Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Daf Yomi

January 29, 2024 | 讬状讟 讘砖讘讟 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 88

The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether a humiliation payment is paid by one who humiliates a Canaanite slave. The basis of their debate depends on whether a Caananite slave falls under the term 鈥榶our brother鈥 that is used in the verse in the Torah regarding the humiliation payment. How do their interpretations of 鈥榖rother鈥 fit in with other Torah verses that use that term as well, such as false witnesses (eidim zomeim) who testify against ‘their brother’, a king that is chosen from among ‘your brothers’, and who is qualified to be a witness. The Gemara brings two different ways to learn that slaves cannot be witnesses. How is it different than a convert whose testimony is accepted? The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba wanted him to inherit her property when she died instead of her husband so she wrote a document bequeathing it to him. Since her husband had rights to the produce of the property while they were married when she wrote the document, did she have the right to pass on the property to her son? The rabbis disagreed about this and the Gemara explains the basis of their positions.

讚讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛 讗讘诇 驻爪讬注讛 讚诇讗 讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛


by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 砖驻爪注讛 讘驻谞讬讛 讜讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛


Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina said: Rabbi Yo岣nan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.


讛讞讜讘诇 讘注讘讚 讻谞注谞讬 砖诇 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讬 讬谞爪讜 讗谞砖讬诐 讬讞讚讜 讗讬砖 讜讗讞讬讜 讘诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 讗讞讜讛 讬爪讗 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讗讞讜讛 讜专讘谞谉 讗讞讬讜 讛讜讗 讘诪爪讜转


搂 The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: 鈥淲hen men strive together, a man and his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation 鈥渁nd his brother鈥 teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews鈥 brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讝讜诪诪讬 注讘讚 诇讗 讬讛专讜讙讜 讚讻转讬讘 讜注砖讬转诐 诇讜 讻讗砖专 讝诪诐 诇注砖讜转 诇讗讞讬讜 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讘注专转 讛专注 诪拽专讘讱 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐


The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: 鈥淎nd you shall put away the evil from your midst,鈥 indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘谞谉 注讘讚 讬讛讗 讻砖专 诇诪诇讻讜转 讗诪专讬 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 讙专 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 诪拽专讘 讗讞讬讱 诪诪讜讘讞专 砖讘讗讞讬讱


The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: 鈥淥ne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: 鈥淥ne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,鈥 which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘谞谉 讬讛讗 注讘讚 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛谞讛 注讚 砖拽专 讛注讚 砖拽专 注谞讛 讘讗讞讬讜


The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: 鈥淎nd behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?


讗诪专 注讜诇讗 注讚讜转 诇讗 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讗转讬讗 注讚讜转 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讗砖讛 讜诪讛 讗砖讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讘讗 讘拽讛诇 驻住讜诇讛 诇注讚讜转 注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讘讗 讘拽讛诇 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


诪讛 诇讗砖讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讛 专讗讜讬讛 诇诪讬诇讛 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇诪讬诇讛 拽讟谉 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讜 讘诪讬诇讛 讜驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one鈥檚 fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one鈥檚 qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪讛 诇拽讟谉 砖讗讬谞讜 讘诪爪讜转 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 讘诪爪讜转 讗砖讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讛 讘诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇讛 诇注讚讜转


This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讗讬谞谉 讘讻诇 讛诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇讬谉 诇讛注讬讚 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇 诇讛注讬讚


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛诐 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讗讬砖 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 讗讬砖


This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?


讗诇讗 转讬转讬 诪讙讝诇谉 诪讛 诇讙讝诇谉 砖讻谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜


The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?


讗诇讗 转讬转讬 诪讙讝诇谉 讜诪讞讚 诪讛谞讱


The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪专 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬讛诐 诪讗讬 讘谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐


Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [岣yis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: 鈥淐hildren,鈥 without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转 讗诇讗 讙专 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.


讗诪专讬 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讙专 谞讛讬 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇诪注诇讛 诇诪讟讛 讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗驻讜拽讬 注讘讚 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛


The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.


讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讙专 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬讛诐 诇讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 讜谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讚砖诪注转 诪讬谞讛 转专讬 讞讚讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讗讘讜转 讜讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转


The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers,鈥 from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.


讜注讘讚 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讙专 讜诪讛 讙专 讚诇诪注诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 讗讘诇 诇诪讟讛 讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬讛讗 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


讗诇讗 诪讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛 讛讜讗 讚驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 讗讘诇 讙专 讻讬讜谉 讚讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇诪讟讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讻转讘 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讻转讘 谞诪讬 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转


And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers,鈥 which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 He also wrote in the same manner: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers.鈥


讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 驻讙讬注转谉 专注讛 讗讬诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 诪讛讙专讜谞讬讗 讛讜转 谞住讬讘讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讗 讻转讘转讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诇专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 讘专讛 讘转专 讚砖讻讬讘讗


搂 The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,


讗讝诇 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗讜拽诪讬讛 讘谞讻住讬 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专讛 诇诪讬诇转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗讝诇 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his mother鈥檚 property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the mother鈥檚 husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husband鈥檚 lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


讗诪专讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗谞讗 诪转谞讬转讗 讬讚注谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘 讜讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 诇讘谉 诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 诇诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘


The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the father鈥檚 death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the father鈥檚 possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.


讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 诪讬讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬 讛讘谉


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property never came into the son鈥檚 possession.


讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讗讘 讘讞讬讬 讛讘谉 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba鈥檚 analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property never came into the son鈥檚 possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the son鈥檚 lifetime, where the property came into the son鈥檚 possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.


讚讗转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


The Gemara records a dispute between the amora鈥檌m with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the father鈥檚 lifetime, and the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讗诪专 诇讱 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讻专 讛讘谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘 讜讻讬 诪讬讬转 讛讗讘 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讚诇讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬 讛讘谉 讗讘诇 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the father鈥檚 lifetime, so that the property came into the son鈥檚 possession upon the father鈥檚 death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, so that the property did not come into the son鈥檚 possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.


讗诇诪讗 拽讗 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讬 讝讘讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讬讚讬讛 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yo岣nan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 诪讬讛转 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 诇讗 砖谞讗 诇讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property came into the son鈥檚 possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property did not come into the son鈥檚 possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.


讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讬 拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讚讬讚讬讛 拽讗 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.


讜讗谞谉 讛砖转讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讜讘讬谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讜拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 讜诪讬讬转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讗诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讻讬 拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讛讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讬讚讬讛 拽讗 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didn鈥檛 he sell property that did not belong to him?


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.


讗讛讚专讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 讚讜诪讛 诇诪砖谞转谞讜


The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba鈥檚 reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讬 转谞讬 讗讬驻讻讗 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻砖讟 诪讬谞讛 讚拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his son鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.


讗诇讗 讛砖转讗 讚拽转谞讬 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讛讜讗


Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the woman鈥檚 property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 讘专讗 讬专讬转 讗讘讗 讗讘讗 诇讗 讬专讬转 讘专讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讘专讜讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诪讘专讬讛 拽讗 讗转讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗讘专讜讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诪讗讞讜讛 讗转讬


Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the son鈥檚 reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the son鈥檚 brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishna鈥檚 choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.


讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬谞讛 讚讜诪讛 诇诪砖谞转谞讜 诪砖讜诐 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuel鈥檚 reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husband鈥檚 rights to his wife鈥檚 property. As Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.


讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 砖讙讬专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜谞转谉 讻转讜讘转讛


Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,


  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

din &daf elana thumbnail exempt series

The Curious Case of the Exempt: Shoteh, Cheresh聽and聽Katan

We frequently read of the categories of the 讞专砖, 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉, one who is both deaf and mute, one who...
din & daf elana stein hain thumbnail

Din & Daf: Katan – The Evolution of a Category

Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain 拽讟谉 讜拽讟谞讛 - The Evolution...
learn daf yomi one week at a time with tamara spitz

Bava Kamma: Daf 84-90 – Daf Yomi: One Week at a Time

This week we continue discussing the 5 payments a person makes if he injured another person. One needs to pay...
din and daf with elana stein hain gemara shiur for women

Din & Daf: Who is a Shotah/Shoteh?

Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain Who is a Shotah/Shoteh? Bava...

Bava Kamma 88

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 88

讚讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛 讗讘诇 驻爪讬注讛 讚诇讗 讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛 诇讗 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛


by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 砖驻爪注讛 讘驻谞讬讛 讜讗驻讞转讛 诪讻住驻讛


Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina said: Rabbi Yo岣nan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.


讛讞讜讘诇 讘注讘讚 讻谞注谞讬 砖诇 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讬 讬谞爪讜 讗谞砖讬诐 讬讞讚讜 讗讬砖 讜讗讞讬讜 讘诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 讗讞讜讛 讬爪讗 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讗讞讜讛 讜专讘谞谉 讗讞讬讜 讛讜讗 讘诪爪讜转


搂 The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: 鈥淲hen men strive together, a man and his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation 鈥渁nd his brother鈥 teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews鈥 brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讝讜诪诪讬 注讘讚 诇讗 讬讛专讜讙讜 讚讻转讬讘 讜注砖讬转诐 诇讜 讻讗砖专 讝诪诐 诇注砖讜转 诇讗讞讬讜 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讘注专转 讛专注 诪拽专讘讱 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐


The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: 鈥淎nd you shall put away the evil from your midst,鈥 indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘谞谉 注讘讚 讬讛讗 讻砖专 诇诪诇讻讜转 讗诪专讬 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 讙专 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 诪拽专讘 讗讞讬讱 诪诪讜讘讞专 砖讘讗讞讬讱


The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: 鈥淥ne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: 鈥淥ne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,鈥 which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇专讘谞谉 讬讛讗 注讘讚 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛谞讛 注讚 砖拽专 讛注讚 砖拽专 注谞讛 讘讗讞讬讜


The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: 鈥淎nd behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?


讗诪专 注讜诇讗 注讚讜转 诇讗 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讗转讬讗 注讚讜转 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讗砖讛 讜诪讛 讗砖讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讘讗 讘拽讛诇 驻住讜诇讛 诇注讚讜转 注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讘讗 讘拽讛诇 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


诪讛 诇讗砖讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讛 专讗讜讬讛 诇诪讬诇讛 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇诪讬诇讛 拽讟谉 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讜 讘诪讬诇讛 讜驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one鈥檚 fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one鈥檚 qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪讛 诇拽讟谉 砖讗讬谞讜 讘诪爪讜转 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 讘诪爪讜转 讗砖讛 转讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讛 讘诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇讛 诇注讚讜转


This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讗讬谞谉 讘讻诇 讛诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇讬谉 诇讛注讬讚 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛诪爪讜转 讜驻住讜诇 诇讛注讬讚


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛诐 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讗讬砖 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讛讜讗 讗讬砖


This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?


讗诇讗 转讬转讬 诪讙讝诇谉 诪讛 诇讙讝诇谉 砖讻谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜 转讗诪专 讘注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诪注砖讬讜 讙专诪讜 诇讜


The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?


讗诇讗 转讬转讬 诪讙讝诇谉 讜诪讞讚 诪讛谞讱


The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


诪专 讘专讬讛 讚专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬讛诐 诪讗讬 讘谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐


Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [岣yis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: 鈥淐hildren,鈥 without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.


讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转 讗诇讗 讙专 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.


讗诪专讬 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讙专 谞讛讬 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇诪注诇讛 诇诪讟讛 讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗驻讜拽讬 注讘讚 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛


The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.


讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讙专 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬讛诐 诇讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 讜谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讚砖诪注转 诪讬谞讛 转专讬 讞讚讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讗讘讜转 讜讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转


The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers,鈥 from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.


讜注讘讚 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讙专 讜诪讛 讙专 讚诇诪注诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 讗讘诇 诇诪讟讛 讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬讛讗 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


讗诇讗 诪讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讗讘讜转 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 讘谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 注讘讚 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇讗 诇诪注诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪讟讛 讛讜讗 讚驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转 讗讘诇 讙专 讻讬讜谉 讚讬砖 诇讜 讞讬讬住 诇诪讟讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 驻讬 讘谞讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛诐 讞讬讬住 讗讘讜转 讗讬讬讚讬 讚讻转讘 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讻转讘 谞诪讬 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转


And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers,鈥 which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淔athers shall not be put to death for children,鈥 He also wrote in the same manner: 鈥淣or shall children be put to death for fathers.鈥


讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 驻讙讬注转谉 专注讛 讗讬诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 诪讛讙专讜谞讬讗 讛讜转 谞住讬讘讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讗 讻转讘转讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诇专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 讘专讛 讘转专 讚砖讻讬讘讗


搂 The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,


讗讝诇 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗讜拽诪讬讛 讘谞讻住讬 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讗诪专讛 诇诪讬诇转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗讝诇 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his mother鈥檚 property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the mother鈥檚 husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husband鈥檚 lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


讗诪专讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗谞讗 诪转谞讬转讗 讬讚注谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诇讗讞专 诪讜转讜 讛讘谉 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讗讘 讜讛讗讘 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇诪讻讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 诇讘谉 诪讻专 讛讗讘 诪讻讜专讬诐 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 诇诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘


The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the father鈥檚 death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the father鈥檚 possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.


讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 诪讬讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬 讛讘谉


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property never came into the son鈥檚 possession.


讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讗讘 讘讞讬讬 讛讘谉 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba鈥檚 analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property never came into the son鈥檚 possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the son鈥檚 lifetime, where the property came into the son鈥檚 possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.


讚讗转诪专 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


The Gemara records a dispute between the amora鈥檌m with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the father鈥檚 lifetime, and the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讗诪专 诇讱 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讻专 讛讘谉 诇讗 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘 讜讻讬 诪讬讬转 讛讗讘 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讚诇讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬 讛讘谉 讗讘诇 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the father鈥檚 lifetime, so that the property came into the son鈥檚 possession upon the father鈥檚 death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, so that the property did not come into the son鈥檚 possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.


讗诇诪讗 拽讗 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讬 讝讘讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讬讚讬讛 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yo岣nan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞 讻讬 拽转谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪讻专 讛讘谉 讗讬谉 诇诇讜拽讞 注讚 砖讬诪讜转 讛讗讘 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 诪讬讛转 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 诇讗 砖谞讗 诇讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 诪转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讚诇讗 讗转讜 诇讬讚讬讛 讚讘谉 拽谞讛 诇讜拽讞


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father鈥檚 lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property came into the son鈥檚 possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, where the property did not come into the son鈥檚 possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.


讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讬 拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讚讬讚讬讛 拽讗 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.


讜讗谞谉 讛砖转讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讜讘讬谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讜拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讘专 讗讘讗 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讻讬 诪讬讬转 讗讘 讜诪讬讬转 讛讘谉 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讗诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讻讬 拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讛讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讬讚讬讛 拽讗 讝讘讬谉


The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the father鈥檚 lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didn鈥檛 he sell property that did not belong to him?


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


Rather, isn鈥檛 it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.


讗讛讚专讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 讚讜诪讛 诇诪砖谞转谞讜


The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba鈥檚 reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讬 转谞讬 讗讬驻讻讗 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻砖讟 诪讬谞讛 讚拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his son鈥檚 lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.


讗诇讗 讛砖转讗 讚拽转谞讬 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讛讜讗


Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the woman鈥檚 property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 讘专讗 讬专讬转 讗讘讗 讗讘讗 诇讗 讬专讬转 讘专讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讘专讜讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诪讘专讬讛 拽讗 讗转讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗讘专讜讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬 诪讗讞讜讛 讗转讬


Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the son鈥檚 reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the son鈥檚 brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishna鈥檚 choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.


讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬谞讛 讚讜诪讛 诇诪砖谞转谞讜 诪砖讜诐 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuel鈥檚 reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husband鈥檚 rights to his wife鈥檚 property. As Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.


讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讗讬砖 驻诇讜谞讬 砖讙讬专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜谞转谉 讻转讜讘转讛


Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,


Scroll To Top