Bava Kamma 28

עמך בן בג בג יחידאה הוא ופליגי רבנן עליה

You can keep this question to yourself, as it poses no difficulty at all. Ben Bag Bag states an individual opinion in this regard, and the Rabbis disagree with him.

רבי ינאי אמר מאי שבור את שיניו בדין

Rabbi Yannai says an alternative response to Rav Kahana’s objection: What does the baraita mean by the phrase: Break his teeth? It means sue him in judgment.

אי הכי ואמור לו ואומרים לו מיבעי ליה שלי אני נוטל שלו הוא נוטל מיבעי ליה קשיא

The Gemara asks: If so, the subsequent statement in the baraita: And say to him, is inaccurate. It should have stated: And they, the court, say to him. Likewise, the wording: I am taking what is mine, is inaccurate. Since it is the court who makes this statement, the baraita should have stated: He is taking what is his. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this poses a difficulty for Rav Yehuda’s version of the response.

תא שמע שור שעלה על גבי חבירו להורגו ובא בעל התחתון ושמט את שלו ונפל עליון ומת פטור מאי לאו במועד דליכא פסידא

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an alternative proof for Rav Naḥman’s opinion. It is stated in a baraita: With regard to an ox that climbed on the back of another ox to kill it, and the owner of the ox on the bottom came and removed his ox, and the ox on top consequently fell and died, the owner of the ox on the bottom is exempt from paying for the dead ox. What, is this ruling not stated with regard to a case where the attacker is a forewarned ox, where there is no loss to the owner of the bottom ox, since even if the owner of the ox on the bottom does not remove his ox, he will eventually receive full restitution from the owner of the belligerent ox? Yet he is exempt from paying restitution for causing the death of the belligerent ox. Evidently, he had the right to take justice into his own hands.

לא בתם דאיכא פסידא

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the ruling is with regard to a case where the attacker is an innocuous ox, where there is a loss for the owner of the ox on the bottom if he does not save it, since the owner of an innocuous ox pays for only half the damages resulting from his ox’s attack.

אי הכי אימא סיפא דחפו לעליון ומת חייב ואי בתם אמאי חייב

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: If, instead of removing his own ox, the owner of the ox on the bottom pushed the one on top and it died, he is liable. And if it is referring to an innocuous ox, why is he liable? He is defending his property so as not to incur a loss.

שהיה לו לשמטו ולא שמטו

The Gemara answers: He is liable because he should have removed his ox from underneath the belligerent ox, and he did not remove it. Instead, he pushed the belligerent ox and caused it to die. Although one may take justice into his own hands, if he damages another person’s property when he could have protected his own property in a harmless manner he is liable.

תא שמע הממלא חצר חבירו כדי יין וכדי שמן בעל החצר משבר ויוצא משבר ונכנס

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Naḥman’s opinion from a baraita: With regard to one who fills another’s courtyard with jugs of wine and jugs of oil, the owner of the courtyard may break his way through them and exit his courtyard or he may break his way through them and enter his courtyard. Since the one who put the jugs there had no right to do so, the owner of the courtyard may take justice into his own hands. This is apparently the ruling even where there is no loss involved to the owner of the courtyard.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק משבר ויוצא לבית דין משבר ונכנס להביא זכיותיו

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said in response that the baraita can be explained as follows: The owner of the courtyard may break the jugs and exit to court, and he may break the jugs and enter his house to bring proof of his rights, i.e., documents proving that the courtyard belongs to him. Since by refraining from doing so he would sustain a loss, he may break the jugs when exiting and entering. He may not take justice into his own hands beyond this extent. Therefore, no proof for Rav Naḥman’s opinion can be inferred from this baraita.

תא שמע מניין לנרצע שכלו לו ימיו ורבו מסרהב בו לצאת וחבל ועשה בו חבורה שהוא פטור

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an alternative proof from a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to a Hebrew slave who had his ear pierced with an awl to extend his tenure as a slave, but whose days of servitude have now ended with the arrival of the Jubilee Year; and his master is urging [mesarhev] him to leave but he insists on remaining; and the master injured the slave and inflicted an injury on him in the process of forcing him out, that the master is exempt from paying for this injury?

תלמוד לומר לא תקחו כפר לשוב לא תקחו כופר לשב

To counter this, the verse states: “You shall take no ransom…that he should return” (Numbers 35:32). Although this verse is referring to the prohibition against an unintentional killer paying a ransom instead of going to a city of refuge, this verse is also interpreted to mean that you shall take no ransom for a Hebrew slave who is obligated to return to his family. In other words, if the slave refuses to return to his family and is injured in the process of his eviction, he does not receive compensation. This seems to indicate that the master may take justice into his own hands even for a matter that involves no loss to him.

הכא במאי עסקינן בעבדא גנבא

The Gemara responds to this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a slave who is a thief, and consequently, if he remains a slave, his master will sustain a loss. Therefore, it is permitted for the master to take justice into his own hands and evict the slave by force.

עד האידנא לא גנב והשתא גנב עד האידנא הוה אימתיה דרביה עליה השתא לית ליה אימתא דרביה עליה

The Gemara questions this explanation: Until now he did not steal, and now he will begin to steal? Why would the master be worried about this just when the slave’s tenure ends? The Gemara answers: Until now, while he was still a slave, the awe of his master was upon him, so he did not steal from him. Now that he may go free he does not have the awe of his master upon him, and the master is therefore worried that he might steal from him.

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר בעבד שמסר לו רבו שפחה כנענית עד האידנא היתירא והשתא איסורא

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said an alternative explanation: The baraita is referring to a slave whose master provided a Canaanite maidservant to him as a wife and he wishes to remain with her. Until now, it was permitted for him to engage in sexual intercourse with her, but now that he is free, it is prohibited for him to do so. In this case, his master may evict him forcefully, assuming the role of an emissary of the court, to prevent him from violating the prohibition. Therefore, this is not considered taking justice into his own hands.

תא שמע המניח את הכד ברשות הרבים ובא אחר ונתקל בה ושברה פטור טעמא דנתקל בה הא שברה חייב

The Gemara suggests a proof for Rav Yehuda’s opinion from the mishna. Come and hear: In the case of one who places a jug in the public domain and another person comes and stumbles on it and breaks it, he is exempt. It may be inferred that the reason he is exempt is that he stumbled on it. But if he broke it intentionally, he is liable. This indicates that one may not take justice into his own hands.

אמר רב זביד משמיה דרבא הוא הדין אפילו שברה והאי דקתני נתקל איידי דקבעי למיתני סיפא אם הוזק בעל חבית חייב בנזקו דדוקא נתקל אבל שבר לא דהוא אזיק נפשיה קתני רישא נתקל

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: That is not a proof, as the same is true even if he broke the barrel intentionally. And as for this fact that the tanna of the mishna teaches a case where he stumbled, it is because he wants to teach in the last clause: And if he incurred damage due to the vessel, the owner of the ḥavit is liable to pay for his damages. As this ruling applies specifically when he stumbled, but if he broke the barrel intentionally and incurred damage in the process, the owner of the barrel is not required to compensate him. Although the pedestrian had the right to break the barrel, it is he who damaged himself, by not being careful while breaking it. Therefore, in the first clause the mishna teaches a case where he stumbled.

תא שמע וקצתה את כפה ממון מאי לאו בשאינה יכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר לא שיכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita, which relates to the case of a woman who, during a fight between her husband and another man, grabs the other man’s genitals: The verse that states: “Then you shall cut off her hand” (Deuteronomy 25:12), should not be taken literally; rather, it is referring to monetary restitution. What, is it not referring to a case where she cannot save her husband from his attacker by a means other than grabbing the attacker’s genitals, and nevertheless she is punished? This indicates that one may not take justice into his own hands. The Gemara answers: No, the verse is referring to a case where she can save him by other means. Otherwise she is exempt from paying restitution.

אבל אינה יכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר פטורה אי הכי אדתני סיפא ושלחה ידה פרט לשליח בית דין לפלוג ולתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים בשיכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר אבל אינה יכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר פטורה

The Gemara asks: But if she cannot save him by other means, is it possible that she is exempt? If so, instead of teaching in the latter clause of that baraita that the expression mentioned in the previous verse: “And extended her hand” (Deuteronomy 25:11), excludes an emissary of the court, who is authorized to act in this manner and is therefore exempt from paying restitution, let the baraita distinguish and teach within the case under discussion in the verse itself, as follows: In what case is this statement that the wife is liable said? It is in a case where she can save her husband by another means. But if she cannot save him by other means, she is exempt.

הכי נמי קאמר במה דברים אמורים בשיכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר אבל אינה יכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר נעשה ידה כשליח בית דין ופטורה

The Gemara answers: That is also what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where she can save him by other means. But if she cannot save him by other means, her hand is rendered like an emissary of the court, and she is exempt.

תא שמע הרי שהיתה דרך הרבים עוברת בתוך שדהו נטלה ונתן להם מן הצד מה שנתן נתן ושלו לא הגיעו

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Yehuda’s opinion from a mishna (Bava Batra 99b): In a case where a public thoroughfare would pass through one’s field, and he appropriated it and instead gave the public an alternative route on the side of his property, the halakha is that the route that he has given is the route that he gave them, and they may use it. But his property, which he appropriated, has not reached him, i.e., he cannot appropriate it for his personal use since it was already in public use.

ואי אמרת עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה לנקוט פזרא וליתיב

And if you say that a person may take justice into his own hands, why does the owner of the field not have the right to close the thoroughfare? Since it is his property and he gave the public an alternative route, let him take a stick [pazra] in his hand and sit by the side of the road, preventing the public from passing through.

אמר רב זביד משמיה דרבא גזירה שמא יתן להם דרך עקלתון

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: It is a rabbinic decree, lest he give them a circuitous route. Since the public has the right to pass through his field, as the Gemara will soon explain, the owner cannot appropriate their thoroughfare without giving the public a similar alternative route. Therefore, the Sages decreed that he cannot appropriate it without their consent, lest he provide an inadequate route.

רב משרשיא אמר בנותן להם דרך עקלתון

Rav Mesharshiyya said: The mishna is referring to a case where he actually gave them a circuitous route. If one in fact gives the public a straight path, he need not surrender his rights, and he may take justice into his own hands by blocking the original thoroughfare.

רב אשי אמר כל מן הצד דרך עקלתון הוא קרובה לזה ורחוקה לזה

Rav Ashi said: Any route on the side that the property owner might give them is necessarily considered a circuitous route, as it is close for this person, and it is far for that person. While some will benefit from the change, it will be detrimental for others.

אי הכי אמאי שלו לא הגיעו לימא להו שקולו דידכו והבו לי דידי

The Gemara asks: If so, why has his property not reached him? If he cannot make the change, why can he not reclaim the path that he intended to turn over to the public? Let him say to them: Take your original route and give me back my property, so that he will not lose both pieces of land.

משום דרב יהודה דאמר רב יהודה מיצר שהחזיקו בו רבים אסור לקלקלו

The Gemara answers that he cannot reclaim it due to Rav Yehuda’s statement, as Rav Yehuda says: With regard to a path that the masses established as a public thoroughfare, it is prohibited to destroy it for them. Therefore, since the public already began using the alternative route, the owner cannot appropriate it from them.

תא שמע בעל הבית שהניח פאה מצד אחד ובאו עניים ונטלו מצד אחר זה וזה פאה ואי אמרת עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה אמאי זה וזה פאה לנקוט פזרא וליתיב

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an alternative proof from a baraita: With regard to the owner of a field who left produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], on one side of the field, and poor people came and took from another side, this produce and that produce are both considered pe’a. And if you say that a person may take justice into his own hands, why are this and that both considered pe’a? Let him take a stick and sit in his field on the side from which the poor people are taking produce without his permission, and let him warn them to take only from the side that he allocated.

אמר רבא מאי זה וזה פאה לפוטרן מן המעשר

Rava said: In terms of monetary law he can prevent them from taking pe’a from the side that he did not allocate. What is meant by the ruling of: This produce and that produce are both considered pe’a? It means that they are considered pe’a with regard to exempting both portions of produce from tithes. Just as the portion that the poor people took is exempt from tithes, so is the portion that he allocated initially.

כדתניא המפקיר את כרמו והשכים בבקר ובצרו חייב בפרט ובעוללות ובשכחה ובפאה ופטור מן המעשר

This is as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who renounces ownership of his vineyard and arose early in the morning before anyone else took possession of it and harvested it, the one who renounces ownership is obligated in the mitzva of individual fallen grapes left for the poor [peret], and in the mitzva of incompletely formed clusters of grapes left for the poor [olelot], and in the mitzva of forgotten clusters of grapes left for the poor, and in the mitzva of pe’a, the four gifts to the poor that the Torah requires one to give from a vineyard (see Leviticus 19:9–10). But he is exempt from the mitzva to tithe his produce, because this requirement does not apply to an ownerless field. Likewise, in the above case the portion of the field that was allocated for pe’a is exempt from tithes even after the owner reclaims it, as pe’a is considered ownerless property in this regard.

מתני׳ נשברה כדו ברשות הרבים והוחלק אחד במים או שלקה בחרסית חייב רבי יהודה אומר במתכוין חייב באינו מתכוין פטור

MISHNA: If one’s jug broke in the public domain and another person slipped in the water from the jug and was injured from the fall, or if he was injured by the shards of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the owner of the jug acted with intent, he is liable, and in a case where he acted without intent, he is exempt.

גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לא שנו אלא שטינפו כליו במים

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They taught that the owner of the jug is liable only when the clothes of the one who slipped were soiled by the dirty water.

אבל הוא עצמו פטור קרקע עולם הזיקתו

But if the person himself was injured, the owner of the jug is exempt, as it is the ground that caused his injury, not the jug or the water.

כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי מכדי אבנו וסכינו ומשאו מבורו למדנו וכולן אני קורא בהן שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים

Rav Yehuda continued: When I stated this ruling of Rav before Shmuel, he said to me: After all, we derive the cases of damage caused by leaving one’s stone, one’s knife, or one’s load in the public domain from the case of one’s pit, and I therefore read, i.e., apply, with regard to all of them the inference of the Sages from the verse: “And an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the one who dug the pit is liable only if what incurred damage is an ox, but not a person, or a donkey, but not vessels.

והני מילי לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין אדם חייב וכלים פטורין

And this statement applies with regard to a situation where the person is killed, i.e., if one fell into a pit and was killed, the person who dug it is exempt from paying restitution, since the verse refers exclusively to an animal that was killed. But with regard to damage, the digger of the pit is liable to pay restitution for injury to a person, but exempt from paying restitution for damage to vessels, for which no distinction between death and injury can be applied. Therefore, the ruling in the case of the jug that broke in the public domain should be the opposite. The owner of the jug is liable to pay restitution for injury caused to another, as Shmuel holds that he is liable even if the injury is caused by the impact with the ground, but that he is exempt from paying restitution for the damage done to the clothes of the one who slipped.

ורב הני מילי היכא דאפקרינהו אבל היכא דלא אפקרינהו ממונו הוא

The Gemara asks: And how would Rav answer this difficulty? The Gemara answers: This presumption that liability for damage caused by one’s stone, knife, or load is derived from the category of Pit, thereby exempting him from payment for damage to vessels, applies only in a case where he renounced ownership of them. But in a case where he did not renounce ownership of them, it is considered to be like any other case where his property causes damage. Therefore, he is liable to pay for damage caused to the vessels.

מתיב רב אושעיא ונפל שמה שור או חמור שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים מכאן אמרו נפל לתוכו שור וכליו ונשתברו חמור וכליו ונתקרעו חייב על הבהמה ופטור על הכלים הא למה זה דומה לאבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברשות הרבים והזיקו

Rav Oshaya raises an objection from a baraita discussing Pit: It is derived from the verse: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the digger is liable to pay restitution only if what incurred damage is an ox but not a person, or a donkey but not vessels. From here the Sages stated that if an ox with its equipment fell into a pit, and the ox was wounded and the equipment broke; or if a donkey with its equipment fell in, and the donkey was wounded and the equipment tore, then the one who dug the pit is liable to pay restitution for any injury sustained by the animal but exempt from paying restitution for the damaged equipment. To what case is this similar? It is similar to the case of his stone, or his knife, or his load that he left in the public domain, and they caused damage.

אדרבה מה דומה לזה מבעי ליה אלא מאי דומה לזה אבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברשות הרבים והזיקו

The Gemara questions the wording of the baraita: On the contrary, it should have stated: What is similar to this, since the cases of one’s stone, knife, or load are not mentioned in the Torah, but are derived from the case of Pit. Rather, the wording should be emended as follows: What is similar to this? It is the case of his stone, or his knife, or his load that he left in the public domain, and they caused damage.

לפיכך אם הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

The baraita continues: Therefore, if one dropped his flask on a stone that was left in the public domain, breaking the flask, the owner of the stone is liable.

רישא קשיא לרב וסיפא קשיא לשמואל

The first clause of this baraita is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, since it compares the cases of a stone, a knife, and a load to the case of Pit, and it does not distinguish between a situation in which he renounced ownership of them or one where he did not. And the last clause of the baraita, which deems the owner of a stone in the public domain liable to pay restitution for the damage to the broken flask, is difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel. According to him, the owner should be liable only for causing injury and not for damaging vessels.

ולטעמיך תיקשי לך היא גופא (קשיא) רישא פטור וסיפא חייב

The Gemara responds to this objection: And according to your reasoning, the baraita itself should pose a difficulty for you, since the first clause states that one is exempt from liability for damage to vessels, and the last clause states that he is liable.

אלא רב מתרץ לטעמיה ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה

Rather, Rav resolves the contradiction according to his line of reasoning, and Shmuel resolves it according to his line of reasoning.

רב מתרץ לטעמיה במה דברים אמורים כשהפקירן אבל לא הפקירן חייב לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

Rav resolves it according to his line of reasoning as follows: In what case is this statement said? Concerning what case does the baraita rule that a stone, a knife, and a load are analogous to Pit, exempting their owner from liability for breakage to vessels caused by them? It is where he renounced ownership of them. But if he did not renounce ownership of them he is liable. Therefore, if one dropped his flask on a stone belonging to another person in the public domain, the owner of the stone is liable to pay for the damage to the flask.

ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה השתא דאמרת אבנו סכינו ומשאו כבורו דמי לרבי יהודה דמחייב על נזקי כלים בבור לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

And Shmuel resolves the contradiction according to his line of reasoning: Now that you said that the cases of one’s stone, one’s knife, and one’s load are similar to one’s pit, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable to pay for damage caused to vessels by falling into a pit that he dug, one is therefore liable in a case where someone dropped his flask on a stone belonging to him, and the flask broke.

אמר רבי אלעזר לא שנו אלא שנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור

§ Rabbi Elazar says: They taught that the owner of the stone is liable only in a case where the pedestrian stumbled on the stone and the flask scraped against the stone and broke. But if he stumbled on the ground, not the stone, and the flask consequently fell and scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, the owner of the stone is exempt from liability for the damage.

כמאן דלא כרבי נתן

In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that if damage is caused by two people and one of them is exempt from paying compensation, the other must pay the entire amount. Similarly here, since there is no liability for damage caused by stumbling on the ground, compensation should be collected from the owner of the stone.

איכא דאמרי אמר רבי אלעזר לא תימא בנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן הוא דמחייב אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור אלא אפילו נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן חייב כמאן כרבי נתן

There are those who say an alternative version of this discourse: Rabbi Elazar says: Do not say that it is only in a case where the pedestrian stumbled on the stone and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, that he is deemed liable, but that if he stumbled on the ground and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, he is exempt. Rather, even if the pedestrian stumbled on the ground and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, he is liable. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.

רבי יהודה אומר במתכוין חייב וכו׳ היכי דמי מתכוין

§ The mishna teaches that if someone’s jug broke in the public domain and one slipped in the water from the jug and was injured from the fall, or if he was injured by the shards of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the owner of the jug acted with intent, he is liable, and in a case where he acted without intent, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which it is considered that he acted with intent?

אמר רבה במתכוין להורידה למטה מכתיפו אמר ליה אביי מכלל דמחייב רבי מאיר אפילו נפשרה אמר ליה אין מחייב היה רבי מאיר אפילו אזנה בידו

Rabba says: Even where he just intends to lower the jug off his shoulder and accidentally breaks it, he is liable to pay for the damage he causes, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Abaye said to him: By inference, does Rabbi Meir, who is the anonymous first tanna of the mishna, deem him liable even if the jug cracked by itself? Rabba said to him: Indeed, Rabbi Meir would deem him liable even if he were holding the handle of the jug in his hand, the optimal manner for holding it, and the handle snapped, causing the jug to fall and break, an accident clearly beyond his control.

אמאי אנוס הוא ואונס רחמנא פטריה דכתיב ולנער לא תעשה דבר

The Gemara asks: Why is this so? Isn’t he the victim of circumstances beyond his control? And the Merciful One exempts a victim of circumstances beyond his control from punishment, as it is written with regard to a betrothed young woman who is raped: “But to the young woman you shall do nothing” (Deuteronomy 22:26).

וכי תימא הני מילי לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין חייב והתניא נשברה כדו ולא סלקו נפל גמלו ולא העמידו רבי מאיר מחייב בהזיקן וחכמים אומרים

And if you would say that this matter applies only with regard to exemption from the death penalty, but with regard to damages one is liable even for circumstances beyond his control, but isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one’s jug broke and he did not remove its shards, or if his camel fell and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to pay for any damage they cause, and the Rabbis say that