Bava Kamma 47

ליתא לפרה משתלם רביע נזק מולד

if the cow is not here, e.g., it went astray, only one-quarter of the cost of the damage is reimbursed from the offspring.

טעמא דלא ידעינן אי הוה ולד בהדה כי נגחה אי לא הוה אבל אי פשיטא לן דהוה ולד בהדה כי נגחה משתלם כוליה חצי נזק מולד

The Gemara infers: According to Rava, the reason for paying only one-quarter of the cost of the damage is that we do not know if the offspring was with it, as a fetus, when the cow gored or whether it was not. But if it is obvious to us that the offspring was with it as a fetus when it gored, the full amount of half the cost of the damage may be reimbursed from the offspring if the cow is not there.

רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא פרה שהזיקה גובה מולדה מאי טעמא גופה היא תרנגולת שהזיקה אינו גובה מביצתה מאי טעמא פירשא בעלמא הוא

The Gemara comments: In this respect, Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: In the case of a cow that caused damage while pregnant, the injured party collects compensation from its offspring, i.e., the offspring that had been a fetus at the time of the goring. What is the reason? It is because it is considered an integral part of its body and therefore may be used to collect payment. By contrast, in the case of a hen that caused damage, the injured party does not collect compensation from its egg. Payment can be collected only from the body of the hen. What is the reason? The egg is simply a secretion and not an integral part of the hen’s body.

ואמר רבא אין שמין לפרה בפני עצמה ולולד בפני עצמו אלא שמין לולד על גב פרה שאם אי אתה אומר כן נמצא אתה מכחיש את המזיק

§ And Rava also says: When assessing the damage inflicted by a goring ox on a cow whose newborn calf is found dead by its side, the court does not appraise the damage to the cow by itself and the damage to the offspring by itself. Rather, the court appraises the offspring together with the cow and evaluates the overall damage inflicted on the pregnant cow, which will be slightly less than it would be with two separate evaluations. The reason for this is that if you do not say this, you will be found to have ultimately weakened the one liable for damage by inflicting a loss on him, as the market value of a newborn calf is greater than the difference in market value between a pregnant cow and one that is not pregnant.

וכן אתה מוצא בקוטע יד עבדו של חבירו וכן אתה מוצא במזיק שדה של חבירו

And similarly, you find this principle in a case where someone severed the hand of another’s slave. The difference in value between a slave with a hand and a slave without a hand is assessed, rather than determining how much money the owner would request in exchange for allowing the hand of his slave to be cut off. And similarly, you also find this principle in a case of one who causes damage to part of another’s field. The court appraises not the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, but the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area.

אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי ואי דינא הוא ליכחוש מזיק

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: The main reason invoked by Rava is that otherwise you will be found to have ultimately weakened the one liable for damage. But if this is the halakha of assessing the damage, then let the one liable for damage be weakened by losing money.

משום דאמר ליה פרה מעברתא אזיקתך פרה מעברתא שיימנא לך

Rav Ashi answered: This is because the one liable for damage can say to him: I caused damage to you through injuring a pregnant cow, and so I am assessing the value of a pregnant cow for you. Therefore, it is not correct to evaluate separately the damage to the cow and the damage to the offspring.

פשיטא פרה דחד וולד דחד פיטמא לבעל פרה נפחא מאי רב פפא אמר לבעל פרה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר חולקין והלכתא חולקין

The Gemara raises a question: It is obvious that in a case where the cow belonged to one person and the offspring belonged to another that the compensation for the cow’s loss of fat is paid to the owner of the cow. The additional value that the cow had due to the fact that it was fatter due to the pregnancy is paid to the owner of the cow. The question is: What is the halakha concerning the cow’s bulk? There is an increase in value of a pregnant cow that it is attributed to its improved appearance, which results from its carrying a fetus. Who is considered the injured party with regard to that sum? Rav Pappa said: This too belongs to the owner of the cow, whereas Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: They divide the restitution. And the halakha is that they divide the restitution.

מתני׳ הקדר שהכניס קדרותיו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ושברה בהמתו של בעל הבית פטור ואם הוזקה בהן בעל הקדרות חייב ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב

MISHNA: In the case of a potter who brought his pots into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal broke the pots, the homeowner is exempt. If the owner’s animal was injured by the pots, the owner of the pots is liable. But if the potter brought them inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable if his animal caused damage to the pots.

הכניס פירותיו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ואכלתן בהמתו של בעל הבית פטור ואם הוזקה בהן בעל הפירות חייב ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב

Similarly, if someone brought his produce into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal ate them, the homeowner is exempt. If his animal was injured by them, e.g., if it slipped on them, the owner of the produce is liable. But if he brought his produce inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for the damage caused by his animal to them.

הכניס שורו לחצר בעל הבית שלא

Similarly, if one brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard without

ברשות ונגחו שורו של בעל הבית או שנשכו כלבו של בעל הבית פטור נגח הוא שורו של בעל הבית חייב נפל לבורו והבאיש מימיו חייב היה אביו או בנו לתוכו משלם את הכופר ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב

permission, and the homeowner’s ox gored it or the homeowner’s dog bit it, the homeowner is exempt. If it gored the homeowner’s ox, the owner of the goring ox is liable. Furthermore, if the ox that he brought into the courtyard without permission fell into the owner’s pit and contaminated its water, the owner of the ox is liable to pay compensation for despoiling the water. If the homeowner’s father or son were inside the pit at the time the ox fell and the person died as a result, the owner of the ox pays the ransom. But if he brought the ox into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for the damage caused.

רבי אומר בכולן אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו לשמור

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The homeowner is not liable in any of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, unless he explicitly accepts responsibility upon himself to safeguard them.

גמ׳ טעמא דשלא ברשות הא ברשות לא מיחייב בעל קדירות בנזקי בהמתו דבעל חצר ולא אמרינן קבולי קביל בעל קדירות נטירותא דבהמתו דבעל חצר

GEMARA: From the first case of the mishna, it can be inferred that the reason the potter is liable is that he brought his pots into another’s courtyard without permission. But if he brought them in with permission, the potter would not be liable for damage caused to the courtyard owner’s animal; and we do not say that the potter accepted responsibility for the safeguarding of the courtyard owner’s animal from his own pots.

מני רבי היא דאמר כל בסתמא לא קביל עליה נטירותא

Whose opinion is this? It is that of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says at the conclusion of the mishna that any case where permission is granted to allow an item into one’s premises without specification, i.e., without an explicit agreement as to who is responsible for safeguarding the item, it is assumed that with regard to each party, he has not accepted upon himself the responsibility of safeguarding the item. Therefore, the potter who received permission to bring his pots into the owner’s courtyard similarly did not accept responsibility to safeguard against damage to the property of the owner of the courtyard.

אימא סיפא אם הכניס ברשות בעל חצר חייב אתאן לרבנן דאמרי בסתמא נמי קבולי קביל עליה נטירותא

But say the latter clause: If the potter brought them into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable. In this case, we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and say that, even in a case where permission is granted to allow an item into one’s premises with-out specification, where the owner merely said he could bring them into the courtyard, the homeowner accepts upon himself responsibility for safeguarding the items to ensure that they are not damaged, as well.

ותו רבי אומר בכולן אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו בעל הבית לשמור רישא וסיפא רבי ומציעתא רבנן

And furthermore, the end of the mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the owner of the courtyard is not liable in any of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, unless the homeowner explicitly accepts responsibility upon himself to safeguard them. Therefore, it emerges that the first clause and the last clause of the mishna are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the middle clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Is this a reasonable way to read the mishna?

אמר רבי זירא תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו רבא אמר כולה רבנן היא וברשות שמירת קדירות קבל עליו בעל החצר ואפילו נשברו ברוח

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Zeira said: This mishna is disjointed and doesn’t follow a single opinion. Rather, the one who taught this clause of the mishna did not teach that clause of the mishna. Rava said: The beginning of the mishna is entirely in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In the case where the potter received permission to place his pots there, the owner of the courtyard accepted responsibility upon himself for the safeguarding of the pots, and even to the extent that if the pots broke due to the wind, he would be liable. The owner of the pots, by contrast, did not accept any responsibility to ensure that his items would not cause damage.

הכניס פירותיו לחצר בעל הבית וכו׳ אמר רב לא שנו אלא שהוחלקה בהן אבל אכלה פטור מאי טעמא הוה לה שלא תאכל

§ The mishna teaches: If he brought his produce into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the owner’s animal was injured by the produce, he is liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the animal slipped on it and fell, but if it ate from the produce and was injured, he is exempt. What is the reason? The animal should not have eaten it, and it was not the owner of the fruit who acted improperly but the animal itself.

אמר רב ששת אמינא כי ניים ושכיב רב אמר להא שמעתא דתניא הנותן סם המות לפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים סם המות הוא דלא עבידא דאכלה אבל פירות דעבידא דאכלה בדיני אדם נמי מיחייב ואמאי הויא לה שלא תאכל

Rav Sheshet said: I say that Rav stated this halakha while dozing and lying down, and it is not entirely precise, as it is taught in a baraita: One who places poison before another’s animal is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. From the above statement, it may be inferred that it is specifically where he put poison before the animal that he is exempt, since it is not suitable for eating. But if he put produce before it, which is suitable for eating, and the animal dies from eating it, he is also liable according to human laws. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: But why is he liable? Here also Rav’s logic can be invoked, that the animal should not have eaten it. Therefore, this baraita poses a difficulty for Rav.

אמרי הוא הדין אפילו פירות נמי פטור מדיני אדם והא קא משמע לן דאפילו סם המות נמי דלא עבידא דאכלה חייב בדיני שמים

In order to explain Rav’s statement, the Sages said: The same is true, that even if the animal was injured by eating the produce, he would also be exempt according to human laws, and this baraita teaches us this, that even in the case of poison, which is not suitable for eating, the one who placed the poison before the animal is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ואיבעית אימא סם המות נמי באפרזתא דהיינו פירי

And if you wish, say instead that the case where the baraita exempts from liability according to human laws the one who placed poison before the animal is referring to an item suitable for eating as well, such as afrazta, a type of herb that appears edible for animals but is actually poisonous. Therefore, this herb is halakhically equivalent to any other produce for which he is exempt from liability according to human laws, since, as Rav explained, the animal should not have eaten it.

מיתיבי האשה שנכנסה לטחון חטים אצל בעל הבית שלא ברשות ואכלתן בהמתו של בעל הבית פטור אם הוזקה חייבת ואמאי נימא הוה לה שלא תאכל

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a baraita: In the case of a woman who entered the house of a homeowner without permission in order to grind wheat, and the homeowner’s animal ate the wheat, he is exempt. Moreover, if the homeowner’s animal was injured by the wheat, the woman is liable. Now according to Rav’s explanation, why is she liable? Let us say here as well that the animal should not have eaten it.

אמרי ומי עדיפא ממתניתין דאוקימנא שהוחלקה בהן

In order to explain Rav’s statement, the Sages said: What is the difficulty here? Is this baraita preferable to the mishna that we interpreted as a scenario where the animal slipped on the produce? Similarly, the baraita is also referring to a case where the animal was injured by slipping on the wheat, not by eating it.

ודקארי לה מאי קארי לה אמר לך בשלמא מתניתין קתני אם הוזקה בהן שהוחלקה בהן הוא אבל הכא קתני אם הוזקה ולא קתני בהן אכילה הוא דקתני

The Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? This answer seems obvious. The Gemara answers: The questioner could have said to you: Granted, the mishna that teaches: If it is injured by them [bahen], is referring to a case where the animal slipped on them [bahen]. But here in the baraita it teaches the phrase: If it is injured, and it does not teach the additional term: Bahen. Since this case is immediately preceded by the case of: And the owner’s animal ate them, it is reasonable to surmise that when the baraita teaches the case of the animal being injured, the injury is due to eating.

ואידך אמר לך לא שנא

The Gemara notes: And the other one, i.e., the one who provided the answer, could have said to you in response: There is no difference whether it states: It was injured, or: It was injured by them, as in both cases the injury can be explained as resulting from slipping and not from eating.

תא שמע הכניס שורו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ואכל חטין והתריז ומת פטור ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב ואמאי הוה ליה שלא יאכל

Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one brought his ox into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the ox ate wheat belonging to the homeowner and consequently was stricken with diarrhea and died, then the homeowner is exempt. But if the ox’s owner brought it into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable. The Gemara comments: Why, in the latter case, is the owner liable for the damage to the ox? Shouldn’t the assertion: The ox shouldn’t have eaten it, be invoked, and any injury that follows is the responsibility of the ox’s owner?

אמר רבא ברשות אשלא ברשות קרמית ברשות שמירת שורו קבל עליו ואפילו חנק את עצמו

Rava said in response: Are you raising a contradiction from a case with permission and applying it against a case without permission? There is no difficulty here, since in the case where the ox’s owner brought the ox into the courtyard with permission, the homeowner thereby accepted responsibility upon himself for safeguarding against any damage to the other’s ox. And even if the ox strangled itself, he would still be liable.

איבעיא להו היכא דקביל עליה נטירותא מהו דנפשיה הוא דקביל עליה או דלמא אפילו נטירותא דעלמא קביל עליה

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where the owner of the courtyard accepted upon himself responsibility for safeguarding the items entering his premises, what is the halakha? Did he accept upon himself only the responsibility of safeguarding himself and his animals from causing damage? Or, perhaps he even accepted responsibility upon himself for safeguarding against all forms of damage that originate from the outside.

תא שמע דתני רב יהודה בר סימון בנזקין דבי קרנא הכניס פירותיו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ובא שור ממקום אחר ואכלן פטור ואם הכניס ברשות חייב מאן פטור ומאן חייב לאו פטור בעל חצר [וחייב בעל חצר]

Come and hear a solution based on that which Rav Yehuda bar Simon taught in the tractate of Nezikin from the school of Karna: If one brought his produce into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and an ox came from elsewhere and ate it, he is exempt. But if one brought the produce into the courtyard with permission, he is liable. The Gemara clarifies: Who is the phrase: He is exempt, referring to, and who is the phrase: He is liable, referring to? Does it not mean that the owner of the courtyard is exempt and the owner of the courtyard is liable? This would indicate that by granting permission for the produce to be brought in, he accepts responsibility to safeguard against other damage as well, such as that caused by another ox entering from the outside.

אמרי לא פטור בעל השור וחייב בעל השור

In response, they said that this interpretation should be rejected: No, it means that the owner of the ox that causes damage is exempt, and the owner of the ox is liable.

ואי בעל השור

The Gemara asks: But if it is referring to the owner of the ox,