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Today's Daf Yomi

June 6, 2016 | 讻状讟 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 6

Study Guide Bava Kamma 6. The gemara assumes that when the mishna mentions the common denominator between all 4 categories of damages, it must be to include an additional case that we wouldn’t have been able to learn from a particular category. 聽There are 4 cases brought that are each unique and needed to be learned from the common denominator and couldn’t be derived from one individual category. 聽Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael have a debate about what it means to pay from the best of your land – from the best of the one you damaged or the best of the one who caused the damage. 聽These opinions are explained in the gemara as well as their derivations.


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诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬讞讻讛 谞讬专讜 讜住讻住讻讛 讗讘谞讬讜

The Gemara answers: It serves to add cases where the fire scorched another鈥檚 plowed field and cases in which it singed his stones. Even though the damaged object remains intact and is not consumed by the fire, one is still liable to pay for the damage caused.

讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗讘谞讜 住讻讬谞讜 讜诪砖讗讜 砖讛谞讬讞谉 讘专讗砖 讙讙讜 讜谞驻诇讜 讘专讜讞 诪爪讜讬讛 讜讛讝讬拽讜

搂 The mishna teaches: The common denominator of the components in all these categories is that it is their typical manner to cause damage. The Gemara asks: In order to add what halakha is this statement cited in the mishna? Abaye said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add that one is liable in a case of his stone, his knife, or his load, where he placed them on top of his roof, and they fell off the roof by means of a common wind and caused damage.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讘讛讚讬 讚拽讗 讗讝诇讬 拽讗 诪讝拽讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讗砖

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one would be liable for the damage that was caused? If it is a case where those items cause damage as they are moving through the air propelled by the wind, that is a subcategory of Fire.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗砖 讚讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讜 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讛谉 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: If so, what is different about Fire that defines it as a unique category? It is that another force is involved with it in causing damage, as it is the wind that causes the fire to spread and cause damage; and the entity propelled by the wind is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. In these cases, too, another force is involved with them in causing damage; and the objects are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the common denominator in the mishna to teach the case of an object that causes damage when propelled off a roof by the wind. That case is included in the primary category of Fire that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讜讗诇讗 讘转专 讚谞讬讬讞讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable when after those objects fall from the roof they come to rest on the ground, and they cause damage as an obstacle on which a person or an animal stumbles. The mishna teaches that the one who placed them on the roof is liable. The Gemara questions this explanation: What are the circumstances in which one is liable? If it is a case where one declared them ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: What is different about Pit that defines it as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to these items he had placed on the roof, too, their initial formation, i.e., when they are placed in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the common denominator in the mishna to teach the case where the objects fell from the roof, came to rest in the public domain, and were declared ownerless. That case is included in the primary category of Pit that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where one did not declare them ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable to pay for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit; this is a subcategory of Pit. The question remains: What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讜 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讜 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讛谉

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the objects ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, those objects are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that there is no other force involved with it in causing the damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where there is another force involved with it in causing the damage, i.e., the wind that propelled them from the roof to rest on the ground?

讗砖 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Pit in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Fire will prove that this factor, that there is another force involved with the object in causing the damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as although there is another force involved in the spreading of a fire, one is liable for the damage the fire causes, so the halakha with regard to these objects can be derived from that of Fire.

诪讛 诇讗砖 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Fire: What is notable about Fire? It is notable in that its typical manner is to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. Will you say the same with regard to these objects propelled by the wind into the public domain, where it is not their typical manner to proceed and cause damage? Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from that of Fire?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Fire in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of a typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt the owner of the objects from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Fire each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Fire. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘讜专 讛诪转讙诇讙诇 讘专讙诇讬 讗讚诐 讜讘专讙诇讬 讘讛诪讛

Rava said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable in a case of Pit where an object is rolled by the feet of a person or the hooves of an animal. This is a case where one placed an obstacle in a public domain and the obstacle caused no damage where it was placed, but subsequently was kicked by passersby to a different location where it caused damage.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one is liable for damage in that case? If it is a case where one declared the objects ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel this is a subcategory of Pit.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: What is different about Pit that it is defined as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to these objects, too, their initial formation, i.e., when the obstacle reaches the in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the mishna to state their common denominator to teach the halakha in the case where the objects came to rest and are declared ownerless. That case is included in the primary category of Pit that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where one did not declare the objects ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit. What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讗讬谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the objects ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, those objects are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that one鈥檚 actions, the digging of the pit, cause the damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where one鈥檚 actions do not cause damage? Rather, it is the feet of the passersby that caused the damage, by rolling the object to a different location where it caused damage.

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Pit in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Ox will prove that this fact, that one鈥檚 actions do not cause the damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as although the owner鈥檚 actions do not cause the ox to cause damage, one is liable for the damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the obstacle kicked by passersby to a different location where it caused damage, it is not its typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from the primary category of Ox? The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Pit will prove that this fact, that the typical manner of a category鈥檚 components is not to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit.

讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛

The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each proves that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing one鈥檚 liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, which is that the defining characteristic of this primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of that category of Pit, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 讗诇讜 砖讗诪专讜 驻讜转拽讬谉 讘讬讘讜转讬讛谉 讜讙讜专驻讬谉 诪注专讜转讬讛谉 讘讬诪讜转 讛讞诪讛 讗讬谉 诇讛诐 专砖讜转 讘讬诪讜转 讛讙砖诪讬诐 讬砖 诇讛诐 专砖讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讘专砖讜转 讗诐 讛讝讬拽讜 讞讬讬讘讬诐 诇砖诇诐

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable to pay damages in this case that is taught in a baraita: With regard to all those people who engage in activities that the Sages stated are permitted, i.e., those who open their gutters and drain the sewage from their houses into the public domain, and those who flush out the water from their caves, where foul-smelling water was stored, into the public domain, during the summer they do not have permission to do so, while during the rainy season they have permission to do so, since the street is rained upon in any event and thereby washed. And although all these people perform their actions with permission, if they cause damage they are liable to pay for it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讘讛讚讬 讚拽讗讝诇讬 诪讝拽讬 讻讞讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one is liable for damage caused by the sewage? If the sewage causes damage as it is moving, after he poured it into the public domain, it is damage caused by his own direct action, and it is no different from any other damage caused by a person. According to Rav, it is under the rubric of Maveh in the mishna. According Shmuel it appears in the next mishna, and it is not derived from the common denominator mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讘转专 讚谞讬讬讞 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 讚转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Rather, it is in a case where the damage was caused after the sewage came to rest on the floor, e.g., a passerby slipped on it. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where one declared the sewage ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit. What is different about Pit that it is defined as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to this sewage, too, its initial formation, i.e., the placement of the sewage in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where he did not declare the sewage ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit. The question remains: What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 讚讘专砖讜转

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where he declared the sewage ownerless, and even if he declared it ownerless, it is not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that the pit was dug in the public domain without permission. Will you say the same with regard to these cases where the sewage was channeled into the public domain with permission?

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Ox will prove that this fact, that the ox, i.e., the cause of the damage, entered the public domain with permission, is not a reason to exempt its owner from payment, as that is the nature of the primary category of Ox, and one is liable for damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the sewage, it is not its typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from the primary category of Ox?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Ox in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of the typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转诇 讜讛讗讬诇谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讛讝讬拽讜 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐 谞转谞讜 诇讜 讝诪谉 诇拽讜抓 讗转 讛讗讬诇谉 讜诇住转讜专 讗转 讛讻讜转诇 讜谞驻诇讜 讘转讜讱 讛讝诪谉 讜讛讝讬拽讜 驻讟讜专 诇讗讞专 讛讝诪谉 讞讬讬讘

Ravina said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable to pay damages in this case that we learned in a mishna (117b): In the case of a wall or a tree that fell on its own into the public domain and caused damage, the owner of the wall or tree is exempt from paying damages because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. But if the court had sensed the potential danger and had allotted him a certain amount of time during which he was obligated to chop down the tree or to demolish the wall, and he had not yet done so, and the wall or tree fell into the public domain within the allotted time and caused damage, he is exempt from paying damages. If he did not do so and it fell after the allotted time expired, he is liable to pay the damages.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讛 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 讚讛讝讬拽讜 诪爪讜讬 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讛讝讬拽谉 诪爪讜讬 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where one declared the fallen tree or wall ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit. What is different about the primary category of Pit that it is defined as a unique category? What is different is that its damage is commonplace, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. In these cases involving the tree and the wall, too, their damage is commonplace, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you.

讗讬 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

If it is a case where one did not declare them ownerless, according to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that he places in the public domain whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit.

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讗讬谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the tree or wall ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, they are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where their initial formation, i.e., the planting of the tree and the building of the wall, is not done in a manner that can result in damage?

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Ox will prove that this factor, of not being initially formed in a manner that can result in damage, is not a reason to exempt its owner from payment, as that is the nature of the primary category of Ox, i.e., an ox is not born in a manner that results in damage, and one is liable for damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the tree and wall, it is not their typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in these cases from the primary category of Ox?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Ox in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of the typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in the cases of the tree and the wall is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

讻砖讛讝讬拽 讞讘 讛诪讝讬拽 讞讘 讛诪讝讬拽 讞讬讬讘 讛诪讝讬拽 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讬专讜砖诇诪讬 讛讜讗 讚转谞讬 诇讬砖谞讗 拽诇讬诇讗

搂 The mishna states: And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated [岣v] to pay restitution with best-quality land. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna of the mishna use the unusual expression: The one liable for the damage is 岣v to pay? He should have used the more standard expression for liability: The one liable for the damage is 岣yyav to pay. The Gemara explains: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This tanna is a Jerusalemite, who teaches using a light and concise formulation, as 岣v is more concise than 岣yyav.

诇砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 讬砖诇诐 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 砖诇 谞讬讝拽 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 砖诇 谞讬讝拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

搂 The mishna continues: The owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated to pay restitution for damage with best-quality land. The one liable for the damage is indebted to pay payments of restitution for damage with his superior-quality land. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to paying damages: 鈥淥f the best of his field, and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:4). What is the meaning of 鈥渉is field鈥 and 鈥渉is vineyard鈥? It refers to that property of the injured party; the one liable for the damage pays from land of a quality that is commensurate to the best-quality field of the injured party and to the best-quality vineyard of the injured party, even if the property he damaged was of a lesser quality; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 讗诇讗 诇讙讘讜转 诇谞讝拽讬谉 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖

Rabbi Akiva says that the verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one liable for the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury of consecrated property collects from superior-quality land.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讻诇 砖诪讬谞讛 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 讻讞讜砖讛 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, if one鈥檚 animal ate from a rich garden bed, it is understandable that he must pay the injured party the value of a rich garden bed. But if it ate from a poor garden bed, is it reasonable that he pays the value of a rich garden bed? While this is the straightforward meaning of his statement, it is untenable, as he would be paying more than the value of the damage he caused.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 注专讜讙讛 讘讬谉 讛注专讜讙讜转 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 讗讬 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 讚诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛

Rav Idi bar Avin said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the animal that caused the damage ate from one garden bed among other garden beds, and we do not know whether it ate from a poor one or it ate from a rich one. In such a case, the halakha is that the animal鈥檚 owner pays the injured party the value of a rich one.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪讛 讗讬诇讜 讬讚注讬谞谉 讚讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讗诇讗 讻讞讜砖讛 讛砖转讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 讗讬 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

Rava raised a question and said: And if we would know that the animal ate from a poor garden bed, its owner would have to pay only the value of a poor garden bed. Now that we do not know whether it ate from a poor garden bed or if it ate from a rich garden bed, is it reasonable that he should have to pay the value of a rich garden bed? There is a general principle governing monetary disputes that the burden of proof falls on the claimant. Therefore, so long as the injured party cannot prove that the animal ate from the rich garden bed, he should not be entitled to collect the value of such a garden bed.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讻讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽

Rather, Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where, after appraising the damage, the court comes to collect from the one liable for the damage, but he does not have money available to pay for the damage. And the tanna鈥檌m disagree in a case where the superior-quality land [iddit], i.e., the best land, of the injured party is equal in quality to the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage, and the one liable for the damage also has land of superior quality.

讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 住讘专 讘讚谞讬讝拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讘讚诪讝讬拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉

And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yishmael holds: We appraise the value of the land of the injured party, and therefore the one liable for the damage can pay with his inferior-quality fields, which are equal in quality to the best fields owned by the injured party. And Rabbi Akiva holds: We appraise the value of the land of the one liable for the damage and have him pay with his fields of superior quality.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞讗诪专 砖讚讛 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专 砖讚讛 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 砖讚讛 讛讗诪讜专 诇诪注诇讛 讚谞讬讝拽 讗祝 砖讚讛 讛讗诪讜专 诇诪讟讛 讚谞讬讝拽

The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael? The word 鈥渇ield鈥 is stated below, toward the end of the verse: 鈥淥f the best of his field, and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:4). And the word 鈥渇ield鈥 is also stated above, at the beginning of that same verse: 鈥淚f a man causes a field or vineyard to be eaten, and he sends forth his animal, and it consumed in the field of another.鈥 Just as the field which is stated above belongs to the injured party, so too the field stated below belongs to the injured party.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 讬砖诇诐 讚讛讗讬讱 讚拽讗 诪砖诇诐

And Rabbi Akiva holds: When the verse says: 鈥淥f the best of his field and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay,鈥 it means from the best of the one who is paying, i.e., from the best fields belonging to the one liable for the damage.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讛谞讬 讙讝专讛 砖讜讛 讜讗讛谞讬 拽专讗 讗讛谞讬 讙讝专讛 砖讜讛 讻讚拽讗诪讬谞讗

And how would Rabbi Yishmael respond to this? The verbal analogy between the two instances of the word 鈥渇ield鈥 is effective, and the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective. The verbal analogy is effective, as I stated. It serves to teach that when it says that he pays from the best of his field, it means from land equal in quality to the best field owned by the injured party.

讗讛谞讬 拽专讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诪讝讬拽 注讬讚讬转 讜讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜注讬讚讬转 诇谞讬讝拽 讜讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽 诇讗 砖讜讬讗 讻注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讚诪砖诇诐 诇讬讛 诪诪讬讟讘 讚讬讚讬讛

And the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective, as it serves to teach a different halakha, in a case where the one liable for the damage has superior-quality land and inferior-quality land, and the injured party has inferior-quality land, and the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage is not as good as the superior-quality land of the injured party. In this case, the halakha is that the one liable for the damage pays the injured party from his best land, i.e., from the superior-quality land that he owns.

讚诇讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转讗 讗转 讙讘讬 诪讝讬讘讜专讬转 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 诪诪讬讟讘

This is as the one liable for the damage is legally unable to say to him: You should come and collect from my inferior-quality land. He cannot say this because the standard for classifying land as being of superior-quality is set according to the injured party鈥檚 superior-quality land, and the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage is of a lower quality than that. Rather, the injured party collects his damages from the best-quality land of the one liable for the damage.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 讗诇讗 诇讙讘讜转 诇谞讬讝拽讬谉 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖 诪讗讬 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖

搂 The baraita cited above teaches: Rabbi Akiva says that the verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one liable for the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury of consecrated property collects from superior-quality land. The Gemara asks: What is the a fortiori inference from ordinary damage to damage involving the consecrated property? To which case does this refer?

讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚谞讙讞 转讜专讗 讚讬讚谉 诇转讜专讗 讚讛拽讚砖 砖讜专 专注讛讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 砖讜专 砖诇 讛拽讚砖

If we say that our ox, i.e., an ox belonging to a Jew, gored an ox that is consecrated property, there is a difficulty, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd if one man鈥檚 ox hurts the ox of another鈥 (Exodus 21:35). This teaches that the halakha applies only if the ox hurt an ox belonging to another Jew, but not if it hurt an ox that is consecrated property. In the latter case no damages are collected.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 诪谞讛 诇讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 讚讗转讬 讙讝讘专 讜砖拽讬诇 诪注讬讚讬转

Rather, we say that the a fortiori inference is referring not to a case of damage but to one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to donate one hundred dinars for Temple maintenance. And the inference teaches that if the one who took the vow has no money, then the Temple treasurer comes and collects the hundred dinars from his superior-quality land.

诇讗 讬讛讗 讗诇讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘

The Gemara challenges this understanding: The Temple treasurer should not be treated any better than an ordinary creditor,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 6

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 6

诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬讞讻讛 谞讬专讜 讜住讻住讻讛 讗讘谞讬讜

The Gemara answers: It serves to add cases where the fire scorched another鈥檚 plowed field and cases in which it singed his stones. Even though the damaged object remains intact and is not consumed by the fire, one is still liable to pay for the damage caused.

讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗讘谞讜 住讻讬谞讜 讜诪砖讗讜 砖讛谞讬讞谉 讘专讗砖 讙讙讜 讜谞驻诇讜 讘专讜讞 诪爪讜讬讛 讜讛讝讬拽讜

搂 The mishna teaches: The common denominator of the components in all these categories is that it is their typical manner to cause damage. The Gemara asks: In order to add what halakha is this statement cited in the mishna? Abaye said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add that one is liable in a case of his stone, his knife, or his load, where he placed them on top of his roof, and they fell off the roof by means of a common wind and caused damage.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讘讛讚讬 讚拽讗 讗讝诇讬 拽讗 诪讝拽讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讗砖

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one would be liable for the damage that was caused? If it is a case where those items cause damage as they are moving through the air propelled by the wind, that is a subcategory of Fire.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗砖 讚讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讜 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讛谉 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: If so, what is different about Fire that defines it as a unique category? It is that another force is involved with it in causing damage, as it is the wind that causes the fire to spread and cause damage; and the entity propelled by the wind is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. In these cases, too, another force is involved with them in causing damage; and the objects are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the common denominator in the mishna to teach the case of an object that causes damage when propelled off a roof by the wind. That case is included in the primary category of Fire that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讜讗诇讗 讘转专 讚谞讬讬讞讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable when after those objects fall from the roof they come to rest on the ground, and they cause damage as an obstacle on which a person or an animal stumbles. The mishna teaches that the one who placed them on the roof is liable. The Gemara questions this explanation: What are the circumstances in which one is liable? If it is a case where one declared them ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: What is different about Pit that defines it as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to these items he had placed on the roof, too, their initial formation, i.e., when they are placed in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the common denominator in the mishna to teach the case where the objects fell from the roof, came to rest in the public domain, and were declared ownerless. That case is included in the primary category of Pit that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where one did not declare them ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable to pay for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit; this is a subcategory of Pit. The question remains: What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讜 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讜 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讻讞 讗讞专 诪注讜专讘 讘讛谉

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the objects ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, those objects are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that there is no other force involved with it in causing the damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where there is another force involved with it in causing the damage, i.e., the wind that propelled them from the roof to rest on the ground?

讗砖 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Pit in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Fire will prove that this factor, that there is another force involved with the object in causing the damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as although there is another force involved in the spreading of a fire, one is liable for the damage the fire causes, so the halakha with regard to these objects can be derived from that of Fire.

诪讛 诇讗砖 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Fire: What is notable about Fire? It is notable in that its typical manner is to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. Will you say the same with regard to these objects propelled by the wind into the public domain, where it is not their typical manner to proceed and cause damage? Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from that of Fire?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Fire in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of a typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt the owner of the objects from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Fire each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Fire. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘讜专 讛诪转讙诇讙诇 讘专讙诇讬 讗讚诐 讜讘专讙诇讬 讘讛诪讛

Rava said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable in a case of Pit where an object is rolled by the feet of a person or the hooves of an animal. This is a case where one placed an obstacle in a public domain and the obstacle caused no damage where it was placed, but subsequently was kicked by passersby to a different location where it caused damage.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one is liable for damage in that case? If it is a case where one declared the objects ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel this is a subcategory of Pit.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Therefore, one could claim: What is different about Pit that it is defined as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to these objects, too, their initial formation, i.e., when the obstacle reaches the in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Perforce, there is no need for the mishna to state their common denominator to teach the halakha in the case where the objects came to rest and are declared ownerless. That case is included in the primary category of Pit that is explicitly mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where one did not declare the objects ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit. What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讗讬谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the objects ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, those objects are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that one鈥檚 actions, the digging of the pit, cause the damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where one鈥檚 actions do not cause damage? Rather, it is the feet of the passersby that caused the damage, by rolling the object to a different location where it caused damage.

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Pit in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Ox will prove that this fact, that one鈥檚 actions do not cause the damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as although the owner鈥檚 actions do not cause the ox to cause damage, one is liable for the damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the obstacle kicked by passersby to a different location where it caused damage, it is not its typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from the primary category of Ox? The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Pit will prove that this fact, that the typical manner of a category鈥檚 components is not to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit.

讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛

The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each proves that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing one鈥檚 liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, which is that the defining characteristic of this primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of that category of Pit, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 讗诇讜 砖讗诪专讜 驻讜转拽讬谉 讘讬讘讜转讬讛谉 讜讙讜专驻讬谉 诪注专讜转讬讛谉 讘讬诪讜转 讛讞诪讛 讗讬谉 诇讛诐 专砖讜转 讘讬诪讜转 讛讙砖诪讬诐 讬砖 诇讛诐 专砖讜转 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讘专砖讜转 讗诐 讛讝讬拽讜 讞讬讬讘讬诐 诇砖诇诐

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable to pay damages in this case that is taught in a baraita: With regard to all those people who engage in activities that the Sages stated are permitted, i.e., those who open their gutters and drain the sewage from their houses into the public domain, and those who flush out the water from their caves, where foul-smelling water was stored, into the public domain, during the summer they do not have permission to do so, while during the rainy season they have permission to do so, since the street is rained upon in any event and thereby washed. And although all these people perform their actions with permission, if they cause damage they are liable to pay for it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讘讛讚讬 讚拽讗讝诇讬 诪讝拽讬 讻讞讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which one is liable for damage caused by the sewage? If the sewage causes damage as it is moving, after he poured it into the public domain, it is damage caused by his own direct action, and it is no different from any other damage caused by a person. According to Rav, it is under the rubric of Maveh in the mishna. According Shmuel it appears in the next mishna, and it is not derived from the common denominator mentioned in the mishna.

讗诇讗 讘转专 讚谞讬讬讞 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 讚转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽 讜诪诪讜谞讱 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

Rather, it is in a case where the damage was caused after the sewage came to rest on the floor, e.g., a passerby slipped on it. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where one declared the sewage ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit. What is different about Pit that it is defined as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. With regard to this sewage, too, its initial formation, i.e., the placement of the sewage in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you.

讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

Rather, perhaps the common denominator serves to teach the halakha that one is liable even in a case where he did not declare the sewage ownerless. The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that one places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit. The question remains: What halakha does the common denominator in the mishna teach?

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 讚讘专砖讜转

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where he declared the sewage ownerless, and even if he declared it ownerless, it is not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that the pit was dug in the public domain without permission. Will you say the same with regard to these cases where the sewage was channeled into the public domain with permission?

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Ox will prove that this fact, that the ox, i.e., the cause of the damage, entered the public domain with permission, is not a reason to exempt its owner from payment, as that is the nature of the primary category of Ox, and one is liable for damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the sewage, it is not its typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in this case from the primary category of Ox?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Ox in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of the typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in these cases is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转诇 讜讛讗讬诇谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讛讝讬拽讜 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐 谞转谞讜 诇讜 讝诪谉 诇拽讜抓 讗转 讛讗讬诇谉 讜诇住转讜专 讗转 讛讻讜转诇 讜谞驻诇讜 讘转讜讱 讛讝诪谉 讜讛讝讬拽讜 驻讟讜专 诇讗讞专 讛讝诪谉 讞讬讬讘

Ravina said: The stating of the common denominator in the mishna serves to add the halakha that one is liable to pay damages in this case that we learned in a mishna (117b): In the case of a wall or a tree that fell on its own into the public domain and caused damage, the owner of the wall or tree is exempt from paying damages because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. But if the court had sensed the potential danger and had allotted him a certain amount of time during which he was obligated to chop down the tree or to demolish the wall, and he had not yet done so, and the wall or tree fell into the public domain within the allotted time and caused damage, he is exempt from paying damages. If he did not do so and it fell after the allotted time expired, he is liable to pay the damages.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗驻拽专讛 讘讬谉 诇专讘 讘讬谉 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讘讜专 讚讛讝讬拽讜 诪爪讜讬 讜砖诪讬专转讜 注诇讬讱 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讛讝讬拽谉 诪爪讜讬 讜砖诪讬专转谉 注诇讬讱

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where one declared the fallen tree or wall ownerless, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel, this is a subcategory of Pit. What is different about the primary category of Pit that it is defined as a unique category? What is different is that its damage is commonplace, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. In these cases involving the tree and the wall, too, their damage is commonplace, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you.

讗讬 讚诇讗 讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻讜诇诐 诪讘讜专讜 诇诪讚谞讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讘讜专

If it is a case where one did not declare them ownerless, according to Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that he places in the public domain whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one鈥檚 pit, this is a subcategory of Pit.

诇注讜诇诐 讚讗驻拽专讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 讚诪讬 诇讘讜专 诪讛 诇讘讜专 砖讻谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 转讗诪专 讘讛谞讬 砖讗讬谉 转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转谉 诇谞讝拽

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna teaches one鈥檚 liability in a case where one declared the tree or wall ownerless, and even if he declared them ownerless, they are not similar to the primary category of Pit. What is notable about the primary category of Pit? It is notable in that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage. Will you say the same with regard to these cases, where their initial formation, i.e., the planting of the tree and the building of the wall, is not done in a manner that can result in damage?

砖讜专 讬讜讻讬讞

The Gemara suggests: The primary category of Ox will prove that this factor, of not being initially formed in a manner that can result in damage, is not a reason to exempt its owner from payment, as that is the nature of the primary category of Ox, i.e., an ox is not born in a manner that results in damage, and one is liable for damage caused by his ox.

诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara questions the derivation from Ox: What is notable about Ox? It is notable in that it is the typical manner of the animals in these categories to proceed from one place to another and cause damage. By contrast, in the case of the tree and wall, it is not their typical manner to proceed and cause damage. Accordingly, how can one learn the halakha in these cases from the primary category of Ox?

讘讜专 转讜讻讬讞 讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara suggests: If one attempts to challenge the derivation from Ox in this manner, it is possible to respond: The halakha of the primary category of Pit will prove that the lack of this characteristic, of the typical manner being to proceed and cause damage, is not a reason to exempt one from paying restitution for the damage, as that is the nature of Pit, and one is liable for damage caused by his pit. The Gemara notes: And as Pit and Ox each prove that the defining characteristic of the other is not decisive in establishing liability or exemption, the derivation has reverted to its starting point, and liability in the cases of the tree and the wall is derived from the common denominator of Pit and Ox. This is the halakha added by the common denominator stated in the mishna.

讻砖讛讝讬拽 讞讘 讛诪讝讬拽 讞讘 讛诪讝讬拽 讞讬讬讘 讛诪讝讬拽 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讬专讜砖诇诪讬 讛讜讗 讚转谞讬 诇讬砖谞讗 拽诇讬诇讗

搂 The mishna states: And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated [岣v] to pay restitution with best-quality land. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna of the mishna use the unusual expression: The one liable for the damage is 岣v to pay? He should have used the more standard expression for liability: The one liable for the damage is 岣yyav to pay. The Gemara explains: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This tanna is a Jerusalemite, who teaches using a light and concise formulation, as 岣v is more concise than 岣yyav.

诇砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 讬砖诇诐 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 砖诇 谞讬讝拽 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 砖诇 谞讬讝拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

搂 The mishna continues: The owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated to pay restitution for damage with best-quality land. The one liable for the damage is indebted to pay payments of restitution for damage with his superior-quality land. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to paying damages: 鈥淥f the best of his field, and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:4). What is the meaning of 鈥渉is field鈥 and 鈥渉is vineyard鈥? It refers to that property of the injured party; the one liable for the damage pays from land of a quality that is commensurate to the best-quality field of the injured party and to the best-quality vineyard of the injured party, even if the property he damaged was of a lesser quality; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 讗诇讗 诇讙讘讜转 诇谞讝拽讬谉 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖

Rabbi Akiva says that the verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one liable for the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury of consecrated property collects from superior-quality land.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讻诇 砖诪讬谞讛 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 讻讞讜砖讛 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, if one鈥檚 animal ate from a rich garden bed, it is understandable that he must pay the injured party the value of a rich garden bed. But if it ate from a poor garden bed, is it reasonable that he pays the value of a rich garden bed? While this is the straightforward meaning of his statement, it is untenable, as he would be paying more than the value of the damage he caused.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 注专讜讙讛 讘讬谉 讛注专讜讙讜转 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 讗讬 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 讚诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛

Rav Idi bar Avin said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the animal that caused the damage ate from one garden bed among other garden beds, and we do not know whether it ate from a poor one or it ate from a rich one. In such a case, the halakha is that the animal鈥檚 owner pays the injured party the value of a rich one.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪讛 讗讬诇讜 讬讚注讬谞谉 讚讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讗诇讗 讻讞讜砖讛 讛砖转讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讻讞讜砖讛 讗讻诇 讗讬 砖诪讬谞讛 讗讻诇 诪砖诇诐 砖诪讬谞讛 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

Rava raised a question and said: And if we would know that the animal ate from a poor garden bed, its owner would have to pay only the value of a poor garden bed. Now that we do not know whether it ate from a poor garden bed or if it ate from a rich garden bed, is it reasonable that he should have to pay the value of a rich garden bed? There is a general principle governing monetary disputes that the burden of proof falls on the claimant. Therefore, so long as the injured party cannot prove that the animal ate from the rich garden bed, he should not be entitled to collect the value of such a garden bed.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讻讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽

Rather, Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where, after appraising the damage, the court comes to collect from the one liable for the damage, but he does not have money available to pay for the damage. And the tanna鈥檌m disagree in a case where the superior-quality land [iddit], i.e., the best land, of the injured party is equal in quality to the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage, and the one liable for the damage also has land of superior quality.

讜讘讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 住讘专 讘讚谞讬讝拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讘讚诪讝讬拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉

And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yishmael holds: We appraise the value of the land of the injured party, and therefore the one liable for the damage can pay with his inferior-quality fields, which are equal in quality to the best fields owned by the injured party. And Rabbi Akiva holds: We appraise the value of the land of the one liable for the damage and have him pay with his fields of superior quality.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞讗诪专 砖讚讛 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专 砖讚讛 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 砖讚讛 讛讗诪讜专 诇诪注诇讛 讚谞讬讝拽 讗祝 砖讚讛 讛讗诪讜专 诇诪讟讛 讚谞讬讝拽

The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael? The word 鈥渇ield鈥 is stated below, toward the end of the verse: 鈥淥f the best of his field, and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:4). And the word 鈥渇ield鈥 is also stated above, at the beginning of that same verse: 鈥淚f a man causes a field or vineyard to be eaten, and he sends forth his animal, and it consumed in the field of another.鈥 Just as the field which is stated above belongs to the injured party, so too the field stated below belongs to the injured party.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讬讟讘 砖讚讛讜 讜诪讬讟讘 讻专诪讜 讬砖诇诐 讚讛讗讬讱 讚拽讗 诪砖诇诐

And Rabbi Akiva holds: When the verse says: 鈥淥f the best of his field and of the best of his vineyard he shall pay,鈥 it means from the best of the one who is paying, i.e., from the best fields belonging to the one liable for the damage.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讛谞讬 讙讝专讛 砖讜讛 讜讗讛谞讬 拽专讗 讗讛谞讬 讙讝专讛 砖讜讛 讻讚拽讗诪讬谞讗

And how would Rabbi Yishmael respond to this? The verbal analogy between the two instances of the word 鈥渇ield鈥 is effective, and the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective. The verbal analogy is effective, as I stated. It serves to teach that when it says that he pays from the best of his field, it means from land equal in quality to the best field owned by the injured party.

讗讛谞讬 拽专讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诪讝讬拽 注讬讚讬转 讜讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜注讬讚讬转 诇谞讬讝拽 讜讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽 诇讗 砖讜讬讗 讻注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讚诪砖诇诐 诇讬讛 诪诪讬讟讘 讚讬讚讬讛

And the straightforward meaning of the verse itself is effective, as it serves to teach a different halakha, in a case where the one liable for the damage has superior-quality land and inferior-quality land, and the injured party has inferior-quality land, and the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage is not as good as the superior-quality land of the injured party. In this case, the halakha is that the one liable for the damage pays the injured party from his best land, i.e., from the superior-quality land that he owns.

讚诇讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转讗 讗转 讙讘讬 诪讝讬讘讜专讬转 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 诪诪讬讟讘

This is as the one liable for the damage is legally unable to say to him: You should come and collect from my inferior-quality land. He cannot say this because the standard for classifying land as being of superior-quality is set according to the injured party鈥檚 superior-quality land, and the inferior-quality land of the one liable for the damage is of a lower quality than that. Rather, the injured party collects his damages from the best-quality land of the one liable for the damage.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讘讗 讛讻转讜讘 讗诇讗 诇讙讘讜转 诇谞讬讝拽讬谉 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖 诪讗讬 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诇讛拽讚砖

搂 The baraita cited above teaches: Rabbi Akiva says that the verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one liable for the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury of consecrated property collects from superior-quality land. The Gemara asks: What is the a fortiori inference from ordinary damage to damage involving the consecrated property? To which case does this refer?

讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚谞讙讞 转讜专讗 讚讬讚谉 诇转讜专讗 讚讛拽讚砖 砖讜专 专注讛讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 砖讜专 砖诇 讛拽讚砖

If we say that our ox, i.e., an ox belonging to a Jew, gored an ox that is consecrated property, there is a difficulty, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd if one man鈥檚 ox hurts the ox of another鈥 (Exodus 21:35). This teaches that the halakha applies only if the ox hurt an ox belonging to another Jew, but not if it hurt an ox that is consecrated property. In the latter case no damages are collected.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 讛专讬 注诇讬 诪谞讛 诇讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 讚讗转讬 讙讝讘专 讜砖拽讬诇 诪注讬讚讬转

Rather, we say that the a fortiori inference is referring not to a case of damage but to one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to donate one hundred dinars for Temple maintenance. And the inference teaches that if the one who took the vow has no money, then the Temple treasurer comes and collects the hundred dinars from his superior-quality land.

诇讗 讬讛讗 讗诇讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘

The Gemara challenges this understanding: The Temple treasurer should not be treated any better than an ordinary creditor,

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