Bava Kamma 42

משכח רברבי שקיל זוטרי שקיל

When he finds big ones he takes them, and when he finds small ones he takes them as well. Here too, although Rabbi Eliezer’s first explanation was sufficient, he added an additional response, despite the fact that it was not as good as the first.

רב טביומי משמיה דרבא אמר המית אמר ליה ברישא משל לצייד ששולה דגים מן הים משכח זוטרי שקיל משכח רברבי שדי זוטרי ושקיל רברבי

By contrast, Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Rava that he first said to him the explanation involving inconclusive testimony asserting that the ox killed, since this is analogous to a fisherman pulling fish from the sea, who finds small ones and takes them, and when he then finds big ones, he discards the small ones and takes only the big ones. Here too, once Rabbi Eliezer thought of a better response to Rabbi Akiva’s question, he suggested it instead of the first.

תניא אידך בעל השור נקי רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר נקי מדמי ולדות

§ It is taught in another baraita with regard to the verse: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It means he shall be clear from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. In other words, if an innocuous ox causes a woman to miscarry, the owner is not liable to pay half the compensation for the miscarried offspring.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא הרי הוא אומר כי ינצו אנשים ונגפו אשה אנשים ולא שוורים

Rabbi Akiva said to him: It is unnecessary for the verse to teach this. Doesn’t it say with regard to paying compensation for miscarried offspring: “If men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22); from which it is inferred that men who cause a woman to miscarry are liable to pay compensation for the offspring, but the owner of oxen who cause a woman to miscarry is not liable?

שפיר קאמר רבי עקיבא

The Gemara comments: Rabbi Akiva is saying well; he states a reasonable objection. What would Rabbi Yosei HaGelili have responded to him?

אמר רב עולא בריה דרב אידי איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא אנשים ולא שוורים הדומין לאנשים מה אנשים מועדין אף שוורים מועדין הא תם מיחייב כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי דפטור

Rav Ulla, son of Rav Idi, said: It was necessary for the verse to teach this exemption, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that this inference should be limited, as follows: Men are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Only some oxen are excluded from this halakha. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. But in the case of miscarriage caused by an innocuous ox, its owner would be liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote with regard to an innocuous ox: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach us that he is exempt from liability.

אמר רבא יציבא בארעא וגיורא בשמי שמיא

Rava said, in objection to this answer: The native is on the ground and the stranger is in the heavens! The aforementioned suggestion contradicts the principle that the halakha of a forewarned ox is more stringent than that of an innocuous ox.

אלא אמר רבא איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא אנשים ולא שוורים הדומין לאנשים מה אנשים מועדין אף שוורים מועדין וקל וחומר לתמין דפטירי הדר כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי תם פטור ומועד חייב

Rather, Rava said a different way for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili to counter Rabbi Akiva’s objection: It was necessary for the verse to teach this exemption, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that only men are liable to pay for miscarried offspring, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. And for miscarriage caused by innocuous oxen, their owners are also exempt due to an a fortiori inference. The Merciful One then wrote that the owner of the innocuous ox shall be clear, indicating that only for an innocuous ox is one exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring, but for a forewarned ox the owner is liable.

אמר ליה אביי אלא מעתה גבי בושת נמי נימא הכי אנשים ולא שוורים הדומין לאנשים מה אנשים מועדין אף שוורים מועדין וקל וחומר לתמין דפטירי הדר כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי תם פטור ומועד חייב

Abaye said to him: If that is so, then with regard to compensation for humiliation, which is derived from the verse: “When men struggle together, a man and his brother, and the wife of one drew near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who smites him, and extended her hand, and grabbed his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11), let us say this as well: Only men are liable to pay for humiliation, but the owner of oxen that are comparable to men is not liable. Just as men are categorically considered forewarned, so too the oxen, which are contrasted with men in this case, are considered forewarned as well. And for humiliation caused by innocuous oxen, their owners are also exempt due to an a fortiori inference. The Merciful One then wrote that the owner of the innocuous ox shall be clear, indicating that only for an innocuous ox is one exempt from paying compensation for humiliation, but for a forewarned ox the owner is liable.

וכי תימא הכי נמי אי הכי ליתני בעל השור נקי רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר פטור מדמי ולדות ומבושת

And if you would say that indeed that is the halakha according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, if so, let the baraita teach that with regard to the verse: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: He is exempt both from paying compensation for miscarried offspring and from paying compensation for humiliation.

אלא אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו אנשים אין אסון באשה יענשו יש אסון באשה לא יענשו ולא שוורים דאף על גב דיש אסון יענשו הדר כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי דפטור

Rava then retracted this explanation of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion. Rather, Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Akiva’s inference is correct, according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, but with regard to the continuation of the verse: “But if any harm follows, you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:22). With regard to men, if there is no harm caused to the woman, i.e., she is not killed, they shall be punished financially and are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. But if there is harm caused to the woman and she dies, they shall not be punished financially, as they are liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. This distinction applies only with regard to men but not with regard to oxen, as even if there is harm caused to the woman, the owners shall be punished financially. In order to preclude this inference, the Merciful One then wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach that he is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

מתקיף לה רב אדא בר אהבה אטו באסון תליא מילתא בכוונה תליא מילתא

Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this: Is that to say that the issue of financial liability is dependent on whether or not there was harm caused to the woman? Clearly, the issue is dependent on the intent to strike the woman.

אלא אמר רב אדא בר אהבה אנשים כי נתכונו זה לזה אף על גב שיש אסון באשה יענשו כי נתכונו לאשה עצמה לא יענשו ולא שוורים דאפילו נתכונו לאשה עצמה יענשו כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי דפטירי

Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said a different inference: With regard to men, in a case where they intended to strike each other, even if there is harm caused to the woman, i.e., she dies, they shall be punished financially, and are liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring. But when they intended to strike the woman herself they shall not be punished financially, as they are liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. But this distinction does not apply with regard to oxen, as even if they intended to strike the woman herself, their owners shall be punished. In order to preclude this inference, the Merciful One wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to teach that the owners are exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

וכן כי אתא רב חגי מדרומא אתא ואייתי מתניתא בידיה כוותיה דרב אדא בר אהבה

And similarly, when Rav Ḥaggai came from the South, he came and brought a baraita in his hand that interprets the verse in accordance with the explanation of Rav Adda bar Ahava.

תניא אידך בעל השור נקי רבי עקיבא אומר נקי מדמי עבד

§ It is taught in another baraita with regard to the verse “The owner of the ox shall be clear” that Rabbi Akiva says: This statement teaches that if an innocuous ox kills a Canaanite slave, its owner shall be clear from paying compensation for the slave, unlike the case of a forewarned ox that killed a Canaanite slave, where the ox’s owner is liable.

ונימא רבי עקיבא לנפשיה והלא עצמו אין משתלם אלא מגופו הביאהו לבית דין וישלם לך

The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Akiva say to himself the same objection that he raised against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation of the verse, that the owner of an innocuous ox is exempt from paying half a ransom (see 41b): Why is it necessary for the verse to teach this? But isn’t compensation for damage caused by an innocuous ox itself paid only from the value of its body? Therefore, its owner can say to the slave’s owner: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. Since the ox was stoned, there is nothing from which he can collect payment.

אמר רב שמואל בר רב יצחק כשקדם בעליו ושחטו מהו דתימא לישתלם מיניה קא משמע לן הואיל ובר קטלא הוא אף על גב דשחטיה לא לישתלם מיניה

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation is applicable in a case where its owner slaughtered it first, before it was sentenced to stoning. Lest you say that the slave’s owner should be paid from the value of the flesh, the verse teaches us that since the ox was subject to be killed, although its owner slaughtered it, the slave’s owner should not be paid from it.

אי הכי לרבי אליעזר נמי כשקדם ושחטו

The Gemara asks: If so, why did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation? According to Rabbi Eliezer as well, it could be explained as referring to a case where its owner slaughtered it first.

הכי נמי וסבר דלמא אית ליה טעמא אחרינא דעדיף מהאי ונימא ליה

The Gemara answers: Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation could also be explained in this manner. And the reason Rabbi Akiva raised this objection was because he reasons: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer has another explanation that is better than this one, and will state it. Rabbi Eliezer did in fact respond with another explanation.

ורבי אליעזר נמי לישני ליה שקדם ושחטו אמר לך התם הוא דנתכוון להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם דשור לאו בר קטלא הוא כלל דסלקא דעתך אמינא ניחייב אצטריך קרא למעוטי אבל הכא דמעיקרא בר קטלא הוה לא צריך קרא אף על גב דשחטיה

The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Eliezer also answer him that the owner slaughtered it first. Why did he offer a different explanation? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Eliezer could have said to you: Specifically there, in the case Rabbi Eliezer referred to in his explanation, namely, where the ox intended to kill another animal but killed a person instead, since the ox was not subject to be killed at all, it might enter your mind to say that he should be liable to pay half a ransom from the ox’s body. Therefore, the verse is necessary to exclude the owner from liability to pay half a ransom. But here, since the ox was initially subject to be killed, a verse is not necessary to teach that the owner is exempt from paying half a ransom even if he slaughtered it.

ולרבי עקיבא נמי ודאי הכי הוה

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Akiva also, certainly it is so, that a verse is not necessary to teach that if the owner slaughters the ox before its verdict he is exempt from liability.

אלא אמר רב אסי האי מילתא מפי דגברא רבה שמיע לי ומנו רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואמר רבי עקיבא אף תם שחבל באדם משלם במותר נזק שלם משתלם נמי [דמי עבד] מעלייה כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי

Rather, Rav Asi said: The above explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation should be rejected, as I heard this following statement from a great man, and who is he? He is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. This is what he said: It might enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna (33a) that in a case where a person and an innocuous ox damaged each other concurrently, the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person also pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference between the two valuations of the damage, as there is no distinction between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox with regard to injuries caused to a person, compensation for the slave is also paid from his superior-quality property, not from the body of the ox; just as in a case where a forewarned ox kills a slave. Therefore, its owner cannot say: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. To counter this possibility, the Merciful One wrote: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that he is exempt from this liability.

אמר ליה רבי זירא לרב אסי והא תבריה רבי עקיבא לגזיזיה דתניא רבי עקיבא אומר יכול ישלם מן העלייה תלמוד לומר כמשפט הזה יעשה לו מגופו משלם ואינו משלם מן העלייה

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But didn’t Rabbi Akiva already break the force of his fist, i.e., qualify this opinion of his? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: One might have thought that the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person pays compensation from his superior-quality property, the same as the owner of a forewarned ox. Therefore, the verse states: “According to this judgment shall be done to him [lo]” (Exodus 21:31), indicating that he pays restitution exclusively from the body of the ox but he does not pay from his superior-quality property, as the word lo also means: To it. This negates Rav Asi’s explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation.

אלא אמר רבא אצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ומחמירני בעבד יותר מבן חורין שבן חורין יפה סלע נותן סלע שלשים נותן שלשים ועבד יפה סלע נותן שלשים משתלם נמי דמי עבד מן העלייה כתב רחמנא בעל השור נקי

Rather, Rava said a different explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s statement: The verse is necessary because it might enter your mind to say that since I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to a forewarned ox that kills a person in the case of a Canaanite slave than in the case of a freeman; as in the case of a freeman who was worth one sela the owner of the ox gives one sela in ransom, and if he was worth thirty sela he gives thirty; but in the case of a Canaanite slave the Torah imposes a fixed amount, so even if he was worth only one sela the owner gives thirty sela, therefore, since the Torah is more stringent in the case of a slave, payment for the slave should also be paid from the owner’s superior-quality property. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that payment is not required in a case where an innocuous ox kills a slave.

תניא כותיה דרבא בעל השור נקי רבי עקיבא אומר נקי מדמי עבד

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rava to Rabbi Akiva’s statement. The baraita states that with regard to the verse “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” Rabbi Akiva says: He shall be clear from payment for a Canaanite slave.

והלא דין הוא הואיל וחייב בעבד וחייב בבן חורין מה כשחייב בבן חורין חלקת בו בין תם למועד אף כשחייב בעבד נחלק בו בין תם למועד

Rabbi Akiva discusses this interpretation: And could this halakha not be derived through logical inference, without the verse? Since the Torah deemed him liable to pay for the killing of a slave and deemed him liable for the killing of a freeman as well, just as when the Torah deemed him liable for a freeman you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, as no ransom is paid in the case of an innocuous ox, so too, when the Torah deemed him liable for a slave, let us distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox.

ועוד קל וחומר ומה בן חורין שנותן כל שוויו חלקת בו בין תם למועד עבד שאינו נותן אלא שלשים אינו דין שנחלוק בו בין תם למועד

Furthermore, this halakha could be proven through an a fortiori inference: If, in the case of a freeman, where he, the owner, gives his full value, you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, with regard to a slave, where he gives only thirty sela and not more, even if the slave was worth more, is it not logical that we should distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, and exempt him from liability for an innocuous ox?

לא מחמירני בעבד יותר מבן חורין שבן חורין יפה סלע נותן סלע שלשים נותן שלשים ועבד יפה סלע נותן שלשים יכול יהא חייב תלמוד לומר בעל השור נקי נקי מדמי עבד

Rabbi Akiva rejects this opinion: No, one could disagree and say the opposite: I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to the case of a slave than with regard to that of a freeman; as for a freeman worth one sela, the ox’s owner gives only one sela, and if he is worth thirty sela he gives thirty. But in the case of a slave, even if he was worth only one sela, he gives thirty sela. Therefore, one might have thought that he should be liable to pay for a slave killed by his innocuous ox. To counter this, the verse states: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” indicating that he shall be clear from paying compensation for a slave.

תנו רבנן והמית איש או אשה אמר רבי עקיבא וכי מה בא זה ללמדנו אם לחייב על האשה כאיש הרי כבר נאמר כי יגח שור את איש או את אשה

§ The Sages taught: The verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: “But if the ox was a goring ox in time past and warning has been given to its owner, and he has not secured it; and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned” (Exodus 21:29). Rabbi Akiva said: And what does this come to teach us? If it is to deem the owner liable for the killing of a woman just as for the killing of a man, this is already stated with regard to an innocuous ox, where it is stated: “When an ox gores a man or a woman, and they die, the ox shall be stoned” (Exodus 21:28).

אלא להקיש אשה לאיש מה איש נזקיו ליורשיו אף אשה נזקיה ליורשיה

Rather, the verse is stated to compare a woman to a man with regard to another issue: Just as with regard to a man, payment for his injuries is paid to his heirs, so too, with regard to a woman, payment for her injuries is paid to her heirs, and not to her husband.

וסבר רבי עקיבא לא ירית לה בעל והתניא וירש אותה מכאן שהבעל יורש את אשתו דברי רבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Akiva hold that a husband does not inherit from his wife? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And he shall inherit it [otah]” (Numbers 27:11). From here it is derived that the husband inherits from his wife, as otah also means: Her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

אמר ריש לקיש לא אמר אלא בכופר הואיל ואין משתלם אלא לאחר מיתה והוה ליה ראוי ואין הבעל נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Akiva says that her heirs and not her husband receive the payment only with regard to ransom, since it is paid only posthumously and is therefore considered property due to her; and the husband does not take in inheritance the property due to the deceased as he does the property she possessed. For instance, an inheritance that would have gone to the woman had she been alive is not awarded to the husband, but rather, to her other heirs.

מאי טעמא אמר קרא והמית איש או אשה השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת אם כפר יושת עליו

What is the reason for the assumption that even if it is clear that the victim is about to die, the husband is not owed ransom? The verse states: “And it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is laid on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid on him” (Exodus 21:29–30), indicating that the owner’s liability to pay ransom is dependent on the ox’s liability to be stoned, which, in turn, applies only after the death of the victim.

ובנזקין לא אמר רבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: And with regard to damages, did Rabbi Akiva not say that damages due to a wife are paid to her heirs and not to her husband, just as with regard to ransom?

והתניא הכה את האשה ויצאו ילדיה נותן נזק וצער לאשה ודמי ולדות לבעל אין הבעל נותן ליורשיו אין האשה נותנת ליורשיה היתה שפחה ונשתחררה

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If an assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated,