Bava Kamma 42
מַשְׁכַּח רַבְרְבֵי – שָׁקֵיל, זוּטְרֵי – שָׁקֵיל.
When he finds big ones he takes them, and when he finds small ones he takes them as well. Here too, although Rabbi Eliezer’s first explanation was sufficient, he added an additional response, despite the fact that it was not as good as the first.
רַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר ״הֵמִית״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא – מָשָׁל לְצַיָּיד שֶׁשּׁוֹלֶה דָּגִים מִן הַיָּם, מַשְׁכַּח זוּטְרֵי – שָׁקֵיל, מַשְׁכַּח רַבְרְבֵי – שָׁדֵי זוּטְרֵי וְשָׁקֵיל רַבְרְבֵי.
By contrast, Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Rava that he first said to him the explanation involving inconclusive testimony asserting that the ox killed, since this is analogous to a fisherman pulling fish from the sea, who finds small ones and takes them, and when he then finds big ones, he discards the small ones and takes only the big ones. Here too, once Rabbi Eliezer thought of a better response to Rabbi Akiva’s question, he suggested it instead of the first.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: נָקִי מִדְּמֵי וְלָדוֹת.
§ It is taught in another baraita with regard to the verse: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It means he shall be clear from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. In other words, if an innocuous ox causes a woman to miscarry, the owner is not liable to pay half the compensation for the miscarried offspring.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה״ – אֲנָשִׁים, וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: It is unnecessary for the verse to teach this. Doesn’t it say with regard to paying compensation for miscarried offspring: “If men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22); from which it is inferred that men who cause a woman to miscarry are liable to pay compensation for the offspring, but the owner of oxen who cause a woman to miscarry is not liable?
שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!
The Gemara comments: Rabbi Akiva is saying well; he states a reasonable objection. What would Rabbi Yosei HaGelili have responded to him?
אָמַר רַב עוּלָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: אֲנָשִׁים – וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים הַדּוֹמִין לַאֲנָשִׁים; מָה אֲנָשִׁים מוּעָדִין – אַף שְׁוָורִים מוּעָדִין, הָא תָּם – מִיחַיַּיב; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – דְּפָטוּר.
Rav Ulla, son of Rav Idi, said: It was necessary for the verse to teach this exemption, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that this inference should be limited, as follows: Men are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Only some oxen are excluded from this halakha. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. But in the case of miscarriage caused by an innocuous ox, its owner would be liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote with regard to an innocuous ox: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach us that he is exempt from liability.
אָמַר רָבָא: יַצִּיבָא בְּאַרְעָא, וְגִיּוֹרָא בִּשְׁמֵי שְׁמַיָּא?!
Rava said, in objection to this answer: The native is on the ground and the stranger is in the heavens! The aforementioned suggestion contradicts the principle that the halakha of a forewarned ox is more stringent than that of an innocuous ox.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: אֲנָשִׁים – וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים הַדּוֹמִין לַאֲנָשִׁים; מָה אֲנָשִׁים מוּעָדִין – אַף שְׁוָורִים מוּעָדִין, וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר לְתַמִּין דִּפְטִירִי; הֲדַר כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – תָּם פָּטוּר, וּמוּעָד חַיָּיב.
Rather, Rava said a different way for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili to counter Rabbi Akiva’s objection: It was necessary for the verse to teach this exemption, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that only men are liable to pay for miscarried offspring, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. And for miscarriage caused by innocuous oxen, their owners are also exempt due to an a fortiori inference. The Merciful One then wrote that the owner of the innocuous ox shall be clear, indicating that only for an innocuous ox is one exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring, but for a forewarned ox the owner is liable.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, גַּבֵּי בּוֹשֶׁת נָמֵי נֵימָא הָכִי: אֲנָשִׁים – וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים הַדּוֹמִין לַאֲנָשִׁים; מָה אֲנָשִׁים מוּעָדִין – אַף שְׁוָורִים מוּעָדִין, וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר לְתַמִּין דִּפְטִירִי; הֲדַר כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – תָּם פָּטוּר, וּמוּעָד חַיָּיב!
Abaye said to him: If that is so, then with regard to compensation for humiliation, which is derived from the verse: “When men struggle together, a man and his brother, and the wife of one drew near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who smites him, and extended her hand, and grabbed his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11), let us say this as well: Only men are liable to pay for humiliation, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. And for humiliation caused by innocuous oxen, their owners are also exempt due to an a fortiori inference. The Merciful One then wrote that the owner of the innocuous ox shall be clear, indicating that only for an innocuous ox is one exempt from paying compensation for humiliation, but for a forewarned ox the owner is liable.
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, אִי הָכִי, לִיתְנֵי: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר מִדְּמֵי וְלָדוֹת וּמִבּוֹשֶׁת!
And if you would say that indeed that is the halakha according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, if so, let the baraita teach that with regard to the verse: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: He is exempt both from paying compensation for miscarried offspring and from paying compensation for humiliation.
אֶלָּא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֲנָשִׁים – אֵין אָסוֹן בְּאִשָּׁה יֵעָנְשׁוּ, יֵשׁ אָסוֹן בָּאִשָּׁה לֹא יֵעָנְשׁוּ. וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים – דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּיֵשׁ אָסוֹן, יֵעָנְשׁוּ. הֲדַר כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – דְּפָטוּר.
Rava then retracted this explanation of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion. Rather, Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Akiva’s inference is correct, according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, but with regard to the continuation of the verse: “But if any harm follows, you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:22). With regard to men, if there is no harm caused to the woman, i.e., she is not killed, they shall be punished financially and are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. But if there is harm caused to the woman and she dies, they shall not be punished financially, as they are liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. This distinction applies only with regard to men but not with regard to oxen, as even if there is harm caused to the woman, the owners shall be punished financially. In order to preclude this inference, the Merciful One then wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach that he is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אַטּוּ בְּאָסוֹן תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא? בְּכַוָּונָה תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא!
Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this: Is that to say that the issue of financial liability is dependent on whether or not there was harm caused to the woman? Clearly, the issue is dependent on the intent to strike the woman.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אֲנָשִׁים – כִּי נִתְכַּוְּנוּ זֶה לָזֶה, אַף עַל גַּב שֶׁיֵּשׁ אָסוֹן בָּאִשָּׁה, יֵעָנְשׁוּ; כִּי נִתְכַּוְּנוּ לָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ, לֹא יֵעָנְשׁוּ. וְלֹא שְׁוָורִים – דַּאֲפִילּוּ נִתְכַּוְּנוּ לָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ, ״יֵעָנְשׁוּ״. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – דִּפְטִירִי.
Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said a different inference: With regard to men, in a case where they intended to strike each other, even if there is harm caused to the woman, i.e., she dies, they shall be punished financially, and are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. But when they intended to strike the woman herself they shall not be punished financially, as they are liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. But this distinction does not apply with regard to oxen, as even if they intended to strike the woman herself, their owners shall be punished. In order to preclude this inference, the Merciful One wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach that the owners are exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.
וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רַב חַגַּי מִדָּרוֹמָא, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה.
And similarly, when Rav Ḥaggai came from the South, he came and brought a baraita in his hand that interprets the verse in accordance with the explanation of Rav Adda bar Ahava.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: נָקִי מִדְּמֵי עֶבֶד.
§ It is taught in another baraita with regard to the verse “The owner of the ox shall be clear” that Rabbi Akiva says: This statement teaches that if an innocuous ox kills a Canaanite slave, its owner shall be clear from paying compensation for the slave, unlike the case of a forewarned ox that killed a Canaanite slave, where the ox’s owner is liable.
וְנֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ – וַהֲלֹא עַצְמוֹ אֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא מִגּוּפוֹ, הֲבִיאֵהוּ לְבֵית דִּין וִישַׁלֶּם לָךְ!
The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Akiva say to himself the same objection that he raised against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation of the verse, that the owner of an innocuous ox is exempt from paying half a ransom (see 41b): Why is it necessary for the verse to teach this? But isn’t compensation for damage caused by an innocuous ox itself paid only from the value of its body? Therefore, its owner can say to the slave’s owner: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. Since the ox was stoned, there is nothing from which he can collect payment.
אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: כְּשֶׁקָּדַם בְּעָלָיו וּשְׁחָטוֹ; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִישְׁתַּלַּם מִינֵּיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, הוֹאִיל וּבַר קְטָלָא הוּא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁחְטֵיהּ – לָא לִישְׁתַּלַּם מִינֵּיהּ.
Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation is applicable in a case where its owner slaughtered it first, before it was sentenced to stoning. Lest you say that the slave’s owner should be paid from the value of the flesh, the verse teaches us that since the ox was subject to be killed, although its owner slaughtered it, the slave’s owner should not be paid from it.
אִי הָכִי, לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נָמֵי – כְּשֶׁקָּדַם וּשְׁחָטוֹ!
The Gemara asks: If so, why did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation? According to Rabbi Eliezer as well, it could be explained as referring to a case where its owner slaughtered it first.
הָכִי נָמֵי; וְסָבַר: דִּלְמָא אִית לֵיהּ טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא דַּעֲדִיף מֵהַאי, וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation could also be explained in this manner. And the reason Rabbi Akiva raised this objection was because he reasons: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer has another explanation that is better than this one, and will state it. Rabbi Eliezer did in fact respond with another explanation.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נָמֵי – לִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ שֶׁקָּדַם וּשְׁחָטוֹ! אָמַר לָךְ: הָתָם הוּא דְּנִתְכַּוֵּון לַהֲרוֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם, דְּשׁוֹר לָאו בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא כְּלָל; דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא נִיחַיַּיב – אִצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי; אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא בַּר קְטָלָא הֲוָה – לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁחְטֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Eliezer also answer him that the owner slaughtered it first. Why did he offer a different explanation? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Eliezer could have said to you: Specifically there, in the case Rabbi Eliezer referred to in his explanation, namely, where the ox intended to kill another animal but killed a person instead, since the ox was not subject to be killed at all, it might enter your mind to say that he should be liable to pay half a ransom from the ox’s body. Therefore, the verse is necessary to exclude the owner from liability to pay half a ransom. But here, since the ox was initially subject to be killed, a verse is not necessary to teach that the owner is exempt from paying half a ransom even if he slaughtered it.
וּלְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי, וַדַּאי הָכִי הֲוָה!
The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Akiva also, certainly it is so, that a verse is not necessary to teach that if the owner slaughters the ox before its verdict he is exempt from liability.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: הַאי מִילְּתָא – מִפִּי דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה שְׁמִיעַ לִי, וּמַנּוּ – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אַף תָּם שֶׁחָבַל בָּאָדָם מְשַׁלֵּם בַּמּוֹתָר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, מִשְׁתַּלַּם נָמֵי [דְּמֵי עֶבֶד] מֵעֲלִיָּיה; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״.
Rather, Rav Asi said: The above explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation should be rejected, as I heard this following statement from a great man, and who is he? He is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. This is what he said: It might enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna (33a) that in a case where a person and an innocuous ox damaged each other concurrently, the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person also pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference between the two valuations of the damage, as there is no distinction between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox with regard to injuries caused to a person, compensation for the slave is also paid from his superior-quality property, not from the body of the ox; just as in a case where a forewarned ox kills a slave. Therefore, its owner cannot say: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. To counter this possibility, the Merciful One wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that he is exempt from this liability.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב אַסִּי: וְהָא תַּבְרֵיהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לִגְזִיזֵיהּ – דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל יְשַׁלֵּם מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״ – מִגּוּפוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה!
Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But didn’t Rabbi Akiva already break the force of his fist, i.e., qualify this opinion of his? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: One might have thought that the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person pays compensation from his superior-quality property, the same as the owner of a forewarned ox. Therefore, the verse states: “According to this judgment shall be done to him [lo]” (Exodus 21:31), indicating that he pays restitution exclusively from the body of the ox but he does not pay from his superior-quality property, as the word lo also means: To it. This negates Rav Asi’s explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּמַחְמִירַנִי בְּעֶבֶד יוֹתֵר מִבֶּן חוֹרִין, שֶׁבֶּן חוֹרִין יָפֶה סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן סֶלַע, שְׁלֹשִׁים – נוֹתֵן שְׁלֹשִׁים, וְעֶבֶד יָפֶה סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן שְׁלֹשִׁים; מִשְׁתַּלַּם נָמֵי דְּמֵי עֶבֶד מִן הָעֲלִיָּיה; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״.
Rather, Rava said a different explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s statement: The verse is necessary because it might enter your mind to say that since I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to a forewarned ox that kills a person in the case of a Canaanite slave than in the case of a freeman; as in the case of a freeman who was worth one sela the owner of the ox gives one sela in ransom, and if he was worth thirty sela he gives thirty; but in the case of a Canaanite slave the Torah imposes a fixed amount, so even if he was worth only one sela the owner gives thirty sela, therefore, since the Torah is more stringent in the case of a slave, payment for the slave should also be paid from the owner’s superior-quality property. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that payment is not required in a case where an innocuous ox kills a slave.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: נָקִי מִדְּמֵי עֶבֶד.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rava to Rabbi Akiva’s statement. The baraita states that with regard to the verse “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” Rabbi Akiva says: He shall be clear from payment for a Canaanite slave.
וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא – הוֹאִיל וְחַיָּיב בְּעֶבֶד וְחַיָּיב בְּבֶן חוֹרִין; מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּבֶן חוֹרִין – חָלַקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּעֶבֶד – נַחְלֹק בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד!
Rabbi Akiva discusses this interpretation: And could this halakha not be derived through logical inference, without the verse? Since the Torah deemed him liable to pay for the killing of a slave and deemed him liable for the killing of a freeman as well, just as when the Torah deemed him liable for a freeman you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, as no ransom is paid in the case of an innocuous ox, so too, when the Torah deemed him liable for a slave, let us distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox.
וְעוֹד, קַל וָחוֹמֶר – וּמָה בֶּן חוֹרִין, שֶׁנּוֹתֵן כׇּל שׇׁוְויוֹ, חָלַקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד; עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא שְׁלֹשִׁים, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד?
Furthermore, this halakha could be proven through an a fortiori inference: If, in the case of a freeman, where he, the owner, gives his full value, you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, with regard to a slave, where he gives only thirty sela and not more, even if the slave was worth more, is it not logical that we should distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, and exempt him from liability for an innocuous ox?
לֹא, מַחְמִירַנִי בְּעֶבֶד יוֹתֵר מִבֶּן חוֹרִין; שֶׁבֶּן חוֹרִין יָפֶה סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן סֶלַע, שְׁלֹשִׁים – נוֹתֵן שְׁלֹשִׁים; וְעֶבֶד יָפֶה סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן שְׁלֹשִׁים, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – נָקִי מִדְּמֵי עֶבֶד.
Rabbi Akiva rejects this opinion: No, one could disagree and say the opposite: I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to the case of a slave than with regard to that of a freeman; as for a freeman worth one sela, the ox’s owner gives only one sela, and if he is worth thirty sela he gives thirty. But in the case of a slave, even if he was worth only one sela, he gives thirty sela. Therefore, one might have thought that he should be liable to pay for a slave killed by his innocuous ox. To counter this, the verse states: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that he shall be clear from paying compensation for a slave.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהֵמִית אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה״ – אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וְכִי מָה בָּא זֶה לְלַמְּדֵנוּ? אִם לְחַיֵּיב עַל הָאִשָּׁה כָּאִישׁ – הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״כִּי יִגַּח שׁוֹר אֶת אִישׁ אוֹ אֶת אִשָּׁה״!
§ The Sages taught: The verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: “But if the ox was a goring ox in time past and warning has been given to its owner, and he has not secured it; and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned” (Exodus 21:29). Rabbi Akiva said: And what does this come to teach us? If it is to deem the owner liable for the killing of a woman just as for the killing of a man, this is already stated with regard to an innocuous ox, where it is stated: “When an ox gores a man or a woman, and they die, the ox shall be stoned” (Exodus 21:28).
אֶלָּא לְהַקִּישׁ אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ, מָה אִישׁ – נְזָקָיו לְיוֹרְשָׁיו, אַף אִשָּׁה – נְזָקֶיהָ לְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ.
Rather, the verse is stated to compare a woman to a man with regard to another issue: Just as with regard to a man, payment for his injuries is paid to his heirs, so too, with regard to a woman, payment for her injuries is paid to her heirs, and not to her husband.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: לָא יָרֵית לַהּ בַּעַל? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְיָרַשׁ אוֹתָהּ״ – מִכָּאן שֶׁהַבַּעַל יוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Akiva hold that a husband does not inherit from his wife? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And he shall inherit it [otah]” (Numbers 27:11). From here it is derived that the husband inherits from his wife, as otah also means: Her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא בְּכוֹפֶר – הוֹאִיל וְאֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ רָאוּי, וְאֵין הַבַּעַל נוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק.
Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Akiva says that her heirs and not her husband receive the payment only with regard to ransom, since it is paid only posthumously and is therefore considered property due to her; and the husband does not take in inheritance the property due to the deceased as he does the property she possessed. For instance, an inheritance that would have gone to the woman had she been alive is not awarded to the husband, but rather, to her other heirs.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהֵמִית אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה, הַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל וְגַם בְּעָלָיו יוּמָת. אִם כֹּפֶר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו״.
What is the reason for the assumption that even if it is clear that the victim is about to die, the husband is not owed ransom? The verse states: “And it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is laid on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid on him” (Exodus 21:29–30), indicating that the owner’s liability to pay ransom is dependent on the ox’s liability to be stoned, which, in turn, applies only after the death of the victim.
וּבִנְזָקִין לֹא אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: And with regard to damages, did Rabbi Akiva not say that damages due to a wife are paid to her heirs and not to her husband, just as with regard to ransom?
וְהָתַנְיָא: הִכָּה אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ – נוֹתֵן נֶזֶק וָצַעַר לָאִשָּׁה, וּדְמֵי וְלָדוֹת לַבַּעַל. אֵין הַבַּעַל – נוֹתֵן לְיוֹרְשָׁיו, אֵין הָאִשָּׁה – נוֹתֶנֶת לְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ. הָיְתָה שִׁפְחָה וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה,
But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If an assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated,
