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Today's Daf Yomi

July 24, 2016 | ื™ืดื— ื‘ืชืžื•ื– ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 54

Study Guide Bava Kamma 54. Many basic arguments regarding bor are brought. ย One is not responsible if a person falls into the pit and dies (but one is responsible for damages). ย One is not responsible for vessels that fall in but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says one is responsible. ย The verse mentions just animals – an ox and a donkey. ย Drashot are brought to explain from where do we know that all animals are included (even birds). ย The mishna explained that one is obligated for an ox that is deaf, dumb or young. ย That seemed to imply not if the animal was older and not blemished. ย the rabbis at first think that somehow the mishna also includes that case but eventually concludes that one is not responsible for that case as an ox should also be paying attention (like a person) and therefore the owner is not responsible. ย There is an argument between the Rambam and Raavad about whether this is only true for death and not damages (as by a person). ย The mishna then brings other cases in the Torah where specific animals are mentioned and yet the intent is all animals. ย The gemara explains the derivation in each case.


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ืื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื—ืœืง ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœื—ืœืง ืžื•ื ืคืœ ื ืคืงื ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœ ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืžืฉืžืข

The word โ€œorโ€ is necessary to separate the cases of the ox and donkey. This indicates that if either falls in individually, the owner of the pit is liable. And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha to separate the cases in the verse? He derives it from the use of the singular form of the verb: โ€œAnd an ox or donkey fall [venafal],โ€ indicating that he is liable if even one animal falls. And the Rabbis maintain that the term and fall can also indicate many animals, as the use of the singular form of a verb does not prove that the subject is necessarily singular.

ืื™ืžื ื•ื ืคืœ ื›ืœืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืคืจื˜ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืืœื ืžื” ืฉื‘ืคืจื˜ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

The Gemara now challenges both opinions: Say that the term โ€œand fallโ€ is a generalization, whereas the phrase โ€œan ox or a donkeyโ€ is a detail. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, when the Torah presents a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only what is contained in the detail. Therefore, an ox and a donkey are indeed included, but anything else is not included.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืขืœ ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื™ืฉืœื ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื

The Sages said in response: The following verse: โ€œThe owner of the pit shall payโ€ (Exodus 21:34), means that it then generalized again. The verses are structured according to the principle of halakhic exegesis of: A generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to this principle, you may deduce that the verses are referring only to items that are similar to the detail. In this case, just as the explicit detail is referring to animals, so too, all items included in the generalization must be animals.

ืื™ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื” ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื” ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืื‘ืœ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara now challenges this answer: If so, just as the explicit detail, i.e., the ox and donkey, is referring to items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure by contact or by carrying, so too, all items, i.e., all animals, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or by carrying, should be included in the halakhot of damage classified as Pit. But birds, whose carcasses do not render a person impure through contact or by carrying, would not be included.

ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ืคืจื˜ื ื”ื™ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืฉื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืœื ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืœื

The Gemara answers: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail, from which the exclusion of birds could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Torah write? If it writes only an ox, I would say that an item that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an item that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: Those animals whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), do indeed render their owners liable, but animals whose firstborn is not sanctified do not render them liable. Therefore, the Torah states both an ox and a donkey.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

The original difficulty therefore resurfaces: Why is the verse not expounded as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, thereby excluding birds? Rather, the previous method of deriving liability for a pit must be rejected, and instead it should be derived as follows: The verse states: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for himโ€ (Exodus 21:34), from which it may be inferred that anything subject to death is included.

ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืงื ืžืžืขื˜ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืงื ืžืจื‘ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื›ืœื™ื ื‘ื ื™ ืžื™ืชื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ ืฉื‘ื™ืจืชืŸ ื–ื• ื”ื™ื ืžื™ืชืชืŸ

The Gemara asks: If this is the basis for liability for a pit, then both according to the Rabbis, who exclude vessels from liability based on another verse, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, who has amplified the halakha to include vessels, one could ask: Are vessels subject to death? Clearly, vessels cannot be subject to death. Why, then, is a separate source necessary to derive their halakhic status? The Sages said in reply: Vessels may also be considered subject to death in the sense that their shattering is tantamount to their death.

ื•ืœืจื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉื—ื™ื™ื‘ื” ืขืœื™ื• ืชื•ืจื” ืœื”ื‘ืœื• ื•ืœื ืœื—ื‘ื˜ื• ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื›ืœื™ื ื‘ื ื™ ื”ื‘ืœื ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื—ื“ืชื™ ื“ืžื™ืคืงืขื™ ืžื”ื‘ืœื

The Gemara continues to challenge this explanation: But according to Rav, who says: With regard to Pit, for which the Torah deems a person liable, it is only for damage caused by its lethal fumes, but not for damage caused by the impact of the fall, the following question may be raised both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Yehuda: Are vessels capable of being broken by the lethal fumes, such that a verse is necessary to exclude them? The Sages said in reply: There is such a case concerning new vessels, which crack from the fumes.

ื”ืื™ ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ืžื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืฉื•ืจ ืคืกื•ืœื™ ื”ืžื•ืงื“ืฉื™ืŸ ืฉื ืคืœ ืœื‘ื•ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื”ืžืช ืฉืœื• ื™ืฆื ื–ื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื”ืžืช ืฉืœื•

The Gemara asks further: But isnโ€™t this verse: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for him,โ€ necessary for that which Rava ruled, as Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the owner of the pit is exempt, as it is stated: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for him.โ€ It is referring to a person to whom the carcass belongs, thereby excluding this person, to whom the carcass does not belong. Once a halakha has already been derived from this verse, it cannot be used as the basis for deriving a second halakha.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืฉื™ื‘ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื›ืœ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื›ืœื™ื ื•ืื“ื ื ืžื™

Rather, the halakhot of liability for Pit must be derived from another source. The verse states concerning Pit: โ€œHe shall recompense money to its ownersโ€ (Exodus 21:34), thereby including any item that has an owner within the scope of liability. The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, then even vessels and people should be included as well, which presents a difficulty for all opinions.

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืื“ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืœื ื›ืœื™ื ื•ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืงื ืžืจื‘ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉืœืžื ืฉื•ืจ ืžืžืขื˜ ื‘ื™ื” ืื“ื ืืœื ื—ืžื•ืจ ืžืื™ ืžืžืขื˜ ื‘ื™ื”

The Gemara answers: This is why the verse states: โ€œAn ox,โ€ but not a person; โ€œa donkey,โ€ but not vessels. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who amplifies the scope of liability to include vessels, granted that the term โ€œan oxโ€ is necessary, as he excludes people based on it, for which he is not liable. But with regard to the term โ€œa donkey,โ€ what does he exclude based on it?

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื“ื‘ื•ืจ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื•ืฉื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืงืฉื™ื

Rather, Rava said: The term โ€œdonkeyโ€ stated with regard to Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the term โ€œsheepโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:1), stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone (see Bava Metzia 27a) are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืงื˜ืŸ ื”ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ

ยง The mishna teaches: If a แธฅeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox fell into the pit, the owner of the pit is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the phrase: A แธฅeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox? If we say that it means: An ox belonging to a deaf-mute [แธฅeresh], an ox belonging to an imbecile [shoteh], or an ox belonging to a minor [katan], then it can be inferred that if it was an ox belonging to a halakhically competent adult, the owner of the pit would be exempt. What would be the reason for this exemption?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืงื˜ืŸ

Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Instead, it should be interpreted as: An ox that is impaired by being deaf, or an ox that is an imbecile, or an ox that is very young.

ื”ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ

The Gemara asks: But can it be inferred that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, the owner of the pit would be exempt?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืื‘ืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืื™ืžื ื—ืจืฉื•ืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ืงื˜ื ื•ืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ื•ืœื™ืคื˜ืจ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, that the pitโ€™s owner is liable. But with regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, say that it was not due to the pit alone that it fell in, but its deafness caused it to fall in or its young age caused it to fall in, and the owner of the pit should be exempt. Therefore, it teaches us that he is liable in these cases as well.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื—ื ืœืจื‘ื™ื ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ื‘ืจ ื“ืขืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืฉื•ืจ ื‘ืจ ื“ืขืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืื“ื ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืื“ื ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื ืœืื• ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ื”ื•ื ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืื“ื ื›ืชื™ื‘

Rav Aแธฅa said to Ravina: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If a living being that is mentally competent fell into a pit, the owner is exempt. What, is it not referring to an ox that is mentally competent? Ravina said to him: No, it is referring to a person. Rav Aแธฅa challenges this response: If that is so, you should then infer that it is only for the injuries of a person who is mentally competent that he is exempt, but if one is not mentally competent, is the halakha that he would be liable? But the term โ€œan oxโ€ is written in the Torah as causing liability, and not a person.

ืืœื ืžืื™ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rava responded to Rav Aแธฅa: Rather, what does the term mentally competent mean? It is referring to a species that is mentally competent, and thereby includes all humans in the exemption from liability. Rav Aแธฅa said to him: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If an ox that was mentally competent fell inside it, he is exempt.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืงื˜ืŸ ื“ื•ืงื ืื‘ืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืขื™ื•ื ื™ ื•ืžื™ื–ืœ ืชื ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืกื•ืžื ื•ืžื”ืœืš ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืคืงื— ื•ืžื”ืœืš ื‘ื™ื•ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rather, Rava said that Rabbi Yirmeyaโ€™s explanation should be rejected, and the mishna is referring specifically to an ox that is deaf, an ox that is an imbecile, and an ox that is very young, for which he is liable; but for an ox that is of standard intelligence, he is exempt. What is the reason? The reason is that the ox should have looked carefully while walking. If it did not, it is responsible for its own injury. The Gemara notes: That idea is also taught in a baraita: With regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, blind, or that is walking at night and unable to see, if it fell into a pit, the pitโ€™s owner is liable. But if the ox is of standard intelligence or is walking during the day, the pitโ€™s owner is exempt, since normal behavior for oxen is that, ordinarily, they watch where they are going and avoid pits.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื—ื“ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืื—ื“ ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ืœื ืคื™ืœืช ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื•ืœื”ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืจ ืกื™ื ื™ ื•ืœืชืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื›ืคืœ ื•ืœื”ืฉื‘ืช ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœืคืจื™ืงื” ืœื—ืกื™ืžื” ืœื›ืœืื™ื ื•ืœืฉื‘ืช

MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat.

ื•ื›ืŸ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืื ื›ืŸ ืœืžื” ื ืืžืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืื• ื—ืžื•ืจ ืืœื ืฉื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ื”ื•ื•ื”

And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same halakhot as domesticated animals. If so, why are all of the above halakhot stated in the Torah only in reference to an ox or a donkey? Rather, the reason is that the verse speaks of a common scenario, from which the other cases may be derived.

ื’ืžืณ ืœื ืคื™ืœืช ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืฉื™ื‘ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืขืœื™ื ื›ื“ืืžืจืŸ ืœื”ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืจ ืกื™ื ื™ ืื ื‘ื”ืžื” ืื ืื™ืฉ ืœื ื™ื—ื™ื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื”ื•ื™ื ืื ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื”ืขื•ืคื•ืช

GEMARA: The Gemara explains the sources for all of the halakhot enumerated in the mishna that apply to all animals. With regard to falling into a pit, it is written: โ€œHe shall recompense money to its ownersโ€ (Exodus 21:34), which means that any animal that has owners is included, as we mentioned (see 54a). With regard to the requirement that animals keep their distance from Mount Sinai before the giving of the Torah, this is derived from the verse: โ€œWhether it be animal or person, it shall not liveโ€ (Exodus 19:13), and an undomesticated animal [แธฅayya] is also included in the term animal [behema]. In addition, the word โ€œwhetherโ€ serves to include birds.

ืœืชืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื›ืคืœ ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืขืœ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืคืฉืข ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืคืฉื™ืขื” ืœื”ืฉื‘ืช ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœื›ืœ ืื‘ื“ืช ืื—ื™ืš ืœืคืจื™ืงื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ื—ืžื•ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the double payment of a thief, it is as we say in a halakhic exegesis of the verse: โ€œFor any matter of trespassโ€ (Exodus 22:8), that it is a general statement which includes any matter of negligence. With regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, the verse states comprehensively: โ€œFor every lost thing of your brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:3). With regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word donkey is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word donkey is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืœื—ืกื™ืžื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the prohibition against muzzling an animal, mentioned in the verse: โ€œYou shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshingโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:4), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืœื›ืœืื™ื ืื™ ื›ืœืื™ื ื“ื—ืจื™ืฉื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, if it is referring to the prohibition against using diverse kinds for plowing, due to which it is forbidden to plow with an ox and a donkey together (see Deuteronomy 22:10), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of plowing with diverse kinds, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืื™ ื›ืœืื™ื ื“ื”ืจื‘ืขื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืžืฉื‘ืช

If it is referring to the prohibition of diverse kinds for crossbreeding, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ื•ื’ื‘ื™ ืฉื‘ืช ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื ืืžืจ ืขื‘ื“ืš ื•ืืžืชืš ื•ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื•ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ื ืืžืจ ื•ืฉื•ืจืš ื•ื—ืžืจืš ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื•ื”ืœื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื”ื™ื• ื•ืœืžื” ื™ืฆืื• ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืš ืžื” ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ืืžื•ืจ ื›ืืŸ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive concerning Shabbat itself that the words โ€œoxโ€ and โ€œdonkeyโ€ are referring to all types of animals? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In the first version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: โ€œYour manservant, your maidservant, nor your cattleโ€ (Exodus 20:10), whereas in the second version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: โ€œNor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your cattleโ€ (Deuteronomy 5:14). Now, arenโ€™t an ox and a donkey already included in the category of: All animals, which are included in the term โ€œcattleโ€? Why, then, were they specified? To teach you that just as with regard to the terms ox and donkey that are stated here, undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them, so too, everywhere that an ox and donkey are mentioned, all types of undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them.

ืื™ืžื ื‘ื”ืžื” ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื›ืœืœ ืฉื•ืจืš ื•ื—ืžืจืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ืคืจื˜ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืืœื ืžื” ืฉื‘ืคืจื˜ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verses be expounded as follows: The term โ€œcattleโ€ used in the first version of the Ten Commandments is a generalization, and the phrase โ€œyour ox and your donkeyโ€ used in the latter version of the Ten Commandments is a detail. In the case of a generalization and a detail, the principles of halakhic exegesis dictate that the generalization includes only what is specified in the detail. Therefore, with regard to this subject, an ox and a donkey should indeed be included, but anything else should not be included.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื

The Sages said in reply: In the phrase โ€œnor any of your cattleโ€ stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments following the phrase โ€œyour ox and your donkey,โ€ it then generalized again. Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as animals, so too, all items included in the general term must be animals.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื• ืžื˜ืžื ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื• ืžื˜ืžื ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืื‘ืœ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara challenges the answer: But say instead that just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as an item, i.e., an animal, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying, so too, all items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying should be included. But birds, whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact or through carrying, should not be included.

ืืžืจื™ ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ืคืจื˜ื ื”ื™ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืฉื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืฉื•ืจ

The Sages said in reply: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail from which this could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Merciful One write? If the Merciful One writes only an ox, I would say: An animal that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an animal that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: An animal whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), does indeed render him liable, but an animal whose firstborn is not sanctified does not render him liable. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both an ox and a donkey.

ืืœื ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื

Consequently, there is no redundancy, and each detail is required for correctly deriving other halakhot. If so, the previous question resurfaces: Why are the verses not expounded such that the prohibition does not include birds? Rather, the term: โ€œNor any [vekhol] of your cattle,โ€ should be understood as an amplification, encompassing any item that is even partially similar to the detail.

ื•ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžืขืฉืจ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื•ืงื ื“ืจืฉื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜

The Gemara asks: But is it the case that anywhere that the Merciful One states the word โ€œany [kol]โ€ it is intended as an amplification? But concerning tithes, where it is written โ€œany [kol],โ€ and yet we expound the verses with the method of a generalization and a detail, rather than using the method of amplification and restriction.

ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืชืชื” ื”ื›ืกืฃ ื‘ื›ืœ ืืฉืจ ืชืื•ื” ื ืคืฉืš ื›ืœืœ ื‘ื‘ืงืจ ื•ื‘ืฆืืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื‘ืฉื›ืจ ืคืจื˜ ื•ื‘ื›ืœ ืืฉืจ ืชืฉืืœืš ื ืคืฉืš ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ

This is as it is taught in a baraita concerning second-tithe money brought to Jerusalem: The verse states: โ€œAnd you shall give the money for anything [bekhol] your soul desiresโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:26), which is a generalization, followed by: โ€œFor oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink,โ€ which is a detail, and concludes with: โ€œOr for anything [uvkhol] your soul asks of you,โ€ where it then generalized again.

ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ืคืจื™ ืžืคืจื™ ื•ื’ื™ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืคืจื™ ืžืคืจื™ ื•ื’ื™ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as produce of produce, i.e., they grow from a parent organism, such as agricultural produce or animals, and they are grown from the ground, i.e., their sustenance comes from the ground, so too, it includes all things that are the produce of produce and are grown from the ground. It is evident from here that the method of a generalization and a detail is used in connection with the term โ€œkol,โ€ as opposed to interpreting it as an amplification.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื›ืœ ื›ืœืœื ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ืœ ื ืžื™ ื›ืœืœื ื”ื•ื ืžื™ื”ื• ื”ืื™ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื›ื ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ืžื“ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ื” ืœืžื›ืชื‘ ื•ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื›ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื•ื›ืชื‘ ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื

The Sages said in response: A distinction may be drawn between the term: โ€œFor anything [bekhol],โ€ which is a generalization, and the term โ€œany [kol],โ€ as in: โ€œAny of your cattle,โ€ which is an amplification. And if you wish, say instead that the word โ€œany [kol]โ€ is a generalization as well, in addition to โ€œfor anything [bekhol].โ€ But this word โ€œany,โ€ written here, is an amplification. This is the case since it could have written: And your cattle, as it is written in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and instead it writes: โ€œNor any of your cattle.โ€ Learn from this that it is an amplification and encompasses other animals as well.

ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ืœืžื” ืœื™

The Gemara continues to analyze this matter: Now that you have said that the term โ€œany [kol]โ€ is an amplification, why do I need the words โ€œyour cattle,โ€ stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and the terms โ€œan ox or a donkey,โ€ stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments? The phrase โ€œand any of your cattleโ€ already includes any animal.

ืืžืจื™ ืฉื•ืจ ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืœื—ืกื™ืžื”

The Sages said in response: Each of these terms is required. The term โ€œoxโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition against muzzling, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat.

ื—ืžื•ืจ ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ื—ืžื•ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ ืœืคืจื™ืงื”

The term โ€œdonkeyโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, as the word โ€œdonkeyโ€ is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word โ€œdonkeyโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14).

ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœื›ืœืื™ื

The term โ€œyour cattleโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, as the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10).

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ืื“ื ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืืœืžื” ืชื ืŸ ืื“ื ืžื•ืชืจ ืขื ื›ื•ืœืŸ ืœื—ืจื•ืฉ ื•ืœืžืฉื•ืš

The Gemara asks: If so, that this redundancy is the source for extending the prohibition of diverse kinds, then it should be prohibited even for a person to plow together with an ox or another animal. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Kilayim 8:6): It is permitted for a person to plow and pull with any of them, indicating that the prohibition relates only to animals?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืคืคื•ื ืื™ ื™ื“ืขื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืžื™ืœืชื ื•ืžื ื• ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืžืขืŸ ื™ื ื•ื— ืขื‘ื“ืš ื•ืืžืชืš ื›ืžื•ืš ืœื”ื ื—ื” ื”ืงืฉืชื™ื• ื•ืœื ืœื“ื‘ืจ ืื—ืจ

Rav Pappa said: The Sages of Paphunya know the reason for this matter, and who are these Sages? Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov, who resided in Paphunya. The reason is that the verse states: โ€œYou shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your ox, your donkey, any of your animals, or the stranger residing within your city gates, that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as youโ€ (Deuteronomy 5:14), as if to say: I have equated people with animals only concerning resting on Shabbat, but not with regard to another matter.

ืฉืืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืขื’ื™ืœ ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืžืคื ื™ ืžื” ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœื ื ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ื˜ื•ื‘ ื•ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช

Having discussed some differences between the two versions of the Ten Commandments, the Gemara now discuses a related matter: Rabbi แธคanina ben Agil asked Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba: For what reason is the word good not stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, whereas in the latter version of the Ten Commandments,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 54

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 54

ืื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื—ืœืง ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœื—ืœืง ืžื•ื ืคืœ ื ืคืงื ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœ ื˜ื•ื‘ื ืžืฉืžืข

The word โ€œorโ€ is necessary to separate the cases of the ox and donkey. This indicates that if either falls in individually, the owner of the pit is liable. And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha to separate the cases in the verse? He derives it from the use of the singular form of the verb: โ€œAnd an ox or donkey fall [venafal],โ€ indicating that he is liable if even one animal falls. And the Rabbis maintain that the term and fall can also indicate many animals, as the use of the singular form of a verb does not prove that the subject is necessarily singular.

ืื™ืžื ื•ื ืคืœ ื›ืœืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืคืจื˜ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืืœื ืžื” ืฉื‘ืคืจื˜ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

The Gemara now challenges both opinions: Say that the term โ€œand fallโ€ is a generalization, whereas the phrase โ€œan ox or a donkeyโ€ is a detail. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, when the Torah presents a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only what is contained in the detail. Therefore, an ox and a donkey are indeed included, but anything else is not included.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืขืœ ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื™ืฉืœื ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื

The Sages said in response: The following verse: โ€œThe owner of the pit shall payโ€ (Exodus 21:34), means that it then generalized again. The verses are structured according to the principle of halakhic exegesis of: A generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to this principle, you may deduce that the verses are referring only to items that are similar to the detail. In this case, just as the explicit detail is referring to animals, so too, all items included in the generalization must be animals.

ืื™ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื” ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื” ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืื‘ืœ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara now challenges this answer: If so, just as the explicit detail, i.e., the ox and donkey, is referring to items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure by contact or by carrying, so too, all items, i.e., all animals, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or by carrying, should be included in the halakhot of damage classified as Pit. But birds, whose carcasses do not render a person impure through contact or by carrying, would not be included.

ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ืคืจื˜ื ื”ื™ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืฉื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืœื ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืœื

The Gemara answers: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail, from which the exclusion of birds could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Torah write? If it writes only an ox, I would say that an item that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an item that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: Those animals whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), do indeed render their owners liable, but animals whose firstborn is not sanctified do not render them liable. Therefore, the Torah states both an ox and a donkey.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

The original difficulty therefore resurfaces: Why is the verse not expounded as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, thereby excluding birds? Rather, the previous method of deriving liability for a pit must be rejected, and instead it should be derived as follows: The verse states: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for himโ€ (Exodus 21:34), from which it may be inferred that anything subject to death is included.

ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืงื ืžืžืขื˜ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืงื ืžืจื‘ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื›ืœื™ื ื‘ื ื™ ืžื™ืชื” ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ ืฉื‘ื™ืจืชืŸ ื–ื• ื”ื™ื ืžื™ืชืชืŸ

The Gemara asks: If this is the basis for liability for a pit, then both according to the Rabbis, who exclude vessels from liability based on another verse, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, who has amplified the halakha to include vessels, one could ask: Are vessels subject to death? Clearly, vessels cannot be subject to death. Why, then, is a separate source necessary to derive their halakhic status? The Sages said in reply: Vessels may also be considered subject to death in the sense that their shattering is tantamount to their death.

ื•ืœืจื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉื—ื™ื™ื‘ื” ืขืœื™ื• ืชื•ืจื” ืœื”ื‘ืœื• ื•ืœื ืœื—ื‘ื˜ื• ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื›ืœื™ื ื‘ื ื™ ื”ื‘ืœื ื ื™ื ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื—ื“ืชื™ ื“ืžื™ืคืงืขื™ ืžื”ื‘ืœื

The Gemara continues to challenge this explanation: But according to Rav, who says: With regard to Pit, for which the Torah deems a person liable, it is only for damage caused by its lethal fumes, but not for damage caused by the impact of the fall, the following question may be raised both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Yehuda: Are vessels capable of being broken by the lethal fumes, such that a verse is necessary to exclude them? The Sages said in reply: There is such a case concerning new vessels, which crack from the fumes.

ื”ืื™ ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ืžื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื›ื“ืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืฉื•ืจ ืคืกื•ืœื™ ื”ืžื•ืงื“ืฉื™ืŸ ืฉื ืคืœ ืœื‘ื•ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ื”ืžืช ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื• ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื”ืžืช ืฉืœื• ื™ืฆื ื–ื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื”ืžืช ืฉืœื•

The Gemara asks further: But isnโ€™t this verse: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for him,โ€ necessary for that which Rava ruled, as Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the owner of the pit is exempt, as it is stated: โ€œAnd the carcass shall be for him.โ€ It is referring to a person to whom the carcass belongs, thereby excluding this person, to whom the carcass does not belong. Once a halakha has already been derived from this verse, it cannot be used as the basis for deriving a second halakha.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืฉื™ื‘ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื›ืœ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื›ืœื™ื ื•ืื“ื ื ืžื™

Rather, the halakhot of liability for Pit must be derived from another source. The verse states concerning Pit: โ€œHe shall recompense money to its ownersโ€ (Exodus 21:34), thereby including any item that has an owner within the scope of liability. The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, then even vessels and people should be included as well, which presents a difficulty for all opinions.

ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืื“ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืœื ื›ืœื™ื ื•ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืงื ืžืจื‘ื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉืœืžื ืฉื•ืจ ืžืžืขื˜ ื‘ื™ื” ืื“ื ืืœื ื—ืžื•ืจ ืžืื™ ืžืžืขื˜ ื‘ื™ื”

The Gemara answers: This is why the verse states: โ€œAn ox,โ€ but not a person; โ€œa donkey,โ€ but not vessels. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who amplifies the scope of liability to include vessels, granted that the term โ€œan oxโ€ is necessary, as he excludes people based on it, for which he is not liable. But with regard to the term โ€œa donkey,โ€ what does he exclude based on it?

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื“ื‘ื•ืจ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื•ืฉื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืงืฉื™ื

Rather, Rava said: The term โ€œdonkeyโ€ stated with regard to Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the term โ€œsheepโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:1), stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone (see Bava Metzia 27a) are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืงื˜ืŸ ื”ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ

ยง The mishna teaches: If a แธฅeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox fell into the pit, the owner of the pit is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the phrase: A แธฅeresh ox or a shoteh ox or a katan ox? If we say that it means: An ox belonging to a deaf-mute [แธฅeresh], an ox belonging to an imbecile [shoteh], or an ox belonging to a minor [katan], then it can be inferred that if it was an ox belonging to a halakhically competent adult, the owner of the pit would be exempt. What would be the reason for this exemption?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืงื˜ืŸ

Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Instead, it should be interpreted as: An ox that is impaired by being deaf, or an ox that is an imbecile, or an ox that is very young.

ื”ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ

The Gemara asks: But can it be inferred that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, the owner of the pit would be exempt?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืื‘ืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืื™ืžื ื—ืจืฉื•ืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ืงื˜ื ื•ืชื• ื’ืจืžื” ืœื• ื•ืœื™ืคื˜ืจ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state that if an ox that is of standard intelligence fell into a pit, that the pitโ€™s owner is liable. But with regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, say that it was not due to the pit alone that it fell in, but its deafness caused it to fall in or its young age caused it to fall in, and the owner of the pit should be exempt. Therefore, it teaches us that he is liable in these cases as well.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื—ื ืœืจื‘ื™ื ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ื‘ืจ ื“ืขืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืฉื•ืจ ื‘ืจ ื“ืขืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืื“ื ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืื“ื ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื ืœืื• ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ื”ื•ื ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืœื ืื“ื ื›ืชื™ื‘

Rav Aแธฅa said to Ravina: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If a living being that is mentally competent fell into a pit, the owner is exempt. What, is it not referring to an ox that is mentally competent? Ravina said to him: No, it is referring to a person. Rav Aแธฅa challenges this response: If that is so, you should then infer that it is only for the injuries of a person who is mentally competent that he is exempt, but if one is not mentally competent, is the halakha that he would be liable? But the term โ€œan oxโ€ is written in the Torah as causing liability, and not a person.

ืืœื ืžืื™ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rava responded to Rav Aแธฅa: Rather, what does the term mentally competent mean? It is referring to a species that is mentally competent, and thereby includes all humans in the exemption from liability. Rav Aแธฅa said to him: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: If an ox that was mentally competent fell inside it, he is exempt.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืฉื•ื˜ื” ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืงื˜ืŸ ื“ื•ืงื ืื‘ืœ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื ืคืงื— ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืขื™ื•ื ื™ ื•ืžื™ื–ืœ ืชื ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืกื•ืžื ื•ืžื”ืœืš ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืคืงื— ื•ืžื”ืœืš ื‘ื™ื•ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rather, Rava said that Rabbi Yirmeyaโ€™s explanation should be rejected, and the mishna is referring specifically to an ox that is deaf, an ox that is an imbecile, and an ox that is very young, for which he is liable; but for an ox that is of standard intelligence, he is exempt. What is the reason? The reason is that the ox should have looked carefully while walking. If it did not, it is responsible for its own injury. The Gemara notes: That idea is also taught in a baraita: With regard to an ox that is deaf, an imbecile, or very young, blind, or that is walking at night and unable to see, if it fell into a pit, the pitโ€™s owner is liable. But if the ox is of standard intelligence or is walking during the day, the pitโ€™s owner is exempt, since normal behavior for oxen is that, ordinarily, they watch where they are going and avoid pits.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื—ื“ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ืื—ื“ ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ืœื ืคื™ืœืช ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื•ืœื”ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืจ ืกื™ื ื™ ื•ืœืชืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื›ืคืœ ื•ืœื”ืฉื‘ืช ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœืคืจื™ืงื” ืœื—ืกื™ืžื” ืœื›ืœืื™ื ื•ืœืฉื‘ืช

MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat.

ื•ื›ืŸ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืื ื›ืŸ ืœืžื” ื ืืžืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืื• ื—ืžื•ืจ ืืœื ืฉื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ื”ื•ื•ื”

And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same halakhot as domesticated animals. If so, why are all of the above halakhot stated in the Torah only in reference to an ox or a donkey? Rather, the reason is that the verse speaks of a common scenario, from which the other cases may be derived.

ื’ืžืณ ืœื ืคื™ืœืช ื”ื‘ื•ืจ ื›ืกืฃ ื™ืฉื™ื‘ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื“ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืขืœื™ื ื›ื“ืืžืจืŸ ืœื”ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืจ ืกื™ื ื™ ืื ื‘ื”ืžื” ืื ืื™ืฉ ืœื ื™ื—ื™ื” ื•ื—ื™ื” ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื”ื•ื™ื ืื ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื”ืขื•ืคื•ืช

GEMARA: The Gemara explains the sources for all of the halakhot enumerated in the mishna that apply to all animals. With regard to falling into a pit, it is written: โ€œHe shall recompense money to its ownersโ€ (Exodus 21:34), which means that any animal that has owners is included, as we mentioned (see 54a). With regard to the requirement that animals keep their distance from Mount Sinai before the giving of the Torah, this is derived from the verse: โ€œWhether it be animal or person, it shall not liveโ€ (Exodus 19:13), and an undomesticated animal [แธฅayya] is also included in the term animal [behema]. In addition, the word โ€œwhetherโ€ serves to include birds.

ืœืชืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื›ืคืœ ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืขืœ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืคืฉืข ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืคืฉื™ืขื” ืœื”ืฉื‘ืช ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ืœื›ืœ ืื‘ื“ืช ืื—ื™ืš ืœืคืจื™ืงื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ื—ืžื•ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the double payment of a thief, it is as we say in a halakhic exegesis of the verse: โ€œFor any matter of trespassโ€ (Exodus 22:8), that it is a general statement which includes any matter of negligence. With regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, the verse states comprehensively: โ€œFor every lost thing of your brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 22:3). With regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word donkey is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word donkey is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืœื—ืกื™ืžื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the prohibition against muzzling an animal, mentioned in the verse: โ€œYou shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshingโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:4), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืœื›ืœืื™ื ืื™ ื›ืœืื™ื ื“ื—ืจื™ืฉื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืžืฉื‘ืช

With regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, if it is referring to the prohibition against using diverse kinds for plowing, due to which it is forbidden to plow with an ox and a donkey together (see Deuteronomy 22:10), derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of plowing with diverse kinds, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ืื™ ื›ืœืื™ื ื“ื”ืจื‘ืขื” ื™ืœื™ืฃ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืžืฉื‘ืช

If it is referring to the prohibition of diverse kinds for crossbreeding, derive it from a verbal analogy from the context of Shabbat, as the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10), and that verse is clearly referring to any animal.

ื•ื’ื‘ื™ ืฉื‘ืช ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื ืืžืจ ืขื‘ื“ืš ื•ืืžืชืš ื•ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื•ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ื ืืžืจ ื•ืฉื•ืจืš ื•ื—ืžืจืš ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื•ื”ืœื ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื”ื™ื• ื•ืœืžื” ื™ืฆืื• ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืš ืžื” ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ืืžื•ืจ ื›ืืŸ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื—ื™ื” ื•ืขื•ืฃ ื›ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive concerning Shabbat itself that the words โ€œoxโ€ and โ€œdonkeyโ€ are referring to all types of animals? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In the first version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: โ€œYour manservant, your maidservant, nor your cattleโ€ (Exodus 20:10), whereas in the second version of the Ten Commandments it is stated: โ€œNor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your cattleโ€ (Deuteronomy 5:14). Now, arenโ€™t an ox and a donkey already included in the category of: All animals, which are included in the term โ€œcattleโ€? Why, then, were they specified? To teach you that just as with regard to the terms ox and donkey that are stated here, undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them, so too, everywhere that an ox and donkey are mentioned, all types of undomesticated animals and birds have the same halakha as them.

ืื™ืžื ื‘ื”ืžื” ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื›ืœืœ ืฉื•ืจืš ื•ื—ืžืจืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ืคืจื˜ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืืœื ืžื” ืฉื‘ืคืจื˜ ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืžื™ื“ื™ ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืœื

The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verses be expounded as follows: The term โ€œcattleโ€ used in the first version of the Ten Commandments is a generalization, and the phrase โ€œyour ox and your donkeyโ€ used in the latter version of the Ten Commandments is a detail. In the case of a generalization and a detail, the principles of halakhic exegesis dictate that the generalization includes only what is specified in the detail. Therefore, with regard to this subject, an ox and a donkey should indeed be included, but anything else should not be included.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื

The Sages said in reply: In the phrase โ€œnor any of your cattleโ€ stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments following the phrase โ€œyour ox and your donkey,โ€ it then generalized again. Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as animals, so too, all items included in the general term must be animals.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื• ืžื˜ืžื ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื ื‘ืœืชื• ืžื˜ืžื ื‘ืžื’ืข ื•ื‘ืžืฉื ืื‘ืœ ืขื•ืคื•ืช ืœื

The Gemara challenges the answer: But say instead that just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as an item, i.e., an animal, whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying, so too, all items whose carcass renders a person ritually impure through contact or through carrying should be included. But birds, whose carcasses do not render one impure through contact or through carrying, should not be included.

ืืžืจื™ ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ืคืจื˜ื ื”ื™ ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืฉื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืงืจื‘ ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ืžื•ืจ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืœื ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืฉื•ืจ

The Sages said in reply: If so, let the Merciful One write only one detail from which this could be derived. The Gemara asks: Which detail should the Merciful One write? If the Merciful One writes only an ox, I would say: An animal that is sacrificed on the altar, such as an ox, indeed renders the owner of the pit liable, whereas an animal that is not sacrificed on the altar does not render him liable. And if the Merciful One writes only a donkey, I would say: An animal whose firstborn is sanctified, such as a donkey, as described in the Torah (Exodus 13:13), does indeed render him liable, but an animal whose firstborn is not sanctified does not render him liable. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both an ox and a donkey.

ืืœื ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื

Consequently, there is no redundancy, and each detail is required for correctly deriving other halakhot. If so, the previous question resurfaces: Why are the verses not expounded such that the prohibition does not include birds? Rather, the term: โ€œNor any [vekhol] of your cattle,โ€ should be understood as an amplification, encompassing any item that is even partially similar to the detail.

ื•ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื ื’ื‘ื™ ืžืขืฉืจ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื•ืงื ื“ืจืฉื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜

The Gemara asks: But is it the case that anywhere that the Merciful One states the word โ€œany [kol]โ€ it is intended as an amplification? But concerning tithes, where it is written โ€œany [kol],โ€ and yet we expound the verses with the method of a generalization and a detail, rather than using the method of amplification and restriction.

ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืชืชื” ื”ื›ืกืฃ ื‘ื›ืœ ืืฉืจ ืชืื•ื” ื ืคืฉืš ื›ืœืœ ื‘ื‘ืงืจ ื•ื‘ืฆืืŸ ื•ื‘ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื‘ืฉื›ืจ ืคืจื˜ ื•ื‘ื›ืœ ืืฉืจ ืชืฉืืœืš ื ืคืฉืš ื—ื–ืจ ื•ื›ืœืœ

This is as it is taught in a baraita concerning second-tithe money brought to Jerusalem: The verse states: โ€œAnd you shall give the money for anything [bekhol] your soul desiresโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:26), which is a generalization, followed by: โ€œFor oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink,โ€ which is a detail, and concludes with: โ€œOr for anything [uvkhol] your soul asks of you,โ€ where it then generalized again.

ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ื•ื›ืœืœ ืื™ ืืชื” ื“ืŸ ืืœื ื›ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžื” ื”ืคืจื˜ ืžืคื•ืจืฉ ืคืจื™ ืžืคืจื™ ื•ื’ื™ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืคืจื™ ืžืคืจื™ ื•ื’ื™ื“ื•ืœื™ ืงืจืงืข

Therefore, the verse is structured as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization. According to the principles of halakhic exegesis, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Consequently, just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as produce of produce, i.e., they grow from a parent organism, such as agricultural produce or animals, and they are grown from the ground, i.e., their sustenance comes from the ground, so too, it includes all things that are the produce of produce and are grown from the ground. It is evident from here that the method of a generalization and a detail is used in connection with the term โ€œkol,โ€ as opposed to interpreting it as an amplification.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื›ืœ ื›ืœืœื ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ื›ืœ ื ืžื™ ื›ืœืœื ื”ื•ื ืžื™ื”ื• ื”ืื™ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื›ื ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ืžื“ื”ื•ื” ืœื™ื” ืœืžื›ืชื‘ ื•ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื›ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื•ื›ืชื‘ ื•ื›ืœ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื

The Sages said in response: A distinction may be drawn between the term: โ€œFor anything [bekhol],โ€ which is a generalization, and the term โ€œany [kol],โ€ as in: โ€œAny of your cattle,โ€ which is an amplification. And if you wish, say instead that the word โ€œany [kol]โ€ is a generalization as well, in addition to โ€œfor anything [bekhol].โ€ But this word โ€œany,โ€ written here, is an amplification. This is the case since it could have written: And your cattle, as it is written in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and instead it writes: โ€œNor any of your cattle.โ€ Learn from this that it is an amplification and encompasses other animals as well.

ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ื›ืœ ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืฉื•ืจ ื•ื—ืžื•ืจ ื“ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ืœืžื” ืœื™

The Gemara continues to analyze this matter: Now that you have said that the term โ€œany [kol]โ€ is an amplification, why do I need the words โ€œyour cattle,โ€ stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, and the terms โ€œan ox or a donkey,โ€ stated in the latter version of the Ten Commandments? The phrase โ€œand any of your cattleโ€ already includes any animal.

ืืžืจื™ ืฉื•ืจ ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื•ืจ ืœื—ืกื™ืžื”

The Sages said in response: Each of these terms is required. The term โ€œoxโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition against muzzling, as the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of muzzling, and the word โ€œoxโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat.

ื—ืžื•ืจ ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ื—ืžื•ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ ืœืคืจื™ืงื”

The term โ€œdonkeyโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the halakha of unloading a burden, as the word โ€œdonkeyโ€ is employed in the context of unloading a burden (see Exodus 23:5), and the word โ€œdonkeyโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Deuteronomy 5:14).

ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœืื’ืžื•ืจื™ ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ื‘ื”ืžืชืš ืœื›ืœืื™ื

The term โ€œyour cattleโ€ can be used to derive the halakha with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, as the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of crossbreeding animals (see Leviticus 19:19), and the term โ€œyour cattleโ€ is employed in the context of the prohibition against having oneโ€™s animal perform labor on Shabbat (see Exodus 20:10).

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ืื“ื ืœื™ืชืกืจ ืืœืžื” ืชื ืŸ ืื“ื ืžื•ืชืจ ืขื ื›ื•ืœืŸ ืœื—ืจื•ืฉ ื•ืœืžืฉื•ืš

The Gemara asks: If so, that this redundancy is the source for extending the prohibition of diverse kinds, then it should be prohibited even for a person to plow together with an ox or another animal. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Kilayim 8:6): It is permitted for a person to plow and pull with any of them, indicating that the prohibition relates only to animals?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืคืคื•ื ืื™ ื™ื“ืขื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืžื™ืœืชื ื•ืžื ื• ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืžืขืŸ ื™ื ื•ื— ืขื‘ื“ืš ื•ืืžืชืš ื›ืžื•ืš ืœื”ื ื—ื” ื”ืงืฉืชื™ื• ื•ืœื ืœื“ื‘ืจ ืื—ืจ

Rav Pappa said: The Sages of Paphunya know the reason for this matter, and who are these Sages? Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov, who resided in Paphunya. The reason is that the verse states: โ€œYou shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your ox, your donkey, any of your animals, or the stranger residing within your city gates, that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as youโ€ (Deuteronomy 5:14), as if to say: I have equated people with animals only concerning resting on Shabbat, but not with regard to another matter.

ืฉืืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืŸ ืขื’ื™ืœ ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืžืคื ื™ ืžื” ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœื ื ืืžืจ ื‘ื”ื ื˜ื•ื‘ ื•ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช

Having discussed some differences between the two versions of the Ten Commandments, the Gemara now discuses a related matter: Rabbi แธคanina ben Agil asked Rabbi แธคiyya bar Abba: For what reason is the word good not stated in the first version of the Ten Commandments, whereas in the latter version of the Ten Commandments,

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