Bava Kamma 33

Bava Kamma 33

אַחֵר – לֵית לֵיהּ אֵימְתָא דְרַבֵּיהּ, הַאי – אִית לֵיהּ אֵימְתָא דְרַבֵּיהּ.

The Gemara answers: Another person does not have awe of his mentor. Therefore, even if the welder urges another person to leave, he must ascertain that that person actually did so, and otherwise he is liable to be exiled. By contrast, this apprentice has awe of his mentor, and so the welder may assume that if he instructed him to leave, he certainly did. Therefore, if in reality the apprentice did not leave and is killed by the sparks, the welder is not liable to be exiled, as he is not held accountable.

רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא: ״וּמָצָא״ – פְּרָט לְמַמְצִיא אֶת עַצְמוֹ. מִכָּאן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: מִי שֶׁיָּצְתָה אֶבֶן מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ, וְהוֹצִיא הַלָּה אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ וְקִיבְּלָהּ – פָּטוּר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: פָּטוּר מִגָּלוּת, וְחַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים.

Rav Zevid taught in the name of Rava that this aforementioned statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina is in reference not to the above baraita but is in reference to this baraita: It is stated in the verse concerning one who kills unintentionally: “And the head slips off the helve, and finds his neighbor, and he dies” (Deuteronomy 19:5); this serves to exclude one who introduces himself into an area of danger, in which case the one who kills unintentionally is exempt from exile. From here Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: With regard to one whom a stone departed from his hand, and another person stuck out his head and received a blow from it and died, the one who threw the stone is exempt from exile. It is in reference to this statement that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: He is exempt from exile for killing him. But if the victim was merely injured, he is liable to pay four types of indemnity.

מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַקַּמַּיְיתָא; וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַקַּמַּיְיתָא – אֲבָל אַהָא פָּטוּר לִגְמָרֵי.

The Gemara comments: The one who teaches this statement in reference to this baraita, all the more so he would teach it in reference to the first baraita, where one entered the workshop of the carpenter. But the one who teaches it with regard to the first baraita teaches it only in reference to that baraita. But in this baraita he is entirely exempt from liability for injury, as one could claim that he is completely blameless.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: פּוֹעֲלִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לִתְבּוֹעַ שְׂכָרָן מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וּנְגָחָן שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וּנְשָׁכָן כַּלְבּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וָמֵת – פָּטוּר. אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: רַשָּׁאִין פּוֹעֲלִין לִתְבּוֹעַ שְׂכָרָן מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to salaried laborers who came into their employer’s courtyard to claim their wages from the homeowner, and the homeowner’s ox gored them, or the homeowner’s dog bit them, and a laborer died, the homeowner is exempt. Others say that he is liable, as salaried laborers are allowed to enter their employer’s property to claim their wages from the homeowner.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּשְׁכִיחַ בְּמָתָא – מַאי טַעְמָא דַּאֲחֵרִים? אִי דִּשְׁכִיחַ בַּבַּיִת – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא?

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the employer can be found in the city, what is the reason of the others, who hold him liable? The laborers could have met him in the city to claim their wages and did not need to enter his courtyard. If he can be found only at home, what is the reason of the first tanna, who exempts him? Clearly they are entitled to claim their wages.

לָא צְרִיכָא, בְּגַבְרָא דִּשְׁכִיחַ וְלָא שְׁכִיחַ, וְקָרֵי אַבָּבָא וַאֲמַר לְהוּ ״אִין״; מַר סָבַר: ״אִין״ – ״עוּל תָּא״ מַשְׁמַע. וּמַר סָבַר: ״אִין״ – ״קוּם אַדּוּכְתָּךְ״ מַשְׁמַע.

The Gemara answers: No, these are not the circumstances under discussion. This halakha is necessary only with regard to a man who can sometimes be found in town and sometimes cannot be found in town, and the laborers called to him at the gate of his courtyard, and he said to them: Yes. One Sage, referred to as the others, holds that the term yes in this context indicates: Come in. Therefore, he is liable for their death. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the term yes in this context indicates: Stand in your place and I will come out to you. Since he did not give them permission to enter, he is exempt.

תַּנְיָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אִין״ – ״קוּם אַדּוּכְתָּךְ״ מַשְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: פּוֹעֵל שֶׁנִּכְנַס לִתְבּוֹעַ שְׂכָרוֹ מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וּנְגָחוֹ שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אוֹ נְשָׁכוֹ כַּלְבּוֹ, פָּטוּר – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּכְנַס בִּרְשׁוּת. אַמַּאי פָּטוּר? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּקָרֵי אַבָּבָא, וְאָמַר לֵיהּ ״אִין״, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ ״אִין״ – ״קוּם אַדּוּכְתָּךְ״ מַשְׁמַע.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that yes in this context indicates: Stand in your place. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a salaried laborer who entered his employer’s courtyard to claim his wages from the homeowner, and the homeowner’s ox gored him, or his dog bit him, the homeowner is exempt, although the laborer entered with permission. The Gemara asks: Why is he exempt if the laborer entered with permission? Rather, is it not because it is a case where the laborer called him at the gate, and he said to him: Yes? Conclude from it that yes in this context indicates: Stand in your place.

מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנֵי שְׁווֹרִין תַּמִּין שֶׁחָבְלוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה – מְשַׁלְּמִין בַּמּוֹתָר חֲצִי נֶזֶק. שְׁנֵיהֶן מוּעָדִין – מְשַׁלְּמִין בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

MISHNA: With regard to two innocuous oxen that injured each other, the respective damages are evaluated, and if one amount is more than the other, the owner pays half the damages with regard to the difference. In other words, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the other owner half the difference. If both oxen were forewarned, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference.

אֶחָד תָּם וְאֶחָד מוּעָד – מוּעָד בַּתָּם מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, תָּם בַּמוּעָד מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

In a case where one of the oxen was innocuous and the other one was forewarned, if the forewarned ox caused greater damage to the innocuous ox than the reverse, the owner of the forewarned ox pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. If the innocuous ox caused greater damage to the forewarned ox, its owner pays half the damage with regard to the difference.

וְכֵן שְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים שֶׁחָבְלוּ זֶה בָּזֶה – מְשַׁלְּמִין בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

And similarly, with regard to two people who injured each other, the one who did greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference, since one is always considered forewarned with regard to damage he causes.

אָדָם בַּמוּעָד וּמוּעָד בָּאָדָם – מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. אָדָם בַּתָּם וְתָם בָּאָדָם – אָדָם בַּתָּם מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, תָּם בָּאָדָם מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר חֲצִי נֶזֶק. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אַף תָּם שֶׁחָבַל בָּאָדָם – מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

If a person caused damage to a forewarned ox and the forewarned ox caused damage to the person, whichever side caused the greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. In a case where a person caused damage to an innocuous ox and the innocuous ox caused damage to the person, if the person caused greater financial damage to the innocuous ox he pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. If the innocuous ox caused greater damage to the person, its owner pays only half the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva says: The owner of the innocuous ox that injured a person also pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between an innocuous and a forewarned ox in a case where an ox injures a person.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ״ – כְּמִשְׁפַּט שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר, כָּךְ מִשְׁפַּט שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם. מָה שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר – תָּם מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וּמוּעָד נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, אַף שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם – תָּם מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וּמוּעָד נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis about a case where an ox injures a person, the Sages taught: It is derived from the verse: “Whether it has gored a son, or has gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done to him” (Exodus 21:31), that as is the judgment concerning an ox that causes damage to an ox, so is the judgment with regard to an ox that causes damage to a person. Just as with regard to an ox that causes damage to an ox, if it is innocuous its owner pays half the cost of the damage and if it is forewarned he pays the full cost of the damage, so too, with regard to an ox that causes damage to a person, if it is an innocuous ox its owner pays half the cost of the damage and if it is a forewarned ox the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה״ – כַּתַּחְתּוֹן, וְלֹא כָּעֶלְיוֹן.

Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the phrase “according to this judgment” that the halakha with regard to an ox that gores a person is judged like the case that appears in the lower verse, i.e., the case of a forewarned ox, which appears in Exodus 21:29, and not like the case that appears in the upper verse, i.e., the case of an innocuous ox, which appears in Exodus 21:28.

יָכוֹל מְשַׁלֵּם מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״ – מִגּוּפוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה.

One might have thought that since the case of an ox that gored a person is compared to the case of a forewarned ox, the owner also pays from his superior-quality property. Therefore, the verse states: “Shall it be done to him [lo],” indicating he pays restitution exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the body of his belligerent ox and does not pay from his superior-quality property, as the word lo can also be understood as referring to the ox. In this manner the case of an innocuous ox that gores a person is compared to the halakha of an innocuous ox that gores another ox, whereas with regard to the amount of restitution, it is compared to the case of a forewarned ox.

וְרַבָּנַן – ״זֶה״ לְמָה לִי? לְפוֹטְרוֹ מֵאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not differentiate between an ox that gores a person and one that gores an animal, inasmuch as the distinction between an innocuous and a forewarned ox applies in both cases, why do I need the seemingly superfluous word “this”? The Gemara answers: The word is stated to exempt him from the four types of indemnity that one who injures another person is liable to pay, thereby emphasizing the comparison to the case of an ox that gores an ox.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – לְפוֹטְרוֹ מֵאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵ״אִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״; ״אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בַּעֲמִיתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive the halakha exempting him from paying these four types of indemnity? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). Rabbi Akiva derives from here that only when a man injures his neighbor is he liable to pay these four types of indemnity, but not when an ox injures his neighbor.

וְרַבָּנַן – אִי מֵהַהִיא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא צַעַר לְחוֹדֵיהּ, אֲבָל רִיפּוּי וָשֶׁבֶת אֵימָא לִיתֵּן לֵיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: And why do the Rabbis not derive this halakha from that verse? The Gemara answers: If it would have been derived from that verse, I would have said that he is exempt only from paying for pain, but for medical costs and loss of livelihood, I would say that he is liable to give him compensation. Therefore, the phrase “according to this judgment” teaches us that he is not liable to pay compensation for anything other than the damage itself.

מַתְנִי׳ שׁוֹר שָׁוֶה מָנֶה שֶׁנָּגַח שׁוֹר שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם, וְאֵין הַנְּבֵילָה יָפָה כְּלוּם – נוֹטֵל אֶת הַשּׁוֹר.

MISHNA: With regard to an innocuous ox worth one hundred dinars that gored an ox worth two hundred dinars, and the carcass of the dead ox is not worth anything, its owner takes the entire ox that gored it, since it is worth half the value of the damage.

גְּמָ׳ מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: יוּשַׁם הַשּׁוֹר בְּבֵית דִּין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הוּחְלַט הַשּׁוֹר.

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna, which rules that the injured party takes the ox immediately? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a baraita: After it gores another ox, the belligerent ox shall be appraised in court before it is taken by the injured party, this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The ox was already assigned to the owner of the dead ox as payment, and if the amount of damages is not contested by the owner of the goring ox, no further legal steps are required.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: בַּעַל חוֹב הוּא, וְזוּזֵי הוּא דְּמַסֵּיק לֵיהּ. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: שׁוּתָּפֵי נִינְהוּ.

The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Yishmael holds that the owner of the dead ox is considered a creditor of the owner of the belligerent ox, and it is money that he is claiming from him, but he has no ownership of the body of the belligerent ox. And Rabbi Akiva holds that they are partners, i.e., from the time the innocuous ox killed the other ox, the owner of the dead ox has a share of ownership in the belligerent ox.

וְקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּהַאי קְרָא: ״וּמָכְרוּ אֶת הַשּׁוֹר הַחַי וְחָצוּ אֶת כַּסְפּוֹ״ – רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: לְבֵי דִינָא קָמַזְהַר רַחֲמָנָא; וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: לְנִיזָּק וּמַזִּיק מַזְהַר לְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא.

And they disagree with regard to the meaning of this verse: “Then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value” (Exodus 21:35). Rabbi Yishmael holds that the Merciful One is commanding the court to evaluate the damages in this manner, and Rabbi Akiva holds that the Merciful One is commanding the injured party and the one liable for damage to split ownership of the live ox, without the involvement of the court.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? הִקְדִּישׁוֹ נִיזָּק אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions as to whether or not they are considered partners? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the injured party consecrated the ox to the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, until the court transfers the ox to the injured party, it still belongs to its owner, and therefore the injured party cannot consecrate it. According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, the injured party owns the ox from the time the damage was inflicted, and he can therefore consecrate it.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: מְכָרוֹ מַזִּיק, לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בַּעַל חוֹב הוּא, וְזוּזֵי הוּא דְּמַסֵּיק לֵיהּ – מָכוּר; אוֹ דִלְמָא,

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: If the one liable for damage sold the ox, what is the halakha according to Rabbi Yishmael? Is it that since Rabbi Yishmael says that the injured party is considered a creditor, and it is merely money that he is claiming from him, it is sold? Or perhaps

כֵּיוָן דִּמְשַׁעְבַּד לֵיהּ לְנִיזָּק – לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ מָכוּר.

does he say that since the ox is liened to the debt to the injured party, who will collect it should the ox’s owner not have sufficient funds, it is not in his power to sell it? Rav Naḥman said to him: It is not sold.

וְהָתַנְיָא: מְכָרוֹ – מָכוּר! חוֹזֵר וְגוֹבֵהוּ. וְכִי מֵאַחַר שֶׁחוֹזֵר וְגוֹבֵהוּ, לָמָּה מָכוּר? לְרִידְיָא.

Rava asked him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if he sold it, it is sold? Rav Naḥman replied: Nevertheless, the injured party then collects it from the purchaser. The Gemara asks: Since the injured party then collects it from the purchaser, with regard to what matter is it sold? His right to collect it negates the effectiveness of the sale. The Gemara answers: It is sold for the purpose of plowing [ridya]. The purchaser may use the ox for plowing until the injured party collects it from him, and the purchaser is not required to reimburse the injured party for the use of his ox.

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לֹוֶה וּמוֹכֵר מִטַּלְטְלִין – בֵּית דִּין גּוֹבִין לוֹ מֵהֶם? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּכְמַאן דַּעֲשָׂאוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי דָּמֵי.

The Gemara asks: Should one conclude from this ruling that with regard to one who borrows money and then sells his movable property, the court can collect the debt from this property on behalf of the creditor, as according to Rabbi Yishmael the belligerent ox is only a lien for the debt owed to the injured party? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the belligerent ox, it is different, as the owner of the ox is considered like one who rendered it designated payment of the debt, since the Torah specifies that the injured party collects damages from the ox. In general, however, movable property that is sold by a debtor cannot be collected by the creditor.

וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: עָשָׂה עַבְדּוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי, וּמְכָרוֹ – בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה הֵימֶנּוּ. שׁוֹרוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי וּמְכָרוֹ – אֵין בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה הֵימֶנּוּ!

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rava say that if one rendered his slave as designated repayment for a debt and subsequently sold him, the creditor collects payment from the purchaser, whereas if one rendered his ox as designated repayment and then sold it, the creditor cannot collect it from the purchaser? This contradicts the previous statement that the belligerent ox is considered designated repayment, and therefore even if it is sold the injured party can collect it from the purchaser.

עֶבֶד מַאי טַעְמָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִית לֵיהּ קָלָא; הַאי נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דִּנְגַח – קָלָא אִית לֵיהּ, דְּ״תוֹרָא נַגְחָנָא״ קָרוּ לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: The distinction made in Rava’s statement answers this question. What is the reason that a slave who was rendered as designated repayment can be collected from the purchaser? It is because rendering a slave as designated repayment is not common and generates publicity. The purchaser was therefore aware of this when he bought the slave. Similarly, with regard to this ox as well, since it gored an animal, it generates publicity, as it is publicly called a goring ox, and so the purchaser was aware of the lien attached to it. Therefore, the injured party can collect it from the purchaser.

תָּנֵי רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר מַעְרְבָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מְכָרוֹ – אֵין מָכוּר, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ – מוּקְדָּשׁ.

Rav Taḥalifa from the West, Eretz Yisrael, taught the following baraita with regard to the belligerent ox before Rabbi Abbahu: If he sold it, it is not sold, but if he consecrated it, it is consecrated.

מְכָרוֹ מַאן? אִילֵימָא מַזִּיק, ״מְכָרוֹ אֵין מָכוּר״ מַנִּי – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הוּחְלַט הַשּׁוֹר; וְ״הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ״ – אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: יוּשַׁם הַשּׁוֹר בְּבֵית דִּין!

The Gemara asks: Who sold it? Is it the injured party or the liable party? If we say it is the one liable for the damage, whose opinion is it that if he sold it, it is not sold? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that the ox was already assigned to the injured party. But in the following statement of the baraita, that if he consecrated it, it is consecrated, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that the ox shall be appraised in court.

אֶלָּא נִיזָּק? ״מְכָרוֹ אֵינוֹ מָכוּר״ מַנִּי – רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, ״הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ״ אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!

If, rather, it is referring to the injured party selling it, whose opinion is it that if he sold it, it is not sold? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that the injured party has no share of ownership in the ox until it is transferred to him by the court. But in the statement that if he consecrated it, it is consecrated, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The baraita does not seem to accord with either opinion.

לְעוֹלָם מַזִּיק, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל; ״מְכָרוֹ אֵינוֹ מָכוּר״ – אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּהָא מְשַׁעְבְּדָא לֵיהּ לְנִיזָּק.

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to the one liable for the damage, and everyone agrees with its ruling. The ruling that if he sold it, it is not sold is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as the ox is liened to the injured party, precluding the owner from selling it.

״הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ״ – אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ הֶקְדֵּשׁ יוֹצֵא בְּלֹא פִּדְיוֹן.

The statement that if he consecrated it, it is consecrated, is the halakha even according to Rabbi Akiva, since it is not actually consecrated but is considered so only due to the statement of Rabbi Abbahu. As Rabbi Abbahu says that if one consecrates liened property, although the consecration does not take effect, nevertheless he is required to redeem it, due to a rabbinic decree lest people say that consecrated property can be removed from the ownership of the Temple treasury without redemption. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of the ox’s consecration notwithstanding, he is still required to redeem it, by means of minimal payment, so as not to cause the denigration of Temple property.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שׁוֹר תָּם שֶׁהִזִּיק; עַד שֶׁלֹּא עָמַד בַּדִּין – מְכָרוֹ מָכוּר, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ, שְׁחָטוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה – מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי. מִשֶּׁעָמַד בַּדִּין – מְכָרוֹ אֵינוֹ מָכוּר, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ אֵינוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ, שְׁחָטוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה – לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to an innocuous ox that caused damage, if, before its owner stood trial, he sold it, it is sold. If he consecrated it, it is consecrated. If he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift, what he did is done, i.e., takes effect. By contrast, once he stood trial and is now obligated to pay the injured party, if he sold it, it is not sold; if he consecrated it, it is not consecrated; if he slaughtered it or gave it is a gift, he has done nothing.

קָדְמוּ בַּעֲלֵי חוֹבוֹת (וְהִגְבִּיהוֹ) [וְגָבוּהוּ]; בֵּין חָב עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִזִּיק, בֵּין הִזִּיק עַד שֶׁלֹּא חָב – לֹא עָשׂוּ וְלֹא כְּלוּם, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא מִגּוּפוֹ.

If creditors of the ox’s owner collected the ox first, whether he owed the creditors before his ox caused the damage or whether it caused the damage before he owed them, they have done nothing. Their collection is void, because compensation to the injured party is paid only from the body of the ox, as it was innocuous, and it is therefore designated exclusively for this compensation.

מוּעָד שֶׁהִזִּיק – בֵּין שֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָמַד בַּדִּין; מְכָרוֹ מָכוּר, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ, שְׁחָטוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה – מָה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי. קָדְמוּ בַּעֲלֵי חוֹבוֹת (וְהִגְבִּיהוּ) [וְגָבוּהוּ]; בֵּין חָב עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִזִּיק, בֵּין הִזִּיק עַד שֶׁלֹּא חָב – מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה.

The baraita continues: With regard to a forewarned ox that caused damage, whether its owner stood trial or whether he did not stand trial, if he sold it, it is sold; if he consecrated it, it is consecrated; if he slaughtered it or gave it as a gift, what he did is done. Likewise, if creditors collected the ox first, whether he owed them before it caused the damage, or whether it caused the damage before he owed them, what they did is done. This is because the restitution is paid only from his superior-quality property, not from the body of the ox. Therefore, what he or his creditors do with the ox takes effect.

אָמַר מָר: ״מְכָרוֹ מָכוּר״ – לְרִדְיָא.

The Gemara explains the baraita: The Master said above, with regard to an innocuous ox, that if he sold it, it is sold. As explained above, the sale is valid only with regard to the purchaser using the ox for plowing in the interim, until the injured party collects it.

״הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מוּקְדָּשׁ״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ.

The statement that if he consecrated it, it is consecrated does not mean that it is actually consecrated, but rather that it must be redeemed through payment of a minimal sum, due to Rabbi Abbahu’s statement mentioned above.

״שְׁחָטוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה, מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי״; בִּשְׁלָמָא נְתָנוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה, מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי – לְרִדְיָא; אֶלָּא שְׁחָטוֹ – לֵיתֵי וְלִשְׁתַּלַּם מִבִּשְׂרֵיהּ!

With regard to the statement that if he slaughtered it or gave it as a present, what he did is done, the Gemara asks: Granted, if he gave it as a present, what he did is done with regard to the recipient’s permission to use it for plowing. But if he slaughtered it, how does that affect the injured party’s rights? Let him come and receive payment from the slaughtered ox’s meat.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״חַי״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא חַי, שְׁחָטוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּמָכְרוּ אֶת הַשּׁוֹר״ מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: It is stated in the Torah: “Then they shall sell the live ox” (Exodus 21:35). I have derived only that the injured party receives a share of ownership if the belligerent ox is alive. From where do I derive that this applies even if the ox’s owner slaughtered it? The verse states: “Then they shall sell the live ox,” indicating that in any case, whatever the circumstances, the injured party is paid from proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִפְחַת שְׁחִיטָה.

Rav Sheizevi said: This statement is necessary only with regard to the diminished value of the ox due to its slaughter. Although the value of the ox may no longer cover the damage, its owner is not liable to compensate the injured party beyond the ox’s current value.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, הַמַּזִּיק שִׁעְבּוּדוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – פָּטוּר.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: That is to say that one who causes damage to another’s liened property is exempt from paying compensation, since the property does not actually belong to the one who holds the lien.

פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא חַסַּרְתָּיךְ וְלָא מִידֵּי – דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: זִיקָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דִּשְׁקַלִי מִינָּךְ; אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא לִיחַיַּיב; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this inference from the baraita obvious? The Gemara answers: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, states this halakha lest you say that it is specifically there, in the case where one slaughters a liened ox, that he is exempt, as he can say to him: I have not detracted anything from what is yours, as he can say to him: I took only spirit from what is yours. He detracted only the life of the ox, not its physical body, and one who causes damage to another’s liened property might be exempt from liability for this intangible damage. But generally one who causes damage to another’s lien should be liable. Therefore, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, teaches us that one is exempt from liability for all types of damage he causes to another’s liened property.

הָא נָמֵי רַבָּה אַמְרַהּ – דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: הַשּׂוֹרֵף שְׁטָרוֹתָיו שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – פָּטוּר!

The Gemara challenges this explanation: Rabba stated this principle, as well, and there would be no need for Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, to state it. As Rabba says: One who burns another’s documents, in which other people’s debts to him are recorded, is exempt, although the owner of the documents can no longer collect payment from liened property.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: נְיָירָא בְּעָלְמָא קְלַאי מִינָּךְ; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּחָפַר בָּהּ בּוֹרוֹת שִׁיחִין וּמְעָרוֹת, לִיחַיַּיב; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּהָא הָכָא כְּמַאן דְּחָפַר בָּהּ בּוֹרוֹת שִׁיחִין וּמְעָרוֹת דָּמֵי, וְקָאָמַר: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי.

The Gemara answers: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, states this principle lest you say that it is specifically there that he is exempt, as the perpetrator of the damage can say to the owner of the documents: I burned your mere paper, for which I am prepared to pay. But in a case where one dug pits, ditches, or caves on liened land, causing substantial damage, he should be liable to compensate the one holding the lien. Therefore, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, teaches us that even in a case of substantial damage he is exempt, as the case here, where the ox was slaughtered, is like one who dug pits, ditches, or caves, as slaughter is considered substantial damage, and the tanna said that in this case what he did is done.

קָדְמוּ בַּעֲלֵי חוֹבוֹת (וְהִגְבִּיהוּ) [וְגָבוּהוּ]; בֵּין חָב עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִזִּיק, בֵּין הִזִּיק עַד שֶׁלֹּא חָב – לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא מִגּוּפוֹ.

The Gemara continues to explain the baraita, which states: If creditors collected the innocuous ox first, whether its owner owed them before his ox caused damage or whether it caused damage before he owed them, they have done nothing, because restitution is paid only from the body of the ox.

בִּשְׁלָמָא הִזִּיק עַד שֶׁלֹּא חָב – נִיזָּקִין קָדְמוּ. אֲבָל חָב עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִזִּיק – בַּעַל חוֹב קְדֵים!

The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case where it caused damage before he owed them, the injured parties came first, and the ox is liened to the debt. But in the case where he owed them before it caused damage, the creditor collected it first, so why does he not have the preemptive right to the ox?