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January 7, 2024 | 讻状讜 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 66

Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family in loving memory of Sgt. Ephraim ben haRav Shmuel v’Liat, HYD, Ephraim Yachman, son of Liat and Sammy, and grandson of our friend and fellow learner Harriet Hartman. “Even as he fought valiantly to defend Am Yisrael and Eretz Yisrael, his sincerity, commitment to Ahavat Yisrael and Torat Yisrael, and devotion to family and friends shone through as they did throughout his life. May Hashem comfort and give strength to his entire family. Yehi zichro baruch.”

Rabbi Il’ah and Rabbi Chanina disagreed about an animal that was stolen while still a calf and at the time of judgment was fully grown – is there a requirement to pay four or five times the animal? However, they both seem to agree that the double payment is assessed by its value at the time of the theft. Rav, however, held that the double payment is assessed based on its value at the time of judgment. How can these two approaches be reconciled? Rabba states that both from the Torah and a Mishna we learn that a thief who changes an item after stealing it, acquires the item and is only required to return the value of the item at the time it was stolen. But Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree regarding yei’ush, if the owner despairs of receiving the stolen item back, does the thief acquire it? Two sources are brought as difficulties against Rabba’s position and one against Rav Yosef’s. All are resolved.

讛诐 讜诇讗 讜诇讚讜转讬讛诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 转专转讬 砖诪注讬转 诪讬谞讛 讛诐 讜诇讗 砖讬谞讜讬讛诐 讛诐 讜诇讗 讜诇讚讜转讬讛诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讛讻转讬讘 讙诐 讙诐 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 拽砖讬讗


鈥渢hese,鈥 comes to teach that this halakha applies only to the animals given as payment to the prostitute but not to their offspring. The Gemara asks: And from where do Beit Hillel derive this halakha? They would say that one should conclude two conclusions from this term: 鈥淭hese鈥 items are disqualified, but not when they are in their changed form, and 鈥渢hese鈥 are disqualified, but not their offspring. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, isn鈥檛 it written 鈥渆ven鈥? Since Beit Hillel reject the halakha that Beit Shammai derive from this term, what do they learn from it? The Gemara states: Indeed, the word 鈥渆ven鈥 is difficult according to the opinion of Beit Hillel.


注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讗讘诇 诇注谞讬谉 砖诇讜诪讬 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讚诪注讬拽专讗 诪砖诇诐 讚拽转谞讬 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讻注讬谉 砖讙谞讘


In any event, they disagree only with regard to this particular issue: One Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that a physical change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it, and one Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that a physical change in a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it. But with regard to the payment of the thief, everyone agrees that he pays according to the initial value of the item, at the time of the theft, as it teaches in the baraita cited above: He pays the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment according to the animal鈥檚 value as of the time when he stole it.


诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 拽专谉 讻注讬谉 砖讙谞讘 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讻砖注转 讛注诪讚讛 讘讚讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讟诇讗讬诐 讻讚诪注讬拽专讗 讚诪讬诐 讻砖诇 注讻砖讬讜


The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that this baraita constitutes a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav? As Rav says: When a thief makes his payments, he pays the principal according to the value as of the time when he stole it, whereas the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment are calculated according to the value at the time of standing trial. Rava said in resolution of this difficulty: If one stole lambs that subsequently became rams or were fattened, he pays the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment according to the initial state of the animal, as claimed by both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. If there was a change in the animal鈥檚 value due to fluctuation of the monetary value of animals, he pays according to the animal鈥檚 worth now, at the time of standing trial.


讗诪专 专讘讛 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讻转讬讘讗 讜转谞讬谞讗 讻转讬讘讗 讜讛砖讬讘 讗转 讛讙讝诇讛 讗砖专 讙讝诇 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗砖专 讙讝诇 讗诐 讻注讬谉 砖讙讝诇 讬讞讝讬专 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讚诪讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬


Rabba said: The principle that a change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it is written in the Torah, and we learned it in a mishna as well. It is written in the Torah: 鈥淭hen it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed鈥 (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states the seemingly superfluous phrase 鈥渢hat he robbed鈥? This serves to teach that if the item is the same as it was when he stole it, he must return the stolen item itself. But if it is not the same as it was then, he is required to pay only money, while the stolen item remains his to keep.


转谞讬谞讗 讛讙讜讝诇 注爪讬诐 讜注砖讗谉 讻诇讬诐 爪诪专 讜注砖讗谉 讘讙讚讬诐 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛


We learned this halakha in a mishna as well, as it is taught (93b): In the case of one who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, he pays the robbery victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, and keeps the altered materials for himself.


讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇讬转谞讜 诇讜 注讚 砖爪讘注讜 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛


Alternatively, another mishna can serve as the source for this principle (岣llin 135a): If one did not manage to give the first of the sheared wool of his sheep to a priest until after he dyed it (see Deuteronomy 18:4), he is exempt from giving it to the priest. This mishna indicates that an item that has undergone a change is no longer considered the same item as it had been. Apparently, a physical change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it.


讬讗讜砖 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讚谞讬拽谞讬 诪讬讛讜 诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讬 讚专讘谞谉


搂 Rabba continues to discuss the ways in which a thief acquires ownership of a stolen item: With regard to the owner鈥檚 despair over ever recovering the stolen item, the Sages say that this too causes the thief to acquire the stolen item. However, we do not know if this halakha applies by Torah law or by rabbinic law.


讗讬 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 诇讗讜 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬讬讗砖 诪专讛 诪讬谞讛 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬转讬 诇讬讚讬讛 拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬讬讗砖 诪专讛 拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇诪讗 拽谞讬


Rabba elaborates on the two possibilities he has just mentioned: If it applies by Torah law, this is just as it is with regard to one who finds a lost item. Is it not the case with regard to one who finds a lost item that once the owner of the item despairs of recovering it, before the item came into the finder鈥檚 possession, the finder acquires it and may keep it for himself? The same principle applies to this thief as well: Once the owner of the item despairs of recovering it, the thief acquires it for himself and need no longer return it. Apparently, then, the despair of the owner causes the thief to acquire the stolen item.


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诇讗讘讬讚讛 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讚讻讬 讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 讘讛转讬专讗 讗转讬讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讘讗讬住讜专讗 讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 诪讚专讘谞谉 讛讜讗


Or perhaps the case of a stolen item is not comparable to the case of a lost item, as it is only with regard to a lost item that the owner鈥檚 despair enables the finder to acquire the item, because the item came into his possession in a permitted manner. But in this case of the thief, since the item came into his possession in a prohibited manner, this case cannot be derived from the halakha of a lost item. If so, the ruling that despair effects acquisition in a case of theft applies not by Torah law but by rabbinic law.


讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 谞讬拽谞讬 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


Why would this halakha have been instituted by rabbinic law? As, the Sages said that a thief should acquire the stolen item in this manner, due to an ordinance instituted for the penitent. To encourage thieves to repent and repay their victims, the Sages instituted that they need not return the stolen item after the owner despairs of recovering it. Rather, they can reimburse the owner for the monetary value of the item.


讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 讬讗讜砖 讗讬谞讜 拽讜谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诪讚专讘谞谉


And Rav Yosef says: Despair on the part of the owner over the possibility of recovering his item does not cause the thief to acquire that item at all, and this is the halakha even by rabbinic law.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇专讘讛 讙讝诇 讞诪抓 讜注讘专 注诇讬讜 讛驻住讞


Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna (96b): If one robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed in the meantime, so that deriving benefit from it is prohibited,


讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱 讜讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讟讗 注讬讚谉 讗讬住讜专讗 讜讚讗讬 诪讬讬讗砖 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讬讗讜砖 拽谞讛 讗诪讗讬 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱 讚诪讬 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬 诇讬讛


the robber may nonetheless return the worthless bread to the owner and say to him: That which is yours is before you, and no compensation is required. Rav Yosef states his objection: But in this case, once the time of the prohibition of leavened bread arrives, the owner certainly despairs of recovering his now-worthless bread. And if it enters your mind to say that the owner鈥檚 despair causes the robber to acquire the stolen item, why can he say to him: That which is yours is before you? He should be required to pay the owner full-fledged money rather than return the worthless food, as the bread now belongs to the robber.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗谞讗 讝讛 诪转讬讬讗砖 讜讝讛 专讜爪讛 诇拽谞讜转 讛讗讬 讝讛 诪转讬讬讗砖 讜讝讛 讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇拽谞讜转


Rava said to him in response: When I say that the thief acquires the stolen item upon the owner鈥檚 despair of recovery it is when this owner despairs, and that thief wants to acquire the item. In this case, this one despairs but that one does not wish to acquire the worthless bread.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讛 拽专讘谞讜 讜诇讗 讛讙讝讜诇 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇驻谞讬 讬讗讜砖 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 驻砖讬讟讗


Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita. The verse: 鈥淚f his offering is a burnt-offering of the herd鈥 (Leviticus 1:3), indicates that one鈥檚 offering must be 鈥渉is offering,鈥 but not an animal stolen from another. What are the circumstances of the case referred to by the baraita? If we say it is dealing with a stolen animal that the robber consecrates and sacrificed before the owner鈥檚 despair of recovery, why do I need a verse to teach this? It is obvious that this is disqualified, as one cannot even consecrate an animal that does not belong to him.


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诇讗讞专 讬讗讜砖 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬讗讜砖 诇讗 拽谞讬


Rather, is it not referring to one who seeks to consecrate and sacrifice a stolen animal after the owner鈥檚 despair? And yet the baraita teaches that the animal cannot be consecrated by the thief. Conclude from the baraita that the owner鈥檚 despair of recovering a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it, as if it belonged to him he would be able to consecrate and sacrifice it.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪砖讻讘讜 讜诇讗 讛讙讝讜诇


Rava said to Abaye in refutation of this proof: And according to your reasoning, consider that which is taught in a baraita: It is written with regard to a zav, a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge: 鈥淎nd whoever touches his bedding shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water and be impure until the evening鈥 (Leviticus 15:5). This indicates that bedding on which a zav lies can become ritually impure and impart impurity only if it is 鈥渉is bedding,鈥 but not if it is stolen bedding.


讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讙讝诇 注诪专讗 讜注讘讚讬讛 诪砖讻讘 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诇讗 拽谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 讚讙讝诇 诪砖讻讘 讚讞讘专讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚讙讝诇 拽专讘谉 讚讞讘专讬讛


What are the circumstances of the case discussed in the baraita? If we say that he robbed another of wool and made it into bedding, is there anyone who says that a physical change that results from an action performed to a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it? Rather, what have you to say? The baraita must be speaking of a case in which the zav robbed another of bedding. So too, the previous baraita is dealing with one who robbed another of an offering, already consecrated. The reason this animal does not atone for the thief is that a consecrated animal cannot be stolen and become the thief鈥檚 property, as it belongs to the Temple treasury wherever it is located.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 注讜专讜转 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from a mishna (Kelim 26:8): With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. Hides and leather are susceptible to contracting impurity only if they are in a finished state. If a private individual uses a piece of hide or leather for a certain purpose, e.g., as a cot or a table top, and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, it is considered a finished product and is susceptible to contracting impurity.


讜砖诇 注讘讚谉 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


But with regard to hides belonging to a leatherworker, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity. Since this individual sells leather to others, when he uses a piece of leather for a household purpose and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, this is not considered a finished state, as he is likely to change his mind and sell the leather to one who will process it further and put it to a different use.


砖诇 讙谞讘 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 砖诇 讙讝诇谉 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


The mishna continues: If the hides are those of a thief, who has stolen them from another, the thief鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. If they are those of a robber his thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity, because he is not considered the owner of the hide. The difference is that unlike the case of a thief, who steals items stealthily, the identity of a robber, who takes the item openly, is known to the owner, and the owner harbors hope of finding the robber and getting the item back. Consequently, he does not despair of recovering his property.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讚讘专讬诐 砖诇 讙讝诇谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 讜砖诇 讙谞讘 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞转讬讬讗砖讜 讛讘注诇讬诐


Rabbi Shimon says that the matters are reversed: In the case of a robber, the robber鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. If the hides are those of a thief, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity, because the owners have not despaired of recovering them and the thief has not acquired the hide. Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 reasoning is that a robber, who seizes items brazenly, is a more difficult criminal to apprehend and bring to justice than a thief.


讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬讗讜砖 拽谞讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬爪注谉


And although the two tanna鈥檌m of the mishna disagree as to which situation involves an owner鈥檚 despair of recovery, whether robbery or theft, in any event one can conclude from this mishna that the despair of the owner causes the thief or robber to acquire the item, as otherwise the perpetrator鈥檚 thoughts about the hide would have no effect on its status with regard to ritual impurity. Rav Yosef said to Abaye in response: With what are we dealing here in this mishna? It is a case where the thief or robber trimmed the leather by cutting it. Although trimming a piece of leather is not a sufficient change to constitute an act of acquisition by itself, it is effective in conjunction with the owner鈥檚 despair.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讞谞谉 讜讛诇讗 注讬爪讘讗 砖谞讜 讻讗谉 讜注讬爪讘讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 拽讬爪讜注


Rabba bar Rav 岣nan objects to this answer: But is it not the case that they taught this mishna here with regard to a leather table top [itzba]? And a leather table top does not require trimming, either due to the fact that its edges are not seen or because it is merely ornamental. Since it does not require trimming, this action should not be considered an act of acquisition at all.


讚转谞谉 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 讞住专讜谉 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转讜 讬砖 讞住专讜谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转讜 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛注讬爪讘讗


As we learned in the previous mishna (Kelim 26:7): Wherever there is no work lacking for an item to be considered finished, one鈥檚 thought renders it susceptible to ritual impurity; when there is still some work lacking for the item to be considered finished, thought does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity, except for the case of a leather table top. Although further work is required to smooth out the edges, one鈥檚 thought can render it susceptible to impurity because people do not care if this leather table top has uneven edges. It is with regard to this case of a table top that the mishna distinguishes between a homeowner and a leatherworker. Therefore, Rav Yosef鈥檚 explanation is rejected.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讬 诪讬诇转讗 拽砖讬 讘讛 专讘讛 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 注砖专讬谉 讜转专转讬谉 砖谞讬谉 讜诇讗 讗讬驻专拽讛 注讚 讚讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专讬砖讗 讜驻专拽讛 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 讻砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬


The Gemara suggests a different answer. Rather, Rava said that this matter was a difficulty posed by Rabba to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved until Rav Yosef sat as the head of the yeshiva and resolved it in the following manner: A change in name of an item, representing a change in status, is similar to a physical change brought about by an action.


砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛转诐 诪注讬拽专讗 注爪讬诐 讛砖转讗 讻诇讬诐 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 谞诪讬 诪注讬拽专讗 拽专讜 诇讬讛 诪砖讻讗 讜讛砖转讗 讗讘专讝讬谉


What is the reason that a physical change through an action causes the thief to acquire the item? It is because there the stolen items were initially just wood, and now they are vessels. The same can be said for a change in name as well: Initially they called it a hide, and now they call it a table top [abrazin].


讜讛专讬 诪专讬砖 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讻砖讜专讗 讜讛砖转讗 讟诇诇讗 讜转谞谉 注诇 讛诪专讬砖 讛讙讝讜诇 砖讘谞讗讜 讘讘讬专讛 砖谞讜讟诇 讚诪讬讜 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


The Gemara asks a question with regard to changes in name: But what about the case of a beam, where there is a change in name, as initially, when it was stolen, it was called a beam, and now, after it has been placed in a building, it is called a joist [telala], and yet we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55a): With regard to a stolen beam that a robber had built into a large building, the court ruled that the owner should receive its value in money rather than demand that the robber demolish the house to return the beam itself, because of an ordinance instituted for the penitent, i.e., to encourage robbers to admit their crime and reimburse the owner of the stolen item.


讟注诪讗 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


This mishna indicates that the only reason the robber does not have to return the beam itself is because of this ordinance instituted for the penitent.


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Bava Kamma 66: Despair

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Bava Kamma 66

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Bava Kamma 66

讛诐 讜诇讗 讜诇讚讜转讬讛诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 转专转讬 砖诪注讬转 诪讬谞讛 讛诐 讜诇讗 砖讬谞讜讬讛诐 讛诐 讜诇讗 讜诇讚讜转讬讛诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讛讻转讬讘 讙诐 讙诐 诇讘讬转 讛诇诇 拽砖讬讗


鈥渢hese,鈥 comes to teach that this halakha applies only to the animals given as payment to the prostitute but not to their offspring. The Gemara asks: And from where do Beit Hillel derive this halakha? They would say that one should conclude two conclusions from this term: 鈥淭hese鈥 items are disqualified, but not when they are in their changed form, and 鈥渢hese鈥 are disqualified, but not their offspring. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, isn鈥檛 it written 鈥渆ven鈥? Since Beit Hillel reject the halakha that Beit Shammai derive from this term, what do they learn from it? The Gemara states: Indeed, the word 鈥渆ven鈥 is difficult according to the opinion of Beit Hillel.


注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讗讘诇 诇注谞讬谉 砖诇讜诪讬 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讚诪注讬拽专讗 诪砖诇诐 讚拽转谞讬 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讻注讬谉 砖讙谞讘


In any event, they disagree only with regard to this particular issue: One Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that a physical change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it, and one Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that a physical change in a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it. But with regard to the payment of the thief, everyone agrees that he pays according to the initial value of the item, at the time of the theft, as it teaches in the baraita cited above: He pays the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment according to the animal鈥檚 value as of the time when he stole it.


诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 拽专谉 讻注讬谉 砖讙谞讘 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜转砖诇讜诪讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讻砖注转 讛注诪讚讛 讘讚讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讟诇讗讬诐 讻讚诪注讬拽专讗 讚诪讬诐 讻砖诇 注讻砖讬讜


The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that this baraita constitutes a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav? As Rav says: When a thief makes his payments, he pays the principal according to the value as of the time when he stole it, whereas the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment are calculated according to the value at the time of standing trial. Rava said in resolution of this difficulty: If one stole lambs that subsequently became rams or were fattened, he pays the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment according to the initial state of the animal, as claimed by both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. If there was a change in the animal鈥檚 value due to fluctuation of the monetary value of animals, he pays according to the animal鈥檚 worth now, at the time of standing trial.


讗诪专 专讘讛 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讻转讬讘讗 讜转谞讬谞讗 讻转讬讘讗 讜讛砖讬讘 讗转 讛讙讝诇讛 讗砖专 讙讝诇 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗砖专 讙讝诇 讗诐 讻注讬谉 砖讙讝诇 讬讞讝讬专 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讚诪讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬


Rabba said: The principle that a change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it is written in the Torah, and we learned it in a mishna as well. It is written in the Torah: 鈥淭hen it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed鈥 (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states the seemingly superfluous phrase 鈥渢hat he robbed鈥? This serves to teach that if the item is the same as it was when he stole it, he must return the stolen item itself. But if it is not the same as it was then, he is required to pay only money, while the stolen item remains his to keep.


转谞讬谞讗 讛讙讜讝诇 注爪讬诐 讜注砖讗谉 讻诇讬诐 爪诪专 讜注砖讗谉 讘讙讚讬诐 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛


We learned this halakha in a mishna as well, as it is taught (93b): In the case of one who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, he pays the robbery victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, and keeps the altered materials for himself.


讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇讬转谞讜 诇讜 注讚 砖爪讘注讜 驻讟讜专 讗诇诪讗 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛


Alternatively, another mishna can serve as the source for this principle (岣llin 135a): If one did not manage to give the first of the sheared wool of his sheep to a priest until after he dyed it (see Deuteronomy 18:4), he is exempt from giving it to the priest. This mishna indicates that an item that has undergone a change is no longer considered the same item as it had been. Apparently, a physical change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it.


讬讗讜砖 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讚谞讬拽谞讬 诪讬讛讜 诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 讗讬 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讬 讚专讘谞谉


搂 Rabba continues to discuss the ways in which a thief acquires ownership of a stolen item: With regard to the owner鈥檚 despair over ever recovering the stolen item, the Sages say that this too causes the thief to acquire the stolen item. However, we do not know if this halakha applies by Torah law or by rabbinic law.


讗讬 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 诇讗讜 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬讬讗砖 诪专讛 诪讬谞讛 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬转讬 诇讬讚讬讛 拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬讬讗砖 诪专讛 拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇诪讗 拽谞讬


Rabba elaborates on the two possibilities he has just mentioned: If it applies by Torah law, this is just as it is with regard to one who finds a lost item. Is it not the case with regard to one who finds a lost item that once the owner of the item despairs of recovering it, before the item came into the finder鈥檚 possession, the finder acquires it and may keep it for himself? The same principle applies to this thief as well: Once the owner of the item despairs of recovering it, the thief acquires it for himself and need no longer return it. Apparently, then, the despair of the owner causes the thief to acquire the stolen item.


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 诇讗讘讬讚讛 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讚讻讬 讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 讘讛转讬专讗 讗转讬讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讘讗讬住讜专讗 讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 诪讚专讘谞谉 讛讜讗


Or perhaps the case of a stolen item is not comparable to the case of a lost item, as it is only with regard to a lost item that the owner鈥檚 despair enables the finder to acquire the item, because the item came into his possession in a permitted manner. But in this case of the thief, since the item came into his possession in a prohibited manner, this case cannot be derived from the halakha of a lost item. If so, the ruling that despair effects acquisition in a case of theft applies not by Torah law but by rabbinic law.


讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 谞讬拽谞讬 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


Why would this halakha have been instituted by rabbinic law? As, the Sages said that a thief should acquire the stolen item in this manner, due to an ordinance instituted for the penitent. To encourage thieves to repent and repay their victims, the Sages instituted that they need not return the stolen item after the owner despairs of recovering it. Rather, they can reimburse the owner for the monetary value of the item.


讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 讬讗讜砖 讗讬谞讜 拽讜谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诪讚专讘谞谉


And Rav Yosef says: Despair on the part of the owner over the possibility of recovering his item does not cause the thief to acquire that item at all, and this is the halakha even by rabbinic law.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇专讘讛 讙讝诇 讞诪抓 讜注讘专 注诇讬讜 讛驻住讞


Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna (96b): If one robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed in the meantime, so that deriving benefit from it is prohibited,


讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱 讜讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讟讗 注讬讚谉 讗讬住讜专讗 讜讚讗讬 诪讬讬讗砖 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讬讗讜砖 拽谞讛 讗诪讗讬 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱 讚诪讬 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬 诇讬讛


the robber may nonetheless return the worthless bread to the owner and say to him: That which is yours is before you, and no compensation is required. Rav Yosef states his objection: But in this case, once the time of the prohibition of leavened bread arrives, the owner certainly despairs of recovering his now-worthless bread. And if it enters your mind to say that the owner鈥檚 despair causes the robber to acquire the stolen item, why can he say to him: That which is yours is before you? He should be required to pay the owner full-fledged money rather than return the worthless food, as the bread now belongs to the robber.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗谞讗 讝讛 诪转讬讬讗砖 讜讝讛 专讜爪讛 诇拽谞讜转 讛讗讬 讝讛 诪转讬讬讗砖 讜讝讛 讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇拽谞讜转


Rava said to him in response: When I say that the thief acquires the stolen item upon the owner鈥檚 despair of recovery it is when this owner despairs, and that thief wants to acquire the item. In this case, this one despairs but that one does not wish to acquire the worthless bread.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讛 拽专讘谞讜 讜诇讗 讛讙讝讜诇 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇驻谞讬 讬讗讜砖 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 驻砖讬讟讗


Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita. The verse: 鈥淚f his offering is a burnt-offering of the herd鈥 (Leviticus 1:3), indicates that one鈥檚 offering must be 鈥渉is offering,鈥 but not an animal stolen from another. What are the circumstances of the case referred to by the baraita? If we say it is dealing with a stolen animal that the robber consecrates and sacrificed before the owner鈥檚 despair of recovery, why do I need a verse to teach this? It is obvious that this is disqualified, as one cannot even consecrate an animal that does not belong to him.


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诇讗讞专 讬讗讜砖 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬讗讜砖 诇讗 拽谞讬


Rather, is it not referring to one who seeks to consecrate and sacrifice a stolen animal after the owner鈥檚 despair? And yet the baraita teaches that the animal cannot be consecrated by the thief. Conclude from the baraita that the owner鈥檚 despair of recovering a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it, as if it belonged to him he would be able to consecrate and sacrifice it.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪砖讻讘讜 讜诇讗 讛讙讝讜诇


Rava said to Abaye in refutation of this proof: And according to your reasoning, consider that which is taught in a baraita: It is written with regard to a zav, a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge: 鈥淎nd whoever touches his bedding shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water and be impure until the evening鈥 (Leviticus 15:5). This indicates that bedding on which a zav lies can become ritually impure and impart impurity only if it is 鈥渉is bedding,鈥 but not if it is stolen bedding.


讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讙讝诇 注诪专讗 讜注讘讚讬讛 诪砖讻讘 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诇讗 拽谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 讚讙讝诇 诪砖讻讘 讚讞讘专讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚讙讝诇 拽专讘谉 讚讞讘专讬讛


What are the circumstances of the case discussed in the baraita? If we say that he robbed another of wool and made it into bedding, is there anyone who says that a physical change that results from an action performed to a stolen item does not cause the thief to acquire it? Rather, what have you to say? The baraita must be speaking of a case in which the zav robbed another of bedding. So too, the previous baraita is dealing with one who robbed another of an offering, already consecrated. The reason this animal does not atone for the thief is that a consecrated animal cannot be stolen and become the thief鈥檚 property, as it belongs to the Temple treasury wherever it is located.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 注讜专讜转 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from a mishna (Kelim 26:8): With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. Hides and leather are susceptible to contracting impurity only if they are in a finished state. If a private individual uses a piece of hide or leather for a certain purpose, e.g., as a cot or a table top, and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, it is considered a finished product and is susceptible to contracting impurity.


讜砖诇 注讘讚谉 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


But with regard to hides belonging to a leatherworker, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity. Since this individual sells leather to others, when he uses a piece of leather for a household purpose and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, this is not considered a finished state, as he is likely to change his mind and sell the leather to one who will process it further and put it to a different use.


砖诇 讙谞讘 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 砖诇 讙讝诇谉 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉


The mishna continues: If the hides are those of a thief, who has stolen them from another, the thief鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. If they are those of a robber his thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity, because he is not considered the owner of the hide. The difference is that unlike the case of a thief, who steals items stealthily, the identity of a robber, who takes the item openly, is known to the owner, and the owner harbors hope of finding the robber and getting the item back. Consequently, he does not despair of recovering his property.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讞讬诇讜祝 讛讚讘专讬诐 砖诇 讙讝诇谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 讜砖诇 讙谞讘 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转谉 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞转讬讬讗砖讜 讛讘注诇讬诐


Rabbi Shimon says that the matters are reversed: In the case of a robber, the robber鈥檚 thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. If the hides are those of a thief, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity, because the owners have not despaired of recovering them and the thief has not acquired the hide. Rabbi Shimon鈥檚 reasoning is that a robber, who seizes items brazenly, is a more difficult criminal to apprehend and bring to justice than a thief.


讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讬讗讜砖 拽谞讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬爪注谉


And although the two tanna鈥檌m of the mishna disagree as to which situation involves an owner鈥檚 despair of recovery, whether robbery or theft, in any event one can conclude from this mishna that the despair of the owner causes the thief or robber to acquire the item, as otherwise the perpetrator鈥檚 thoughts about the hide would have no effect on its status with regard to ritual impurity. Rav Yosef said to Abaye in response: With what are we dealing here in this mishna? It is a case where the thief or robber trimmed the leather by cutting it. Although trimming a piece of leather is not a sufficient change to constitute an act of acquisition by itself, it is effective in conjunction with the owner鈥檚 despair.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讞谞谉 讜讛诇讗 注讬爪讘讗 砖谞讜 讻讗谉 讜注讬爪讘讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 拽讬爪讜注


Rabba bar Rav 岣nan objects to this answer: But is it not the case that they taught this mishna here with regard to a leather table top [itzba]? And a leather table top does not require trimming, either due to the fact that its edges are not seen or because it is merely ornamental. Since it does not require trimming, this action should not be considered an act of acquisition at all.


讚转谞谉 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 讞住专讜谉 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转讜 讬砖 讞住专讜谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讬谉 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讟诪讗转讜 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛注讬爪讘讗


As we learned in the previous mishna (Kelim 26:7): Wherever there is no work lacking for an item to be considered finished, one鈥檚 thought renders it susceptible to ritual impurity; when there is still some work lacking for the item to be considered finished, thought does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity, except for the case of a leather table top. Although further work is required to smooth out the edges, one鈥檚 thought can render it susceptible to impurity because people do not care if this leather table top has uneven edges. It is with regard to this case of a table top that the mishna distinguishes between a homeowner and a leatherworker. Therefore, Rav Yosef鈥檚 explanation is rejected.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讬 诪讬诇转讗 拽砖讬 讘讛 专讘讛 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 注砖专讬谉 讜转专转讬谉 砖谞讬谉 讜诇讗 讗讬驻专拽讛 注讚 讚讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专讬砖讗 讜驻专拽讛 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 讻砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬


The Gemara suggests a different answer. Rather, Rava said that this matter was a difficulty posed by Rabba to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved until Rav Yosef sat as the head of the yeshiva and resolved it in the following manner: A change in name of an item, representing a change in status, is similar to a physical change brought about by an action.


砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛转诐 诪注讬拽专讗 注爪讬诐 讛砖转讗 讻诇讬诐 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 谞诪讬 诪注讬拽专讗 拽专讜 诇讬讛 诪砖讻讗 讜讛砖转讗 讗讘专讝讬谉


What is the reason that a physical change through an action causes the thief to acquire the item? It is because there the stolen items were initially just wood, and now they are vessels. The same can be said for a change in name as well: Initially they called it a hide, and now they call it a table top [abrazin].


讜讛专讬 诪专讬砖 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讬谞讜讬 讛砖诐 讚诪注讬拽专讗 讻砖讜专讗 讜讛砖转讗 讟诇诇讗 讜转谞谉 注诇 讛诪专讬砖 讛讙讝讜诇 砖讘谞讗讜 讘讘讬专讛 砖谞讜讟诇 讚诪讬讜 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


The Gemara asks a question with regard to changes in name: But what about the case of a beam, where there is a change in name, as initially, when it was stolen, it was called a beam, and now, after it has been placed in a building, it is called a joist [telala], and yet we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55a): With regard to a stolen beam that a robber had built into a large building, the court ruled that the owner should receive its value in money rather than demand that the robber demolish the house to return the beam itself, because of an ordinance instituted for the penitent, i.e., to encourage robbers to admit their crime and reimburse the owner of the stolen item.


讟注诪讗 诪驻谞讬 转拽谞转 讛砖讘讬诐


This mishna indicates that the only reason the robber does not have to return the beam itself is because of this ordinance instituted for the penitent.


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