגבה אימרא מעדרא דידיה ורמא ביה קלא ושדייה ולא ידע אי הדריה אי לא הדריה ומת או נגנב חייב באחריותו

The Gemara assumes that since Rava explained Rav Ḥisda’s reasoning, he accepts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. The Gemara asks: But did Rava actually say this? Doesn’t Rava say that in the case of this person who saw another lift a lamb from his flock in order to steal it, and the owner then raised his voice at the thief, and the thief discarded it, but the owner did not know if the thief returned the lamb or if he did not return it, and the lamb then died or was stolen, the thief is to pay restitution for it?

מאי לאו אף על גב דמני לא דלא מני

The Gemara comments: What, is this statement of Rava not applicable even if the owner counted his flock after this incident? Accordingly, Rava rules that if the owner knew about the theft, the thief is rendered exempt from liability only if he returns the lamb with the owner’s knowledge, which is not in accordance with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: No, Rava’s ruling applies only where the owner did not count the flock.

ומי אמר רב הכי והאמר רב החזירו לעדר שבמדבר יצא אמר רב חנן בר אבא מודה רב ברקועתא

The Gemara examines Rav’s ruling. But did Rav actually say this? Doesn’t Rav say that if the thief returned the lamb to the owner’s flock that is in an unsettled area, he has fulfilled his obligation to return it? This indicates that the thief is exempt from further liability even though the thief did not inform the owner of the lamb’s return and the owner did not count the flock. The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said: Rav concedes that the thief is exempt in this case only where the lamb was spotted [birkuata]. Since the lamb’s spots are distinctive, the owner immediately becomes aware of its return.

לימא כתנאי הגונב טלה מן העדר וסלע מן הכיס למקום שגנב יחזיר דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר צריך דעת בעלים

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the amoraic dispute cited previously is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One who steals a lamb from a flock or a sela from a purse must return it to the place from where he stole it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The thief is required to return it with the knowledge of its owners.

סברוה דכולי עלמא אית להו דרבי יצחק דאמר רבי יצחק אדם עשוי למשמש בכיסו בכל שעה מאי לאו בסלע לדעת ובפלוגתא דרב ושמואל

The Gemara explains: The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware of the theft soon after it takes place. What, is it not a case where a sela was stolen with the owner’s knowledge, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel? According to this explanation, Rav rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and Shmuel rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.

לא בטלה שלא לדעת ובפלוגתא דרב חסדא ורבי יוחנן

The Gemara responds: No, they disagree in the case of a lamb that was stolen without the knowledge of its owners, i.e., they did not know that it was stolen, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav Ḥisda and Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ḥisda rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that the lamb must be returned with the owner’s knowledge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael that the owners do not need to become aware of the lamb’s return.

אמר רב זביד משמיה דרבא בשומר שגנב מרשות בעלים כולי עלמא לא פליגי כדרב חסדא והכא בשומר שגנב מרשותו שיחזיר למקום שגנב קמיפלגי רבי עקיבא סבר כלתה לו שמירתו ורבי ישמעאל סבר לא כלתה לו שמירתו

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: With regard to a bailee who stole a lamb from the owner’s domain, everyone, including Rabbi Yishmael, agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and the owner must be aware of the animal’s return in order for the thief to become exempt from further liability. And here it is with regard to whether a bailee who stole from within his own domain may return what he stole to the place from where he stole it that they disagree. Rabbi Akiva holds: His safeguarding was terminated when he stole the lamb and he must therefore return it with the owner’s knowledge. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: His safeguarding was not terminated and he may return it to his own domain.

לימא מנין פוטר תנאי היא דתניא הגוזל את חבירו והבליע לו בחשבון תני חדא יצא ותניא אידך לא יצא

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that with regard to the dispute over whether the owner’s counting of his flock exempts a thief who returned a stolen lamb without notifying the owner, it is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who robbed another and then included the money he owed him for the robbery in the calculation of the payment for a different transaction, i.e., he compensated the owner by overpaying him for a different transaction, it is taught in one baraita: He has fulfilled his obligation to pay, and it is taught in another baraita: He has not fulfilled his obligation to pay.

סברוה דכולי עלמא אית להו דרבי יצחק דאמר אדם עשוי למשמש בכיסו בכל שעה ושעה מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמאן דאמר יצא סבר מנין פוטר ומאן דאמר לא יצא סבר מנין אינו פוטר

The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware that he has been compensated soon after the payment is made. What, is it not with regard to this following point that they disagree: The one who says that the robber has fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability, and the one who says that the robber has not fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting does not exempt a robber from further liability.

אמרי אי סבירא לן כרבי יצחק כולי עלמא לא פליגי דמנין פוטר אלא בדרבי יצחק קמיפלגי מר אית ליה דרבי יצחק ומר לית ליה דרבי יצחק

The Gemara responds: One can say that if we held in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, it would follow that everyone agrees that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability. Rather, it is with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak itself that they disagree: One Sage accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and one Sage does not accept the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

ואי בעית אימא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרבי יצחק ולא קשיא הא דמני ורמא ליה בכיסיה והא דמני ורמא לידיה

And if you wish, say instead that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and it is not difficult: This first baraita, which rules that the robber fulfilled his obligation, is discussing a case where the robber counted the money and placed it directly in the owner’s purse, which the owner will soon open and count. And that other baraita, which rules that the robber did not fulfill his obligation, is discussing a case where he counted the money and placed it in the owner’s hand. Consequently, it is possible that the owner will put the money directly into a container with other coins in it and will never realize that he was compensated for the theft.

ואיבעית אימא אידי ואידי דמני ורמא בכיסיה הא דאית ליה זוזי אחריני בכיסיה הא דלית ליה זוזי אחריני בכיסיה

And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are discussing a case where the robber counted the money and placed it in the owner’s purse. This baraita discusses a case where he has other dinars in his purse, but he did not know how many. Therefore, when he counts the money, he will not realize that the robber inserted an additional sum. Whereas that baraita is discussing a case where he does not have other dinars in his purse, so that when he counts the money he will realize that an additional sum has been included in the payment.

מתני׳ אין לוקחין מן הרועים צמר וחלב וגדיים ולא משומרי פירות עצים ופירות

MISHNA: One may not purchase wool, milk, and kids from the shepherds who tend the flocks of others, due to the concern that they have stolen these items from the owners of the flocks. And similarly, one may not purchase wood and produce from produce watchmen.

אבל לוקחין מן הנשים כלי צמר ביהודה וכלי פשתן בגליל ועגלים בשרון וכולן שאמרו להטמין אסור ולוקחין ביצים ותרנגולין מכל מקום

But one may purchase from women woolen goods in Judea, and linen goods in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon, as women in these locations often work with those commodities and it can be assumed that they are selling the items with the owner’s consent. And with regard to all these items, in a case where the seller told the buyer to conceal the purchase, it is prohibited, as there is good reason to suspect that the items are stolen. And one may purchase eggs and chickens from everywhere, as it is unlikely that one would steal and sell these commodities.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן אין לוקחין מן הרועים לא עזים ולא גדיים ולא גיזין ולא תלושין של צמר אבל לוקחין מהן תפורין מפני שהן שלהן ולוקחין מהן חלב וגבינה במדבר ולא בישוב

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 11:9): One may purchase from shepherds neither goats, nor kids, nor fleeces, nor torn pieces of wool, but one may purchase sewn garments from them, because they are presumed to be theirs. And one may purchase milk and cheese from them in an unsettled area, but not in a settled area.

ולוקחין מהן ארבע וחמש צאן ארבע וחמש גיזין אבל לא שתי צאן ולא שתי גיזין

And one may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time, because it is unlikely that a shepherd would risk stealing such a significant quantity at once. But one may not purchase two sheep, and similarly, one may not purchase two fleeces at a time, as it is reasonable to assume that the shepherd would attempt to steal this amount from the owner.

רבי יהודה אומר בייתות לוקחין מהן מדבריות אין לוקחין מהן כללו של דבר כל שהרועה מוכר ובעל הבית מרגיש בו לוקחין מהן אין מרגיש בו אין לוקחין מהן

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, as it is unlikely that the shepherds would steal them from their owner, who would notice if they did not return home. Conversely, one may not purchase desert, i.e., non-domesticated, animals from them, as it is more likely that a shepherd would steal these animals. The principle of the matter is that with regard to anything that the shepherd sells and the owner would perceive its absence if it were stolen, one may purchase it from them. But if the owner would not perceive its absence, one may not purchase it from them.

אמר מר לוקחין מהן ארבע וחמש צאן ארבע וחמש גיזין השתא יש לומר ארבעה זבנינן חמשה מיבעיא אמר רב חסדא ארבעה מתוך חמשה ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב חסדא ארבעה מעדר קטן וחמש מעדר גדול

The Gemara examines the baraita: The Master said that one may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time. Now that it can be said that we may buy four sheep, as it is unlikely that the shepherd would steal such a large quantity at one time, is it necessary to state that we may buy five? The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥisda said: The meaning of the baraita is that one may purchase four sheep out of a flock consisting of five sheep, as it is reasonable to assume that the shepherd would not attempt to steal four-fifths of the owner’s flock. And there are those who say that Rav Ḥisda said as follows: Four sheep may be purchased from the shepherd of a small flock, and five may be purchased from the shepherd of a large flock.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת ארבע וחמש צאן ארבע וחמש גיזין ארבע וחמש אין אבל שלש לא אימא סיפא אבל לא שתי צאן הא שלש זבנינן

The Gemara asks another question with regard to the baraita: This matter itself is difficult, as you said in the baraita: One may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time, which indicates that purchasing four or five, yes, it is permitted, but purchasing three, no, it is prohibited. Say the latter clause: But one may not purchase two sheep. This indicates that we may purchase three sheep at a time.

לא קשיא הא בברייתא הא בכחישתא

The Gemara answers that this is not difficult: This clause, which permits the purchase of three sheep, is discussing a case where the sheep are robust, and therefore the owner is more attentive to them and would notice if three were missing. Conversely, that clause, which prohibits the purchase of three sheep, is discussing a case where the sheep are frail. Consequently, the owner does not care about them as much, and it is possible that he would not notice if only three of them went missing.

רבי יהודה אומר בייתות לוקחין מהן מדבריות אין לוקחין מהן כו׳ איבעיא להו רבי יהודה ארישא קאי ולחומרא או דלמא אסיפא קאי ולקולא

The baraita teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, but one may not purchase desert animals from them. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause, and his statement is therefore a stringency? Or perhaps it is referring to the latter clause, and his statement is a leniency?

ארישא קאי ולחומרא דאמר לוקחין מהן ארבעה וחמשה צאן הני מילי בייתות אבל מדבריות אפילו ארבעה וחמשה לא או דלמא אסיפא קאי ולקולא דאמר אבל לא שתי צאן ולא שתי גיזין הני מילי מדבריות אבל בייתות שתים נמי לוקחין

The Gemara elaborates: Is it referring to the first clause, and his statement is therefore a stringency, as he would be saying: One may purchase four or five sheep from them, and this statement applies only to domesticated animals, but with regard to desert animals, even four or five sheep may not be purchased? Or perhaps it is referring to the latter clause and it is a leniency, as he would be saying: But one may not purchase two sheep, and similarly, one may not purchase two fleeces, and this statement applies only to desert animals, but with regard to domesticated animals, one may purchase even two animals.

תא שמע דתניא רבי יהודה אומר לוקחין בייתות מהן ואין לוקחין מהן מדבריות ובכל מקום לוקחין מהן ארבעה וחמשה צאן

The Gemara presents an answer: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, but one may not purchase desert animals from them. But one may always purchase four or five sheep from them.