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Today's Daf Yomi

September 6, 2016 | ื’ืณ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Kamma 98

More discussions on the effects of currency changes on outstanding loans – distinctions are made between the percentageย of change. ย Raba brings 4 halachot where indirect damage is concerned and rules in all 4 cases that the one who caused the damage is exempt. ย Different important halachic principles are discussed such as garmei and davar hagorem lemamon – an item that can have monetary significance even if the item is not worth anything at the time.

ื•ืื™ ืžื—ืžืช ืชืจืขื ื–ื™ืœ ืœื ืžื ื›ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื”

And if the produce decreased in price due to the market value, the debt is not reduced for him.

ื•ื”ื ืงื ืฉื‘ื— ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ื ืกื›ื ืืœื ื›ื™ ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื•ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื‘ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื“ืื’ืจื“ืžื™ืก ื˜ื™ื™ืขื ืขื“ ืขืฉืจื” ื‘ืชืžื ื™ื

The Gemara challenges: But the value of the coin has been enhanced for the purpose of melting it down into a bar of metal. Since this coin now contains a larger quantity of metal, if it were to be melted it would be worth more than an earlier coin of the same type, so it should be considered interest. Rather, in this case one must act in accordance with how Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, acted when they performed an action with the dinars of Agardamis the Arab merchant [tayyaโ€™a]: They considered up to ten old coins to be the equivalent of eight new coins. Since ten old coins were equivalent in value to eight new coins, they paid eight new coins in exchange for ten old ones.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ื–ื•ืจืง ืžื˜ื‘ืข ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืœื™ื ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืืžืจ ื”ื ืžื ื— ืงืžืš ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืฆืœื•ืœื™ืŸ ื“ืงื ื—ื–ื™ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ืœ ืขื›ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื“ืœื ืงื—ื–ื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื“ืื“ื™ื™ื” ืื“ื•ื™ื™ ืื‘ืœ ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื‘ื™ื“ื™ื” ืžื™ื’ื–ืœ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื”ืฉื‘ื” ื‘ืขื™ ืžื™ืขื‘ื“

ยง Rabba says: One who throws anotherโ€™s coin into the Great Sea is exempt from liability. What is the reason for this? He can say: The coin is resting before you; if you wish, take it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only if the coin is in translucent water, where the owner of the coin can see the coin, but in turbid water, where he cannot see the coin, it does not apply, and the one that threw it will be liable to compensate the owner. And this statement applies only when he rolled the coin into the sea without picking it up, but if he took the coin with his hands and threw it into the sea, he has robbed the owner of it, and the robber is required to perform the mitzva of returning the coin to its owner.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ืœืœื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืžืขื•ืช ืฉืื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืจืฉื•ืชื• ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื”ื™ื• ืœื• ืžืขื•ืช ื‘ืงืกื˜ืจื ืื• ื‘ื”ืจ ื”ืžืœืš ืื• ืฉื ืคืœ ื›ื™ืกื• ืœื™ื ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ืœืœื™ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ืฉืื ื™ ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉืจ ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืžืฆื•ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ืš ื“ืจื—ืžื ื ืืžืจ ื•ืฆืจืช ื”ื›ืกืฃ ื‘ื™ื“ืš ื•ืœื™ื›ื

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta, Maโ€™aser Sheni 1:6): One cannot desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto money that is not in his possession. How so? If he had money in a fortress [kastera], or in the Kingโ€™s Mountain [Har HaMelekh], or if his purse fell into the Great Sea, one may not desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto that money. This indicates that money that fell into the Great Sea is considered lost. Rabba said: This is not difficult; it is different with regard to second tithe, since it is necessary that the money be found in the hand of the one who wishes to desacralize the tithe, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: โ€œThen you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and shall go to the place that the Lord your God shall chooseโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:25), and if it is in the Great Sea, it is not in his hand, but nevertheless it is not considered lost.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฉืฃ ืžื˜ื‘ืข ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืœื ืขื‘ื“ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื” ื‘ืงื•ืจื ืกื ื•ื˜ืจืฉื™ื” ืื‘ืœ ืฉื™ื™ืคื ื‘ืฉื•ืคื™ื ื ื—ืกื•ืจื™ ื—ืกืจื™ื”

And Rabba also says: One who effaces the image of anotherโ€™s coin is exempt from paying damages, even though he caused the coin to lose value. What is the reason for this? As he did not do anything, the coin remains the same size as before. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only in a case where he struck it with a hammer [kurnesa] and flattened it; but if he filed it with a file [shofina] he must pay the amount of the reduction in value, since he caused it to diminish in size.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ื”ื›ื”ื• ืขืœ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืกืžืื” ืขืœ ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ืจืฉื• ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื ื’ื“ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืจื•ืื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ืื–ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื™ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a master struck his slave on his eye and blinded it, or on his ear and deafened it, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries. If he struck the slave near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these injuries. The first clause indicates that one is liable for damage caused even if it is not visible damage.

ืจื‘ื” ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื—ืจืฉื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ื ื”ืจื’ ืฉืื™ ืืคืฉืจ ืœื—ืจื™ืฉื” ื‘ืœื ื—ื‘ื•ืจื” ื“ื˜ืคืชื ื“ื“ืžื ื ืคืœืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืื•ื ื™ื”

The Gemara responds: Rabba conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rabba says: One who deafens his father is put to death, even though no bruise is visible, because it is impossible for deafening to occur without a bruise, as it is certain that a drop of blood fell into his ear from the blow, even if it is not visible from the outside. Striking someone in the ear in a manner that causes deafness results in a significant physical change, while striking a coin with a hammer does not detract from the actual size of the coin.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฆื•ืจื ืื•ื–ืŸ ืคืจืชื• ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืคืจื” ื›ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื ืงื™ื™ืžื ื“ืœื ืขื‘ื“ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืฉื•ื•ืจื™ื ืœืื• ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืงื™ื™ืžื™

And Rabba also says: One who slits the ear of anotherโ€™s cow is exempt from paying damages, even though this cow is no longer fit to be sacrificed as an offering due to the injury. What is the reason for this? As the cow was available for many uses until now, so it is still available for those uses now, since the one who slit its ear did not do anything to damage the cow in a substantial way. And concerning the fact that it is rendered disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering, not all oxen stand near the altar, i.e., most animals are not sacrificed as offerings anyway, so it is not considered a loss.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ื”ืขื•ืฉื” ืžืœืื›ื” ื‘ืžื™ ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื‘ืคืจืช ื—ื˜ืืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื ืžืœืื›ื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืฆื•ืจื ื“ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: One who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer and sprinkled upon one who has become impure as part of the purification ritual, or with the red heifer of purification, whose ashes are mixed with springwater and sprinkled on those who have contracted impurity imparted by a corpse on the third and seventh days of their impurity, is exempt according to human laws, since he has not caused any discernible damage, but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. It may be inferred from here that one is exempt from liability according to human laws only if he performed a task with those items, since the damage that he caused is not evident, but in the case of one who slits the ear, where the damage is evident, he is indeed liable according to human laws.

ืืžืจื™ ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืฆื•ืจื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืžืœืื›ื” ื“ืœื ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื

The Sages say in response: The same is true that even one who slits the ear is exempt according to human laws, and the baraita that specified cases where the damage is not evident teaches us this: That even one who performs a task with the water of purification or the red heifer, where the damage is not evident, is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฉื•ืจืฃ ืฉื˜ืจื• ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื™ืจื ืงืœืื™ ืžื™ื ืš ืžืชืงื™ืฃ ืœื” ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™

And Rabba also says: One who burns anotherโ€™s promissory note is exempt, as the one who burned it can say to him: I have burned only your paper, and he is not held liable for the fact that the creditor will no longer be able to prove that he had provided the loan. Rami bar แธคama objects to this: What are the circumstances?

ืื™ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืกื”ื“ื™ ื“ื™ื“ืขื™ ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืฉื˜ืจื ืœื™ื›ืชื‘ื• ืœื™ื” ืฉื˜ืจื ืžืขืœื™ื ื•ืื™ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืกื”ื“ื™ ืื ืŸ ืžื ื ื™ื“ืขื™ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืชื”ื ื‘ืžืืžื™ื ื•

If there are witnesses who know what was written in the promissory note, they should write a new, proper, promissory note for him, and there will not be any loss. And if there are no witnesses, how do we know what was written in the promissory note in order to assess liability? Rava says: Let it refer to a case where the one who burned the promissory note trusts the creditor with regard to the details of the promissory note. Despite the concession of the one who burned the promissory note with regard to the amount of the debt, Rabba holds that he is exempt, since the value of the debt is not inherent in the actual paper.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ื™ืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื” ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ืœืื• ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘

Rav Dimi bar แธคanina said: This statement of Rabba is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned the promissory note is liable. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is not liable. Rabba holds in accordance with the Rabbis, and therefore rules that one who burns a promissory note is exempt from liability.

ืžืชืงื™ืฃ ืœื” ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืื™ืžืจ ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืขื™ืงืจื• ืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ื“ืจื‘ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื’ื–ืœ ื—ืžืฅ ืœืคื ื™ ื”ืคืกื— ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืฉืจืคื• ื‘ืžื•ืขื“ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืฉื”ื›ืœ ืžืฆื•ื•ื™ื ืขืœื™ื• ืœื‘ืขืจื• ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืคืกื— ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: Say that you heard the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, with regard to a case where he damaged an item that has intrinsic monetary value, in accordance with the statement of Rabba. As Rabba says: If one robbed another of leavened bread before Passover, and another came and burned it during the festival of Passover, when the leavened bread had already become forbidden, the one who burned it is exempt from paying the robber, as all are commanded to destroy the leavened bread, and he therefore performed a mitzva. If he burned it after Passover, that is the matter of dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis.

ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ืœืื• ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืขื™ืงืจื• ืžืžื•ืŸ ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, explains: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned it is liable, and he must pay the robber. Although it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, the robber could have returned it to the victim and been exempt from liability. Now that it has been burned, the robber will have to pay the monetary value of the leavened bread at the time of the theft. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is exempt. But with regard to an item such as a promissory note, which has no intrinsic monetary value, do we say that in Rabbi Shimonโ€™s opinion it too is considered to have monetary value?

ืืžืจ ืืžื™ืžืจ ืžืืŸ ื“ื“ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื ื“ื’ืจืžื™ ืžื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื“ืžื™ ืฉื˜ืจื ืžืขืœื™ื ื•ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื ื“ื’ืจืžื™ ืžื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื“ืžื™ ื ื™ื™ืจื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื” ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื•ื›ืคื™ื™ื” ืจืคืจื ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื•ืื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื›ื™ ื›ืฉื•ืจื ืœืฆืœืžื

The Gemara cites a ruling for the case where one burns the promissory note of another. Ameimar said: The one who rules that there is liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, the value of a proper promissory note, i.e., the amount of the debt, from the one who burned the promissory note. The one who rules that there is no liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, merely the value of the paper. The Gemara relates that there was an incident like this one, and Rafram forced Rav Ashi, who had burned a document in his youth, to pay damages, and he collected payment, in this case, as if he had damaged a beam used for crafting a sculpture, i.e., he paid him the value of the debt listed in the promissory note.

ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ืžื™ืช ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืžื›ืจื• ืžื›ื•ืจ ื”ืงื“ื™ืฉื• ืžื•ืงื“ืฉ ืฉื—ื˜ื• ื‘ืฉืจื• ืžื•ืชืจ ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ

ยง The mishna teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, the robber says to his victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one says: That which is yours is before you? Rav แธคisda said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yaโ€™akov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:4): If there was an ox that killed a person and is consequently liable to be stoned, and before the court sentenced it the owner sold the ox, the sale is valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is permitted; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืžื›ืจื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื›ื•ืจ ื”ืงื“ื™ืฉื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ืงื“ืฉ ืฉื—ื˜ื• ื‘ืฉืจื• ืืกื•ืจ ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืื•ืžืจ ืืฃ ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ

The baraita continues: By contrast, from when it was sentenced to be stoned it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and if the owner sold it, the sale is not valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is not valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is not returned, as once it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, the ox is worthless. Rabbi Yaโ€™akov says: Even after it was sentenced, if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืกื‘ืจ ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš

Rav แธคisda completes his analysis: What, is it not that they disagree about this issue, that Rabbi Yaโ€™akov holds that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the Rabbis hold that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one cannot say: That which is yours is before you?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื” ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ื ืคืœื’ื• ื‘ื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ื›ื ื‘ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ืงื ืžื™ืคืœื’ื™

Rabba said to him in response: No. It may be that everyone agrees that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the ruling of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As if so, i.e., if it were true that the dispute in the baraita between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yaโ€™akov concerns the general question of returning an item from which benefit is forbidden, they should disagree with regard to the case of leavened bread on Passover and whether it can be returned as is, since this is a clear case of an item from which benefit is forbidden. Rather, Rabba said: Here, in the baraita, they disagree with regard to a different issue: Can an ox be sentenced in its absence?

ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืื™ืŸ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืื™ื™ืชื™ืชื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ื”ื•ื” ืžืขืจื™ืงื ื ืœื™ื” ืœืื’ืžื ื”ืฉืชื ืžืกืจืชื™ื” ื‘ื™ื“ ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ืžืฆื™ื ื ืœืื™ืฉืชืขื•ื™ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื‘ื”ื“ื™ื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืกื‘ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœื™ื” ืกื•ืฃ ืกื•ืฃ ื”ื•ื” ื’ืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื•

Rabba explains the dispute: The Rabbis hold that an ox may not be sentenced in its absence, and therefore the bailee is liable to pay. The reason is that when the ox is returned after its sentencing, the owner may say to the bailee: Had you brought the ox to me before sentencing, I would have chased it away into the marsh, preventing the sentencing from taking place. Now, since you did not return it to me before it was given to the court, you have given it to one with whom I cannot litigate, as the court was sure to sentence it. Therefore you must pay me and not return the ox. And Rabbi Yaโ€™akov holds that an ox may be sentenced even in its absence, and the claim of the owner of the ox is not accepted. The reason is that the bailee may say to the owner in response: What did I do to the ox? Ultimately it would have been sentenced in its absence and rendered forbidden.

ืืฉื›ื—ื™ื” ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืœืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืชื ื™ืช ืžื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืชื ื™ื ื ื•ื”ืฉื™ื‘ ืืช ื”ื’ื–ืœื” ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืืฉืจ ื’ื–ืœ ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื›ืขื™ืŸ ืฉื’ื–ืœ

The Gemara relates an incident: Rav แธคisda, who stated that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yaโ€™akov and not the Rabbis, found Rabba bar Shmuel and said to him: Did you learn anything with regard to the halakhot of returning stolen items from which benefit is forbidden? Rabba bar Shmuel said to him: Yes, we learned a baraita: The verse states: โ€œThen it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbedโ€ (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œThat he robbedโ€? It means that the robber must return the same item that he robbed.

ืžื›ืืŸ ืืžืจื• ื’ื–ืœ ืžื˜ื‘ืข ื•ื ืคืกืœ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื”ื—ืžื™ืฅ ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ื ื˜ืžืืช ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืฉื•ืจ ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš

The baraita continues: From here the Sages stated that if one robbed another of a coin and it was invalidated, or of produce and it rotted, or of wine and it fermented, or of teruma and it became ritually impure, or of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, or of an animal and a sin was performed with it, or of an ox that had not been sentenced, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you.

ืžืืŸ ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืœื ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ืงืชื ื™ ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื”ื• ืœื ืชื™ืžื ืœื”ื• ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™

The Gemara notes: Who did you hear say that before the ox was sentenced it can be returned, but after it was sentenced it cannot? It is the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yaโ€™akov in the baraita; and this baraita teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. This disproves the analysis of Rav แธคisda, as even the Rabbis agree that an item from which benefit is forbidden is returned as is. Rav แธคisda said to Rabba bar Shmuel: If you find the Sages, do not say anything to them, i.e., do not publicize that I erred.

ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืžืฉืœื ื›ืฉืขืช ื”ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื›ืืŸ ืฉื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ื›ื•ืœืŸ ื›ืืŸ ืฉื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืžืงืฆืชืŸ

ยง The Gemara discusses the baraita, which states that if one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: But didnโ€™t we learn in the mishna (96b): If one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he pays compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery? Rav Pappa said: Here, the mishna is referring to a case where the stolen produce all rotted, which constitutes a significant change. The robber acquires the produce and must pay what its value was at the time of the robbery. There, the baraita is referring to a case where part of the stolen produce rotted. In such a case the robber may return it and say: That which is yours is before you.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื ื•ื”ื‘ื ืื™ ืฉืงื™ื‘ืœ ืขืœื™ื• ืœืกืชื•ืจ ืืช ื”ื›ื•ืชืœ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจ ื”ืื‘ื ื™ื ืื• ืฉื”ื–ื™ืงืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ืกื•ืชืจ ืžืฆื“ ื–ื” ื•ื ืคืœ ืžืฆื“ ืื—ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืื ืžื—ืžืช ื”ืžื›ื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘

MISHNA: If one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, the craftsmen are liable to pay for the damage. For example, if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to fix, and he damaged it, he is liable to pay. And a builder who committed to demolish a wall and while demolishing it he broke the stones, or who damaged them, is liable to pay. If he was demolishing on this side of the wall, and the wall fell from another side and caused damage, he is exempt from liability. But if a stone fell and caused damage due to the force of the blow, he is liable.

ื’ืžืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ืฉื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืœื ืขืฅ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืกืžืจ ื•ื ืขืฅ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืกืžืจ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจืŸ ืื‘ืœ ื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืขืฆื™ื ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจืŸ ืคื˜ื•ืจ

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to fix, and he damaged it, the carpenter is liable to pay for the damage. Rav Asi says: The Sages taught that a carpenter is liable to pay damages only in a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to drive a nail into them, i.e., he gave the carpenter complete vessels to repair, and he drove the nail into them and broke them. But if one gave wood to a carpenter to build a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he built a chest, a box, or a cabinet from the wood, and before giving it to the owner the carpenter broke them, he is exempt from paying for the damage caused to these vessels, and must pay only for the damage caused to the wood.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืื•ืžืŸ ืงื•ื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื— ื›ืœื™

What is the reason for this? It is because a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel. The craftsman is considered to have acquired the vessel through his work, which enhances its value, and it remains in his possession until he returns it to the owners. Consequently, if he damages the vessel in any way, he is damaging his own item, and must return only the value of the raw materials to the owners.

ืชื ืŸ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืœื”ื• ืขืฆื™ื ืœื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ

The Gemara attempts to contradict Rav Asiโ€™s statement: We learned in the mishna that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, they are liable to pay for the damage. What, is it not referring to a case where he gave them wood, and they nevertheless pay the owner the value of a vessel? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a case where he gave them a chest, a box, or a cabinet to repair.

ื”ื ืžื“ืงืชื ื™ ืกื™ืคื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ืืžืจื™ ืคืจื•ืฉื™ ืงื ืžืคืจืฉ ืœื” ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches about a chest, a box, or a cabinet, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is referring to wood. The Sages say in response: The latter clause is explaining the first clause. After stating that the craftsmen are liable to pay damages, the mishna explains: In what case is it so that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix, and they damaged them, they are liable to pay? It is with regard to a case where one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet.

ื•ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืžืกืชื‘ืจื ื“ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืงืชื ื™ ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ื”ืฉืชื ืืฉืžืขื™ื ืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื•ืœื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžืŸ ืงื•ื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื— ื›ืœื™ื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื‘ืขื™ื

The Gemara notes: And so too, it is reasonable to say that the latter clause of the mishna teaches in what case the first clause deems them liable, as, if it enters your mind to think that the first clause is referring to a case where he gave wood, one could ask: Now that the mishna told us that if one gave wood, the craftsman is liable to pay the value of a vessel, and we do not say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of vessels, is it necessary to tell us that if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet, the craftsman is liable to pay damages?

ืื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื”ื ืœื ืื™ืจื™ื ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืœื’ืœื•ื™ื™ ืจื™ืฉื ืฉืœื ืชืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ื›ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื

The Gemara dismisses this proof: If it is due to that reason, i.e., if that is the manner in which the explanation of the mishna is refuted, there is no conclusive argument, because that claim can be refuted by saying that the tanna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you would not say that the first clause is referring to a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet, but had he given wood, the carpenter would not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches the case of one who gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet in the latter clause, and it follows by inference that the first clause discusses one who gave the carpenter wood, and even so the carpenter is liable to pay damages. It is therefore impossible to prove Rav Asiโ€™s statement from the mishna.

ืœื™ืžื ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืฆืžืจ ืœืฆื‘ืข

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna (100b) supports the opinion of Rav Asi: With regard to one who gives wool to a dyer

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Bava Kamma 98

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 98

ื•ืื™ ืžื—ืžืช ืชืจืขื ื–ื™ืœ ืœื ืžื ื›ื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื”

And if the produce decreased in price due to the market value, the debt is not reduced for him.

ื•ื”ื ืงื ืฉื‘ื— ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ื ืกื›ื ืืœื ื›ื™ ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื•ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื‘ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื“ืื’ืจื“ืžื™ืก ื˜ื™ื™ืขื ืขื“ ืขืฉืจื” ื‘ืชืžื ื™ื

The Gemara challenges: But the value of the coin has been enhanced for the purpose of melting it down into a bar of metal. Since this coin now contains a larger quantity of metal, if it were to be melted it would be worth more than an earlier coin of the same type, so it should be considered interest. Rather, in this case one must act in accordance with how Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, acted when they performed an action with the dinars of Agardamis the Arab merchant [tayyaโ€™a]: They considered up to ten old coins to be the equivalent of eight new coins. Since ten old coins were equivalent in value to eight new coins, they paid eight new coins in exchange for ten old ones.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ื–ื•ืจืง ืžื˜ื‘ืข ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืœื™ื ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืืžืจ ื”ื ืžื ื— ืงืžืš ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืฆืœื•ืœื™ืŸ ื“ืงื ื—ื–ื™ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ืœ ืขื›ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื“ืœื ืงื—ื–ื™ ืœื™ื” ืœื ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื“ืื“ื™ื™ื” ืื“ื•ื™ื™ ืื‘ืœ ืฉืงืœื™ื” ื‘ื™ื“ื™ื” ืžื™ื’ื–ืœ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื”ืฉื‘ื” ื‘ืขื™ ืžื™ืขื‘ื“

ยง Rabba says: One who throws anotherโ€™s coin into the Great Sea is exempt from liability. What is the reason for this? He can say: The coin is resting before you; if you wish, take it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only if the coin is in translucent water, where the owner of the coin can see the coin, but in turbid water, where he cannot see the coin, it does not apply, and the one that threw it will be liable to compensate the owner. And this statement applies only when he rolled the coin into the sea without picking it up, but if he took the coin with his hands and threw it into the sea, he has robbed the owner of it, and the robber is required to perform the mitzva of returning the coin to its owner.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ืœืœื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืžืขื•ืช ืฉืื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืจืฉื•ืชื• ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื”ื™ื• ืœื• ืžืขื•ืช ื‘ืงืกื˜ืจื ืื• ื‘ื”ืจ ื”ืžืœืš ืื• ืฉื ืคืœ ื›ื™ืกื• ืœื™ื ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ืœืœื™ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ืฉืื ื™ ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉืจ ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืžืฆื•ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ืš ื“ืจื—ืžื ื ืืžืจ ื•ืฆืจืช ื”ื›ืกืฃ ื‘ื™ื“ืš ื•ืœื™ื›ื

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta, Maโ€™aser Sheni 1:6): One cannot desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto money that is not in his possession. How so? If he had money in a fortress [kastera], or in the Kingโ€™s Mountain [Har HaMelekh], or if his purse fell into the Great Sea, one may not desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto that money. This indicates that money that fell into the Great Sea is considered lost. Rabba said: This is not difficult; it is different with regard to second tithe, since it is necessary that the money be found in the hand of the one who wishes to desacralize the tithe, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: โ€œThen you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and shall go to the place that the Lord your God shall chooseโ€ (Deuteronomy 14:25), and if it is in the Great Sea, it is not in his hand, but nevertheless it is not considered lost.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฉืฃ ืžื˜ื‘ืข ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืœื ืขื‘ื“ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื” ื‘ืงื•ืจื ืกื ื•ื˜ืจืฉื™ื” ืื‘ืœ ืฉื™ื™ืคื ื‘ืฉื•ืคื™ื ื ื—ืกื•ืจื™ ื—ืกืจื™ื”

And Rabba also says: One who effaces the image of anotherโ€™s coin is exempt from paying damages, even though he caused the coin to lose value. What is the reason for this? As he did not do anything, the coin remains the same size as before. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only in a case where he struck it with a hammer [kurnesa] and flattened it; but if he filed it with a file [shofina] he must pay the amount of the reduction in value, since he caused it to diminish in size.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ื”ื›ื”ื• ืขืœ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืกืžืื” ืขืœ ืื–ื ื• ื•ื—ืจืฉื• ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื›ื ื’ื“ ืขื™ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืจื•ืื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ืื–ื ื• ื•ืื™ื ื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื™ืŸ ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a master struck his slave on his eye and blinded it, or on his ear and deafened it, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries. If he struck the slave near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these injuries. The first clause indicates that one is liable for damage caused even if it is not visible damage.

ืจื‘ื” ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื—ืจืฉื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ื ื”ืจื’ ืฉืื™ ืืคืฉืจ ืœื—ืจื™ืฉื” ื‘ืœื ื—ื‘ื•ืจื” ื“ื˜ืคืชื ื“ื“ืžื ื ืคืœืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืื•ื ื™ื”

The Gemara responds: Rabba conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rabba says: One who deafens his father is put to death, even though no bruise is visible, because it is impossible for deafening to occur without a bruise, as it is certain that a drop of blood fell into his ear from the blow, even if it is not visible from the outside. Striking someone in the ear in a manner that causes deafness results in a significant physical change, while striking a coin with a hammer does not detract from the actual size of the coin.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฆื•ืจื ืื•ื–ืŸ ืคืจืชื• ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืคืจื” ื›ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื ืงื™ื™ืžื ื“ืœื ืขื‘ื“ ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™ ื•ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืฉื•ื•ืจื™ื ืœืื• ืœื’ื‘ื™ ืžื–ื‘ื— ืงื™ื™ืžื™

And Rabba also says: One who slits the ear of anotherโ€™s cow is exempt from paying damages, even though this cow is no longer fit to be sacrificed as an offering due to the injury. What is the reason for this? As the cow was available for many uses until now, so it is still available for those uses now, since the one who slit its ear did not do anything to damage the cow in a substantial way. And concerning the fact that it is rendered disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering, not all oxen stand near the altar, i.e., most animals are not sacrificed as offerings anyway, so it is not considered a loss.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ื”ืขื•ืฉื” ืžืœืื›ื” ื‘ืžื™ ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื‘ืคืจืช ื—ื˜ืืช ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื ืžืœืื›ื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ืื‘ืœ ืฆื•ืจื ื“ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืื“ื

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: One who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer and sprinkled upon one who has become impure as part of the purification ritual, or with the red heifer of purification, whose ashes are mixed with springwater and sprinkled on those who have contracted impurity imparted by a corpse on the third and seventh days of their impurity, is exempt according to human laws, since he has not caused any discernible damage, but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. It may be inferred from here that one is exempt from liability according to human laws only if he performed a task with those items, since the damage that he caused is not evident, but in the case of one who slits the ear, where the damage is evident, he is indeed liable according to human laws.

ืืžืจื™ ื”ื•ื ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืฆื•ืจื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืžืœืื›ื” ื“ืœื ืžื™ื ื›ืจ ื”ื™ื–ื™ืงื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืฉืžื™ื

The Sages say in response: The same is true that even one who slits the ear is exempt according to human laws, and the baraita that specified cases where the damage is not evident teaches us this: That even one who performs a task with the water of purification or the red heifer, where the damage is not evident, is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืฉื•ืจืฃ ืฉื˜ืจื• ืฉืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื ื™ื™ืจื ืงืœืื™ ืžื™ื ืš ืžืชืงื™ืฃ ืœื” ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™

And Rabba also says: One who burns anotherโ€™s promissory note is exempt, as the one who burned it can say to him: I have burned only your paper, and he is not held liable for the fact that the creditor will no longer be able to prove that he had provided the loan. Rami bar แธคama objects to this: What are the circumstances?

ืื™ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืกื”ื“ื™ ื“ื™ื“ืขื™ ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื” ื‘ืฉื˜ืจื ืœื™ื›ืชื‘ื• ืœื™ื” ืฉื˜ืจื ืžืขืœื™ื ื•ืื™ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืกื”ื“ื™ ืื ืŸ ืžื ื ื™ื“ืขื™ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืชื”ื ื‘ืžืืžื™ื ื•

If there are witnesses who know what was written in the promissory note, they should write a new, proper, promissory note for him, and there will not be any loss. And if there are no witnesses, how do we know what was written in the promissory note in order to assess liability? Rava says: Let it refer to a case where the one who burned the promissory note trusts the creditor with regard to the details of the promissory note. Despite the concession of the one who burned the promissory note with regard to the amount of the debt, Rabba holds that he is exempt, since the value of the debt is not inherent in the actual paper.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ื™ืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ื” ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื™ื ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ืœืื• ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘

Rav Dimi bar แธคanina said: This statement of Rabba is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned the promissory note is liable. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is not liable. Rabba holds in accordance with the Rabbis, and therefore rules that one who burns a promissory note is exempt from liability.

ืžืชืงื™ืฃ ืœื” ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืื™ืžืจ ื“ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืขื™ืงืจื• ืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ื“ืจื‘ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื’ื–ืœ ื—ืžืฅ ืœืคื ื™ ื”ืคืกื— ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืฉืจืคื• ื‘ืžื•ืขื“ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืฉื”ื›ืœ ืžืฆื•ื•ื™ื ืขืœื™ื• ืœื‘ืขืจื• ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืคืกื— ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: Say that you heard the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, with regard to a case where he damaged an item that has intrinsic monetary value, in accordance with the statement of Rabba. As Rabba says: If one robbed another of leavened bread before Passover, and another came and burned it during the festival of Passover, when the leavened bread had already become forbidden, the one who burned it is exempt from paying the robber, as all are commanded to destroy the leavened bread, and he therefore performed a mitzva. If he burned it after Passover, that is the matter of dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis.

ืœืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื’ื•ืจื ืœืžืžื•ืŸ ืœืื• ื›ืžืžื•ืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืขื™ืงืจื• ืžืžื•ืŸ ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, explains: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned it is liable, and he must pay the robber. Although it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, the robber could have returned it to the victim and been exempt from liability. Now that it has been burned, the robber will have to pay the monetary value of the leavened bread at the time of the theft. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is exempt. But with regard to an item such as a promissory note, which has no intrinsic monetary value, do we say that in Rabbi Shimonโ€™s opinion it too is considered to have monetary value?

ืืžืจ ืืžื™ืžืจ ืžืืŸ ื“ื“ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื ื“ื’ืจืžื™ ืžื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื“ืžื™ ืฉื˜ืจื ืžืขืœื™ื ื•ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื ื“ื’ืจืžื™ ืžื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื“ืžื™ ื ื™ื™ืจื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื” ืขื•ื‘ื“ื ื•ื›ืคื™ื™ื” ืจืคืจื ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื•ืื’ื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื” ื›ื™ ื›ืฉื•ืจื ืœืฆืœืžื

The Gemara cites a ruling for the case where one burns the promissory note of another. Ameimar said: The one who rules that there is liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, the value of a proper promissory note, i.e., the amount of the debt, from the one who burned the promissory note. The one who rules that there is no liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, merely the value of the paper. The Gemara relates that there was an incident like this one, and Rafram forced Rav Ashi, who had burned a document in his youth, to pay damages, and he collected payment, in this case, as if he had damaged a beam used for crafting a sculpture, i.e., he paid him the value of the debt listed in the promissory note.

ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืฉื•ืจ ืฉื”ืžื™ืช ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืžื›ืจื• ืžื›ื•ืจ ื”ืงื“ื™ืฉื• ืžื•ืงื“ืฉ ืฉื—ื˜ื• ื‘ืฉืจื• ืžื•ืชืจ ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ

ยง The mishna teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, the robber says to his victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one says: That which is yours is before you? Rav แธคisda said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yaโ€™akov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:4): If there was an ox that killed a person and is consequently liable to be stoned, and before the court sentenced it the owner sold the ox, the sale is valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is permitted; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืžื›ืจื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื›ื•ืจ ื”ืงื“ื™ืฉื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ืงื“ืฉ ืฉื—ื˜ื• ื‘ืฉืจื• ืืกื•ืจ ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืื™ื ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืื•ืžืจ ืืฃ ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ื”ื—ื–ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื• ืžื•ื—ื–ืจ

The baraita continues: By contrast, from when it was sentenced to be stoned it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and if the owner sold it, the sale is not valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is not valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is not returned, as once it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, the ox is worthless. Rabbi Yaโ€™akov says: Even after it was sentenced, if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืกื‘ืจ ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืื™ืŸ ืื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš

Rav แธคisda completes his analysis: What, is it not that they disagree about this issue, that Rabbi Yaโ€™akov holds that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the Rabbis hold that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one cannot say: That which is yours is before you?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื” ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ื ืคืœื’ื• ื‘ื—ืžืฅ ื‘ืคืกื— ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื”ื›ื ื‘ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ืงื ืžื™ืคืœื’ื™

Rabba said to him in response: No. It may be that everyone agrees that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the ruling of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As if so, i.e., if it were true that the dispute in the baraita between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yaโ€™akov concerns the general question of returning an item from which benefit is forbidden, they should disagree with regard to the case of leavened bread on Passover and whether it can be returned as is, since this is a clear case of an item from which benefit is forbidden. Rather, Rabba said: Here, in the baraita, they disagree with regard to a different issue: Can an ox be sentenced in its absence?

ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืื™ืŸ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืื™ื™ืชื™ืชื™ื” ื ื™ื”ืœื™ื” ื”ื•ื” ืžืขืจื™ืงื ื ืœื™ื” ืœืื’ืžื ื”ืฉืชื ืžืกืจืชื™ื” ื‘ื™ื“ ืžืืŸ ื“ืœื ืžืฆื™ื ื ืœืื™ืฉืชืขื•ื™ื™ ื“ื™ื ื ื‘ื”ื“ื™ื” ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืกื‘ืจ ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื• ืฉืœ ืฉื•ืจ ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื• ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœื™ื” ืกื•ืฃ ืกื•ืฃ ื”ื•ื” ื’ืžืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื“ื™ื ื ืฉืœื ื‘ืคื ื™ื•

Rabba explains the dispute: The Rabbis hold that an ox may not be sentenced in its absence, and therefore the bailee is liable to pay. The reason is that when the ox is returned after its sentencing, the owner may say to the bailee: Had you brought the ox to me before sentencing, I would have chased it away into the marsh, preventing the sentencing from taking place. Now, since you did not return it to me before it was given to the court, you have given it to one with whom I cannot litigate, as the court was sure to sentence it. Therefore you must pay me and not return the ox. And Rabbi Yaโ€™akov holds that an ox may be sentenced even in its absence, and the claim of the owner of the ox is not accepted. The reason is that the bailee may say to the owner in response: What did I do to the ox? Ultimately it would have been sentenced in its absence and rendered forbidden.

ืืฉื›ื—ื™ื” ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืœืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืชื ื™ืช ืžื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ ื”ื ืื” ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืชื ื™ื ื ื•ื”ืฉื™ื‘ ืืช ื”ื’ื–ืœื” ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืืฉืจ ื’ื–ืœ ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื›ืขื™ืŸ ืฉื’ื–ืœ

The Gemara relates an incident: Rav แธคisda, who stated that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yaโ€™akov and not the Rabbis, found Rabba bar Shmuel and said to him: Did you learn anything with regard to the halakhot of returning stolen items from which benefit is forbidden? Rabba bar Shmuel said to him: Yes, we learned a baraita: The verse states: โ€œThen it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbedโ€ (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states: โ€œThat he robbedโ€? It means that the robber must return the same item that he robbed.

ืžื›ืืŸ ืืžืจื• ื’ื–ืœ ืžื˜ื‘ืข ื•ื ืคืกืœ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื”ื—ืžื™ืฅ ืชืจื•ืžื” ื•ื ื˜ืžืืช ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ื‘ื”ืžื” ื•ื ืขื‘ื“ื” ื‘ื” ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ื•ืฉื•ืจ ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš

The baraita continues: From here the Sages stated that if one robbed another of a coin and it was invalidated, or of produce and it rotted, or of wine and it fermented, or of teruma and it became ritually impure, or of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, or of an animal and a sin was performed with it, or of an ox that had not been sentenced, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you.

ืžืืŸ ืฉืžืขืช ืœื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื• ืœื ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื•ืงืชื ื™ ื—ืžืฅ ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืคืกื— ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื”ื• ืœื ืชื™ืžื ืœื”ื• ื•ืœื ืžื™ื“ื™

The Gemara notes: Who did you hear say that before the ox was sentenced it can be returned, but after it was sentenced it cannot? It is the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yaโ€™akov in the baraita; and this baraita teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. This disproves the analysis of Rav แธคisda, as even the Rabbis agree that an item from which benefit is forbidden is returned as is. Rav แธคisda said to Rabba bar Shmuel: If you find the Sages, do not say anything to them, i.e., do not publicize that I erred.

ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื”ืจื™ ืฉืœืš ืœืคื ื™ืš ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืžืฉืœื ื›ืฉืขืช ื”ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื›ืืŸ ืฉื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ื›ื•ืœืŸ ื›ืืŸ ืฉื”ืจืงื™ื‘ื• ืžืงืฆืชืŸ

ยง The Gemara discusses the baraita, which states that if one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: But didnโ€™t we learn in the mishna (96b): If one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he pays compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery? Rav Pappa said: Here, the mishna is referring to a case where the stolen produce all rotted, which constitutes a significant change. The robber acquires the produce and must pay what its value was at the time of the robbery. There, the baraita is referring to a case where part of the stolen produce rotted. In such a case the robber may return it and say: That which is yours is before you.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื ื•ื”ื‘ื ืื™ ืฉืงื™ื‘ืœ ืขืœื™ื• ืœืกืชื•ืจ ืืช ื”ื›ื•ืชืœ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจ ื”ืื‘ื ื™ื ืื• ืฉื”ื–ื™ืงืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื ื”ื™ื” ืกื•ืชืจ ืžืฆื“ ื–ื” ื•ื ืคืœ ืžืฆื“ ืื—ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืื ืžื—ืžืช ื”ืžื›ื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘

MISHNA: If one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, the craftsmen are liable to pay for the damage. For example, if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to fix, and he damaged it, he is liable to pay. And a builder who committed to demolish a wall and while demolishing it he broke the stones, or who damaged them, is liable to pay. If he was demolishing on this side of the wall, and the wall fell from another side and caused damage, he is exempt from liability. But if a stone fell and caused damage due to the force of the blow, he is liable.

ื’ืžืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืกื™ ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ืฉื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืœื ืขืฅ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืกืžืจ ื•ื ืขืฅ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืกืžืจ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจืŸ ืื‘ืœ ื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืขืฆื™ื ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ื•ืขืฉื” ืžื”ืŸ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ื•ืฉื™ื‘ืจืŸ ืคื˜ื•ืจ

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to fix, and he damaged it, the carpenter is liable to pay for the damage. Rav Asi says: The Sages taught that a carpenter is liable to pay damages only in a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to drive a nail into them, i.e., he gave the carpenter complete vessels to repair, and he drove the nail into them and broke them. But if one gave wood to a carpenter to build a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he built a chest, a box, or a cabinet from the wood, and before giving it to the owner the carpenter broke them, he is exempt from paying for the damage caused to these vessels, and must pay only for the damage caused to the wood.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืื•ืžืŸ ืงื•ื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื— ื›ืœื™

What is the reason for this? It is because a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel. The craftsman is considered to have acquired the vessel through his work, which enhances its value, and it remains in his possession until he returns it to the owners. Consequently, if he damages the vessel in any way, he is damaging his own item, and must return only the value of the raw materials to the owners.

ืชื ืŸ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืœื”ื• ืขืฆื™ื ืœื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ

The Gemara attempts to contradict Rav Asiโ€™s statement: We learned in the mishna that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, they are liable to pay for the damage. What, is it not referring to a case where he gave them wood, and they nevertheless pay the owner the value of a vessel? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a case where he gave them a chest, a box, or a cabinet to repair.

ื”ื ืžื“ืงืชื ื™ ืกื™ืคื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ืืžืจื™ ืคืจื•ืฉื™ ืงื ืžืคืจืฉ ืœื” ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื ืชืŸ ืœืื•ืžื ื™ืŸ ืœืชืงืŸ ื•ืงืœืงืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืœื—ืจืฉ ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches about a chest, a box, or a cabinet, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is referring to wood. The Sages say in response: The latter clause is explaining the first clause. After stating that the craftsmen are liable to pay damages, the mishna explains: In what case is it so that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix, and they damaged them, they are liable to pay? It is with regard to a case where one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet.

ื•ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ืžืกืชื‘ืจื ื“ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืงืชื ื™ ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ื”ืฉืชื ืืฉืžืขื™ื ืŸ ืขืฆื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืฉืœื ื•ืœื ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืื•ืžืŸ ืงื•ื ื” ื‘ืฉื‘ื— ื›ืœื™ื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื‘ืขื™ื

The Gemara notes: And so too, it is reasonable to say that the latter clause of the mishna teaches in what case the first clause deems them liable, as, if it enters your mind to think that the first clause is referring to a case where he gave wood, one could ask: Now that the mishna told us that if one gave wood, the craftsman is liable to pay the value of a vessel, and we do not say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of vessels, is it necessary to tell us that if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet, the craftsman is liable to pay damages?

ืื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื”ื ืœื ืื™ืจื™ื ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืœื’ืœื•ื™ื™ ืจื™ืฉื ืฉืœื ืชืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืื‘ืœ ืขืฆื™ื ืœื ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืฉื™ื“ื” ืชื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื’ื“ืœ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืจื™ืฉื ืขืฆื™ื ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ื›ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœืฉืœื

The Gemara dismisses this proof: If it is due to that reason, i.e., if that is the manner in which the explanation of the mishna is refuted, there is no conclusive argument, because that claim can be refuted by saying that the tanna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you would not say that the first clause is referring to a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet, but had he given wood, the carpenter would not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches the case of one who gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet in the latter clause, and it follows by inference that the first clause discusses one who gave the carpenter wood, and even so the carpenter is liable to pay damages. It is therefore impossible to prove Rav Asiโ€™s statement from the mishna.

ืœื™ืžื ืžืกื™ื™ืข ืœื™ื” ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืฆืžืจ ืœืฆื‘ืข

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna (100b) supports the opinion of Rav Asi: With regard to one who gives wool to a dyer

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