From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive his position that the only way to “protect” a shor muad from damaging others is to kill him? The Mishna in the beginning of the fifth chapter sets up two cases with a cow and her fetus – in the first case, the cow is gored by an ox (shor tam) and killed and the dead fetus is beside her also dead. However, it is unclear whether the death occurred before the goring or after and therefore unclear whether the owner of the ox owes damages for the fetus. In the second case, the cow gored and ox and is found with a newborn calf beside her and again it is unclear whether the calf was born before or after. If it was born after, the fetus is used to pay for damages as well. In both cases, the fetus is a case of doubt so a quarter damage is paid by/for the fetus instead of half. This is based on Sumchus’ position that when in doubt regarding money, both parties split the amount. The rabbis disagree and hold the burden of proof lies on the one who is requesting money from the other party (hamotzi mechavero alav hareaya). They say that this is an important principle. Why was it necessary to say that? The Gemara brings two possible situations to answer that question. One is that even if the one who was damaged makes a definitive claim (bari) and the other side is not making a definitive claim (shema), we still hold by the principle (that the burden of proof is on the one who was damaged). The second is that even though in general we follow the majority, in cases of monetary this, this principle overrides that. What is the source of this principle? In the second case of the Mishna, the owner pays half the value of the cow and a quarter of the value of the newborn calf. The Gemara asks, why does the owner of the ox get three-quarters of the damage in this case when they should only be getting half? In response, Abaye understands the Mishna differently – ‘half’ means a quarter, ‘a quarter’ means an eighth, which amounts to three-eighths, as there were two animals responsible so each only covers half the amount that they should have had to pay if they acted by themselves. They explain Abaye’s case only if the cow and its offspring had different owners. Rava rejects Abaye’s explanation as it doesn’t fit with the words of the Mishna and suggests an alternative explanation.
Bava Kamma
Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
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Bava Kamma
Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
Bava Kamma 46
אֲבָל מוּעָד לִגְמָרֵי – לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ בֵּיהּ צַד תַּמּוּת כְּלָל.
But if an ox is entirely rendered forewarned, you do not find an element of innocuousness with regard to it at all. If it is forewarned with regard to goring with either horn, its status of innocuousness is completely revoked.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין לוֹ שְׁמִירָה אֶלָּא סַכִּין (כּוּ׳). אָמַר רַבָּה: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יִשְׁמְרֶנּוּ״ – שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ שְׁמִירָה לָזֶה.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife. Rabba said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? It is as the verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), meaning that once it is rendered forewarned the owner no longer has any sufficient manner of safeguarding this animal, and the owner is responsible for all damage it causes.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, דִּכְתִיב ״וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ״ נָמֵי – שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ כִּיסּוּי לָזֶה?
Abaye said to Rabba: If that is so, does that which is written with regard to a pit: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it” (Exodus 21:33), also mean that once a pit has been dug the owner no longer has any adequate way of covering this pit, which would exempt its owner from paying damages?
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתְנַן: כִּסָּהוּ כָּרָאוּי, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר וּמֵת – פָּטוּר.
And if you would say that indeed that is the halakha, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (52a) that if he covered the pit appropriately, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt? Evidently, a pit can be covered adequately.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַיְינוּ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִין שֶׁלֹּא יְגַדֵּל אָדָם כֶּלֶב רַע בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, וְאַל יַעֲמִיד סוּלָּם רָעוּעַ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלֹא תָשִׂים דָּמִים בְּבֵיתֶךָ״.
Rather, Abaye rejected Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, and said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that one may not raise a vicious dog in his house, and that one may not set up an unstable ladder in his house? As it is stated: “You shall not bring blood into your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8), which means that one may not allow a hazardous situation to remain in his house. Similarly, a person should not keep a forewarned ox in his possession, as it is dangerous. This is why Rabbi Eliezer rules that no level of safeguarding is sufficient for it; the ox should be slaughtered so that it will not cause damage.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה
מַתְנִי׳ שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אֶת הַפָּרָה וְנִמְצָא עוּבָּרָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָגְחָה יָלְדָה, אִם מִשֶּׁנָּגְחָה יָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק לַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק לַוָּלָד.
MISHNA: In the case of an innocuous ox that gored and killed a cow, and the cow’s fetus was found dead at its side, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before the ox gored it and the fetus’s death is unrelated to the goring or whether it gave birth after the ox gored it and the fetus died on account of the goring, the owner of the ox pays half the cost of the damage for the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the ox was responsible for the death of the fetus, in which case he would pay half the damages, its owner pays only half the amount for the fetus that he would ordinarily be required to pay, i.e., one-quarter.
וְכֵן פָּרָה שֶׁנָּגְחָה אֶת הַשּׁוֹר וְנִמְצָא וְלָדָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָגְחָה יָלְדָה, אִם מִשֶּׁנָּגְחָה יָלְדָה – מִשְׁתַּלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק מִן הַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק מִן הַוָּלָד.
And likewise, there is uncertainty in the case of an innocuous cow that gored an ox, and the cow’s newborn offspring was found at its side dead or alive, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before it gored the ox or whether the cow gave birth after it gored. When damage is caused by an innocuous animal, the liability of the owner is limited to the value of the animal that gored. Therefore, half the cost of the damage is paid from the value of the cow, as in the standard case of an innocuous animal. And if that does not suffice to pay for half the cost of the damage, one-quarter of the cost of the damage is paid from the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the offspring was part of the cow at the time the cow gored, the owner pays only half of what he would pay if it were certain that it was part of the cow.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי סוֹמְכוֹס – דְּאָמַר: מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק – חוֹלְקִין. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה כְּלָל גָּדוֹל בַּדִּין, הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This ruling in the mishna is the statement of Sumakhos, who says: Property of uncertain ownership is divided by the two parties. But the Rabbis say that this is the significant principle of monetary law: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and the disputed sum is not divided. According to the Rabbis, in the cases of uncertainty in the mishna, no payment is made for the fetus or from the offspring, respectively.
לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר ״זֶה כְּלָל גָּדוֹל בַּדִּין״? אִצְטְרִיךְ, דַּאֲפִילּוּ נִיזָּק אוֹמֵר בָּרִי, וּמַזִּיק אוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּא – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
The Gemara asks: Why do I need for the Rabbis to say the words: This is the significant principle of monetary law? Why not just state the principle? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to say them because even in a case where the injured party states: I am certain that such and such occurred, and the one liable for the damage says: Perhaps it was otherwise, without definitively refuting the claim against him, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Although the injured party claims with certainty that he is correct and the defendant’s claim is only speculative, the definite claim still does not render the defendant liable to pay, absent proof.
אִי נָמֵי, לְכִי הָא דְּאִתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שׁוֹר לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְנִמְצָא נַגְחָן – רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: יָכוֹל שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ ״לִשְׁחִיטָה מְכַרְתִּיו לָךְ״.
Alternatively, the phrase: This is the significant principle of monetary law, was necessary for instances such as this, as it was stated: In the case of one who sells an ox to another and the ox is found to be one that habitually gores, Rav says that this is considered to be a mistaken transaction, since the purchaser can claim that he bought the ox specifically for labor, and an ox that gores is not suitable for such tasks. And Shmuel says: The seller can say to him: I sold it to you for slaughter, and the fact that it gores is immaterial.
אַמַּאי? וְנִיחְזֵי אִי גַּבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְרִדְיָא, אִי גַּבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְנִכְסְתָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, בְּגַבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְהָא וּלְהָא.
The Gemara asks: Why are Rav and Shmuel speculating about the purpose of the sale? But let us simply see if the purchaser is a person who buys oxen for plowing or a person who buys oxen for slaughter. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in the case of a person who buys oxen for both this and for that reason, and in this instance it was unclear for which purpose it was intended.
וְנִיחְזֵי אִי דְּמֵי רִדְיָא – לְרִדְיָא, אִי דְּמֵי נִכְסְתָא – לְנִכְסְתָא!
The Gemara asks: But let us see what the purchase price was: If he paid the price of an ox fit for plowing, which is a large amount of money, then it can be assumed it was intended for plowing. But if he paid the price of an ox for slaughtering, which is a much smaller amount, it can be assumed that it was sold for slaughtering.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיַּקַּיר בִּישְׂרָא, וְקָאֵי בִּדְמֵי רִדְיָא.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in a case where the cost of meat rose and an ox purchased for slaughtering stands at the same price as an ox purchased for plowing. In that case, Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the purchaser can claim that the transaction was made in error, or whether the seller can claim that he sold it to be slaughtered and the purchaser must provide proof for his claim.
אָמְרִי:
The Sages said:
וְאִי לֵיכָּא לְאִשְׁתַּלּוֹמֵי מִינֵּיהּ, לִישְׁקְלֵיהּ לְתוֹרָא בְּזוּזֵי! דְּאָמְרִי אֱנָשֵׁי: מִמָּרֵי רַשְׁווֹתָךְ פָּארֵי אִפְּרַע!
But if the loss to the purchaser cannot be reimbursed from the purchasing money by returning it, e.g., if the seller spent it already, let the purchaser take the ox itself in lieu of the money, as people say: Allow yourself to be repaid by your debtors even in bran, since anything may be used as payment for a debt. In the event that the seller has no money with which to reimburse the purchaser, even if it is a mistaken transaction the result may be that the purchaser keeps the ox in lieu of having his money returned. Accordingly, there would be no practical difference between the opinions of Rav and Shmuel.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְאִשְׁתַּלּוֹמֵי מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in a case where the seller does have sufficient funds from which to repay the purchaser, and the purchaser demands that his money be returned as opposed to keeping the ox as payment.
רַב אָמַר הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת – זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא, וְרוּבָּא דְאִינָשֵׁי לְרִדְיָא הוּא דְּזָבְנִי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר, יָכוֹל שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ ״לִשְׁחִיטָה מְכַרְתִּיו לָךְ״ – וְלָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא. כִּי אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא – בְּאִיסּוּרָא, אֲבָל בְּמָמוֹנָא – לָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, אֶלָּא הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
The Gemara now explains the logic of Rav and Shmuel: Rav says that this is a case of a mistaken transaction, due to the principle: Follow the majority, and the majority of people buy oxen for plowing. And Shmuel says that the seller can say to him: I sold it to you for slaughtering, and we do not follow the majority in this case. When do we follow the majority according to Shmuel? Only in determining the prohibited or permitted status of an item. But in monetary matters such as this, we do not follow the majority. Rather, the operative principle is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אֶת הַפָּרָה וְנִמְצָא עוּבָּרָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נְגָחָהּ יָלְדָה אִם מִשֶּׁנְּגָחָהּ יָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק לַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק לַוָּלָד; דִּבְרֵי סוֹמְכוֹס. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
That which Rav Yehuda stated above, that the mishna follows the opinion of Sumakhos, is also taught in a baraita: In the case of an ox that gores a cow, and its fetus is found dead at its side, and he does not know whether it gave birth before the ox gored it or it gave birth after the ox gored it, the owner of the ox pays half the cost of the damage for the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring; this is the statement of Sumakhos. The Rabbis say: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי: מִנַּיִין לְהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִי בַעַל דְּבָרִים יִגַּשׁ אֲלֵהֶם״ – יַגִּישׁ רְאָיָה אֲלֵיהֶם.
Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: From where is it derived that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant? As it is stated in the Torah when Moses appointed Aaron and Hur to judge the people: “Whoever has a cause, let him come near [yiggash] to them” (Exodus 24:14). This is interpreted to mean that whoever has a claim against another should submit [yaggish] proof to them. According to this interpretation, this verse demonstrates clearly that the claimant is responsible for supplying the proof.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? סְבָרָא הוּא – דְּכָאֵיב לֵיהּ כְּאֵיבָא, אָזֵיל לְבֵי אָסְיָא!
Rav Ashi objects to this: Why do I need a verse to derive this? It is based on logical reasoning that one who suffers from pain goes to the doctor. Just as here the individual with the problem has the responsibility to resolve it, so too, someone with a claim against another must bring a proof to corroborate his claim.
אֶלָּא קְרָא לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין נִזְקָקִין אֶלָּא לַתּוֹבֵעַ תְּחִלָּה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִי בַעַל דְּבָרִים יִגַּשׁ אֲלֵהֶם״ – יַגִּישׁ דְּבָרָיו אֲלֵיהֶם.
Rather, the verse is needed for that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a court first attends only to the arguments of the claimant and only afterward attends to the counterclaims of the defendant and discusses them? As it is stated: “Whoever has a cause, let him come near [yiggash] to them,” which is interpreted to mean that whoever has a claim against another should submit [yaggish] his claim to them first before the defendant.
אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: פְּעָמִים שֶׁנִּזְקָקִין לַנִּתְבָּע תְּחִלָּה. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּקָא זִילִי נִכְסֵיהּ.
The Sages of Neharde’a say that despite this principle, sometimes a court attends to the defendant first and listens to his defense before discussing the arguments of the claimant. What are the circumstances where this occurs? This occurs in a case where his assets are depreciating because of the claim against him. In that situation, the court allows him to present his arguments first so that he can sell his assets at their true price.
וְכֵן פָּרָה שֶׁנָּגְחָה אֶת הַשּׁוֹר [וְכוּ׳]. חֲצִי נֶזֶק וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק?! פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא הוּא דְּבָעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי! כּוּלֵּי נִזְקָא נְכֵי רִבְעָא מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ?
§ The mishna teaches: And likewise, in the case of a cow that gored an ox, and the cow’s newborn offspring was subsequently found at its side, half the cost of the damage is paid from the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage is paid from the offspring. The Gemara asks: The mishna’s wording indicates that the owner of the cow pays half the cost of the damage and an additional one-quarter of the cost of the damage, thereby amounting to three-quarters of the cost of the damage. This is difficult to understand, as he is required to pay only half the cost of the damage, since the ox is innocuous. If the mishna states that he pays three-quarters of the cost of the damage, what is its purpose?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: חֲצִי נֶזֶק – אֶחָד מֵאַרְבָּעָה בַּנֶּזֶק, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק – אֶחָד מִשְּׁמֹנָה בַּנֶּזֶק.
Abaye said: The phrase: Half the cost of the damage, actually means one-fourth of the cost of the damage. Since there are two animals that may have accomplices in the incident, the owner of the cow pays only half of the normal amount from the value of the cow, i.e., one-quarter of the cost of the damage. The other half of the payment, which is one-quarter of the cost of the damage, should be paid from the value of the newborn, who is the accomplice of the cow. Yet, due to the uncertainty of whether it was born before the goring or afterward, only half of that amount is paid from it, which is one-eighth of the cost of the damage. Therefore, the owner of the ox receives a total of three-eighths of the cost of the damage.
וְאִי פָּרָה וּוָלָד דְּחַד נִינְהוּ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה: מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ, חֲצִי נֶזֶק הַב לִי. אֶלָּא לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּפָרָה דְּחַד, וּוָלָד דְּחַד.
The Gemara asks: But if the cow and the offspring are owned by one person, the injured party can indeed say to the owner of the cow: Whichever way you look at it, give me half the cost of the damage, either from the value of the cow or the newborn, which both belong to you. Why is it necessary to give half of the payment specifically from the cow and half from the newborn? Rather, this ruling of the mishna is not necessary except for the case where the cow belongs to one person and the offspring to another, and so each can claim that he is only partially responsible for the damage.
וְאִי דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה תְּחִלָּה – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה: פָּרָה דִּידָךְ אַזֵּיקְתַּן, הַב לִי רְאָיָה דְּאִית לָךְ שׁוּתָּפֵי.
The Gemara asks: But even in this case, if the injured party came forward and claimed payment from the owner of the cow first, he can indeed say to the owner of the cow: Your cow certainly caused damage to my property, so bring me a proof that you have a partner. The owner of the cow would then have to prove that the newborn calf was still a fetus at the time and therefore a partner in the incident, in order to exempt himself from paying the entire payment of half the cost of the damage.
אֶלָּא דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל וָלָד תְּחִלָּה, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: גַּלֵּית אַדַּעְתָּךְ דְּשׁוּתָּפָא אִית לִי.
Rather, the case of the mishna is one where he claimed payment from the owner of the offspring first, as in this case the owner of the cow can say to him: Since you claimed payment from the owner of the newborn, you thereby disclosed your opinion on the matter, that I have a partner who is responsible for part of the damage. Therefore, I am not prepared to pay the full amount required, i.e., half the cost of the damage, but only half of that amount, i.e., one-quarter.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַף עַל גַּב דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה תְּחִלָּה, מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידָּע יְדַעִי אֲנָא דְּשׁוּתָּפָא אִית לִי.
There are those who say: Even though the injured party came forward and claimed payment from the owner of the cow first, the latter can dismiss his claim, as he can say to him: I know that I have a partner in this matter, i.e., the owner of the newborn calf.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַטּוּ ״אֶחָד מֵאַרְבָּעָה בַּנֶּזֶק״ וְ״אֶחָד מִשְּׁמֹנָה בַּנֶּזֶק״ קָתָנֵי? ״חֲצִי נֶזֶק״ וּ״רְבִיעַ נֶזֶק״ קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּפָרָה וּוָלָד דְּחַד, וְהָכִי קָאָמְרִינַן: אִיתַהּ לְפָרָה – מִשְׁתַּלַּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק מִפָּרָה.
Rava said, in challenging Abaye’s explanation: Is that to say that the mishna teaches: One-quarter of the cost of the damage and one-eighth of the cost of the damage? The mishna teaches half the cost of the damage and one-quarter of the cost of the damage. Rather, Rava said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the cow and its offspring belong to one person, and this is what we are saying: The halakha is that with regard to damage caused by an innocuous animal, restitution is paid only from the money realized by selling the belligerent animal. Therefore, if the cow is here, half the cost of the damage is paid from the value of the cow itself;
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Bava Kamma 46
אֲבָל מוּעָד לִגְמָרֵי – לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ בֵּיהּ צַד תַּמּוּת כְּלָל.
But if an ox is entirely rendered forewarned, you do not find an element of innocuousness with regard to it at all. If it is forewarned with regard to goring with either horn, its status of innocuousness is completely revoked.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין לוֹ שְׁמִירָה אֶלָּא סַכִּין (כּוּ׳). אָמַר רַבָּה: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יִשְׁמְרֶנּוּ״ – שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ שְׁמִירָה לָזֶה.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife. Rabba said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? It is as the verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), meaning that once it is rendered forewarned the owner no longer has any sufficient manner of safeguarding this animal, and the owner is responsible for all damage it causes.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, דִּכְתִיב ״וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ״ נָמֵי – שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ כִּיסּוּי לָזֶה?
Abaye said to Rabba: If that is so, does that which is written with regard to a pit: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it” (Exodus 21:33), also mean that once a pit has been dug the owner no longer has any adequate way of covering this pit, which would exempt its owner from paying damages?
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתְנַן: כִּסָּהוּ כָּרָאוּי, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר וּמֵת – פָּטוּר.
And if you would say that indeed that is the halakha, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (52a) that if he covered the pit appropriately, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt? Evidently, a pit can be covered adequately.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַיְינוּ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִין שֶׁלֹּא יְגַדֵּל אָדָם כֶּלֶב רַע בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, וְאַל יַעֲמִיד סוּלָּם רָעוּעַ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלֹא תָשִׂים דָּמִים בְּבֵיתֶךָ״.
Rather, Abaye rejected Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, and said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that one may not raise a vicious dog in his house, and that one may not set up an unstable ladder in his house? As it is stated: “You shall not bring blood into your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8), which means that one may not allow a hazardous situation to remain in his house. Similarly, a person should not keep a forewarned ox in his possession, as it is dangerous. This is why Rabbi Eliezer rules that no level of safeguarding is sufficient for it; the ox should be slaughtered so that it will not cause damage.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה
מַתְנִי׳ שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אֶת הַפָּרָה וְנִמְצָא עוּבָּרָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָגְחָה יָלְדָה, אִם מִשֶּׁנָּגְחָה יָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק לַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק לַוָּלָד.
MISHNA: In the case of an innocuous ox that gored and killed a cow, and the cow’s fetus was found dead at its side, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before the ox gored it and the fetus’s death is unrelated to the goring or whether it gave birth after the ox gored it and the fetus died on account of the goring, the owner of the ox pays half the cost of the damage for the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the ox was responsible for the death of the fetus, in which case he would pay half the damages, its owner pays only half the amount for the fetus that he would ordinarily be required to pay, i.e., one-quarter.
וְכֵן פָּרָה שֶׁנָּגְחָה אֶת הַשּׁוֹר וְנִמְצָא וְלָדָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָגְחָה יָלְדָה, אִם מִשֶּׁנָּגְחָה יָלְדָה – מִשְׁתַּלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק מִן הַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק מִן הַוָּלָד.
And likewise, there is uncertainty in the case of an innocuous cow that gored an ox, and the cow’s newborn offspring was found at its side dead or alive, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before it gored the ox or whether the cow gave birth after it gored. When damage is caused by an innocuous animal, the liability of the owner is limited to the value of the animal that gored. Therefore, half the cost of the damage is paid from the value of the cow, as in the standard case of an innocuous animal. And if that does not suffice to pay for half the cost of the damage, one-quarter of the cost of the damage is paid from the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the offspring was part of the cow at the time the cow gored, the owner pays only half of what he would pay if it were certain that it was part of the cow.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי סוֹמְכוֹס – דְּאָמַר: מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק – חוֹלְקִין. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה כְּלָל גָּדוֹל בַּדִּין, הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This ruling in the mishna is the statement of Sumakhos, who says: Property of uncertain ownership is divided by the two parties. But the Rabbis say that this is the significant principle of monetary law: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and the disputed sum is not divided. According to the Rabbis, in the cases of uncertainty in the mishna, no payment is made for the fetus or from the offspring, respectively.
לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר ״זֶה כְּלָל גָּדוֹל בַּדִּין״? אִצְטְרִיךְ, דַּאֲפִילּוּ נִיזָּק אוֹמֵר בָּרִי, וּמַזִּיק אוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּא – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
The Gemara asks: Why do I need for the Rabbis to say the words: This is the significant principle of monetary law? Why not just state the principle? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to say them because even in a case where the injured party states: I am certain that such and such occurred, and the one liable for the damage says: Perhaps it was otherwise, without definitively refuting the claim against him, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Although the injured party claims with certainty that he is correct and the defendant’s claim is only speculative, the definite claim still does not render the defendant liable to pay, absent proof.
אִי נָמֵי, לְכִי הָא דְּאִתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שׁוֹר לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְנִמְצָא נַגְחָן – רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: יָכוֹל שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ ״לִשְׁחִיטָה מְכַרְתִּיו לָךְ״.
Alternatively, the phrase: This is the significant principle of monetary law, was necessary for instances such as this, as it was stated: In the case of one who sells an ox to another and the ox is found to be one that habitually gores, Rav says that this is considered to be a mistaken transaction, since the purchaser can claim that he bought the ox specifically for labor, and an ox that gores is not suitable for such tasks. And Shmuel says: The seller can say to him: I sold it to you for slaughter, and the fact that it gores is immaterial.
אַמַּאי? וְנִיחְזֵי אִי גַּבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְרִדְיָא, אִי גַּבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְנִכְסְתָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, בְּגַבְרָא דְּזָבֵין לְהָא וּלְהָא.
The Gemara asks: Why are Rav and Shmuel speculating about the purpose of the sale? But let us simply see if the purchaser is a person who buys oxen for plowing or a person who buys oxen for slaughter. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in the case of a person who buys oxen for both this and for that reason, and in this instance it was unclear for which purpose it was intended.
וְנִיחְזֵי אִי דְּמֵי רִדְיָא – לְרִדְיָא, אִי דְּמֵי נִכְסְתָא – לְנִכְסְתָא!
The Gemara asks: But let us see what the purchase price was: If he paid the price of an ox fit for plowing, which is a large amount of money, then it can be assumed it was intended for plowing. But if he paid the price of an ox for slaughtering, which is a much smaller amount, it can be assumed that it was sold for slaughtering.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיַּקַּיר בִּישְׂרָא, וְקָאֵי בִּדְמֵי רִדְיָא.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in a case where the cost of meat rose and an ox purchased for slaughtering stands at the same price as an ox purchased for plowing. In that case, Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the purchaser can claim that the transaction was made in error, or whether the seller can claim that he sold it to be slaughtered and the purchaser must provide proof for his claim.
אָמְרִי:
The Sages said:
וְאִי לֵיכָּא לְאִשְׁתַּלּוֹמֵי מִינֵּיהּ, לִישְׁקְלֵיהּ לְתוֹרָא בְּזוּזֵי! דְּאָמְרִי אֱנָשֵׁי: מִמָּרֵי רַשְׁווֹתָךְ פָּארֵי אִפְּרַע!
But if the loss to the purchaser cannot be reimbursed from the purchasing money by returning it, e.g., if the seller spent it already, let the purchaser take the ox itself in lieu of the money, as people say: Allow yourself to be repaid by your debtors even in bran, since anything may be used as payment for a debt. In the event that the seller has no money with which to reimburse the purchaser, even if it is a mistaken transaction the result may be that the purchaser keeps the ox in lieu of having his money returned. Accordingly, there would be no practical difference between the opinions of Rav and Shmuel.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְאִשְׁתַּלּוֹמֵי מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for them to engage in a dispute in a case where the seller does have sufficient funds from which to repay the purchaser, and the purchaser demands that his money be returned as opposed to keeping the ox as payment.
רַב אָמַר הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת – זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא, וְרוּבָּא דְאִינָשֵׁי לְרִדְיָא הוּא דְּזָבְנִי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר, יָכוֹל שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ ״לִשְׁחִיטָה מְכַרְתִּיו לָךְ״ – וְלָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא. כִּי אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא – בְּאִיסּוּרָא, אֲבָל בְּמָמוֹנָא – לָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, אֶלָּא הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
The Gemara now explains the logic of Rav and Shmuel: Rav says that this is a case of a mistaken transaction, due to the principle: Follow the majority, and the majority of people buy oxen for plowing. And Shmuel says that the seller can say to him: I sold it to you for slaughtering, and we do not follow the majority in this case. When do we follow the majority according to Shmuel? Only in determining the prohibited or permitted status of an item. But in monetary matters such as this, we do not follow the majority. Rather, the operative principle is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אֶת הַפָּרָה וְנִמְצָא עוּבָּרָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נְגָחָהּ יָלְדָה אִם מִשֶּׁנְּגָחָהּ יָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק לַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק לַוָּלָד; דִּבְרֵי סוֹמְכוֹס. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
That which Rav Yehuda stated above, that the mishna follows the opinion of Sumakhos, is also taught in a baraita: In the case of an ox that gores a cow, and its fetus is found dead at its side, and he does not know whether it gave birth before the ox gored it or it gave birth after the ox gored it, the owner of the ox pays half the cost of the damage for the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring; this is the statement of Sumakhos. The Rabbis say: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי: מִנַּיִין לְהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִי בַעַל דְּבָרִים יִגַּשׁ אֲלֵהֶם״ – יַגִּישׁ רְאָיָה אֲלֵיהֶם.
Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: From where is it derived that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant? As it is stated in the Torah when Moses appointed Aaron and Hur to judge the people: “Whoever has a cause, let him come near [yiggash] to them” (Exodus 24:14). This is interpreted to mean that whoever has a claim against another should submit [yaggish] proof to them. According to this interpretation, this verse demonstrates clearly that the claimant is responsible for supplying the proof.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? סְבָרָא הוּא – דְּכָאֵיב לֵיהּ כְּאֵיבָא, אָזֵיל לְבֵי אָסְיָא!
Rav Ashi objects to this: Why do I need a verse to derive this? It is based on logical reasoning that one who suffers from pain goes to the doctor. Just as here the individual with the problem has the responsibility to resolve it, so too, someone with a claim against another must bring a proof to corroborate his claim.
אֶלָּא קְרָא לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין נִזְקָקִין אֶלָּא לַתּוֹבֵעַ תְּחִלָּה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִי בַעַל דְּבָרִים יִגַּשׁ אֲלֵהֶם״ – יַגִּישׁ דְּבָרָיו אֲלֵיהֶם.
Rather, the verse is needed for that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a court first attends only to the arguments of the claimant and only afterward attends to the counterclaims of the defendant and discusses them? As it is stated: “Whoever has a cause, let him come near [yiggash] to them,” which is interpreted to mean that whoever has a claim against another should submit [yaggish] his claim to them first before the defendant.
אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: פְּעָמִים שֶׁנִּזְקָקִין לַנִּתְבָּע תְּחִלָּה. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּקָא זִילִי נִכְסֵיהּ.
The Sages of Neharde’a say that despite this principle, sometimes a court attends to the defendant first and listens to his defense before discussing the arguments of the claimant. What are the circumstances where this occurs? This occurs in a case where his assets are depreciating because of the claim against him. In that situation, the court allows him to present his arguments first so that he can sell his assets at their true price.
וְכֵן פָּרָה שֶׁנָּגְחָה אֶת הַשּׁוֹר [וְכוּ׳]. חֲצִי נֶזֶק וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק?! פַּלְגָא נִזְקָא הוּא דְּבָעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי! כּוּלֵּי נִזְקָא נְכֵי רִבְעָא מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ?
§ The mishna teaches: And likewise, in the case of a cow that gored an ox, and the cow’s newborn offspring was subsequently found at its side, half the cost of the damage is paid from the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage is paid from the offspring. The Gemara asks: The mishna’s wording indicates that the owner of the cow pays half the cost of the damage and an additional one-quarter of the cost of the damage, thereby amounting to three-quarters of the cost of the damage. This is difficult to understand, as he is required to pay only half the cost of the damage, since the ox is innocuous. If the mishna states that he pays three-quarters of the cost of the damage, what is its purpose?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: חֲצִי נֶזֶק – אֶחָד מֵאַרְבָּעָה בַּנֶּזֶק, וּרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק – אֶחָד מִשְּׁמֹנָה בַּנֶּזֶק.
Abaye said: The phrase: Half the cost of the damage, actually means one-fourth of the cost of the damage. Since there are two animals that may have accomplices in the incident, the owner of the cow pays only half of the normal amount from the value of the cow, i.e., one-quarter of the cost of the damage. The other half of the payment, which is one-quarter of the cost of the damage, should be paid from the value of the newborn, who is the accomplice of the cow. Yet, due to the uncertainty of whether it was born before the goring or afterward, only half of that amount is paid from it, which is one-eighth of the cost of the damage. Therefore, the owner of the ox receives a total of three-eighths of the cost of the damage.
וְאִי פָּרָה וּוָלָד דְּחַד נִינְהוּ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה: מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ, חֲצִי נֶזֶק הַב לִי. אֶלָּא לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּפָרָה דְּחַד, וּוָלָד דְּחַד.
The Gemara asks: But if the cow and the offspring are owned by one person, the injured party can indeed say to the owner of the cow: Whichever way you look at it, give me half the cost of the damage, either from the value of the cow or the newborn, which both belong to you. Why is it necessary to give half of the payment specifically from the cow and half from the newborn? Rather, this ruling of the mishna is not necessary except for the case where the cow belongs to one person and the offspring to another, and so each can claim that he is only partially responsible for the damage.
וְאִי דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה תְּחִלָּה – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה: פָּרָה דִּידָךְ אַזֵּיקְתַּן, הַב לִי רְאָיָה דְּאִית לָךְ שׁוּתָּפֵי.
The Gemara asks: But even in this case, if the injured party came forward and claimed payment from the owner of the cow first, he can indeed say to the owner of the cow: Your cow certainly caused damage to my property, so bring me a proof that you have a partner. The owner of the cow would then have to prove that the newborn calf was still a fetus at the time and therefore a partner in the incident, in order to exempt himself from paying the entire payment of half the cost of the damage.
אֶלָּא דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל וָלָד תְּחִלָּה, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: גַּלֵּית אַדַּעְתָּךְ דְּשׁוּתָּפָא אִית לִי.
Rather, the case of the mishna is one where he claimed payment from the owner of the offspring first, as in this case the owner of the cow can say to him: Since you claimed payment from the owner of the newborn, you thereby disclosed your opinion on the matter, that I have a partner who is responsible for part of the damage. Therefore, I am not prepared to pay the full amount required, i.e., half the cost of the damage, but only half of that amount, i.e., one-quarter.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַף עַל גַּב דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל פָּרָה תְּחִלָּה, מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידָּע יְדַעִי אֲנָא דְּשׁוּתָּפָא אִית לִי.
There are those who say: Even though the injured party came forward and claimed payment from the owner of the cow first, the latter can dismiss his claim, as he can say to him: I know that I have a partner in this matter, i.e., the owner of the newborn calf.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַטּוּ ״אֶחָד מֵאַרְבָּעָה בַּנֶּזֶק״ וְ״אֶחָד מִשְּׁמֹנָה בַּנֶּזֶק״ קָתָנֵי? ״חֲצִי נֶזֶק״ וּ״רְבִיעַ נֶזֶק״ קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּפָרָה וּוָלָד דְּחַד, וְהָכִי קָאָמְרִינַן: אִיתַהּ לְפָרָה – מִשְׁתַּלַּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק מִפָּרָה.
Rava said, in challenging Abaye’s explanation: Is that to say that the mishna teaches: One-quarter of the cost of the damage and one-eighth of the cost of the damage? The mishna teaches half the cost of the damage and one-quarter of the cost of the damage. Rather, Rava said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the cow and its offspring belong to one person, and this is what we are saying: The halakha is that with regard to damage caused by an innocuous animal, restitution is paid only from the money realized by selling the belligerent animal. Therefore, if the cow is here, half the cost of the damage is paid from the value of the cow itself;
