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January 29, 2024 | ื™ืดื˜ ื‘ืฉื‘ื˜ ืชืฉืคืดื“

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 88

The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether a humiliation payment is paid by one who humiliates a Canaanite slave. The basis of their debate depends on whether a Caananite slave falls under the term โ€˜your brotherโ€™ that is used in the verse in the Torah regarding the humiliation payment. How do their interpretations of โ€˜brotherโ€™ fit in with other Torah verses that use that term as well, such as false witnesses (eidim zomeim) who testify against ‘their brother’, a king that is chosen from among ‘your brothers’, and who is qualified to be a witness. The Gemara brings two different ways to learn that slaves cannot be witnesses. How is it different than a convert whose testimony is accepted? The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba wanted him to inherit her property when she died instead of her husband so she wrote a document bequeathing it to him. Since her husband had rights to the produce of the property while they were married when she wrote the document, did she have the right to pass on the property to her son? The rabbis disagreed about this and the Gemara explains the basis of their positions.

ื“ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื” ืื‘ืœ ืคืฆื™ืขื” ื“ืœื ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื” ืœื ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”


by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืฉืคืฆืขื” ื‘ืคื ื™ื” ื•ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื”


Rabbi Yosei bar แธคanina said: Rabbi Yoแธฅanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.


ื”ื—ื•ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ื›ื ืขื ื™ ืฉืœ ืื—ืจื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ื ืฆื• ืื ืฉื™ื ื™ื—ื“ื• ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื—ื™ื• ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื• ืื—ื•ื” ื™ืฆื ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืื—ื•ื” ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื—ื™ื• ื”ื•ื ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช


ยง The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: โ€œWhen men strive together, a man and his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation โ€œand his brotherโ€ teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jewsโ€™ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื–ื•ืžืžื™ ืขื‘ื“ ืœื ื™ื”ืจื•ื’ื• ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ืขืฉื™ืชื ืœื• ื›ืืฉืจ ื–ืžื ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืœืื—ื™ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื‘ืขืจืช ื”ืจืข ืžืงืจื‘ืš ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื


The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: โ€œYou shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: โ€œAnd you shall put away the evil from your midst,โ€ indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื”ื ื›ืฉืจ ืœืžืœื›ื•ืช ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœื˜ืขืžื™ืš ืชื™ืงืฉื™ ืœืš ื’ืจ ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืžืงืจื‘ ืื—ื™ืš ืžืžื•ื‘ื—ืจ ืฉื‘ืื—ื™ืš


The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: โ€œOne from among your brothers shall you set a king over youโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: โ€œOne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,โ€ which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื™ื”ื ืขื‘ื“ ื›ืฉืจ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื ื” ืขื“ ืฉืงืจ ื”ืขื“ ืฉืงืจ ืขื ื” ื‘ืื—ื™ื•


The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: โ€œAnd behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?


ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ืขื“ื•ืช ืœื ืžืฆื™ืช ืืžืจืช ืืชื™ื ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžืืฉื” ื•ืžื” ืืฉื” ืฉื”ื™ื ืจืื•ื™ื” ืœื‘ื ื‘ืงื”ืœ ืคืกื•ืœื” ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื ื‘ืงื”ืœ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


ืžื” ืœืืฉื” ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ื” ืจืื•ื™ื” ืœืžื™ืœื” ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ืจืื•ื™ ืœืžื™ืœื” ืงื˜ืŸ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื™ืฉื ื• ื‘ืžื™ืœื” ื•ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that oneโ€™s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to oneโ€™s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžื” ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ืืฉื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื™ืฉื ื” ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœื” ืœืขื“ื•ืช


This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ื•ื—ื–ืจ ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืœื ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื›ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื•ืœื ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื›ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื”ืขื™ื“ ืืฃ ืื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื ืืช ื”ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœ ืœื”ืขื™ื“


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžื” ืœื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืื™ืฉ ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ืื™ืฉ


This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?


ืืœื ืชื™ืชื™ ืžื’ื–ืœืŸ ืžื” ืœื’ื–ืœืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื• ื’ืจืžื• ืœื• ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื• ื’ืจืžื• ืœื•


The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?


ืืœื ืชื™ืชื™ ืžื’ื–ืœืŸ ื•ืžื—ื“ ืžื”ื ืš


The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžืจ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื”ื ืžืื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื


Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for childrenโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [แธฅayis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: โ€œChildren,โ€ without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช ืืœื ื’ืจ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื“ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathersโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.


ืืžืจื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื’ืจ ื ื”ื™ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืžืขืœื” ืœืžื˜ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื”


The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.


ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื’ืจ ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื”ื ืœื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจื™ ื—ื“ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ื‘ื ื™ื ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ืื‘ื•ืช ื•ืื™ื“ืš ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช


The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers,โ€ from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.


ื•ืขื‘ื“ ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžื’ืจ ื•ืžื” ื’ืจ ื“ืœืžืขืœื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ืœ ืœืžื˜ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


ืืœื ืžื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื“ืžืฉืžืข ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืื‘ืœ ื’ืจ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืžื˜ื” ื›ืฉืจ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.


ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืชื™ื”ื ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื“ืžืฉืžืข ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื›ืชื‘ ื ืžื™ ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช


And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers,โ€ which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ He also wrote in the same manner: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers.โ€


ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืคื’ื™ืขืชืŸ ืจืขื” ืื™ืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืžื”ื’ืจื•ื ื™ื ื”ื•ืช ื ืกื™ื‘ื ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื›ืชื‘ืชื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืœืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจื” ื‘ืชืจ ื“ืฉื›ื™ื‘ื


ยง The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,


ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืื•ืงืžื™ื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ืืžืจื” ืœืžื™ืœืชื ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื”ื•ืฉืขื™ื ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ืฉืขื™ื ืืžืจื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื”ืืฉื” ืฉืžื›ืจื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืžืœื•ื’ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื‘ืขืœื” ื•ืžืชื” ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžื™ื“ ื”ืœืงื•ื—ื•ืช


Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his motherโ€™s property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the motherโ€™s husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husbandโ€™s lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


ืืžืจื•ื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื ื™ื“ืขื ื ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื•ืชื• ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืŸ ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื•ื”ืื‘ ืื™ื ื• ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ืื‘ ืžื›ื•ืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืœืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘


The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the fatherโ€™s death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the fatherโ€™s possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.


ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ืžื™ื”ื ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื•ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property never came into the sonโ€™s possession.


ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ืื‘ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abbaโ€™s analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property never came into the sonโ€™s possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the sonโ€™s lifetime, where the property came into the sonโ€™s possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.


ื“ืืชืžืจ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื•ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืืžืจ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara records a dispute between the amoraโ€™im with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, and the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.


ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืืžืจ ืœืš ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื•ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ื”ืื‘ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื“ืœื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื‘ืœ ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the fatherโ€™s lifetime, so that the property came into the sonโ€™s possession upon the fatherโ€™s death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, so that the property did not come into the sonโ€™s possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.


ืืœืžื ืงื ืกื‘ืจ ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื•ื›ื™ ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.


ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืื•ืžืจ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืœืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ืžื™ื”ืช ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ืœื ืฉื ื ืœื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property came into the sonโ€™s possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property did not come into the sonโ€™s possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.


ืืœืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื•ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.


ื•ืื ืŸ ื”ืฉืชื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื”ื• ื•ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ื•ืžื™ื™ืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ืืžืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืื™ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didnโ€™t he sell property that did not belong to him?


ืืœื ืœืื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™


Rather, isnโ€™t it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.


ืื”ื“ืจื•ื” ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื–ื• ืื™ื ื” ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืžืฉื ืชื ื•


The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abbaโ€™s reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.


ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืฉืœืžื ืื™ ืชื ื™ ืื™ืคื›ื ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืื™ื›ื ืœืžืคืฉื˜ ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his sonโ€™s lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.


ืืœื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืจืื•ื™ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื• ื”ื•ื


Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the womanโ€™s property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืื˜ื• ื‘ืจื ื™ืจื™ืช ืื‘ื ืื‘ื ืœื ื™ืจื™ืช ื‘ืจื ืืœื ืœืื‘ืจื•ื—ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืžื‘ืจื™ื” ืงื ืืชื™ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœืื‘ืจื•ื—ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืžืื—ื•ื” ืืชื™


Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the sonโ€™s reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the sonโ€™s brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishnaโ€™s choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.


ืืœื ืžืื™ ืื™ื ื” ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืžืฉื ืชื ื• ืžืฉื•ื ืชืงื ืช ืื•ืฉื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืื•ืฉื ื”ืชืงื™ื ื• ื”ืืฉื” ืฉืžื›ืจื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืžืœื•ื’ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื‘ืขืœื” ื•ืžืชื” ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžื™ื“ ื”ืœืงื•ื—ื•ืช


Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuelโ€™s reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husbandโ€™s rights to his wifeโ€™s property. As Rabbi Yosei bar แธคanina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husbandโ€™s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ืžืขื™ื“ื™ื ืื ื• ื‘ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืฉื’ื™ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ื ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ืชื”


Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,


  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

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Bava Kamma 88

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 88

ื“ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื” ืื‘ืœ ืคืฆื™ืขื” ื“ืœื ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื” ืœื ืงืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื”


by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืฉืคืฆืขื” ื‘ืคื ื™ื” ื•ืืคื—ืชื” ืžื›ืกืคื”


Rabbi Yosei bar แธคanina said: Rabbi Yoแธฅanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.


ื”ื—ื•ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ื›ื ืขื ื™ ืฉืœ ืื—ืจื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื›ื•ืณ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื›ื™ ื™ื ืฆื• ืื ืฉื™ื ื™ื—ื“ื• ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื—ื™ื• ื‘ืžื™ ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื• ืื—ื•ื” ื™ืฆื ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืื—ื•ื” ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื—ื™ื• ื”ื•ื ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช


ยง The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: โ€œWhen men strive together, a man and his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation โ€œand his brotherโ€ teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jewsโ€™ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื–ื•ืžืžื™ ืขื‘ื“ ืœื ื™ื”ืจื•ื’ื• ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ืขืฉื™ืชื ืœื• ื›ืืฉืจ ื–ืžื ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืœืื—ื™ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื‘ืขืจืช ื”ืจืข ืžืงืจื‘ืš ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื


The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: โ€œYou shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: โ€œAnd you shall put away the evil from your midst,โ€ indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื”ื ื›ืฉืจ ืœืžืœื›ื•ืช ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœื˜ืขืžื™ืš ืชื™ืงืฉื™ ืœืš ื’ืจ ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืืœื ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืžืงืจื‘ ืื—ื™ืš ืžืžื•ื‘ื—ืจ ืฉื‘ืื—ื™ืš


The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: โ€œOne from among your brothers shall you set a king over youโ€ (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: โ€œOne from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,โ€ which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื™ื”ื ืขื‘ื“ ื›ืฉืจ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื ื” ืขื“ ืฉืงืจ ื”ืขื“ ืฉืงืจ ืขื ื” ื‘ืื—ื™ื•


The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: โ€œAnd behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brotherโ€ (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?


ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ืขื“ื•ืช ืœื ืžืฆื™ืช ืืžืจืช ืืชื™ื ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžืืฉื” ื•ืžื” ืืฉื” ืฉื”ื™ื ืจืื•ื™ื” ืœื‘ื ื‘ืงื”ืœ ืคืกื•ืœื” ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืื•ื™ ืœื‘ื ื‘ืงื”ืœ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


ืžื” ืœืืฉื” ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ื” ืจืื•ื™ื” ืœืžื™ืœื” ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ืจืื•ื™ ืœืžื™ืœื” ืงื˜ืŸ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื™ืฉื ื• ื‘ืžื™ืœื” ื•ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that oneโ€™s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to oneโ€™s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžื” ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ืืฉื” ืชื•ื›ื™ื— ืฉื™ืฉื ื” ื‘ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœื” ืœืขื“ื•ืช


This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ื•ื—ื–ืจ ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืœื ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื›ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื•ืœื ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื›ืจืื™ ื–ื” ื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ ืœื”ืขื™ื“ ืืฃ ืื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื ืืช ื”ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืžืฆื•ืช ื•ืคืกื•ืœ ืœื”ืขื™ื“


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžื” ืœื”ืฆื“ ื”ืฉื•ื” ืฉื‘ื”ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืื™ืฉ ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ืื™ืฉ


This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?


ืืœื ืชื™ืชื™ ืžื’ื–ืœืŸ ืžื” ืœื’ื–ืœืŸ ืฉื›ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื• ื’ืจืžื• ืœื• ืชืืžืจ ื‘ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื™ื• ื’ืจืžื• ืœื•


The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?


ืืœื ืชื™ืชื™ ืžื’ื–ืœืŸ ื•ืžื—ื“ ืžื”ื ืš


The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.


ืžืจ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื”ื ืžืื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื


Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for childrenโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [แธฅayis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: โ€œChildren,โ€ without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.


ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช ืืœื ื’ืจ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื“ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathersโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.


ืืžืจื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื’ืจ ื ื”ื™ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืžืขืœื” ืœืžื˜ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื”


The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.


ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื’ืจ ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื”ื ืœื›ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ื ื™ื ื•ื ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืžื™ื ื” ืชืจื™ ื—ื“ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ื‘ื ื™ื ื‘ืขื“ื•ืช ืื‘ื•ืช ื•ืื™ื“ืš ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช


The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers,โ€ from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.


ื•ืขื‘ื“ ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืžื’ืจ ื•ืžื” ื’ืจ ื“ืœืžืขืœื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ืœ ืœืžื˜ื” ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื” ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?


ืืœื ืžื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื“ืžืฉืžืข ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืขื‘ื“ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœื ืœืžืขืœื” ื•ืœื ืœืžื˜ื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืกื•ืœ ืœืขื“ื•ืช ืื‘ืœ ื’ืจ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ืฉ ืœื• ื—ื™ื™ืก ืœืžื˜ื” ื›ืฉืจ ืœืขื“ื•ืช


The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.


ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืœื›ืชื•ื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืชื™ื”ื ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช ื“ืžืฉืžืข ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืคื™ ื‘ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื™ืก ืื‘ื•ืช ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืื‘ื•ืช ืขืœ ื‘ื ื™ื ื›ืชื‘ ื ืžื™ ื•ื‘ื ื™ื ืœื ื™ื•ืžืชื• ืขืœ ืื‘ื•ืช


And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers,โ€ which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: โ€œFathers shall not be put to death for children,โ€ He also wrote in the same manner: โ€œNor shall children be put to death for fathers.โ€


ื—ืจืฉ ืฉื•ื˜ื” ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ืคื’ื™ืขืชืŸ ืจืขื” ืื™ืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืžื”ื’ืจื•ื ื™ื ื”ื•ืช ื ืกื™ื‘ื ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื›ืชื‘ืชื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืœืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจื” ื‘ืชืจ ื“ืฉื›ื™ื‘ื


ยง The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,


ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืื•ืงืžื™ื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ืืžืจื” ืœืžื™ืœืชื ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื”ื•ืฉืขื™ื ืื–ืœ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ืฉืขื™ื ืืžืจื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื”ืืฉื” ืฉืžื›ืจื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืžืœื•ื’ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื‘ืขืœื” ื•ืžืชื” ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžื™ื“ ื”ืœืงื•ื—ื•ืช


Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his motherโ€™s property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the motherโ€™s husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husbandโ€™s lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


ืืžืจื•ื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืื ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื ื™ื“ืขื ื ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื•ืชื• ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืŸ ื‘ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื•ื”ืื‘ ืื™ื ื• ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ืื‘ ืžื›ื•ืจื™ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืœืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘


The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the fatherโ€™s death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the fatherโ€™s possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.


ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ืžื™ื”ื ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื•ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property never came into the sonโ€™s possession.


ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ืื‘ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abbaโ€™s analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property never came into the sonโ€™s possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the sonโ€™s lifetime, where the property came into the sonโ€™s possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.


ื“ืืชืžืจ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื•ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืืžืจ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara records a dispute between the amoraโ€™im with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, and the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.


ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืืžืจ ืœืš ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืœื ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื•ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ื”ืื‘ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื“ืœื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื‘ืœ ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ื ืžื™ ืœื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan. Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the fatherโ€™s lifetime, so that the property came into the sonโ€™s possession upon the fatherโ€™s death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, so that the property did not come into the sonโ€™s possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.


ืืœืžื ืงื ืกื‘ืจ ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื•ื›ื™ ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.


ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืื•ืžืจ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื— ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืœืœื•ืงื— ืขื“ ืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืื‘ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ืžื™ื”ืช ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ืœื ืฉื ื ืœื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืžืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ื“ืœื ืืชื• ืœื™ื“ื™ื” ื“ื‘ืŸ ืงื ื” ืœื•ืงื—


The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his fatherโ€™s lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property came into the sonโ€™s possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, where the property did not come into the sonโ€™s possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.


ืืœืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื•ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.


ื•ืื ืŸ ื”ืฉืชื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื”ื• ื•ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™ ื›ื™ ืžื™ื™ืช ืื‘ ื•ืžื™ื™ืช ื”ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื”ืื‘ ืืžืื™ ืื™ืช ืœื™ื” ืœืœื•ืงื— ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืื™ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืงื ื–ื‘ื™ืŸ


The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the fatherโ€™s lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didnโ€™t he sell property that did not belong to him?


ืืœื ืœืื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™


Rather, isnโ€™t it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.


ืื”ื“ืจื•ื” ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื–ื• ืื™ื ื” ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืžืฉื ืชื ื•


The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abbaโ€™s reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.


ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืฉืœืžื ืื™ ืชื ื™ ืื™ืคื›ื ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืื™ื›ื ืœืžืคืฉื˜ ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืงื ื™ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ืœืื• ื›ืงื ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื“ืžื™


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his sonโ€™s lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.


ืืœื ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœื‘ื ื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืจืื•ื™ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื• ื”ื•ื


Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the womanโ€™s property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืื˜ื• ื‘ืจื ื™ืจื™ืช ืื‘ื ืื‘ื ืœื ื™ืจื™ืช ื‘ืจื ืืœื ืœืื‘ืจื•ื—ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืžื‘ืจื™ื” ืงื ืืชื™ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœืื‘ืจื•ื—ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ื›ืกื™ ืžืื—ื•ื” ืืชื™


Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the sonโ€™s reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the sonโ€™s brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishnaโ€™s choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.


ืืœื ืžืื™ ืื™ื ื” ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืžืฉื ืชื ื• ืžืฉื•ื ืชืงื ืช ืื•ืฉื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื‘ืื•ืฉื ื”ืชืงื™ื ื• ื”ืืฉื” ืฉืžื›ืจื” ื‘ื ื›ืกื™ ืžืœื•ื’ ื‘ื—ื™ื™ ื‘ืขืœื” ื•ืžืชื” ื”ื‘ืขืœ ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžื™ื“ ื”ืœืงื•ื—ื•ืช


Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuelโ€™s reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husbandโ€™s rights to his wifeโ€™s property. As Rabbi Yosei bar แธคanina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husbandโ€™s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ืืฃ ืื ืŸ ื ืžื™ ืชื ื™ื ื ืžืขื™ื“ื™ื ืื ื• ื‘ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืฉื’ื™ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ื ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ืชื”


Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,


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