Bava Kamma 54
״אוֹ״, מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – לְחַלֵּק מִ״וְּנָפַל״ נָפְקָא. וְרַבָּנַן – ״וְנָפַל״, טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע.
The word “or” is necessary to separate the cases of the ox and donkey. This indicates that if either falls in individually, the owner of the pit is liable. And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha to separate the cases in the verse? He derives it from the use of the singular form of the verb: “And an ox or donkey fall [venafal],” indicating that he is liable if even one animal falls. And the Rabbis maintain that the term and fall can also indicate many animals, as the use of the singular form of a verb does not prove that the subject is necessarily singular.
אֵימָא ״וְנָפַל״ – כָּלַל, ״שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר״ – פָּרַט; כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא!
The Gemara now challenges both opinions: Say that the term “and fall” is a generalization, whereas the phrase “an ox or a donkey” is a detail. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, when the Torah presents a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only what is contained in the detail. Therefore, an ox and a donkey are indeed included, but anything else is not included.
אָמְרִי: ״בַּעַל הַבּוֹר יְשַׁלֵּם״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים, אַף כֹּל בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים.
The Sages said in response: The following verse: “The owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:34), means that it then generalized again. The verses are structured according to the principle of halakhic exegesis of: A generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to this principle, you may deduce that the verses are referring only to items that are similar to the detail. In this case, just as the explicit detail is referring to animals, so too, all items included in the generalization must be animals.
אִי, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָש, דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – אַף כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא, אֲבָל עוֹפוֹת לֹא!
The Gemara now challenges this answer: If so, just as the explicit detail, i.e., the ox and donkey, is referring to items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure by contact or by carrying, so too, all items, i.e., all animals, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or by carrying, should be included in the halakhot of damage classified as Pit. But birds, whose carcasses do not render a person impure through contact or by carrying, would not be included.
אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא חַד פְּרָטָא! הֵי נִכְתּוֹב? אִי כְּתַב ״שׁוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – אִין, שֶׁאֵינוֹ קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – לָא. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חֲמוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – אִין, שֶׁאֵין קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – לָא!
The Gemara answers: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail, from which the exclusion of birds could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Torah write? If it writes only an ox, I would say that an item that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an item that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: Those animals whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), do indeed render their owners liable, but animals whose firstborn is not sanctified do not render them liable. Therefore, the Torah states both an ox and a donkey.
אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – כֹּל דְּבַר מִיתָה.
The original difficulty therefore resurfaces: Why is the verse not expounded as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, thereby excluding birds? Rather, the previous method of deriving liability for a pit must be rejected, and instead it should be derived as follows: The verse states: “And the carcass shall be for him” (Exodus 21:34), from which it may be inferred that anything subject to death is included.
בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן דְּקָא מְמַעֲטִי לְהוּ לְכֵלִים, וּבֵין לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּקָא מְרַבֵּי לְהוּ לְכֵלִים – כֵּלִים בְּנֵי מִיתָה נִינְהוּ?! אָמְרִי: שְׁבִירָתָן זוֹ הִיא מִיתָתָן.
The Gemara asks: If this is the basis for liability for a pit, then both according to the Rabbis, who exclude vessels from liability based on another verse, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, who has amplified the halakha to include vessels, one could ask: Are vessels subject to death? Clearly, vessels cannot be subject to death. Why, then, is a separate source necessary to derive their halakhic status? The Sages said in reply: Vessels may also be considered subject to death in the sense that their shattering is tantamount to their death.
וּלְרַב דְּאָמַר: בּוֹר שֶׁחִיְּיבָה עָלָיו תּוֹרָה – לְהֶבְלוֹ וְלֹא לַחֲבָטוֹ; בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן בֵּין לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – כֵּלִים בְּנֵי הַבְלָא נִינְהוּ?! אָמְרִי: בְּחַדְתֵי, דְּמִיפַּקְעִי מֵהַבְלָא.
The Gemara continues to challenge this explanation: But according to Rav, who says: With regard to Pit, for which the Torah deems a person liable, it is only for damage caused by its lethal fumes, but not for damage caused by the impact of the fall, the following question may be raised both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Yehuda: Are vessels capable of being broken by the lethal fumes, such that a verse is necessary to exclude them? The Sages said in reply: There is such a case concerning new vessels, which crack from the fumes.
הַאי ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: שׁוֹר פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין שֶׁנָּפַל לְבוֹר – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – בְּמִי שֶׁהַמֵּת שֶׁלּוֹ, יָצָא זֶה שֶׁאֵין הַמֵּת שֶׁלּוֹ.
The Gemara asks further: But isn’t this verse: “And the carcass shall be for him,” necessary for that which Rava ruled, as Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the owner of the pit is exempt, as it is stated: “And the carcass shall be for him.” It is referring to a person to whom the carcass belongs, thereby excluding this person, to whom the carcass does not belong. Once a halakha has already been derived from this verse, it cannot be used as the basis for deriving a second halakha.
אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״כֶּסֶף יָשִׁיב לִבְעָלָיו״ – לְרַבּוֹת כֹּל דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּעָלִים. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ כֵּלִים וְאָדָם נָמֵי!
Rather, the halakhot of liability for Pit must be derived from another source. The verse states concerning Pit: “He shall recompense money to its owners” (Exodus 21:34), thereby including any item that has an owner within the scope of liability. The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, then even vessels and people should be included as well, which presents a difficulty for all opinions.
אָמַר קְרָא: ״שׁוֹר״ – וְלֹא אָדָם, ״חֲמוֹר״ – וְלֹא כֵּלִים. וּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּקָא מְרַבֵּי לְהוּ לְכֵלִים, בִּשְׁלָמָא ״שׁוֹר״ – מְמַעֵט בֵּיהּ אָדָם, אֶלָּא ״חֲמוֹר״ מַאי מְמַעֵט בֵּיהּ?
The Gemara answers: This is why the verse states: “An ox,” but not a person; “a donkey,” but not vessels. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who amplifies the scope of liability to include vessels, granted that the term “an ox” is necessary, as he excludes people based on it, for which he is not liable. But with regard to the term “a donkey,” what does he exclude based on it?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: ״חֲמוֹר״ דְּבוֹר לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְ״שֶׂה״ דַּאֲבֵידָה לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל – קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, Rava said: The term “donkey” stated with regard to Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the term “sheep” (Deuteronomy 22:1), stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone (see Bava Metzia 27a) are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.
נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב. מַאי ״שׁוֹר חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן״? אִילֵימָא שׁוֹר שֶׁל חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹר שֶׁל שׁוֹטֶה, שׁוֹר שֶׁל קָטָן – הָא שׁוֹר שֶׁל פִּקֵּחַ פָּטוּר?!
§ The mishna teaches: If a ḥeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox fell into the pit, the owner of the pit is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the phrase: A ḥeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox? If we say that it means: An ox belonging to a deaf-mute [ḥeresh], an ox belonging to an imbecile [shoteh], or an ox belonging to a minor [katan], then it can be inferred that if it was an ox belonging to a halakhically competent adult, the owner of the pit would be exempt. What would be the reason for this exemption?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שׁוֹר שֶׁהוּא חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹר שֶׁהוּא שׁוֹטֶה, שׁוֹר שֶׁהוּא קָטָן.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Instead, it should be interpreted as: An ox that is impaired by being deaf, or an ox that is an imbecile, or an ox that is very young.
הָא שׁוֹר שֶׁהוּא פִּקֵּחַ – פָּטוּר?
The Gemara asks: But can it be inferred that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, the owner of the pit would be exempt?
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר; לָא מִבַּעְיָא שׁוֹר שֶׁהוּא פִּקֵּחַ – דְּחַיָּיב; אֲבָל שׁוֹר חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, אֵימָא חֵרְשׁוּתוֹ גָּרְמָה לוֹ, קַטְנוּתוֹ גָּרְמָה לוֹ, וְלִיפְּטַר; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, that the pit’s owner is liable. But with regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, say that it was not due to the pit alone that it fell in, but its deafness caused it to fall in or its young age caused it to fall in, and the owner of the pit should be exempt. Therefore, it teaches us that he is liable in these cases as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא לְרָבִינָא, וְהָתַנְיָא: נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ בַּר דַּעַת – פָּטוּר. מַאי, לָאו שׁוֹר בַּר דַּעַת? אָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, אָדָם. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, אָדָם בֶּן דַּעַת הוּא דְּפָטוּר, הָא לָאו בֶּן דַּעַת הוּא – דְּחַיָּיב? ״שׁוֹר״ – וְלֹא אָדָם כְּתִיב!
Rav Aḥa said to Ravina: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a living being that is mentally competent fell into a pit, the owner is exempt. What, is it not referring to an ox that is mentally competent? Ravina said to him: No, it is referring to a person. Rav Aḥa challenges this response: If that is so, you should then infer that it is only for the injuries of a person who is mentally competent that he is exempt, but if one is not mentally competent, is the halakha that he would be liable? But the term “an ox” is written in the Torah as causing liability, and not a person.
אֶלָּא מַאי ״בֶּן דַּעַת״ – מִין בֶּן דַּעַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ, וְהָתַנְיָא: נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר בֶּן דַּעַת – פָּטוּר!
Rava responded to Rav Aḥa: Rather, what does the term mentally competent mean? It is referring to a species that is mentally competent, and thereby includes all humans in the exemption from liability. Rav Aḥa said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If an ox that was mentally competent fell inside it, he is exempt.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: שׁוֹר וְהוּא חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹר וְהוּא שׁוֹטֶה, שׁוֹר וְהוּא קָטָן – דַּוְקָא; אֲבָל שׁוֹר וְהוּא פִּקֵּחַ – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּבָעֵי לֵיהּ עַיּוֹנֵי וּמֵיזַל. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, וְסוֹמֵא, וּמְהַלֵּךְ בַּלַּיְלָה – חַיָּיב. פִּקֵּחַ וּמְהַלֵּךְ בַּיוֹם – פָּטוּר.
Rather, Rava said that Rabbi Yirmeya’s explanation should be rejected, and the mishna is referring specifically to an ox that is deaf, an ox that is an imbecile, and an ox that is very young, for which he is liable; but for an ox that is of standard intelligence, he is exempt. What is the reason? The reason is that the ox should have looked carefully while walking. If it did not, it is responsible for its own injury. The Gemara notes: That idea is also taught in a baraita: With regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, blind, or that is walking at night and unable to see, if it fell into a pit, the pit’s owner is liable. But if the ox is of standard intelligence and is walking during the day, the pit’s owner is exempt, since normal behavior for oxen is that, ordinarily, they watch where they are going and avoid pits.
מַתְנִי׳ אֶחָד שׁוֹר וְאֶחָד כׇּל בְּהֵמָה – לִנְפִילַת הַבּוֹר, וּלְהַפְרָשַׁת הַר סִינַי, וּלְתַשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְלַהֲשָׁבַת אֲבֵידָה, לִפְרִיקָה, לַחֲסִימָה, לַכִּלְאַיִם, וְלַשַּׁבָּת.
MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat.
וְכֵן חַיָּה וָעוֹף כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. אִם כֵּן, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר״? אֶלָּא שֶׁדִּבֵּר הַכָּתוּב בַּהוֹוֶה.
And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same halakhot as domesticated animals. If so, why are all of the above halakhot stated in the Torah only in reference to an ox or a donkey? Rather, the reason is that the verse speaks of a common scenario, from which the other cases may be derived.
גְּמָ׳ לִנְפִילַת הַבּוֹר – ״כֶּסֶף יָשִׁיב לִבְעָלָיו״ כְּתִיב – כֹּל דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּעָלִים, כְּדַאֲמַרַן. לְהַפְרָשַׁת הַר סִינַי – ״אִם בְּהֵמָה אִם אִישׁ לֹא יִחְיֶה״, וְחַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה הָוְיָא; ״אִם״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹפוֹת.
GEMARA: The Gemara explains the sources for all of the halakhot enumerated in the mishna that apply to all animals. With regard to falling into a pit, it is written: “He shall recompense money to its owners” (Exodus 21:34), which means that any animal that has owners is included, as we mentioned (see 54a). With regard to the requirement that animals keep their distance from Mount Sinai before the giving of the Torah, this is derived from the verse: “Whether it be animal or person, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13), and an undomesticated animal [ḥayya] is also included in the term animal [behema]. In addition, the word “whether” serves to include birds.
לְתַשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל – כִּדְאָמְרִינַן: ״עַל כׇּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע״ – כָּלַל כֹּל דְּבַר פְּשִׁיעָה. לַהֲשָׁבַת אֲבֵידָה – ״לְכׇל אֲבֵדַת אָחִיךָ״. לִפְרִיקָה – יָלֵיף ״חֲמוֹר״–״חֲמוֹר״ מִשַּׁבָּת.
With regard to the double payment of a thief, it is as we say in a halakhic exegesis of the verse: “For any matter of trespass” (Exodus 22:8), that it is a general statement which includes any matter of negligence. With regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, the verse states comprehensively: “For every lost thing of your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:3). With regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word donkey is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word donkey is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.
לַחֲסִימָה – יָלֵיף ״שׁוֹר״–״שׁוֹר״ מִשַּׁבָּת.
With regard to the prohibition against muzzling an animal, mentioned in the verse: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.
לְכִלְאַיִם – אִי כִּלְאַיִם דַּחֲרִישָׁה, יָלֵיף ״שׁוֹר״–״שׁוֹר״ מִשַּׁבָּת;
With regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, if it is referring to the prohibition against using diverse kinds for plowing, due to which it is forbidden to plow with an ox and a donkey together (see Deuteronomy 22:10), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of plowing with diverse kinds, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.
אִי כִּלְאַיִם דְּהַרְבָּעָה, יָלֵיף ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ״–״בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״ מִשַּׁבָּת.
If it is referring to the prohibition of diverse kinds for crossbreeding, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.
וְגַבֵּי שַׁבָּת מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, בְּדִבְּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת נֶאֱמַר: ״עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ״, וּבְדִבְּרוֹת הָאַחֲרוֹנוֹת נֶאֱמַר: ״וְשׁוֹרְךָ וַחֲמֹרְךָ וְכׇל בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״. וַהֲלֹא שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר בִּכְלַל כׇּל בְּהֵמָה הָיוּ, וְלָמָּה יָצְאוּ? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר הָאָמוּר כָּאן – חַיָּה וָעוֹף כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן, אַף כֹּל חַיָּה וָעוֹף כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן.
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive concerning Shabbat itself that the words “ox” and “donkey” are referring to all types of animals? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In the first version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: “Your manservant, your maidservant, nor your cattle” (Exodus 20:10), whereas in the second version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: “Nor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your cattle” (Deuteronomy 5:14). Now, aren’t an ox and a donkey already included in the category of: All animals, which are included in the term “cattle”? Why, then, were they specified? To teach you that just as with regard to the terms ox and donkey that are stated here, undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them, so too, everywhere that an ox and donkey are mentioned, all types of undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them.
אֵימָא: ״בְּהֵמָה״ דְּדִבְּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת – כָּלַל, ״שׁוֹרְךָ וַחֲמֹרְךָ״ דְּדִבְּרוֹת הָאַחֲרוֹנוֹת – פָּרַט; כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא!
The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verses be expounded as follows: The term “cattle” used in the first version of the Ten Commandments is a generalization, and the phrase “your ox and your donkey” used in the latter version of the Ten Commandments is a detail. In the case of a generalization and a detail, the principles of halakhic exegesis dictate that the generalization includes only what is specified in the detail. Therefore, with regard to this subject, an ox and a donkey should indeed be included, but anything else should not be included.
אָמְרִי: ״וְכׇל בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״ דְּדִבְּרוֹת הָאַחֲרוֹנוֹת – חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים, אַף כֹּל בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים.
The Sages said in reply: In the phrase “nor any of your cattle” stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments following the phrase “your ox and your donkey,” it then generalized again. Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as animals, so too, all items included in the general term must be animals.
וְאֵימָא: מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא, אַף כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁנְּבָלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא; אֲבָל עוֹפוֹת – לֹא!
The Gemara challenges the answer: But say instead that just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as an item, i.e., an animal, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying, so too, all items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying should be included. But birds, whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact or through carrying, should not be included.
אָמְרִי: אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא חַד פְּרָטָא! הֵי נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא? אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – אִין, שֶׁאֵינוֹ קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – לָא; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חֲמוֹר״. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חֲמוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – אִין, שֶׁאֵין קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – לָא; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר״.
The Sages said in reply: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail from which this could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Merciful One write? If the Merciful One writes only an ox, I would say: An animal that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an animal that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: An animal whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), does indeed render him liable, but an animal whose firstborn is not sanctified does not render him liable. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both an ox and a donkey.
אֶלָּא ״וְכׇל בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.
Consequently, there is no redundancy, and each detail is required for correctly deriving other halakhot. If so, the previous question resurfaces: Why are the verses not expounded such that the prohibition does not include birds? Rather, the term: “Nor any [vekhol] of your cattle,” should be understood as an amplification, encompassing any item that is even partially similar to the detail.
וְכֹל הֵיכָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא?! וְהָא גַּבֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר דִּכְתִיב ״כֹּל״, וְקָא דָרְשִׁינַן לֵיהּ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט!
The Gemara asks: But is it the case that anywhere that the Merciful One states the word “any [kol]” it is intended as an amplification? But concerning tithes, where it is written “any [kol],” and yet we expound the verses with the method of a generalization and a detail, rather than using the method of amplification and restriction.
דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנָתַתָּה הַכֶּסֶף בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ״ – כָּלַל, ״בַּבָּקָר וּבַצֹּאן וּבַיַּיִן וּבַשֵּׁכָר״ – פָּרַט, ״וּבְכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁאׇלְךָ נַפְשֶׁךָ״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל;
This is as it is taught in a baraita concerning second-tithe money brought to Jerusalem: The verse states: “And you shall give the money for anything [bekhol] your soul desires” (Deuteronomy 14:26), which is a generalization, followed by: “For oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink,” which is a detail, and concludes with: “Or for anything [uvkhol] your soul asks of you,” where it then generalized again.
כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – פְּרִי מִפְּרִי וְגִידּוּלֵי קַרְקַע, אַף כֹּל פְּרִי מִפְּרִי וְגִידּוּלֵי קַרְקַע!
Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as produce of produce, i.e., they grow from a parent organism, such as agricultural produce or animals, and they are grown from the ground, i.e., their sustenance comes from the ground, so too, it includes all things that are the produce of produce and are grown from the ground. It is evident from here that the method of a generalization and a detail is used in connection with the term “kol,” as opposed to interpreting it as an amplification.
אָמְרִי: ״בְּכֹל״ – כְּלָלָא, ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״כֹּל״ נָמֵי כְּלָלָא הוּא, מִיהוּ הַאי ״כֹּל״ דְּהָכָא – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא; מִדַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמִכְתַּב: ״וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ״ כְּדִכְתִיב בְּדִבְּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת, וּכְתַב: ״וְכׇל בְּהֶמְתְּךָ״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רִיבּוּיָא.
The Sages said in response: A distinction may be drawn between the term: “For anything [bekhol],” which is a generalization, and the term “any [kol],” as in: “Any of your cattle,” which is an amplification. And if you wish, say instead that the word “any [kol]” is a generalization as well, in addition to “for anything [bekhol].” But this word “any,” written here, is an amplification. This is the case since it could have written: And your cattle, as it is written in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and instead it writes: “Nor any of your cattle.” Learn from this that it is an amplification and encompasses other animals as well.
הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ: ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא; ״בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״ דְּדִבְּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת, וְ״שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר״ דְּדִבְּרוֹת הָאַחֲרוֹנוֹת – לְמָה לִי?
The Gemara continues to analyze this matter: Now that you have said that the term “any [kol]” is an amplification, why do I need the words “your cattle,” stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and the terms “an ox or a donkey,” stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments? The phrase “and any of your cattle” already includes any animal.
אָמְרִי: ״שׁוֹר״ – לְאַגְמוֹרֵי ״שׁוֹר״–״שׁוֹר״ לַחֲסִימָה,
The Sages said in response: Each of these terms is required. The term “ox” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition against muzzling, as the word “ox” is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word “ox” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat.
״חֲמוֹר״ – לְאַגְמוֹרֵי ״חֲמוֹר״–״חֲמוֹר״ לִפְרִיקָה,
The term “donkey” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, as the word “donkey” is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word “donkey” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14).
״בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״ – לְאַגְמוֹרֵי ״בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ״–״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ״ לְכִלְאַיִם.
The term “your cattle” can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, as the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term “your cattle” is employed in the context of the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10).
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ אָדָם לִיתְּסַר! אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: אָדָם מוּתָּר עִם כּוּלָּן לַחְרוֹשׁ וְלִמְשׁוֹךְ?
The Gemara asks: If so, that this redundancy is the source for extending the prohibition of diverse kinds, then it should be prohibited even for a person to plow together with an ox or another animal. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Kilayim 8:6): It is permitted for a person to plow and pull with any of them, indicating that the prohibition relates only to animals?
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: פַּפּוּנָאֵי יָדְעִי טַעְמָא דְּהָא מִילְּתָא – וּמַנּוּ? רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב; אָמַר קְרָא: ״לְמַעַן יָנוּחַ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ כָּמוֹךָ״ – לְהַנָּחָה הִקַּשְׁתִּיו, וְלֹא לְדָבָר אַחֵר.
Rav Pappa said: The Sages of Paphunya know the reason for this matter, and who are these Sages? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who resided in Paphunya. The reason is that the verse states: “You shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your ox, your donkey, any of your animals, or the stranger residing within your city gates, that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as you” (Deuteronomy 5:14), as if to say: I have equated people with animals only concerning resting on Shabbat, but not with regard to another matter.
שָׁאַל רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עָגֵיל אֶת רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: מִפְּנֵי מָה בְּדִבְּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת לֹא נֶאֱמַר בָּהֶם ״טוֹב״, וּבְדִבְּרוֹת הָאַחֲרוֹנוֹת
Having discussed some differences between the two versions of the Ten Commandments, the Gemara now discusses a related matter: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Agil asked Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: For what reason is the word good not stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, whereas in the latter version of the Ten Commandments,
