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Daf Yomi

February 1, 2024 | ื›ืดื‘ ื‘ืฉื‘ื˜ ืชืฉืคืดื“

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.ย 

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 91

Today’s daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in loving memory of her mother, Shoshana Rosa bat Shmuel and Minda Lea. “A self-made woman who at the age of 60 graduated high school with honors. She found fulfillment in the sanctuary of Torah learning which she bequeathed to her children and grandchildren.ย  She was known for the trait of hakarat hatov. She was always the first to thank a lecturer and to express appreciation. We had the zechut to bring her on Aliyah at the age ofย  90. We miss her every day. Yehi zichra baruch.”

If a shor muad kills someone and then injures, the court rules first on the injury for payment, then on the killing, and the ox will get killed. If first they rule on the killing, they can no longer judge the owner for the injury. This accords with Rabbi Shimon haTimni who ruled that the implement used for injuring needs to be brought before the court, as once the ox is subject to death, he is killed immediately and therefore cannot be brought to court. Another explanation is that the ruling is according to Rabbi Akiva, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon haTimni, and the case is where the owner ran away, which is why we cannot judge the owner for the damages. Does the court need to evaluate whether the act of damage was sufficient to cause the damage that was on the one who was injured? Four sources are brought to answer this question. The first three are rejected but the last one proves that the court does need to do an evaluation. If the court assesses how much the doctor bills should be and it comes out to too much or too little, the court does not change the amount – why? The Mishna mentioned a case where the accused asked for time to delay the payment. In what cases is this permitted? Is it forbidden to cause personal injury to oneself? There seem to be contradictory sources on this topic. After trying unsuccessfully to reconcile these sources, they explain it as a tanaitic debate and attribute the opinion that it is forbidden to Rabbi Elazar haKapar who explains the sin offering of the nazir since the nazir causes him/herself to suffer by not drinking wine. Rabba bar bar Hanna brought a braita saying that if one accuses another of killing his ox or cutting his sapling, the other can claim, “You told me to do it.” How can this be? Anyone can then exempt themselves in court by making this claim! Rav explained the braita in a case where the ox was going to be killed as it killed a person and the sapling was to be destroyed as it was used for idol worship. What types of fruit trees cannot be destroyed, and when is there an exception to this rule?

ืืœืžื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ื”ื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืงื˜ืœื ืœื ืžืฉื”ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ืœืื•ืžื“ื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ืœื ืžืขื ื™ื ืŸ ืœื“ื™ื ื™ื”


Rava continues the report in their name: Apparently, we require the evaluation of the court in order to render him liable to pay for the damage. And with regard to this ox that killed, once the verdict was given that it to be put to death, we do not delay the implementation of the verdict in order to wait for the evaluation of the court, and we do not delay its judgment. Therefore, the monetary case is not judged.


ื•ืืžื™ื ื ืœื”ื• ืื ื ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ืจื—


And I, Rava, said to the Sages of the school of Rav: Even if you say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who does not require assessment by the court, one could explain that here we are dealing with a case where the owner of the ox fled, and the court cannot judge his case in his absence and cannot render him liable to pay for the damage caused by his ox.


ืื™ ื‘ืจื— ื›ื™ ืœื ื“ื ื•ื”ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื ื ืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืœื ื‘ืขืœื™ื ื“ืงื‘ื™ืœ ืกื”ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืจื—


The Gemara asks: If the baraita is discussing a case where the owner fled, then in the case where they did not yet judge it as a case of capital law, how does the court judge it as a case of monetary law without the owner of the ox being present? The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the court accepted the testimony of the witnesses in the presence of the owner, and he subsequently fled.


ืกื•ืฃ ืกื•ืฃ ืžื”ื™ื›ื ืžืฉืชืœื ืžืจื™ื“ื™ื ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืชื ื ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ื•ื ืฉืชืœื ืžืจื™ื“ื™ื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ื ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช


The Gemara asks: Ultimately, from where are the damages paid in a situation where the owner fled, as he is not here to pay the damages? The Gemara answers: They are paid from plowing. The ox is rented out to plow fields, and the fees generated are used to pay the damages. Afterward, the ox is judged for the killing as a case of capital law. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to an innocuous ox, why did the baraita rule that the court does not judge it as a case of monetary law? The court should judge it as a case of monetary law first, and the damages will be paid from fees generated from renting out the animal for plowing, and then the court should judge it as a case of capital law.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืžืจื™ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื–ืืช ืื•ืžืจืช ืจื™ื“ื™ื™ื ืขืœื™ื™ื” ื“ืžืจื” ื”ื•ื


Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said in answer to this last question: That is to say that the money gained from plowing is considered like the superior-quality property of its owner. In other words, that money is like the rest of the ownerโ€™s estate, and is not considered to be part of the value of the ox itself. Since payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is taken only from the value of the ox itself, it follows that money received from renting out the ox to plow cannot be used to pay damages.


ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


ยง In connection with the ruling of the baraita that the court must assess whether the death can be attributed directly to the action of the assailant, the Gemara notes: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is there an evaluation performed with regard to damage as well, to determine whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, or is there no evaluation performed with regard to damage?


ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœืงื˜ืœื ื”ื•ื ื“ืืžื“ื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืงื ื ืฉืžื” ื‘ื”ื›ื™ ืœื ื ืคืงื ื ืฉืžื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืœื ืฉื ื


Do we say that specifically in a case of killing is where we perform an evaluation? The assessment is to determine whether a soul departs with this assault and the assailant will be held liable or whether a soul doesnโ€™t depart with this assault and the death is attributed to other factors. But in a case of damage, perhaps we say that he is liable for whatever caused the damage. Or perhaps there is no difference between the two, and with regard to damage as well, the court evaluates whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, and if it was not, he will be exempt.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื” ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื• ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืžื™ืช ืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื• ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืžื™ืช ืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ื”ื™ื• ืคื—ื•ืชื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ื•ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ืื• ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืžืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื•ื–ืง ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘


The Gemara says: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a mishna (50b) concerning the halakhot of a pit: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it but did not die he is liable to pay damages.


ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืžืžื˜ื” ืœืžืขืœื” ืงื ื—ืฉื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืžื˜ืคื— ื•ืขื“ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื™ืชื” ืœื™ื›ื ื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื™ื›ื ืืœืžื ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื™ืŸ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


What, is it not the case that the mishna is counting the handbreadths from below to above, and this is what it is saying: From one handbreadth deep until ten handbreadths deep, there is no liability for death but there is liability for damage? Apparently, with regard to damage he is liable for whatever caused the damage, even a fall into an excavation having the depth of one handbreadth. Learn from the mishna that the court does not perform an evaluation with regard to damage.


ืœื ืžืžืขืœื” ืœืžื˜ื” ืงื ื—ืฉื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื™ืชื” ืื™ื›ื ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืขืฉืจื” ืคื•ืจืชื ื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื™ืชื ืžื™ืชื” ืœื™ื›ื ื•ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ืžื ืœืš ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื›ืœ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ืžื™ื“ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ืชื–ืงื” ื‘ื™ื” ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ


The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is counting from above to below, and this is what it is saying: If the excavation is ten handbreadths deep then there is liability for death. If the excavation is slightly less than ten, there is liability for damage but there is no liability for death. And actually, I will say to you that there is an evaluation performed for damage, and for each and every circumstance, we require that there be conditions whereby the injured party could reasonably be damaged by whatever caused the damage.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ื”ื›ื”ื• ืขืœ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืกื™ืžืื• ืขืœ ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื ื’ื“ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืจื•ืื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ืื–ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื™ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ื•ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a slave owner struck his Canaanite slave on his eye and blinded him, or on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these wounds. If he struck near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these wounds. What is the reason that the slave is not emancipated? Isnโ€™t it due to the fact that we require an evaluation of the damage, and in such a case the assumption is that the ownerโ€™s action did not suffice to cause the injury? And learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage.


ืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื“ืื‘ืขื™ืช ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ืžื‘ืขื™ืช ืืช ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืชืงืข ื‘ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืื—ื–ื• ื•ืชืงืข ื‘ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘


The Gemara rejects this: No; the slave is not emancipated, because we say that it is possible that it was the slave who frightened himself, resulting in his blindness or deafness, but it was not the actual strike that caused it. An injury can result from being frightened, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 6:16): One who frightens another and thereby causes him injury is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so? If one shouted into anotherโ€™s ear and deafened him, he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. But if he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him, he is liable according to human laws as well, as he physically took hold of him.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ื—ืžืฉื” ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืื•ืžื“ื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื•ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื™ื“ ืจื™ืคื•ื™ ื•ืฉื‘ืช ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชืจืคื ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื™ื” ืžืชื ื•ื ื” ื•ื”ื•ืœืš ืื™ืŸ ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ืืœื ื›ืžื• ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื•


The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:3): With regard to the five types of indemnity that one who injures another must pay, the court evaluates the victim as to the value of the damage that he suffered, and the assailant gives this payment to him immediately. Payment for medical costs and loss of livelihood is evaluated from the moment of injury until he is healed. If the court evaluated that a certain sum would be needed to pay for his medical costs and loss of livelihood, and subsequently the victimโ€™s condition began progressively deteriorating and the sum proved to be inadequate, they give him payment only as they had evaluated him.


ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื‘ืจื™ื ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืœืžื™ืžื“ ื’ื‘ืจื ื›ืžื” ืœื™ืงืฆืจ ืžื™ื”ื ืžื›ื” ื›ืžื” ืœื ืžืงืฆืจ ืœื ืงื ืžื‘ืขื™ ืœืŸ ื“ื•ื“ืื™ ืืžื“ื™ื ืŸ ื›ื™ ืงื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืœืŸ ืœืžื™ืžื“ ื—ืคืฆื ืื™ ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื”ืื™ ื ื–ืงื ืื• ืœื ืžืื™


The baraita continues: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to evaluating an injured man to determine how long he will suffer from this injury and how long he will not suffer, we do not raise a dilemma, since it is obvious that we certainly evaluate this element. When we raise the dilemma of whether the court performs an evaluation or not, it is with regard to evaluating an item, i.e., determining if it is capable of causing this damage or if it is not capable of causing this damage. With regard to this issue, what is the halakha?


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืชื™ืžื ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื” ืื’ืจื•ืฃ ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืฉืžืกื•ืจ ืœืขื“ื” ื•ืœืขื“ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืฉืžืกื•ืจ ืœืขื“ื” ื•ืœืขื“ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sanhedrin 12:3): Shimon HaTimni says: Just as a fist is unique in that it is submitted to the assembly of judges to assess its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the fist used to strike, so too, a ruling can be issued in the case of any item that is submitted to the assembly of judges to identify its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the item used to strike. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the baraita that this is so.


ืืžืจ ืžืจ ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื‘ืจื™ื ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืื™ ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืœื›ื•ืœื™ ื™ื•ืžื ื•ืื™ืชืคื— ืœืคืœื’ื ื“ื™ื•ืžื ื•ืงื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืขื‘ื™ื“ืชื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ื™ื•ืžื ืžืŸ ืฉืžื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืจื—ืžื™ ืขืœื™ื”


The Master said above: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. This supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to this man whom they evaluated, concluding that he would not be able to perform labor for the entire day, and his wounds healed [veโ€™itpaแธฅ] at midday and he was performing labor, we give him compensation for the entire day. The injury was one that would generally cause a man to not be able to perform labor for an entire day, and it was from Heaven that they had compassion on him and healed him sooner. This does not affect the liability of the one who caused the damage.


ืจืงืง ื•ื”ื’ื™ืข ื‘ื• ื”ืจื•ืง ื•ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ื‘ื• ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื‘ื’ื“ื• ืœื ื•ื ื™ื”ื•ื™ ื›ื™ ื‘ื™ื™ืฉ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื


ยง The mishna teaches (90a): If he spat at him and his spittle reached him, or if he removed anotherโ€™s cloak, he must give the injured party four hundred dinars. Rav Pappa says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the spittle reached him. But if the spittle landed on his clothing without touching him, he is not required to pay him. The Gemara asks: Why not? Let it be like one who humiliated another with words.


ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื–ืืช ืื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื™ื™ืฉื• ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืœื•ื


The Gemara answers: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Avin: That is to say that if he humiliated another with words alone, he is exempt from paying anything, although he will be held accountable by Heaven for his sin.


ื”ื›ืœ ืœืคื™ ื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืื• ืœื—ื•ืžืจื ืงืืžืจ ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื ื™ ื“ืœื ื‘ืขื™ ืœืžืฉืงืœ ื›ื•ืœื™ ื”ืื™ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืœื—ื•ืžืจื ืงืืžืจ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขืฉื™ืจ ื“ื‘ืขื™ ืœืžื™ืชื‘ ืœื™ื” ื˜ืคื™


The mishna teaches with regard to the assessment of payment for humiliation: It is all assessed in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does the first tanna in the mishna say his opinion as a leniency, or does he say his opinion as a stringency? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: He says his opinion as a leniency, teaching that there is a poor person, who doesnโ€™t need to take so much payment for humiliation, as detailed in the fixed sums of the mishna. Or perhaps he says his opinion as a stringency, teaching that there is a rich person whom the assailant needs to give him more than those fixed sums.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื“ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืคื™ืœื• ืขื ื™ื™ื ืฉื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืจื•ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืชืŸ ื›ืื™ืœื• ื”ืŸ ื‘ื ื™ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืจื“ื• ืžื ื›ืกื™ื”ื ืฉื”ื ื‘ื ื™ ืื‘ืจื”ื ื™ืฆื—ืง ื•ื™ืขืงื‘ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna: Even with regard to the poor of the Jewish people, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished, and their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. Conclude from Rabbi Akivaโ€™s statement that the first tanna says his opinion as a leniency, meaning that while the first tanna states the principle that payment for humiliation is in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated, and therefore a poor person will receive less than the fixed sums listed in the mishna, Rabbi Akiva responds that even a poor man is deserving of those fixed sums by virtue of his esteemed lineage. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is so.


ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉืคืจืข ืจืืฉ ื”ืืฉื” [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ื•ืžื™ ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ื–ืžืŸ ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืื™ืŸ ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ื–ืžืŸ ืœื—ื‘ืœื•ืช


ยง The mishna relates: And an incident occurred involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace. The woman came before Rabbi Akiva to request that he assess payment for the humiliation that she suffered, and Rabbi Akiva obligated the assailant to give her four hundred dinars. The man said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, give me time to pay the penalty, and Rabbi Akiva gave him time. The Gemara asks: But do we give time for an assailant to pay compensation? But doesnโ€™t Rabbi แธคanina say: The court does not give one time to provide payment for injuries, and he must pay compensation immediately.


ื›ื™ ืœื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื–ืžืŸ ืœื—ื‘ืœื” ื“ื—ืกืจื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ืื‘ืœ ืœื‘ื•ืฉืช ื“ืœื ื—ืกืจื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ


The Gemara answers: When we do not give him time to pay compensation it is specifically with regard to injury, as he caused a monetary loss by inflicting physical damage on the victim. But with regard to humiliation, where he did not cause him a monetary loss, we do give him time to pay compensation.


ืฉืžืจื” ืขื•ืžื“ืช ืขืœ ืคืชื— ื—ืฆื™ืจื” ื•ื›ื•ืณ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืฆืœืœืช ื‘ืžื™ื ืื“ื™ืจื™ื ื•ื”ืขืœื™ืช ื—ืจืก ื‘ื™ื“ืš ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื•


The mishna relates that the man then waited for her until she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and caused her to uncover her own head. Rabbi Akiva said that although she caused injury to herself, which is not permitted, this does not negate the manโ€™s requirement to pay her compensation. The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said to him: You plunged into mighty waters and you raised nothing more than worthless earthenware in your hand, since it is permitted for a person to injure himself. This contradicts the mishnaโ€™s account of Rabbi Akivaโ€™s opinion.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื—ื‘ืœื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื•ื”ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื”ื•ื


The Gemara answers: Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, where it states that one may not injure himself, it is stated with regard to inflicting actual physical injury, while there, in the baraita, where it states that it is permitted for one to injure himself, it is stated with regard to causing humiliation to oneself. The Gemara asks: But the ruling of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna is stated with regard to causing humiliation,


ื•ืงืชื ื™ ื”ื—ื•ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืฉืื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื“ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื‘ื™ื™ืฉ ืืช ืขืฆืžื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ื—ื‘ืœื” ื“ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืื—ืจื™ื ืฉื—ื‘ืœื• ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ


and it teaches: With regard to one who injures himself, although it is not permitted for him to do so, he is nevertheless exempt from any sort of penalty, indicating that the prohibition is in effect even with regard to humiliation. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Akiva said to the man: It is not necessary to say with regard to humiliation, where it is permitted for a person to humiliate himself, that someone else who humiliated him is liable. But even with regard to injury, where it is not permitted for a person to injure himself, others who injured him are liable.


ื•ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื™ื›ื•ืœ ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื”ืจืข ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืœื ื”ืจืข ื™ื”ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœื”ืจืข ืื• ืœื”ื˜ื™ื‘ ืžื” ื”ื˜ื‘ื” ืจืฉื•ืช ืืฃ ื”ืจืขื” ืจืฉื•ืช ืื‘ื™ื ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื”ืจืข ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืœื ื”ืจืข


ยง The Gemara discusses whether it is permitted to injure oneself. And is a person not permitted to injure himself? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to do evil to himself and did not do evil he will be exempt from bringing an offering for having transgressed this oath. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œOr if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil or to do goodโ€ (Leviticus 5:4), which teaches that just as taking an oath to do good for which one is liable is referring to an optional activity, as opposed to taking an oath to perform a mitzva, so too, taking an oath to do evil is referring to an optional activity, as opposed to taking an oath to transgress. I can therefore include within the category of one who is liable if he transgressed his oath the person who takes an oath to do evil to himself and did not do evil. It is clear from this baraita that doing evil to oneself is permitted.


ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื‘ ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืช


The Gemara answers: Shmuel says: The ruling of the baraita is not referring to one who takes an oath to injure himself but is stated with regard to one who takes an oath stating: I will sit in observance of a fast, which it is permitted to do.


ื“ื›ื•ื•ืชื” ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืจืขืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืœื”ืฉื™ื‘ื ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืžื™ ืžื•ืชื™ื‘ ืœื”ื• ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืชื


Earlier in this same baraita, it states that one who takes an oath to do evil to others is not liable for violating his oath if he does not do evil, as it is prohibited to do evil to others. If the baraita is referring to one who takes an oath to fast, then in the corresponding situation in the context of doing evil to others, the baraita must also then be referring to one who takes an oath to have others sit in observance of a fast. The Gemara asks: Can one compel others to sit in observance of a fast?


ืื™ืŸ ื“ืžื”ื“ืง ืœื”ื• ื‘ืื ื“ืจื•ื ื


The Gemara answers: Yes; it is possible, as by preventing others from accessing food he can impose a fast on them, e.g., in a situation where he confined them in a room.


ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื–ื”ื• ื”ืจืขืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืื›ื” ืคืœื•ื ื™ ื•ืืคืฆืข ืืช ืžื•ื—ื•


The Gemara questions the assertion that this is the case of the baraita: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: What is considered taking an oath to do evil to others? It is considered such if one takes an oath stating: I will strike so-and-so and I will injure his brain. Accordingly, in the corresponding situation of doing evil to oneself it is necessary to explain that the baraita is referring to causing injury as well, and the inference that this is permitted remains.


ืืœื ืชื ืื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืื™ื›ื ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื•


Rather, it must be that this is a dispute between tannaโ€™im, as there is a tanna who says that it is not permitted for a person to injure himself, and there is a tanna who says that it is permitted for a person to injure himself.


ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ืืš ืืช ื“ืžื›ื ืœื ืคืฉืชื™ื›ื ืื“ืจืฉ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื™ื“ ื ืคืฉื•ืชื™ื›ื ืื“ืจืฉ ืืช ื“ืžื›ื


The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna that you heard that says: It is not permitted for a person to injure himself? If we say that it is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd surely your blood of your souls will I requireโ€ (Genesis 9:5), and Rabbi Elazar says: From the hand of your souls, i.e., from yourself, will I require your blood, meaning one is liable even for taking his own life, that is not a correct inference.


ื•ื“ืœืžื ืงื˜ืœื ืฉืื ื™


But perhaps killing is different. While Rabbi Elazar holds that it is prohibited to take oneโ€™s own life, it cannot be inferred from here that he holds that one is liable for injuring himself.


ืืœื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืžืงืจืขื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืžืช ื•ืœื ืžื“ืจื›ื™ ื”ืืžื•ืจื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืฉืžืขืชื™ ืฉื”ืžืงืจืข ืขืœ ื”ืžืช ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžื“ืื™ ืœื•ืงื” ืžืฉื•ื ื‘ืœ ืชืฉื—ื™ืช ื•ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื•ืคื•


The Gemara suggests: Rather, it is the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: One may rend garments in anguish over one who died, and it is not considered of the ways of the Amorites, but a Jewish custom. Rabbi Elazar says: I heard that one who rends his garments excessively over one who died is flogged for having transgressed the prohibition of: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara suggests: And all the more so it is the case that according to Rabbi Elazar one who injures his body in anguish transgresses this prohibition.


ื•ื“ืœืžื ื‘ื’ื“ื™ื ืฉืื ื™ ื“ืคืกื™ื“ื ื“ืœื ื”ื“ืจ ื”ื•ื ื›ื™ ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืงืจื™ ืœืžืื ื™ ืžื›ื‘ื“ื•ืชื ื•ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื›ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืžืกื’ื™ ื‘ื™ื ื™ ื”ื™ื–ืžื™ ื•ื”ื’ื ืžื“ืœื™ ืœื”ื• ืœืžืื ื™ื” ืืžืจ ื–ื” ืžืขืœื” ืืจื•ื›ื” ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ืžืขืœื” ืืจื•ื›ื”


The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But perhaps garments are different, in that tearing them is a loss that is irreversible, like that practice of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, who would refer to his garments as: My honor, and like that practice of Rav แธคisda, who, when he would walk among thorns and shrubs, would raise his clothing despite the fact that his skin would get scratched by the thorns. He said in explanation of his actions: This flesh will heal if scratched, but that garment will not heal if torn. Similarly, perhaps it is prohibited to rend oneโ€™s garments, but it is permitted to injure oneself.


ืืœื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ืงืคืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื›ืคืจ ืขืœื™ื• ืžืืฉืจ ื—ื˜ื ืขืœ ื”ื ืคืฉ ื•ื›ื™ ื‘ืื™ื–ื” ื ืคืฉ ื—ื˜ื ื–ื” ืืœื ืฉืฆื™ืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžืŸ ื”ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ื–ื” ืฉืœื ืฆื™ืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืืœื ืžืŸ ื”ื™ื™ืŸ ื ืงืจื ื—ื•ื˜ื ื”ืžืฆืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืขืœ ืื—ืช ื›ืžื” ื•ื›ืžื”


Rather, it is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished said: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to a nazirite: โ€œAnd he shall atone for him for sinning by the soulโ€ (Numbers 6:11)? And with which soul did this person sin by becoming a nazirite? Rather, in that he afflicted himself by abstaining from wine he is considered to have sinned with his own soul, and he must bring a sin-offering for the naziriteship itself, for causing his body to suffer. And are these matters not inferred a fortiori: And just as this person who afflicted himself by abstaining only from wine is nevertheless called a sinner, one who afflicts himself by abstaining from everything, through fasting or other acts of mortification, all the more so is he described as a sinner? Consequently, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar holds that one may not harm himself in any manner.


ื”ืงื•ืฆืฅ ื ื˜ื™ืขื•ืชื™ื• [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ืชื ื™ ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืฉื•ืจื™ ื”ืจื’ืช ื ื˜ื™ืขื•ืชื™ ืงืฆืฆืช ืืชื” ืืžืจืช ืœื™ ืœื”ื•ืจื’ื• ืืชื” ืืžืจืช ืœื™ ืœืงื•ืฆืฆื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื ืฉื‘ืงืช ื—ื™ื™ ืœื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื”


ยง The mishna teaches: One who cuts down his own saplings, although it is not permitted for him to do so, is exempt from payment. Nevertheless, others who cut down his saplings are liable. Rabba bar bar แธคana taught the following baraita before Rav: If one charged another: You killed my ox, or: You cut down my saplings, and you are liable to pay for them, and the other responds: You told me to kill the ox, or: You told me to cut down the saplings, he is exempt from paying. Rav said to him: If that is so, you let no creature exist. Is it in his power to assert that because the other instructed him to cause damage he is exempt? With this claim, anyone who causes damage can exempt himself.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืกืžื™ื™ื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืชืชืจื’ื ืžืชื ื™ืชืš ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื”ืขื•ืžื“ ืœื”ืจื™ื’ื” ื•ื‘ืื™ืœืŸ ื”ืขื•ืžื“ ืœืงืฆื™ืฆื”


Rabba bar bar แธคana said to Rav: Shall I erase this baraita from the baraitot that I teach? Rav said to him: No, just interpret that your baraita is stated with regard to an ox that is ready to be killed, e.g., it had gored, and the owner decided to have it killed, and it is stated with regard to a tree that is ready to be cut down for whatever reason, e.g., it was worshipped as part of an idolatrous rite or it is situated in a manner that poses a danger to the public. In such a case there is reason to believe that he was in fact instructed to cut it down.


ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžืื™ ืงื ื˜ืขื™ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื ื ื‘ืขื™ื ื ืœืžื™ืขื‘ื“ ื”ื ืžืฆื•ื”


The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the owner of the ox or tree acknowledges that it would be killed or cut down in any event, what claim is he stating to him, as there was no loss resulting from the action of the other? The Gemara answers: The case is where he said to him: I desire to perform this mitzva of removing a danger or destroying idolatry by myself, and therefore I am demanding payment from you for having prevented me from doing so.


ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ืฉืคืš ื•ื›ืกื” ืžื™ ืฉืฉืคืš ื™ื›ืกื” ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉืฉื—ื˜ ื•ืงื“ื ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ื›ืกื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื• ืจื‘ืŸ ื’ืžืœื™ืืœ ืœื™ืชืŸ ืœื• ืขืฉืจื” ื–ื”ื•ื‘ื™ื


This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird: โ€œHe shall pour out the blood thereof, and he shall cover it with dustโ€ (Leviticus 17:13). This teaches that the one who poured the blood, i.e., the one who slaughtered, shall cover the blood. An incident occurred involving one who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or bird, and another preempted him and covered the blood, and Rabban Gamliel deemed him liable to give ten golden coins to the one who slaughtered the animal, as he prevented him from performing the mitzva.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ื™ืงืœื ื“ื˜ืขืŸ ืงื‘ื ืืกื•ืจ ืœืžืงืฆืฆื™ื”


ยง In connection with the prohibition against cutting down trees the Gemara notes: Rav said with regard to a palm tree that still produces fruit in the amount of a kav, that it is prohibited to cut it down due to the prohibition of: โ€œWhen you shall besiege a cityโ€ฆyou shall not destroy the treesโ€ (Deuteronomy 20:19).


ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื›ืžื” ื™ื”ื ื‘ื–ื™ืช ื•ืœื ื™ืงืฆืฆื• ืจื•ื‘ืข ืฉืื ื™ ื–ื™ืชื™ื ื“ื—ืฉื™ื‘ื™


The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rav from what was taught in a mishna (Sheviโ€™it 4:10): How much fruit must be on an olive tree so that one may not cut it down? A quarterkav. Why did Rav say that it must produce a full kav? The Gemara answers: Olive trees are different, since they are significant. Therefore, even a quarter-kav is valuable.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืœื ืฉื›ื™ื‘ ืฉื™ื‘ื—ืช ื‘ืจื™ ืืœื ื“ืงืฅ ืชืื™ื ืชื ื‘ืœื ื–ืžื ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ื•ืื ื”ื™ื” ืžืขื•ืœื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ื ืžื•ืชืจ


Rabbi แธคanina said: My son Shivแธฅat did not die for any reason other than that he cut down a fig tree before its time. Ravina says: But if the lumber was greater in monetary value than its fruits, it is permitted to chop it down, and this does not violate the prohibition against destroying a tree.


ืชื ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืจืง ืขืฅ ืืฉืจ ืชื“ืข ื–ื” ืื™ืœืŸ ืžืื›ืœ ื›ื™ ืœื ืขืฅ ืžืื›ืœ ื”ื•ื ื–ื” ืื™ืœืŸ ืกืจืง


This halakha is also taught in a baraita. The verse states: โ€œOnly the trees of which you know that they are not trees for food, them you may destroy and cut downโ€ (Deuteronomy 20:20). โ€œOnly the trees of which you knowโ€; this is referring to a tree that bears fruit used for food, and it is permitted to cut down this type of tree under certain circumstances. โ€œThat they are not trees for foodโ€; this is referring to a barren tree.


ื•ื›ื™ ืžืื—ืจ ืฉืกื•ืคื• ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื›ื™ ืœื ืขืฅ ืžืื›ืœ ืœื”ืงื“ื™ื ืกืจืง ืœืžืื›ืœ


The Gemara asks: And since the baraita will ultimately include all types of trees, so that even a tree that produces fruit may be cut down, what, then, is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œThat they are not trees for food,โ€ which indicates that it is permitted to cut down only a barren tree? The Gemara answers: It is to give precedence to cutting down a barren tree over a tree whose fruit is used for food.


  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.ย 

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

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Bava Kamma 91

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Bava Kamma 91

ืืœืžื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ื”ื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืงื˜ืœื ืœื ืžืฉื”ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ืœืื•ืžื“ื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื•ืœื ืžืขื ื™ื ืŸ ืœื“ื™ื ื™ื”


Rava continues the report in their name: Apparently, we require the evaluation of the court in order to render him liable to pay for the damage. And with regard to this ox that killed, once the verdict was given that it to be put to death, we do not delay the implementation of the verdict in order to wait for the evaluation of the court, and we do not delay its judgment. Therefore, the monetary case is not judged.


ื•ืืžื™ื ื ืœื”ื• ืื ื ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ืจื—


And I, Rava, said to the Sages of the school of Rav: Even if you say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who does not require assessment by the court, one could explain that here we are dealing with a case where the owner of the ox fled, and the court cannot judge his case in his absence and cannot render him liable to pay for the damage caused by his ox.


ืื™ ื‘ืจื— ื›ื™ ืœื ื“ื ื•ื”ื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื ื ืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืœื ื‘ืขืœื™ื ื“ืงื‘ื™ืœ ืกื”ื“ื™ ื•ื‘ืจื—


The Gemara asks: If the baraita is discussing a case where the owner fled, then in the case where they did not yet judge it as a case of capital law, how does the court judge it as a case of monetary law without the owner of the ox being present? The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the court accepted the testimony of the witnesses in the presence of the owner, and he subsequently fled.


ืกื•ืฃ ืกื•ืฃ ืžื”ื™ื›ื ืžืฉืชืœื ืžืจื™ื“ื™ื ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืชื ื ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ื•ื ืฉืชืœื ืžืจื™ื“ื™ื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ื ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช


The Gemara asks: Ultimately, from where are the damages paid in a situation where the owner fled, as he is not here to pay the damages? The Gemara answers: They are paid from plowing. The ox is rented out to plow fields, and the fees generated are used to pay the damages. Afterward, the ox is judged for the killing as a case of capital law. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to an innocuous ox, why did the baraita rule that the court does not judge it as a case of monetary law? The court should judge it as a case of monetary law first, and the damages will be paid from fees generated from renting out the animal for plowing, and then the court should judge it as a case of capital law.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืžืจื™ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื–ืืช ืื•ืžืจืช ืจื™ื“ื™ื™ื ืขืœื™ื™ื” ื“ืžืจื” ื”ื•ื


Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said in answer to this last question: That is to say that the money gained from plowing is considered like the superior-quality property of its owner. In other words, that money is like the rest of the ownerโ€™s estate, and is not considered to be part of the value of the ox itself. Since payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is taken only from the value of the ox itself, it follows that money received from renting out the ox to plow cannot be used to pay damages.


ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


ยง In connection with the ruling of the baraita that the court must assess whether the death can be attributed directly to the action of the assailant, the Gemara notes: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is there an evaluation performed with regard to damage as well, to determine whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, or is there no evaluation performed with regard to damage?


ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœืงื˜ืœื ื”ื•ื ื“ืืžื“ื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืงื ื ืฉืžื” ื‘ื”ื›ื™ ืœื ื ืคืงื ื ืฉืžื” ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืœื ืฉื ื


Do we say that specifically in a case of killing is where we perform an evaluation? The assessment is to determine whether a soul departs with this assault and the assailant will be held liable or whether a soul doesnโ€™t depart with this assault and the death is attributed to other factors. But in a case of damage, perhaps we say that he is liable for whatever caused the damage. Or perhaps there is no difference between the two, and with regard to damage as well, the court evaluates whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, and if it was not, he will be exempt.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื” ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื• ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืžื™ืช ืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื• ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืžื™ืช ืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ื”ื™ื• ืคื—ื•ืชื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉืจื” ื˜ืคื—ื™ื ื•ื ืคืœ ืœืชื•ื›ื• ืฉื•ืจ ืื• ื—ืžื•ืจ ื•ืžืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื•ื–ืง ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘


The Gemara says: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a mishna (50b) concerning the halakhot of a pit: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it but did not die he is liable to pay damages.


ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืžืžื˜ื” ืœืžืขืœื” ืงื ื—ืฉื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืžื˜ืคื— ื•ืขื“ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื™ืชื” ืœื™ื›ื ื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื™ื›ื ืืœืžื ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื™ืŸ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


What, is it not the case that the mishna is counting the handbreadths from below to above, and this is what it is saying: From one handbreadth deep until ten handbreadths deep, there is no liability for death but there is liability for damage? Apparently, with regard to damage he is liable for whatever caused the damage, even a fall into an excavation having the depth of one handbreadth. Learn from the mishna that the court does not perform an evaluation with regard to damage.


ืœื ืžืžืขืœื” ืœืžื˜ื” ืงื ื—ืฉื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืขืฉืจื” ืžื™ืชื” ืื™ื›ื ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืขืฉืจื” ืคื•ืจืชื ื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืื™ืชื ืžื™ืชื” ืœื™ื›ื ื•ืœืขื•ืœื ืื™ืžื ืœืš ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื›ืœ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ืžื™ื“ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ืชื–ืงื” ื‘ื™ื” ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ


The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is counting from above to below, and this is what it is saying: If the excavation is ten handbreadths deep then there is liability for death. If the excavation is slightly less than ten, there is liability for damage but there is no liability for death. And actually, I will say to you that there is an evaluation performed for damage, and for each and every circumstance, we require that there be conditions whereby the injured party could reasonably be damaged by whatever caused the damage.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ื”ื›ื”ื• ืขืœ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืกื™ืžืื• ืขืœ ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื ื’ื“ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืจื•ืื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ืื–ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื™ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืœืื• ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ื•ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ื ื ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ


The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a slave owner struck his Canaanite slave on his eye and blinded him, or on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these wounds. If he struck near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these wounds. What is the reason that the slave is not emancipated? Isnโ€™t it due to the fact that we require an evaluation of the damage, and in such a case the assumption is that the ownerโ€™s action did not suffice to cause the injury? And learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage.


ืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื“ืื‘ืขื™ืช ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ื”ืžื‘ืขื™ืช ืืช ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืชืงืข ื‘ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืื—ื–ื• ื•ืชืงืข ื‘ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ื™ืจืฉื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘


The Gemara rejects this: No; the slave is not emancipated, because we say that it is possible that it was the slave who frightened himself, resulting in his blindness or deafness, but it was not the actual strike that caused it. An injury can result from being frightened, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 6:16): One who frightens another and thereby causes him injury is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so? If one shouted into anotherโ€™s ear and deafened him, he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. But if he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him, he is liable according to human laws as well, as he physically took hold of him.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ื—ืžืฉื” ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืื•ืžื“ื™ืŸ ืื•ืชื• ื•ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื™ื“ ืจื™ืคื•ื™ ื•ืฉื‘ืช ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชืจืคื ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื™ื” ืžืชื ื•ื ื” ื•ื”ื•ืœืš ืื™ืŸ ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ืืœื ื›ืžื• ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื•


The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:3): With regard to the five types of indemnity that one who injures another must pay, the court evaluates the victim as to the value of the damage that he suffered, and the assailant gives this payment to him immediately. Payment for medical costs and loss of livelihood is evaluated from the moment of injury until he is healed. If the court evaluated that a certain sum would be needed to pay for his medical costs and loss of livelihood, and subsequently the victimโ€™s condition began progressively deteriorating and the sum proved to be inadequate, they give him payment only as they had evaluated him.


ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื‘ืจื™ื ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืœืžื™ืžื“ ื’ื‘ืจื ื›ืžื” ืœื™ืงืฆืจ ืžื™ื”ื ืžื›ื” ื›ืžื” ืœื ืžืงืฆืจ ืœื ืงื ืžื‘ืขื™ ืœืŸ ื“ื•ื“ืื™ ืืžื“ื™ื ืŸ ื›ื™ ืงื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืœืŸ ืœืžื™ืžื“ ื—ืคืฆื ืื™ ืขื‘ื™ื“ ื”ืื™ ื ื–ืงื ืื• ืœื ืžืื™


The baraita continues: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to evaluating an injured man to determine how long he will suffer from this injury and how long he will not suffer, we do not raise a dilemma, since it is obvious that we certainly evaluate this element. When we raise the dilemma of whether the court performs an evaluation or not, it is with regard to evaluating an item, i.e., determining if it is capable of causing this damage or if it is not capable of causing this damage. With regard to this issue, what is the halakha?


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืชื™ืžื ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื” ืื’ืจื•ืฃ ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืฉืžืกื•ืจ ืœืขื“ื” ื•ืœืขื“ื™ื ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืฉืžืกื•ืจ ืœืขื“ื” ื•ืœืขื“ื™ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื™ืฉ ืื•ืžื“ ืœื ื–ืงื™ืŸ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sanhedrin 12:3): Shimon HaTimni says: Just as a fist is unique in that it is submitted to the assembly of judges to assess its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the fist used to strike, so too, a ruling can be issued in the case of any item that is submitted to the assembly of judges to identify its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the item used to strike. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the baraita that this is so.


ืืžืจ ืžืจ ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ื•ื”ื‘ืจื™ื ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื• ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืื™ ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžื“ื•ื”ื• ืœื›ื•ืœื™ ื™ื•ืžื ื•ืื™ืชืคื— ืœืคืœื’ื ื“ื™ื•ืžื ื•ืงื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืขื‘ื™ื“ืชื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ื™ื•ืžื ืžืŸ ืฉืžื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืจื—ืžื™ ืขืœื™ื”


The Master said above: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. This supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to this man whom they evaluated, concluding that he would not be able to perform labor for the entire day, and his wounds healed [veโ€™itpaแธฅ] at midday and he was performing labor, we give him compensation for the entire day. The injury was one that would generally cause a man to not be able to perform labor for an entire day, and it was from Heaven that they had compassion on him and healed him sooner. This does not affect the liability of the one who caused the damage.


ืจืงืง ื•ื”ื’ื™ืข ื‘ื• ื”ืจื•ืง ื•ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ื‘ื• ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื‘ื’ื“ื• ืœื ื•ื ื™ื”ื•ื™ ื›ื™ ื‘ื™ื™ืฉ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื


ยง The mishna teaches (90a): If he spat at him and his spittle reached him, or if he removed anotherโ€™s cloak, he must give the injured party four hundred dinars. Rav Pappa says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the spittle reached him. But if the spittle landed on his clothing without touching him, he is not required to pay him. The Gemara asks: Why not? Let it be like one who humiliated another with words.


ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื–ืืช ืื•ืžืจืช ื‘ื™ื™ืฉื• ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืœื•ื


The Gemara answers: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Avin: That is to say that if he humiliated another with words alone, he is exempt from paying anything, although he will be held accountable by Heaven for his sin.


ื”ื›ืœ ืœืคื™ ื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืื• ืœื—ื•ืžืจื ืงืืžืจ ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขื ื™ ื“ืœื ื‘ืขื™ ืœืžืฉืงืœ ื›ื•ืœื™ ื”ืื™ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืœื—ื•ืžืจื ืงืืžืจ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืขืฉื™ืจ ื“ื‘ืขื™ ืœืžื™ืชื‘ ืœื™ื” ื˜ืคื™


The mishna teaches with regard to the assessment of payment for humiliation: It is all assessed in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does the first tanna in the mishna say his opinion as a leniency, or does he say his opinion as a stringency? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: He says his opinion as a leniency, teaching that there is a poor person, who doesnโ€™t need to take so much payment for humiliation, as detailed in the fixed sums of the mishna. Or perhaps he says his opinion as a stringency, teaching that there is a rich person whom the assailant needs to give him more than those fixed sums.


ืชื ืฉืžืข ืžื“ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืคื™ืœื• ืขื ื™ื™ื ืฉื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืจื•ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืชืŸ ื›ืื™ืœื• ื”ืŸ ื‘ื ื™ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืจื“ื• ืžื ื›ืกื™ื”ื ืฉื”ื ื‘ื ื™ ืื‘ืจื”ื ื™ืฆื—ืง ื•ื™ืขืงื‘ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœืงื•ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna: Even with regard to the poor of the Jewish people, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished, and their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. Conclude from Rabbi Akivaโ€™s statement that the first tanna says his opinion as a leniency, meaning that while the first tanna states the principle that payment for humiliation is in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated, and therefore a poor person will receive less than the fixed sums listed in the mishna, Rabbi Akiva responds that even a poor man is deserving of those fixed sums by virtue of his esteemed lineage. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is so.


ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉืคืจืข ืจืืฉ ื”ืืฉื” [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ื•ืžื™ ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ื–ืžืŸ ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืื™ืŸ ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ื–ืžืŸ ืœื—ื‘ืœื•ืช


ยง The mishna relates: And an incident occurred involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace. The woman came before Rabbi Akiva to request that he assess payment for the humiliation that she suffered, and Rabbi Akiva obligated the assailant to give her four hundred dinars. The man said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, give me time to pay the penalty, and Rabbi Akiva gave him time. The Gemara asks: But do we give time for an assailant to pay compensation? But doesnโ€™t Rabbi แธคanina say: The court does not give one time to provide payment for injuries, and he must pay compensation immediately.


ื›ื™ ืœื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื–ืžืŸ ืœื—ื‘ืœื” ื“ื—ืกืจื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ืื‘ืœ ืœื‘ื•ืฉืช ื“ืœื ื—ืกืจื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ื™ื”ื‘ื™ื ืŸ


The Gemara answers: When we do not give him time to pay compensation it is specifically with regard to injury, as he caused a monetary loss by inflicting physical damage on the victim. But with regard to humiliation, where he did not cause him a monetary loss, we do give him time to pay compensation.


ืฉืžืจื” ืขื•ืžื“ืช ืขืœ ืคืชื— ื—ืฆื™ืจื” ื•ื›ื•ืณ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืฆืœืœืช ื‘ืžื™ื ืื“ื™ืจื™ื ื•ื”ืขืœื™ืช ื—ืจืก ื‘ื™ื“ืš ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื•


The mishna relates that the man then waited for her until she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and caused her to uncover her own head. Rabbi Akiva said that although she caused injury to herself, which is not permitted, this does not negate the manโ€™s requirement to pay her compensation. The Gemara asks: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said to him: You plunged into mighty waters and you raised nothing more than worthless earthenware in your hand, since it is permitted for a person to injure himself. This contradicts the mishnaโ€™s account of Rabbi Akivaโ€™s opinion.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื—ื‘ืœื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื•ื”ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื”ื•ื


The Gemara answers: Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, where it states that one may not injure himself, it is stated with regard to inflicting actual physical injury, while there, in the baraita, where it states that it is permitted for one to injure himself, it is stated with regard to causing humiliation to oneself. The Gemara asks: But the ruling of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna is stated with regard to causing humiliation,


ื•ืงืชื ื™ ื”ื—ื•ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืฉืื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ื‘ื•ืฉืช ื“ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื‘ื™ื™ืฉ ืืช ืขืฆืžื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ื—ื‘ืœื” ื“ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืื—ืจื™ื ืฉื—ื‘ืœื• ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ


and it teaches: With regard to one who injures himself, although it is not permitted for him to do so, he is nevertheless exempt from any sort of penalty, indicating that the prohibition is in effect even with regard to humiliation. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Akiva said to the man: It is not necessary to say with regard to humiliation, where it is permitted for a person to humiliate himself, that someone else who humiliated him is liable. But even with regard to injury, where it is not permitted for a person to injure himself, others who injured him are liable.


ื•ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื™ื›ื•ืœ ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื”ืจืข ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืœื ื”ืจืข ื™ื”ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœื”ืจืข ืื• ืœื”ื˜ื™ื‘ ืžื” ื”ื˜ื‘ื” ืจืฉื•ืช ืืฃ ื”ืจืขื” ืจืฉื•ืช ืื‘ื™ื ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื”ืจืข ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืœื ื”ืจืข


ยง The Gemara discusses whether it is permitted to injure oneself. And is a person not permitted to injure himself? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to do evil to himself and did not do evil he will be exempt from bringing an offering for having transgressed this oath. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œOr if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil or to do goodโ€ (Leviticus 5:4), which teaches that just as taking an oath to do good for which one is liable is referring to an optional activity, as opposed to taking an oath to perform a mitzva, so too, taking an oath to do evil is referring to an optional activity, as opposed to taking an oath to transgress. I can therefore include within the category of one who is liable if he transgressed his oath the person who takes an oath to do evil to himself and did not do evil. It is clear from this baraita that doing evil to oneself is permitted.


ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื‘ ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืช


The Gemara answers: Shmuel says: The ruling of the baraita is not referring to one who takes an oath to injure himself but is stated with regard to one who takes an oath stating: I will sit in observance of a fast, which it is permitted to do.


ื“ื›ื•ื•ืชื” ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืจืขืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืœื”ืฉื™ื‘ื ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืžื™ ืžื•ืชื™ื‘ ืœื”ื• ื‘ืชืขื ื™ืชื


Earlier in this same baraita, it states that one who takes an oath to do evil to others is not liable for violating his oath if he does not do evil, as it is prohibited to do evil to others. If the baraita is referring to one who takes an oath to fast, then in the corresponding situation in the context of doing evil to others, the baraita must also then be referring to one who takes an oath to have others sit in observance of a fast. The Gemara asks: Can one compel others to sit in observance of a fast?


ืื™ืŸ ื“ืžื”ื“ืง ืœื”ื• ื‘ืื ื“ืจื•ื ื


The Gemara answers: Yes; it is possible, as by preventing others from accessing food he can impose a fast on them, e.g., in a situation where he confined them in a room.


ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื–ื”ื• ื”ืจืขืช ืื—ืจื™ื ืื›ื” ืคืœื•ื ื™ ื•ืืคืฆืข ืืช ืžื•ื—ื•


The Gemara questions the assertion that this is the case of the baraita: But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: What is considered taking an oath to do evil to others? It is considered such if one takes an oath stating: I will strike so-and-so and I will injure his brain. Accordingly, in the corresponding situation of doing evil to oneself it is necessary to explain that the baraita is referring to causing injury as well, and the inference that this is permitted remains.


ืืœื ืชื ืื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื•ืื™ื›ื ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื•


Rather, it must be that this is a dispute between tannaโ€™im, as there is a tanna who says that it is not permitted for a person to injure himself, and there is a tanna who says that it is permitted for a person to injure himself.


ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจืฉืื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ืืš ืืช ื“ืžื›ื ืœื ืคืฉืชื™ื›ื ืื“ืจืฉ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื™ื“ ื ืคืฉื•ืชื™ื›ื ืื“ืจืฉ ืืช ื“ืžื›ื


The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna that you heard that says: It is not permitted for a person to injure himself? If we say that it is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd surely your blood of your souls will I requireโ€ (Genesis 9:5), and Rabbi Elazar says: From the hand of your souls, i.e., from yourself, will I require your blood, meaning one is liable even for taking his own life, that is not a correct inference.


ื•ื“ืœืžื ืงื˜ืœื ืฉืื ื™


But perhaps killing is different. While Rabbi Elazar holds that it is prohibited to take oneโ€™s own life, it cannot be inferred from here that he holds that one is liable for injuring himself.


ืืœื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืžืงืจืขื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืžืช ื•ืœื ืžื“ืจื›ื™ ื”ืืžื•ืจื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืฉืžืขืชื™ ืฉื”ืžืงืจืข ืขืœ ื”ืžืช ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžื“ืื™ ืœื•ืงื” ืžืฉื•ื ื‘ืœ ืชืฉื—ื™ืช ื•ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื’ื•ืคื•


The Gemara suggests: Rather, it is the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: One may rend garments in anguish over one who died, and it is not considered of the ways of the Amorites, but a Jewish custom. Rabbi Elazar says: I heard that one who rends his garments excessively over one who died is flogged for having transgressed the prohibition of: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara suggests: And all the more so it is the case that according to Rabbi Elazar one who injures his body in anguish transgresses this prohibition.


ื•ื“ืœืžื ื‘ื’ื“ื™ื ืฉืื ื™ ื“ืคืกื™ื“ื ื“ืœื ื”ื“ืจ ื”ื•ื ื›ื™ ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืงืจื™ ืœืžืื ื™ ืžื›ื‘ื“ื•ืชื ื•ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื›ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืžืกื’ื™ ื‘ื™ื ื™ ื”ื™ื–ืžื™ ื•ื”ื’ื ืžื“ืœื™ ืœื”ื• ืœืžืื ื™ื” ืืžืจ ื–ื” ืžืขืœื” ืืจื•ื›ื” ื•ื–ื” ืื™ื ื• ืžืขืœื” ืืจื•ื›ื”


The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But perhaps garments are different, in that tearing them is a loss that is irreversible, like that practice of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, who would refer to his garments as: My honor, and like that practice of Rav แธคisda, who, when he would walk among thorns and shrubs, would raise his clothing despite the fact that his skin would get scratched by the thorns. He said in explanation of his actions: This flesh will heal if scratched, but that garment will not heal if torn. Similarly, perhaps it is prohibited to rend oneโ€™s garments, but it is permitted to injure oneself.


ืืœื ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ืงืคืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื›ืคืจ ืขืœื™ื• ืžืืฉืจ ื—ื˜ื ืขืœ ื”ื ืคืฉ ื•ื›ื™ ื‘ืื™ื–ื” ื ืคืฉ ื—ื˜ื ื–ื” ืืœื ืฉืฆื™ืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžืŸ ื”ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ื–ื” ืฉืœื ืฆื™ืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืืœื ืžืŸ ื”ื™ื™ืŸ ื ืงืจื ื—ื•ื˜ื ื”ืžืฆืขืจ ืขืฆืžื• ืžื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืขืœ ืื—ืช ื›ืžื” ื•ื›ืžื”


Rather, it is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished said: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to a nazirite: โ€œAnd he shall atone for him for sinning by the soulโ€ (Numbers 6:11)? And with which soul did this person sin by becoming a nazirite? Rather, in that he afflicted himself by abstaining from wine he is considered to have sinned with his own soul, and he must bring a sin-offering for the naziriteship itself, for causing his body to suffer. And are these matters not inferred a fortiori: And just as this person who afflicted himself by abstaining only from wine is nevertheless called a sinner, one who afflicts himself by abstaining from everything, through fasting or other acts of mortification, all the more so is he described as a sinner? Consequently, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar holds that one may not harm himself in any manner.


ื”ืงื•ืฆืฅ ื ื˜ื™ืขื•ืชื™ื• [ื•ื›ื•ืณ] ืชื ื™ ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื” ืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืฉื•ืจื™ ื”ืจื’ืช ื ื˜ื™ืขื•ืชื™ ืงืฆืฆืช ืืชื” ืืžืจืช ืœื™ ืœื”ื•ืจื’ื• ืืชื” ืืžืจืช ืœื™ ืœืงื•ืฆืฆื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื ืฉื‘ืงืช ื—ื™ื™ ืœื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื”


ยง The mishna teaches: One who cuts down his own saplings, although it is not permitted for him to do so, is exempt from payment. Nevertheless, others who cut down his saplings are liable. Rabba bar bar แธคana taught the following baraita before Rav: If one charged another: You killed my ox, or: You cut down my saplings, and you are liable to pay for them, and the other responds: You told me to kill the ox, or: You told me to cut down the saplings, he is exempt from paying. Rav said to him: If that is so, you let no creature exist. Is it in his power to assert that because the other instructed him to cause damage he is exempt? With this claim, anyone who causes damage can exempt himself.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืกืžื™ื™ื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื ืชืชืจื’ื ืžืชื ื™ืชืš ื‘ืฉื•ืจ ื”ืขื•ืžื“ ืœื”ืจื™ื’ื” ื•ื‘ืื™ืœืŸ ื”ืขื•ืžื“ ืœืงืฆื™ืฆื”


Rabba bar bar แธคana said to Rav: Shall I erase this baraita from the baraitot that I teach? Rav said to him: No, just interpret that your baraita is stated with regard to an ox that is ready to be killed, e.g., it had gored, and the owner decided to have it killed, and it is stated with regard to a tree that is ready to be cut down for whatever reason, e.g., it was worshipped as part of an idolatrous rite or it is situated in a manner that poses a danger to the public. In such a case there is reason to believe that he was in fact instructed to cut it down.


ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžืื™ ืงื ื˜ืขื™ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื ื ื‘ืขื™ื ื ืœืžื™ืขื‘ื“ ื”ื ืžืฆื•ื”


The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the owner of the ox or tree acknowledges that it would be killed or cut down in any event, what claim is he stating to him, as there was no loss resulting from the action of the other? The Gemara answers: The case is where he said to him: I desire to perform this mitzva of removing a danger or destroying idolatry by myself, and therefore I am demanding payment from you for having prevented me from doing so.


ื“ืชื ื™ื ื•ืฉืคืš ื•ื›ืกื” ืžื™ ืฉืฉืคืš ื™ื›ืกื” ื•ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืฉืฉื—ื˜ ื•ืงื“ื ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ื›ืกื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื• ืจื‘ืŸ ื’ืžืœื™ืืœ ืœื™ืชืŸ ืœื• ืขืฉืจื” ื–ื”ื•ื‘ื™ื


This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird: โ€œHe shall pour out the blood thereof, and he shall cover it with dustโ€ (Leviticus 17:13). This teaches that the one who poured the blood, i.e., the one who slaughtered, shall cover the blood. An incident occurred involving one who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or bird, and another preempted him and covered the blood, and Rabban Gamliel deemed him liable to give ten golden coins to the one who slaughtered the animal, as he prevented him from performing the mitzva.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ื™ืงืœื ื“ื˜ืขืŸ ืงื‘ื ืืกื•ืจ ืœืžืงืฆืฆื™ื”


ยง In connection with the prohibition against cutting down trees the Gemara notes: Rav said with regard to a palm tree that still produces fruit in the amount of a kav, that it is prohibited to cut it down due to the prohibition of: โ€œWhen you shall besiege a cityโ€ฆyou shall not destroy the treesโ€ (Deuteronomy 20:19).


ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื›ืžื” ื™ื”ื ื‘ื–ื™ืช ื•ืœื ื™ืงืฆืฆื• ืจื•ื‘ืข ืฉืื ื™ ื–ื™ืชื™ื ื“ื—ืฉื™ื‘ื™


The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rav from what was taught in a mishna (Sheviโ€™it 4:10): How much fruit must be on an olive tree so that one may not cut it down? A quarterkav. Why did Rav say that it must produce a full kav? The Gemara answers: Olive trees are different, since they are significant. Therefore, even a quarter-kav is valuable.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืœื ืฉื›ื™ื‘ ืฉื™ื‘ื—ืช ื‘ืจื™ ืืœื ื“ืงืฅ ืชืื™ื ืชื ื‘ืœื ื–ืžื ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ื•ืื ื”ื™ื” ืžืขื•ืœื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ื ืžื•ืชืจ


Rabbi แธคanina said: My son Shivแธฅat did not die for any reason other than that he cut down a fig tree before its time. Ravina says: But if the lumber was greater in monetary value than its fruits, it is permitted to chop it down, and this does not violate the prohibition against destroying a tree.


ืชื ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืจืง ืขืฅ ืืฉืจ ืชื“ืข ื–ื” ืื™ืœืŸ ืžืื›ืœ ื›ื™ ืœื ืขืฅ ืžืื›ืœ ื”ื•ื ื–ื” ืื™ืœืŸ ืกืจืง


This halakha is also taught in a baraita. The verse states: โ€œOnly the trees of which you know that they are not trees for food, them you may destroy and cut downโ€ (Deuteronomy 20:20). โ€œOnly the trees of which you knowโ€; this is referring to a tree that bears fruit used for food, and it is permitted to cut down this type of tree under certain circumstances. โ€œThat they are not trees for foodโ€; this is referring to a barren tree.


ื•ื›ื™ ืžืื—ืจ ืฉืกื•ืคื• ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื›ืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื›ื™ ืœื ืขืฅ ืžืื›ืœ ืœื”ืงื“ื™ื ืกืจืง ืœืžืื›ืœ


The Gemara asks: And since the baraita will ultimately include all types of trees, so that even a tree that produces fruit may be cut down, what, then, is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œThat they are not trees for food,โ€ which indicates that it is permitted to cut down only a barren tree? The Gemara answers: It is to give precedence to cutting down a barren tree over a tree whose fruit is used for food.


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