Bava Kamma 52

כיון שמסר לו מפתח קנה

once he has conveyed the key to him, he has acquired it.

היכי דמי אי בכספא ליקני בכספא אי בחזקה ליקני בחזקה לעולם בחזקה ובעי למימר ליה לך חזק וקני וכיון שמסר לו מפתח כמאן דאמר ליה לך חזק וקני דמי

Here too, the Gemara asks: What are the circumstances involving this sale? If it was a transaction by payment of money, then let him acquire it by paying money. If it was by taking possession of it, let him acquire it by taking possession. What is the significance of transferring the key? The Gemara answers: Actually, the transaction occurred by taking possession, and in that case, the seller usually must say to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it for yourself. And in this case, once he conveys the key to him, he is considered like one who says to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it.

אמר ריש לקיש משום רבי ינאי המוכר עדר לחבירו כיון שמסר לו משכוכית קנה

Similarly, Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yannai: With regard to one who sells a flock of sheep to another, once he conveys the mashkukhit to the buyer, he has acquired the flock.

היכי דמי אי במשיכה ליקני במשיכה אי במסירה ליקני במסירה לעולם במשיכה ובעי למימר ליה לך משוך וקני וכיון דמסר לו משכוכית כמאן דאמר ליה לך משוך וקני דמי

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If the transaction occurred by pulling the flock into his possession, then let the buyer acquire it by pulling. If it was by conveying it, let the buyer acquire it by the seller conveying it. The Gemara answers: Actually, it was a transaction by pulling, and in that case, the seller usually must say to him: Go, pull it and acquire it for yourself. And in this case, once he conveys the mashkukhit to him, he is like one who says to him: Go, pull it and acquire it.

מאי משכוכית הכא תרגמו קרקשתא רבי יעקב אומר עיזא דאזלא בריש עדרא כדדרש ההוא גלילאה עליה דרב חסדא כד רגיז רעיא על ענא עביד לנגדא סמותא

The Gemara asks: What is this mashkukhit? Here, in Babylonia, they translate it as a bell [karkashta] that the shepherd rings and whose sound the flock follows. Rabbi Ya’akov says: It is referring to the goat that goes at the front of the flock that they follow. The Gemara notes: This explanation of Rabbi Ya’akov is similar to that which a certain Galilean taught in the presence of Rav Ḥisda concerning this goat: When a shepherd is angry with his flock, he renders the goat leading [lenaggada] them, i.e., the mashkukhit, blind. Similarly, when God is angry with the Jewish people, he appoints unsuitable leaders for them.

מתני׳ כסהו הראשון ובא השני ומצאו מגולה ולא כסהו השני חייב כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור לא כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב

MISHNA: The mishna lists several halakhot that pertain to damage classified as Pit: In the case of a pit that the first person who passed by covered after using it, and then the second came to use it and found it uncovered after the cover fell off or was damaged, and he did not cover it, the second one is liable for damage caused by the pit. If the owner covered the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt. If he did not cover the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is liable.

נפל לפניו מקול הכרייה חייב לאחריו מקול הכרייה פטור

If a man was digging or widening a pit, and an ox passing by fell forward into it in fright due to the sound of the digging, he is liable. If it fell backward into the pit due to the sound of the digging, he is exempt.

נפל לתוכו שור וכליו ונשתברו חמור וכליו ונתקרעו חייב על הבהמה ופטור על הכלים

If an ox and its accoutrements, i.e., the vessels it was carrying, fell into the pit and the vessels were broken, or if a donkey and its accoutrements fell in and the accoutrements were torn, the owner of the pit is liable for damage to the animal caused by the pit, but he is exempt from liability for damage caused to the vessels, by Torah edict.

נפל לתוכו שור חרש שוטה וקטן חייב בן או בת עבד או אמה פטור

If an ox that was impaired by being deaf, or an ox that was an imbecile, or an ox that was very young fell into the pit, he is liable. If a boy or a girl, a Canaanite slave or a Canaanite maidservant fell in, he is exempt, since there is a Torah edict that the digger of a pit is liable only for damage caused to an animal.

גמ׳ וראשון עד אימת מיפטר אמר רב בכדי שידע ושמואל אמר בכדי שיודיעוהו ורבי יוחנן אמר בכדי שיודיעוהו וישכור פועלים ויכרות ארזים ויכסנו

GEMARA: With regard to the first case in the mishna, the Gemara asks: And until when is the first person exempt if the pit is later uncovered? Rav says: He is exempt from liability for the time necessary for him to become aware that it became uncovered. Once this time has passed, he bears responsibility. And Shmuel says: He is exempt for the time necessary for others to realize that the pit is uncovered and inform him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is exempt for the time necessary for others to inform him that the cover has fallen down and for him to hire workers and cut cedar trees to make a suitable cover and cover it. After this period of time has passed, the first bears responsibility.

כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור כיון דכסהו כראוי היכי נפל אמר רבי יצחק בר בר חנה שהתליע מתוכו

§ The mishna teaches: If he covered the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell inside and died, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Since he covered the pit appropriately, how did it fall in? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar bar Ḥana says: This is a case where the cover rotted from the inside, and he could not have known that the cover was damaged. Therefore, he is not responsible for damage caused as a result.

איבעיא להו כסהו כסוי שיכול לעמוד לפני שוורים ואין יכול לעמוד בפני גמלים ואתו גמלים וארעוה ואתו שוורים ונפלי ביה מאי אמרי היכי דמי אי דשכיחי גמלים פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים אנוס הוא

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If he covered it with a cover that is able to withstand the weight of oxen but cannot withstand the weight of camels, which are heavier, and camels came and weakened it, and subsequently oxen came and broke the weakened cover and fell into the pit, what is the halakha? The Sages said in response: What are the circumstances? If camels are commonly found there, he is negligent, since he should have constructed the cover suitably for camels as well. And if camels are not commonly found there, then he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control if by chance they did come and weaken the cover.

לא צריכא דאתו לפרקים מי אמרינן כיון דאתיין לפרקים פושע הוא דאיבעי ליה אסוקי אדעתיה או דלמא כיון דהשתא מיהת ליכא אנוס הוא

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where camels come occasionally, in which case the question effectively becomes: Do we say that since they come occasionally, he is considered negligent, since he should have anticipated their coming? Or perhaps since now, in any event, there are no camels, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

תא שמע כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור היכי דמי אילימא כראוי לשוורים וכראוי לגמלים היכי נפול אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים

Come and hear a possible proof from the mishna: If he covered the pit appropriately, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt. Now what are the circumstances? If we say that he covered it appropriately for oxen and appropriately for camels, then how did they fall in? Rather, is it not the case that he covered it with a covering that was appropriate for oxen

ולא כראוי לגמלים ואי דשכיחי גמלים אמאי פטור פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים פשיטא אנוס הוא אלא לאו דאתיין לפרקים ואתו גמלים וארעוה ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה וקתני פטור אלמא כיון דהשתא ליכא אנוס הוא

but not appropriate for camels? In this case, the following must be clarified: If it is a location where camels are commonly found, why is he exempt? He is negligent. And if camels are not commonly found there, it is obvious that he is exempt, since he is clearly a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Rather, is it not the case that this is a location where camels come occasionally, and camels came and weakened the covering, after which oxen came and fell into it? And with regard to this case, it teaches that he is exempt. Apparently, since now, in any event, the camels are not there, he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

אמרי לא לעולם כראוי לשוורים וכראוי לגמלים ודקא קשיא לך היכי נפול אמר רבי יצחק בר בר חנה שהתליע מתוכו

They said in reply: No; actually, the scenario is where he covered it appropriately for oxen and appropriately for camels, and as for what was difficult for you to explain: How did they fall? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar bar Ḥana says: It is where the cover rotted from the inside, and so nothing can be derived from here with regard to the question posed above with regard to the camels.

תא שמע לא כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב היכי דמי אילימא לא כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים פשיטא צריכא למימר דחייב אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים היכי דמי אי דשכיחי גמלים פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים אנוס הוא

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different proof from the mishna: If he did not cover the pit appropriately, and an ox or a donkey fell in and died, he is liable. Now, what are the circumstances? If we say that he did not cover it appropriately for oxen and he did not cover it appropriately for camels, and they fell in, it is obvious. Does it need to be said that he is liable in that case? Rather, is it not referring to a case where he covered it appropriately for oxen but not appropriately for camels? And if this is the case, the following point must be clarified: What are the circumstances? If camels are commonly found there, he is clearly negligent, but if camels are not commonly found there, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

אלא לאו דאתיין לפרקים ואתו גמלים וארעוהו ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה וקתני חייב אלמא כיון דאתיין לפרקים פושע הוא דאיבעי ליה אסוקי אדעתיה

Rather, is it not referring to a case where camels come occasionally, and camels came and weakened it, and subsequently oxen came and fell into it? And in this case, it teaches that he is liable. Apparently, since they do come occasionally, he is considered negligent, since he should have anticipated that they would come.

לעולם כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים ודקא קשיא לך פושע הוא איידי דנסיב רישא כסהו כראוי נסיב סיפא נמי לא כסהו כראוי

The Gemara responds: Actually, it is possible that he covered it appropriately for oxen but not appropriately for camels, and camels are commonly found there. And as for what was difficult for you to explain: In such a case he is considered negligent and should be liable, rendering the ruling in the mishna superfluous, one may answer that since the tanna needs to cite the first clause with regard to the halakha if he covered it appropriately, he cites the latter clause as well, with regard to the halakha that if he did not cover it appropriately, he is liable.

איכא דאמרי הא נמי ודאי לא איבעיא לן דכיון דאתיין לפרקים פושע הוא דאיבעי ליה אסוקי אדעתיה

There are those who say that the discussion is as follows: With regard to this also we certainly did not raise the dilemma, because since they occasionally come, he is considered negligent, as he should have anticipated this possibility.

כי איבעי לן הכי הוא דאיבעיא לן כסהו כסוי שיכול לעמוד בפני שוורים ואינו יכול לעמוד בפני גמלים ושכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו מהו מי אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע אצל גמלים הוי פושע נמי לענין התלעה או דלמא לא אמרינן מגו

When we raised the dilemma, this is the dilemma that we raised: He covered it with a cover that is able to withstand the presence of oxen but is unable to withstand the presence of camels, and camels are commonly found in that location. What actually transpired was that the cover rotted from the inside. In this case, what is the halakha? Do we say: Since he was negligent concerning camels, he is considered negligent also concerning the rotting? Or perhaps we do not say that since he was negligent concerning camels he is considered negligent concerning rotting, and since in practice he is not to blame for the incident, he is not held liable?

תא שמע כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור ואתמר עלה אמר רבי יצחק בר בר חנה שהתליע מתוכו היכי דמי אילימא כראוי לשוורים וכראוי לגמלים והתליע מתוכו פשיטא דפטור מאי הוה ליה למעבד

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he covered the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt. And it was stated with regard to this that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar bar Ḥana says: This halakha applies where the cover rotted from the inside. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is referring to where he covered it in a manner appropriate for oxen and appropriate for camels and it rotted from the inside, isn’t it obvious that he is exempt? Being unaware of this, what should he have done?

אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו וקתני פטור אלמא לא אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע לענין גמלים הוי פושע לענין התלעה

Rather, is it not referring to a case where he covered it appropriately for oxen but not appropriately for camels, and camels are commonly found in that location? And the strength of the cover vis-à-vis oxen and camels is not relevant to the halakha here because the cover rotted from the inside. And the mishna teaches that he is exempt. Apparently, we do not say that since he is considered negligent concerning camels, he is also considered negligent with regard to the rotting.

לא לעולם כראוי לגמלים וכראוי לשוורים והתליע מתוכו ודקא קשיא לך כי התליע מאי הוה ליה למעבד מהו דתימא איבעי ליה למיזל ומנקש עליה קא משמע לן

The Gemara rejects this: No; actually, the case is where the cover was appropriate for camels and appropriate for oxen, and it rotted from the inside. And as for what was difficult for you to explain: When it rotted from the inside, what should he have done, and shouldn’t he be exempt? There is, nevertheless, a novelty in this ruling: It is necessary lest you say that he should have gone and knocked on the covering to ensure it was not hollow on the inside. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that he is not required to check to this extent.

תא שמע לא כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב היכי דמי אילימא לא כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים צריכא למימר דחייב

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna: If he did not cover the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is referring to where he did not cover it appropriately for oxen and did not cover it appropriately for camels, does it need to be said that he is liable?

אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ואי דשכיחי גמלים פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים אנוס הוא אלא לאו דשכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו וקתני חייב אלמא אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע לענין גמלים הוי פושע לענין התלעה

Rather, is it not a case where he covered it appropriately for oxen but not appropriately for camels? In this case, the following point needs clarification: If camels are commonly found there, he is negligent and should be liable. And if camels are not commonly found there, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Rather, is it not a case where camels are commonly found there, and it rotted from the inside, and the mishna teaches that he is liable? Apparently, we do say that since he is negligent concerning the camels, he is considered negligent concerning the rotting, and he is therefore liable.

אמרי לא לעולם כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים ואתו גמלים וארעוהו ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה ודקא קשיא לך פשיטא פושע הוא איידי דנסיב רישא כסהו כראוי נסיב סיפא נמי לא כסהו

They said in response: No; actually it is referring to where he covered the pit appropriately for oxen but not appropriately for camels; and camels are commonly found there, and camels came and weakened the cover. And, subsequently, oxen came and fell in. And as for what was difficult for you to explain: It is obvious that he is liable, since he is clearly negligent, so what novelty is being introduced? The answer is that since he needs to cite the first clause of the mishna, i.e., where he covered the pit appropriately, he therefore cites the latter clause as well, i.e., where he did not cover it.

תא שמע נפל לתוכו שור חרש שוטה וקטן סומא ומהלך בלילה חייב פקח ומהלך ביום פטור ואמאי נימא מדהוי פושע לענין חרש הוי נמי פושע לענין פקח אלא לאו שמע מיניה לא אמרינן מגו שמע מיניה

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different proof from a baraita: With regard toan ox that was impaired by being deaf, or an ox that was an imbecile, or an ox that was very young, or a blind ox, or an ox that is walking at night and unable to see, if it fell into the pit, he is liable. If the ox was of standard intelligence for its species and was walking in the day, the owner of the pit is exempt, since the ox should have been aware of the pit. The Gemara asks: But why is he exempt? Let us say that since he is considered negligent concerning a deaf ox, he is also negligent concerning an ox of standard intelligence. Rather, is it not correct to conclude the following principle from here: We do not say that since he is negligent with regard to one matter, it is also considered negligence with regard to another matter, but he is held liable only for the damage actually attributable to his negligence? The Gemara affirms: Yes, conclude from the mishna that this is so.

נפל לפניו כו׳ אמר רב לפניו לפניו ממש לאחריו אחריו ממש

§ The mishna teaches: If a man was digging or widening a pit, and an ox passing by fell forward into it in fright due to the sound of the digging, he is liable. If it fell backward into the pit due to the sound of the digging, he is exempt. Rav says: The term forward means literally forward, and the term backward means literally backward,