Bava Kamma 98

ואי מחמת תרעא זיל לא מנכינן ליה

And if the produce decreased in price due to the market value, the debt is not reduced for him.

והא קא שבח לענין נסכא אלא כי הא דרב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע עבדי עובדא בזוזי דאגרדמיס טייעא עד עשרה בתמניא

The Gemara challenges: But the value of the coin has been enhanced for the purpose of melting it down into a bar of metal. Since this coin now contains a larger quantity of metal, if it were to be melted it would be worth more than an earlier coin of the same type, so it should be considered interest. Rather, in this case one must act in accordance with how Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, acted when they performed an action with the dinars of Agardamis the Arab merchant [tayya’a]: They considered up to ten old coins to be the equivalent of eight new coins. Since ten old coins were equivalent in value to eight new coins, they paid eight new coins in exchange for ten old ones.

אמר רבה הזורק מטבע של חבירו לים הגדול פטור מאי טעמא אמר הא מנח קמך אי בעית שקליה והני מילי בצלולין דקא חזי ליה אבל עכורין דלא קחזי ליה לא והני מילי דאדייה אדויי אבל שקליה בידיה מיגזל גזליה השבה בעי מיעבד

§ Rabba says: One who throws another’s coin into the Great Sea is exempt from liability. What is the reason for this? He can say: The coin is resting before you; if you wish, take it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only if the coin is in translucent water, where the owner of the coin can see the coin, but in turbid water, where he cannot see the coin, it does not apply, and the one that threw it will be liable to compensate the owner. And this statement applies only when he rolled the coin into the sea without picking it up, but if he took the coin with his hands and threw it into the sea, he has robbed the owner of it, and the robber is required to perform the mitzva of returning the coin to its owner.

מתיב רבא אין מחללין על מעות שאינן ברשותו כיצד היו לו מעות בקסטרא או בהר המלך או שנפל כיסו לים הגדול אין מחללין אמר רבה שאני לענין מעשר דבעינן מצוי בידך דרחמנא אמר וצרת הכסף בידך וליכא

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 1:6): One cannot desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto money that is not in his possession. How so? If he had money in a fortress [kastera], or in the King’s Mountain [Har HaMelekh], or if his purse fell into the Great Sea, one may not desacralize second tithe by transferring its sanctity onto that money. This indicates that money that fell into the Great Sea is considered lost. Rabba said: This is not difficult; it is different with regard to second tithe, since it is necessary that the money be found in the hand of the one who wishes to desacralize the tithe, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “Then you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and shall go to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 14:25), and if it is in the Great Sea, it is not in his hand, but nevertheless it is not considered lost.

ואמר רבה השף מטבע של חבירו פטור מאי טעמא דהא לא עבד ולא מידי והני מילי דמחייה בקורנסא וטרשיה אבל שייפא בשופינא חסורי חסריה

And Rabba also says: One who effaces the image of another’s coin is exempt from paying damages, even though he caused the coin to lose value. What is the reason for this? As he did not do anything, the coin remains the same size as before. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only in a case where he struck it with a hammer [kurnesa] and flattened it; but if he filed it with a file [shofina] he must pay the amount of the reduction in value, since he caused it to diminish in size.

מתיב רבא הכהו על עינו וסמאה על אזנו וחרשו עבד יוצא בהן לחירות כנגד עינו ואינו רואה כנגד אזנו ואינו שומע אין עבד יוצא בהן לחירות

Rava raises an objection to the statement of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a master struck his slave on his eye and blinded it, or on his ear and deafened it, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries. If he struck the slave near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these injuries. The first clause indicates that one is liable for damage caused even if it is not visible damage.

רבה לטעמיה דאמר רבה חרשו לאביו נהרג שאי אפשר לחרישה בלא חבורה דטפתא דדמא נפלת ליה באוניה

The Gemara responds: Rabba conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rabba says: One who deafens his father is put to death, even though no bruise is visible, because it is impossible for deafening to occur without a bruise, as it is certain that a drop of blood fell into his ear from the blow, even if it is not visible from the outside. Striking someone in the ear in a manner that causes deafness results in a significant physical change, while striking a coin with a hammer does not detract from the actual size of the coin.

ואמר רבה הצורם אוזן פרתו של חבירו פטור מאי טעמא פרה כדקיימא קיימא דלא עבד ולא מידי וכולהו שוורים לאו לגבי מזבח קיימי

And Rabba also says: One who slits the ear of another’s cow is exempt from paying damages, even though this cow is no longer fit to be sacrificed as an offering due to the injury. What is the reason for this? As the cow was available for many uses until now, so it is still available for those uses now, since the one who slit its ear did not do anything to damage the cow in a substantial way. And concerning the fact that it is rendered disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering, not all oxen stand near the altar, i.e., most animals are not sacrificed as offerings anyway, so it is not considered a loss.

מתיב רבא העושה מלאכה במי חטאת ובפרת חטאת פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים מלאכה הוא דלא מינכר היזיקה אבל צורם דמינכר היזיקה הכי נמי דמחייב בדיני אדם

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: One who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer and sprinkled upon one who has become impure as part of the purification ritual, or with the red heifer of purification, whose ashes are mixed with springwater and sprinkled on those who have contracted impurity imparted by a corpse on the third and seventh days of their impurity, is exempt according to human laws, since he has not caused any discernible damage, but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. It may be inferred from here that one is exempt from liability according to human laws only if he performed a task with those items, since the damage that he caused is not evident, but in the case of one who slits the ear, where the damage is evident, he is indeed liable according to human laws.

אמרי הוא הדין דאפילו צורם פטור והא קא משמע לן דאפילו מלאכה דלא מינכר היזיקה חייב בדיני שמים

The Sages say in response: The same is true that even one who slits the ear is exempt according to human laws, and the baraita that specified cases where the damage is not evident teaches us this: That even one who performs a task with the water of purification or the red heifer, where the damage is not evident, is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ואמר רבה השורף שטרו של חבירו פטור דאמר ליה ניירא קלאי מינך מתקיף לה רמי בר חמא היכי דמי

And Rabba also says: One who burns another’s promissory note is exempt, as the one who burned it can say to him: I have burned only your paper, and he is not held liable for the fact that the creditor will no longer be able to prove that he had provided the loan. Rami bar Ḥama objects to this: What are the circumstances?

אי דאיכא סהדי דידעי מאי הוה בשטרא ליכתבו ליה שטרא מעליא ואי דליכא סהדי אנן מנא ידעינן אמר רבא תהא במאמינו

If there are witnesses who know what was written in the promissory note, they should write a new, proper, promissory note for him, and there will not be any loss. And if there are no witnesses, how do we know what was written in the promissory note in order to assess liability? Rava says: Let it refer to a case where the one who burned the promissory note trusts the creditor with regard to the details of the promissory note. Despite the concession of the one who burned the promissory note with regard to the amount of the debt, Rabba holds that he is exempt, since the value of the debt is not inherent in the actual paper.

אמר רב דימי בר חנינא הא דרבה מחלוקת רבי שמעון ורבנן היא לרבי שמעון דאמר דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי מחייב לרבנן דאמרי דבר הגורם לממון לאו כממון דמי לא מחייב

Rav Dimi bar Ḥanina said: This statement of Rabba is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned the promissory note is liable. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is not liable. Rabba holds in accordance with the Rabbis, and therefore rules that one who burns a promissory note is exempt from liability.

מתקיף לה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי שמעון דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי בדבר שעיקרו ממון כדרבה דאמר רבה גזל חמץ לפני הפסח ובא אחר ושרפו במועד פטור שהכל מצווים עליו לבערו לאחר הפסח מחלוקת רבי שמעון ורבנן

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: Say that you heard the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, with regard to a case where he damaged an item that has intrinsic monetary value, in accordance with the statement of Rabba. As Rabba says: If one robbed another of leavened bread before Passover, and another came and burned it during the festival of Passover, when the leavened bread had already become forbidden, the one who burned it is exempt from paying the robber, as all are commanded to destroy the leavened bread, and he therefore performed a mitzva. If he burned it after Passover, that is the matter of dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis.

לרבי שמעון דאמר דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי חייב לרבנן דאמרי דבר הגורם לממון לאו כממון דמי פטור בדבר שאין עיקרו ממון מי אמרינן

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, explains: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an item that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, the one who burned it is liable, and he must pay the robber. Although it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, the robber could have returned it to the victim and been exempt from liability. Now that it has been burned, the robber will have to pay the monetary value of the leavened bread at the time of the theft. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an item that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, he is exempt. But with regard to an item such as a promissory note, which has no intrinsic monetary value, do we say that in Rabbi Shimon’s opinion it too is considered to have monetary value?

אמר אמימר מאן דדאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה דמי שטרא מעליא ומאן דלא דאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה דמי ניירא בעלמא הוה עובדא וכפייה רפרם לרב אשי ואגבי ביה כי כשורא לצלמא

The Gemara cites a ruling for the case where one burns the promissory note of another. Ameimar said: The one who rules that there is liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, the value of a proper promissory note, i.e., the amount of the debt, from the one who burned the promissory note. The one who rules that there is no liability for damage caused by indirect action collects, in this case, merely the value of the paper. The Gemara relates that there was an incident like this one, and Rafram forced Rav Ashi, who had burned a document in his youth, to pay damages, and he collected payment, in this case, as if he had damaged a beam used for crafting a sculpture, i.e., he paid him the value of the debt listed in the promissory note.

חמץ ועבר עליו הפסח אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מאן תנא אומרין באיסורי הנאה הרי שלך לפניך אמר רב חסדא רבי יעקב היא דתניא שור שהמית עד שלא נגמר דינו מכרו מכור הקדישו מוקדש שחטו בשרו מותר החזירו שומר לבעליו מוחזר

§ The mishna teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, the robber says to his victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one says: That which is yours is before you? Rav Ḥisda said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:4): If there was an ox that killed a person and is consequently liable to be stoned, and before the court sentenced it the owner sold the ox, the sale is valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is permitted; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

משנגמר דינו מכרו אינו מכור הקדישו אינו מוקדש שחטו בשרו אסור החזירו שומר לבעליו אינו מוחזר רבי יעקב אומר אף משנגמר דינו החזירו שומר לבעליו מוחזר

The baraita continues: By contrast, from when it was sentenced to be stoned it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and if the owner sold it, the sale is not valid; if he consecrated it, the consecration is not valid; if he slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden; if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is not returned, as once it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, the ox is worthless. Rabbi Ya’akov says: Even after it was sentenced, if a bailee returned it to its owner, it is returned.

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דרבי יעקב סבר אומרין באיסורי הנאה הרי שלך לפניך ורבנן סברי אין אומרין באיסורי הנאה הרי שלך לפניך

Rav Ḥisda completes his analysis: What, is it not that they disagree about this issue, that Rabbi Ya’akov holds that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the Rabbis hold that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one cannot say: That which is yours is before you?

אמר ליה רבה לא דכולי עלמא אמרינן באיסורי הנאה הרי שלך לפניך דאם כן נפלגו בחמץ בפסח אלא אמר רבה הכא בגומרין דינו של שור שלא בפניו קא מיפלגי

Rabba said to him in response: No. It may be that everyone agrees that with regard to items from which benefit is forbidden one can say: That which is yours is before you, and the ruling of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As if so, i.e., if it were true that the dispute in the baraita between the Rabbis and Rabbi Ya’akov concerns the general question of returning an item from which benefit is forbidden, they should disagree with regard to the case of leavened bread on Passover and whether it can be returned as is, since this is a clear case of an item from which benefit is forbidden. Rather, Rabba said: Here, in the baraita, they disagree with regard to a different issue: Can an ox be sentenced in its absence?

רבנן סברי אין גומרין דינו של שור שלא בפניו דאמר ליה אי אייתיתיה ניהליה הוה מעריקנא ליה לאגמא השתא מסרתיה ביד מאן דלא מצינא לאישתעויי דינא בהדיה ורבי יעקב סבר גומרין דינו של שור שלא בפניו דאמר ליה מאי עבדי ליה סוף סוף הוה גמרי ליה דינא שלא בפניו

Rabba explains the dispute: The Rabbis hold that an ox may not be sentenced in its absence, and therefore the bailee is liable to pay. The reason is that when the ox is returned after its sentencing, the owner may say to the bailee: Had you brought the ox to me before sentencing, I would have chased it away into the marsh, preventing the sentencing from taking place. Now, since you did not return it to me before it was given to the court, you have given it to one with whom I cannot litigate, as the court was sure to sentence it. Therefore you must pay me and not return the ox. And Rabbi Ya’akov holds that an ox may be sentenced even in its absence, and the claim of the owner of the ox is not accepted. The reason is that the bailee may say to the owner in response: What did I do to the ox? Ultimately it would have been sentenced in its absence and rendered forbidden.

אשכחיה רב חסדא לרבה בר שמואל אמר ליה תנית מידי באיסורי הנאה אמר ליה אין תנינא והשיב את הגזלה מה תלמוד לומר אשר גזל יחזיר כעין שגזל

The Gemara relates an incident: Rav Ḥisda, who stated that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov and not the Rabbis, found Rabba bar Shmuel and said to him: Did you learn anything with regard to the halakhot of returning stolen items from which benefit is forbidden? Rabba bar Shmuel said to him: Yes, we learned a baraita: The verse states: “Then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed” (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states: “That he robbed”? It means that the robber must return the same item that he robbed.

מכאן אמרו גזל מטבע ונפסל פירות והרקיבו יין והחמיץ תרומה ונטמאת חמץ ועבר עליו הפסח בהמה ונעבדה בה עבירה ושור עד שלא נגמר דינו אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך

The baraita continues: From here the Sages stated that if one robbed another of a coin and it was invalidated, or of produce and it rotted, or of wine and it fermented, or of teruma and it became ritually impure, or of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, or of an animal and a sin was performed with it, or of an ox that had not been sentenced, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you.

מאן שמעת ליה דאמר עד שלא נגמר דינו אין משנגמר דינו לא רבנן וקתני חמץ ועבר עליו הפסח אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך אמר ליה אי משכחת להו לא תימא להו ולא מידי

The Gemara notes: Who did you hear say that before the ox was sentenced it can be returned, but after it was sentenced it cannot? It is the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Ya’akov in the baraita; and this baraita teaches that if one robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. This disproves the analysis of Rav Ḥisda, as even the Rabbis agree that an item from which benefit is forbidden is returned as is. Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba bar Shmuel: If you find the Sages, do not say anything to them, i.e., do not publicize that I erred.

פירות והרקיבו אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך והתנן פירות והרקיבו משלם כשעת הגזילה אמר רב פפא כאן שהרקיבו כולן כאן שהרקיבו מקצתן

§ The Gemara discusses the baraita, which states that if one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he can say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna (96b): If one robbed another of produce and it rotted, he pays compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery? Rav Pappa said: Here, the mishna is referring to a case where the stolen produce all rotted, which constitutes a significant change. The robber acquires the produce and must pay what its value was at the time of the robbery. There, the baraita is referring to a case where part of the stolen produce rotted. In such a case the robber may return it and say: That which is yours is before you.

מתני׳ נתן לאומנין לתקן וקלקלו חייבין לשלם נתן לחרש שידה תיבה ומגדל לתקן וקלקל חייב לשלם והבנאי שקיבל עליו לסתור את הכותל ושיבר האבנים או שהזיקן חייב לשלם היה סותר מצד זה ונפל מצד אחר פטור ואם מחמת המכה חייב

MISHNA: If one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, the craftsmen are liable to pay for the damage. For example, if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to fix, and he damaged it, he is liable to pay. And a builder who committed to demolish a wall and while demolishing it he broke the stones, or who damaged them, is liable to pay. If he was demolishing on this side of the wall, and the wall fell from another side and caused damage, he is exempt from liability. But if a stone fell and caused damage due to the force of the blow, he is liable.

גמ׳ אמר רב אסי לא שנו אלא שנתן לחרש שידה תיבה ומגדל לנעץ בהן מסמר ונעץ בהן מסמר ושיברן אבל נתן לחרש עצים לעשות שידה תיבה ומגדל ועשה מהן שידה תיבה ומגדל ושיברן פטור

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to fix, and he damaged it, the carpenter is liable to pay for the damage. Rav Asi says: The Sages taught that a carpenter is liable to pay damages only in a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet to drive a nail into them, i.e., he gave the carpenter complete vessels to repair, and he drove the nail into them and broke them. But if one gave wood to a carpenter to build a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he built a chest, a box, or a cabinet from the wood, and before giving it to the owner the carpenter broke them, he is exempt from paying for the damage caused to these vessels, and must pay only for the damage caused to the wood.

מאי טעמא אומן קונה בשבח כלי

What is the reason for this? It is because a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel. The craftsman is considered to have acquired the vessel through his work, which enhances its value, and it remains in his possession until he returns it to the owners. Consequently, if he damages the vessel in any way, he is damaging his own item, and must return only the value of the raw materials to the owners.

תנן נתן לאומנין וקלקלו חייבין לשלם מאי לאו דיהיב להו עצים לא שידה תיבה ומגדל

The Gemara attempts to contradict Rav Asi’s statement: We learned in the mishna that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, they are liable to pay for the damage. What, is it not referring to a case where he gave them wood, and they nevertheless pay the owner the value of a vessel? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a case where he gave them a chest, a box, or a cabinet to repair.

הא מדקתני סיפא שידה תיבה ומגדל מכלל דרישא עצים אמרי פרושי קא מפרש לה כיצד נתן לאומנין לתקן וקלקלו חייבין לשלם כגון שנתן לחרש שידה תיבה ומגדל

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches about a chest, a box, or a cabinet, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is referring to wood. The Sages say in response: The latter clause is explaining the first clause. After stating that the craftsmen are liable to pay damages, the mishna explains: In what case is it so that if one gave items to craftsmen to fix, and they damaged them, they are liable to pay? It is with regard to a case where one gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet.

והכי נמי מסתברא דכיצד קתני דאי סלקא דעתך רישא עצים השתא אשמעינן עצים חייבין לשלם ולא אמרינן אומן קונה בשבח כלים שידה תיבה ומגדל מבעיא

The Gemara notes: And so too, it is reasonable to say that the latter clause of the mishna teaches in what case the first clause deems them liable, as, if it enters your mind to think that the first clause is referring to a case where he gave wood, one could ask: Now that the mishna told us that if one gave wood, the craftsman is liable to pay the value of a vessel, and we do not say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of vessels, is it necessary to tell us that if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet, the craftsman is liable to pay damages?

אי משום הא לא איריא תנא סיפא לגלויי רישא שלא תאמר רישא שידה תיבה ומגדל אבל עצים לא תנא סיפא שידה תיבה ומגדל מכלל דרישא עצים ואפילו הכי חייב לשלם

The Gemara dismisses this proof: If it is due to that reason, i.e., if that is the manner in which the explanation of the mishna is refuted, there is no conclusive argument, because that claim can be refuted by saying that the tanna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you would not say that the first clause is referring to a case where one gave the carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet, but had he given wood, the carpenter would not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches the case of one who gave a carpenter a chest, a box, or a cabinet in the latter clause, and it follows by inference that the first clause discusses one who gave the carpenter wood, and even so the carpenter is liable to pay damages. It is therefore impossible to prove Rav Asi’s statement from the mishna.

לימא מסייע ליה הנותן צמר לצבע

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna (100b) supports the opinion of Rav Asi: With regard to one who gives wool to a dyer