Bava Kamma 74
מִדְּסֵיפָא בְּמֵיפַךְ וַהֲזַמָּה, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בְּמֵיפַךְ וַהֲזַמָּה.
From the fact that the latter clause of the baraita states a ruling with regard to a case in which the second set of witnesses both reverses the order of events and renders the first pair as conspiring witnesses, it may be inferred that the first case as well, in parallel fashion, states a ruling with regard to a case in which the second set of witnesses both reverses the order of events and renders the first pair as conspiring witnesses.
דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: ״מֵעִידַנוּ אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁהִפִּיל אֶת שֵׁן עַבְדּוֹ, וְסִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ״ – שֶׁהֲרֵי הָעֶבֶד אוֹמֵר כֵּן; וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין – מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי עַיִן לָרַב.
This is as it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita, that if witnesses say: We testify with regard to so-and-so that he knocked out his Canaanite slave’s tooth and afterward blinded his eye, which requires the master to emancipate him and compensate him for the value of his eye, as that is what the slave says, i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the slave, and subsequently they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they pay the value of an eye to the master.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא קָא מוֹדוּ לְהוּ בָּתְרָאֵי בְּחַבְלָא כְּלָל, דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ עֶבֶד לְרַב בָּעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי לֵיהּ!
Abaye analyzes this clause of the baraita: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is speaking of a situation where the latter set of witnesses, who attested that the first set of witnesses were conspiring witnesses, do not concede that there was any injury at all inflicted on the slave by his master, then there is no testimony to confirm that those injuries were inflicted other than that given by the witnesses who were shown to be conspiring witnesses. Consequently, they should be required to pay the entire value of the slave to the master, as this is the amount of monetary damage the master stood to incur as a result of their false testimony.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא – דְּקָא מוֹדוּ כּוּלְּהוּ בְּחַבְלָא,
Rather, it is obvious that all of them, i.e., both the first set of witnesses and the latter set, concede with regard to the injury inflicted on the slave by the master. They both agree that the master both blinded the slave’s eye and knocked out his tooth and therefore is obligated to emancipate him. They disagree concerning only the order of events. The first set of witnesses said that the tooth injury occurred first and the eye injury occurred afterward. Consequently, they sought to require the master to emancipate the slave and compensate him for the eye injury.
(וּדְקָא אָפְכִינַן) [וּדְאַפְכִינְהוּ] וְאַזְּמִינְהוּ.
And the second set of witnesses reversed the order of events in their testimony, saying that the eye injury took place first, and in the same testimony, they rendered the first pair conspiring witnesses, by testifying that they were not present when the events occurred. Since the latter clause of the baraita must be interpreted in this manner, it stands to reason that the first case should be explained similarly.
וְהֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּקָא מְאַחֲרִי אַחוֹרֵי הָנֵי בָּתְרָאֵי – אַכַּתִּי דְּמֵי עֶבֶד לְרַב בָּעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי;
The Gemara analyzes Abaye’s interpretation of the baraita: And what are the circumstances of the case? The second set of witnesses, who are deemed credible, have established that the injuries did not take place on the date reported by the first set of witnesses. According to their testimony, when did the injuries take place? If the latter witnesses postdated the events, by testifying that the injuries were actually inflicted at a later stage than that mentioned by the first set of witnesses, the first set of witnesses should still be required to pay the full value of a slave to the master.
דְּכִי מְחַיְּיבִי לֵיהּ לְגַבְרָא – אַכַּתִּי גַּבְרָא לָאו בַּר חִיּוּבָא הוּא! אֶלָּא דְּקָא מְקַדְּמִי קַדּוֹמֵי הָנֵי בָּתְרָאֵי.
The reason the first set of witnesses should be liable is that when they sought to impose liability upon the man, i.e., the master, this man was not yet burdened with any liability. When the first set of witnesses testified about the injuries, the master was not yet obligated to emancipate his slave or pay damages. Therefore, these conspiring witnesses should be required to pay these sums, which they had sought to impose on the master. Rather, it must be that the latter set of witnesses predated the time of the injuries, by testifying that they were inflicted at an earlier date than that attested to by the first set of witnesses.
וְאִי דְּלָא עָמַד בַּדִּין – אַכַּתִּי דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ עֶבֶד לְרַב בָּעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי לֵיהּ, דְּאַכַּתִּי גַּבְרָא לָא מִיחַיַּיב!
The Gemara continues to analyze the case: And if the baraita is referring to a case where the master had not yet stood trial for having injured his slave when the first set of witnesses submitted their testimony, those witnesses should still be required to pay the entire value of the slave to the master, as at the time of their testimony the man, i.e., the master, was not yet liable. The first set of witnesses sought to render the master liable at a time when he was exempt from liability, and therefore they should be obligated to pay him the full value of the slave.
אֶלָּא דְּעָמַד בַּדִּין.
Rather, it must be that the master had already stood trial for having inflicted these injuries, and had been sentenced by the court to emancipate the slave for the first injury and pay him for the second injury. Then, the master evaded payment, and was subsequently brought before another court, where witnesses testified that the first court had established liability for knocking out the tooth first and then blinding the slave’s eye. This testimony was subsequently rendered conspiring testimony by a second set of witnesses, who testified both that the first set of witnesses was not at the scene of the first trial and that the results of the trial were actually reversed, i.e., the master’s liability was for blinding the eye first and then for knocking out the tooth. Since the first set of witnesses, who were rendered conspiring witnesses, sought to increase the master’s liability payment from that of the value of a tooth to that of an eye, they must pay the value of an eye to the master.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דּוּקְיָא דְרָבָא מֵהֵיכָא? אִילֵּימָא מֵרֵישָׁא, רֵישָׁא מִי קָא מִתַּכְחֲשִׁי מְצִיעָאֵי?
Rava sought to infer from this baraita to his opinion that contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said to Rav Ashi: From which case in the baraita is the inference of Rava? If we say that his inference is from the first clause, this is difficult. In the case of the first clause, if it involves three sets of witnesses, as claimed by Rava, is the intermediate set of witnesses contradicted and rejected before they are established as conspiring witnesses? The first set of witnesses testified that the eye injury took place after the tooth injury, whereas the intermediate set of witnesses reversed the order. If so, the intermediate set of witnesses sought to lower the master’s payment from the value of an eye to that of a tooth.
כֵּיוָן דְּאִי לָא מִתַּזְּמִי – סָהֲדוּתָא כְּווֹתַיְיהוּ קָא קָיְימָא, דְּדִינָא כְּווֹתַיְיהוּ פָּסְקִינַן, דְּיֵשׁ בִּכְלַל מָאתַיִם מָנֶה;
Rav Aḥa continues: Since if the second set of witnesses would not have been rendered conspiring witnesses, the testimony would have been established in accordance with their statement, as the judgment would have been decided in accordance with their testimony. The reason their testimony would have determined the ruling is that one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred, i.e., testimony concerning a large sum includes testimony concerning a smaller sum.
הִלְכָּךְ קַמָּאֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִתַּכְחֲשִׁי, מְצִיעָאֵי לָא מִתַּכְחֲשִׁי מִידֵּי!
Rav Aḥa continues: Therefore, it is the first set of witnesses, who testified that the eye injury occurred last, whose testimony would be considered contradicted and rejected, whereas the testimony of the intermediate set of witnesses would not be considered contradicted at all, as it is accepted in full. If so, this is not a case of witnesses who were rejected due to contradiction and then subsequently rendered conspiring witnesses.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, רָבָא סָבַר: מִדְּרֵישָׁא בְּשָׁלֹשׁ כִּיתּוֹת – סֵיפָא נָמֵי בְּשָׁלֹשׁ; וְדָיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא –
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa in response: Rava maintains that from the fact that the ruling of the first clause of the baraita is stated with regard to a case involving three sets of witnesses, it is logical to assume that the ruling of the latter clause is also stated with regard to a case involving three sets of witnesses, and Rava infers his ruling from the latter clause.
כְּגוֹן דְּאָתוּ בֵּי תְרֵי, וְאָמְרִי: ״הִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ וְסִימֵּא עֵינוֹ״, וּפַסְקִינֵיהּ לְדִינָא אַפּוּמַּיְיהוּ;
Rava explains that the latter clause is referring to a case where two witnesses, i.e., the ones mentioned in the baraita, come and say: The master knocked out the slave’s tooth and afterward blinded his eye, and the court ruled its judgment in accordance with their statement, obligating the master to emancipate his slave and compensate him for the value of his eye.
וְאָתוּ בֵּי תְרֵי אַחֲרִינֵי, וְאָמְרִי: ״סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וְהִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ״, דְּקָא מַכְחֲשִׁי לְהוּ לְהָנֵי קַמָּאֵי; וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין קַמָּאֵי – מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי עַיִן לְרַב.
And subsequently two other witnesses, who were not mentioned in the baraita, come and say that the events were reversed: First the master blinded his slave’s eye and then he knocked out his tooth, so that they contradict the testimony of those first witnesses. At this point the master is obligated to emancipate his slave and pay him only the value of his tooth, as this much was required of him according to both sets of witnesses. And then the first pair were found to be conspiring witnesses. Therefore, as the baraita states, the first set of witnesses pays the value of an eye to the master, less the value of a tooth.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הַכְחָשָׁה לָאו תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא, אַמַּאי מְשַׁלְּמִי? הָא אִתַּכְחַשׁוּ לְהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, הַכְחָשָׁה – תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא.
Rava reaches his conclusion based on the following reasoning: And if it enters your mind that the contradiction of testimony is not the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, and witnesses who were first contradicted and then rendered conspiring witnesses are not punished as conspiring witnesses, why must these witnesses pay? They were already contradicted from the outset, before they were shown to be conspiring witnesses. Rather, conclude from the latter clause of the baraita that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony.
וְאַבַּיֵּי אָמַר לָךְ: בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא – לָא סַגִּי דְּלָא שָׁלֹשׁ כִּיתּוֹת, שֶׁהֲרֵי קָתָנֵי ״הָרַב אוֹמֵר כֵּן״;
And how could Abaye, who disagrees with Rava, refute this proof? He could say to you: Granted, it is impossible to interpret the first clause without the supposition that there are three sets of witnesses involved. The reason is that it is taught with regard to that first clause: As that is what the master says, i.e., this testimony is satisfactory to the master. The only testimony recorded in the baraita is that the master blinded the slave’s eye and then knocked out his tooth. Why would this be considered satisfactory to the master? It must therefore be assumed that this testimony was preceded by another one that was even less advantageous to the master. That testimony confirmed the injuries but placed the eye injury after the tooth injury, which involves greater liability for the master. Finally, a third set of witnesses must have arrived and rendered the intermediate set as conspiring witnesses, so that there are a total of three sets of witnesses.
אֶלָּא סֵיפָא – לְמָה לִי שָׁלֹשׁ כִּיתּוֹת? ״שֶׁהֲרֵי הָעֶבֶד אוֹמֵר כֵּן״?!
But with regard to the latter clause, why do I need to explain it as referring to three sets of witnesses? If you say that it is because the baraita states concerning this case: As that is what the slave says, i.e., this testimony is satisfactory to the slave, this does not prove that there is another testimony, not mentioned in the baraita, that is less favorable to the slave than this one.
עֶבֶד – כֹּל דְּהוּ מֵימָר אָמַר, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִיפּוֹק לְחֵירוּת.
The reason is that a slave would say anything, i.e., any form of testimony would be favorable to him, as it is satisfactory for him that he should be emancipated. The court’s acceptance of testimony confirming either order of events would result in his emancipation from slavery, and therefore both testimonies are satisfactory to him. Although there is a compelling reason to posit the existence of three sets of witnesses in the first clause, there is no justification to do so in the second clause, and therefore it should be explained as did Abaye, as discussing only two sets of witnesses.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא, אֵימָא: סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ –
Rabbi Zeira objects to the basic assumption of the baraita that when a master inflicts two injuries upon his Canaanite slave he must indemnify the slave for the second injury. One can say instead that if the master blinded his slave’s eye,
נִיפּוֹק בְּעֵינוֹ; הִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ – נִיפּוֹק בְּשִׁינּוֹ; סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וְהִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ – נִיפּוֹק בְּעֵינוֹ וְשִׁינּוֹ!
the slave should go free on account of his eye, and if he knocked out his tooth he should go free on account of his tooth, and if the master both blinded his eye and knocked out his tooth, the slave should go free on account of both his eye and his tooth, without the master having to pay damages for the loss of his tooth.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, עָלֶיךָ אָמַר קְרָא: ״תַּחַת עֵינוֹ״ – וְלֹא תַּחַת עֵינוֹ וְשִׁינּוֹ, ״תַּחַת שִׁינּוֹ״ – וְלֹא תַּחַת שִׁינּוֹ וְעֵינוֹ.
Abaye said to him in response: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “And if a man smites the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall let him go free for his eye’s sake” (Exodus 21:26). The phrase “for his eye’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth. The same can be inferred from the subsequent verse: “And if he smites out his bondman’s tooth or his bondwoman’s tooth, he shall let him go free for his tooth’s sake” (Exodus 21:27). The phrase “for his tooth’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth.
אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: גָּנַב עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר עַל פִּיהֶם, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין – מְשַׁלְּמִין לוֹ אֶת הַכֹּל.
The Gemara returns to Rava’s opinion that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony. Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too can learn from the mishna that Rava’s claim is correct, as it teaches (72b): If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, also based on the testimony of the same witnesses, and these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, these conspiring witnesses must pay everything, i.e., not only the principal amount but also the fourfold or fivefold payment.
מַאי, לָאו דְּהֵעִידוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה וְחָזְרוּ וְהֵעִידוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה, וְהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה וְחָזְרוּ וְהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה?
What, is it not referring to a case where they testified concerning the theft and then testified concerning the slaughter, and they were subsequently rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft and then were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter?
וְהָא כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה – לְגַבֵּי טְבִיחָה הָווּ לְהוּ מוּכְחָשִׁין, וְקָתָנֵי: מְשַׁלְּמִין לוֹ אֶת הַכֹּל. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הַכְחָשָׁה לָאו תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא, אַטְּבִיחָה אַמַּאי מְשַׁלְּמִין? אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הַכְחָשָׁה תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא?
Rav Idi bar Avin states his inference: But once they were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft, their testimony with regard to the slaughter is in effect contradicted, i.e., nullified, as testimony concerning the slaughter of an animal without prior testimony establishing that the animal was stolen is meaningless. And yet the mishna teaches that the witnesses must pay everything. And if it enters your mind that the contradiction of testimony is not the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, why should they pay a fine for lying about the slaughter? Their testimony concerning the slaughter was rendered irrelevant before it was established as conspiring testimony. Rather, must one not conclude from this mishna that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony?
אָמְרִי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה תְּחִילָּה,
The Sages say in refutation of this inference: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter first, before they were rendered conspiring witnesses in their testimony concerning the theft itself. In this case, the testimony concerning the slaughter was not rendered irrelevant before it was rendered conspiring testimony.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא: עֵדִים שֶׁהוּכְחֲשׁוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף הוּזַּמּוּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, חַד אָמַר: נֶהֱרָגִין, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין.
And this is a matter in the dispute between other amora’im, before Rava and Abaye discussed it. As it was stated: With regard to witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted by two other witnesses and ultimately were rendered conspiring witnesses, this is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One said: These witnesses are killed, like all conspiring witnesses in a capital case, as the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, and one said: They are not killed.
תִּסְתַּיֵּים דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: עֵדִים שֶׁהוּכְחֲשׁוּ בְּנֶפֶשׁ – לוֹקִין.
The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Elazar who says they are not killed. As Rabbi Elazar says: Witnesses who were contradicted in a case involving the taking of a life, i.e., a capital case, are flogged for violating the prohibition: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13).
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר נֶהֱרָגִין – אַמַּאי לוֹקִין? הָוֵה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו!
And if it enters your mind that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately found to be conspiring witnesses are killed, why are they flogged in this case? There is always the possibility that they might be rendered conspiring witnesses, which would render them liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. Consequently, this is a case of a prohibition given as warning of liability for court-imposed capital punishment, and there is a principle that one is not flogged for violating any prohibition given as warning of liability for court-imposed capital punishment.
אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין? תִּסְתַּיַּים.
Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this statement that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately were found to be conspiring witnesses are not killed? The Gemara affirms: It may be concluded that this is so.
לוֹקִין?! תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי נִינְהוּ, מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי? סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי!
The Gemara asks a question with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion that witnesses who were contradicted in a capital case are flogged. Why are they flogged simply because their testimony was contradicted? They are two witnesses, and they are contradicted by two other witnesses. What did you see in the testimony of the second set of witnesses that leads you to rely on those witnesses to the extent that the first set of witnesses is flogged? You could just as well rely on these witnesses, i.e., the first witnesses. How can the court ever determine with certainty that a given testimony is false based merely on contradictory testimony?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּבָא הָרוּג בְּרַגְלָיו.
Abaye said: The contradiction to which Rabbi Elazar is referring involves a case where the witnesses testified that they saw a certain person murdered, and subsequently the individual who was allegedly killed came to the court on his feet, conclusively disproving their testimony.
מַתְנִי׳ גָּנַב עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד אוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.
MISHNA: If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, as established based on the testimony of one witness or based on his own admission, i.e., he himself admitted that he performed these acts, without there being any witness testimony, he pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּשַּׁבָּת; גָּנַב וְטָבַח לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה; גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו, וּמֵת אָבִיו, וְאַחַר כָּךְ טָבַח וּמָכַר; גָּנַב וְהִקְדִּישׁ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.
If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, which is a capital offense, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it for the purpose of idol worship, or if he stole his father’s animal and subsequently his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, or if he stole an animal and subsequently he consecrated it as an offering and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, in all these cases the thief pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: קֳדָשִׁים – שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָם, מְשַׁלֵּם. תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה – שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָם, פָּטוּר.
Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of sacrificial animals for which the owner bears financial responsibility to replace with another animal if one of the original animals that one stole is lost or dies, the thief is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughters one of the animals. If it is a sacrificial animal for which the owner bears no financial responsibility, the thief is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment.
גְּמָ׳ עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד – פְּשִׁיטָא!
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if the fact that the thief slaughtered or sold the animal was established based on the testimony of one witness, he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious?
אָמְרִי: הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – דּוּמְיָא דְּעַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד; מָה עַל פִּי [עֵד] אֶחָד – כִּי אָתֵי עֵד אֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף בַּהֲדֵיהּ, מִיחַיַּיב; עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ נָמֵי – כִּי אָתוּ עֵדִים, מִיחַיַּיב.
The Sages say in response: By stating this case, the mishna teaches us this halakha: The case of the thief slaughtering the animal established based on the testimony of one witness is similar to a case where it is established based on his own admission. Just as in the case where the slaughter is established based on the testimony of one witness, if one other witness comes and corroborates the testimony of the first, he joins together with the first witness and together their testimony is rendered a valid testimony of two, and the thief becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, so too, where the slaughter is established based on his own admission, if witnesses come after his admission he becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara comments: This interpretation of the mishna serves to exclude that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability.
גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב הוּנָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁסִּימֵּא אֶת עֵין טָבִי עַבְדּוֹ, וְהָיָה שָׂמֵחַ שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה.
Since Rav Huna’s halakha was mentioned, the Gemara discusses in detail the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who blinded the eye of his Canaanite slave Tavi, and he experienced great joy as a result. Rabban Gamliel had long wanted to emancipate Tavi, but it is generally prohibited to emancipate a Canaanite slave. The injury provided a fortuitous opportunity for Rabban Gamliel to emancipate his slave, as blinding the eye of one’s slave results in his emancipation (see Exodus 21:27).
מְצָאוֹ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, אָמַר לוֹ: ״אִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁטָּבִי עַבְדִּי יָצָא לְחֵירוּת?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״לָמָּה?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״שֶׁסִּמִּיתִי אֶת עֵינוֹ״. אָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵין בִּדְבָרֶיךָ כְּלוּם, שֶׁכְּבָר אֵין לוֹ עֵדִים״.
Rabban Gamliel encountered Rabbi Yehoshua and said to him: Do you know that my slave Tavi was emancipated? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Why? What circumstances enabled you to emancipate him? Rabban Gamliel said to him: I was able to do so, as I blinded his eye. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabban Gamliel: Your statement is nothing, and is not grounds for his emancipation, as he has no witnesses who can testify that you did this to him. The principle is that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. One pays a fine only based on the testimony of witnesses. The requirement to emancipate one’s slave after injuring his eye is a type of fine.
הָא יֵשׁ לוֹ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב, וְשָׁמְעִינַן מִינַּהּ: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב!
The Gemara infers from the baraita: But if Tavi had witnesses who could testify with regard to the injury, Rabban Gamliel would be obligated to emancipate him, even if they testify after Rabban Gamliel’s admission. And we can learn from this that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is liable, even if afterward witnesses come and testify with regard to his liability.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּלָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אוֹדִי. וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַב בֵּית דִּין הֲוָה!
Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥisda: This case involving Rabban Gamliel is different, as he admitted to his actions when he was not in the presence of a court. An admission not in the presence of a court does not exempt the perpetrator from paying the relevant fine. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehoshua was the president of the court, so it is likely that the encounter took place in court.
