Bava Metzia 34
מִי יֵימַר דְּמִגַּנְבָא, וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר דְּמִגַּנְבָא – מִי יֵימַר דְּמִשְׁתְּכַח גַּנָּב, וְאִי מִשְׁתְּכַח גַּנָּב – מִי יֵימַר דִּמְשַׁלֵּם, דִּלְמָא מוֹדֵי וּמִפְּטַר? אָמַר רָבָא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לוֹ, לִכְשֶׁתִּגָּנֵב וְתִרְצֶה וּתְשַׁלְּמֵנִי הֲרֵי פָּרָתִי קְנוּיָה לְךָ מֵעַכְשָׁיו.
who could say that the deposit will be stolen? And if you say it will be stolen, who could say that the thief will be found? And even if the thief will be found, who could say that he will pay the double payment? Perhaps he will confess and will be exempted from the double payment. Rava said in response: It is as though the owner said to the bailee at the time that he gave him the deposit: When it will be stolen, and you will wish to refrain from taking an oath, and you will pay me instead, ownership of my cow is hereby transferred to you from this time, and the cow is an entity that already came into the world. Since ownership of the cow is retroactively transferred to the bailee from the time of the deposit, any profits generated by the cow, e.g., the double payment, belong to the bailee.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ גִּיזּוֹתֶיהָ וּוַלְדוֹתֶיהָ נָמֵי! אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא חוּץ מִגִּיזּוֹתֶיהָ וּוַלְדוֹתֶיהָ? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לוֹ, חוּץ מִגִּיזּוֹתֶיהָ וּוַלְדוֹתֶיהָ.
Rabbi Zeira objects to this: If so, then even the fleece and offspring of the animal that grew while it was in the bailee’s possession should be the property of the bailee. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita that the bailee receives all profits generated by the animal except for its fleece and its offspring? Rather, Rabbi Zeira says that it is as though the owner said to the bailee: My animal is hereby transferred to you from this time except for its fleece and its offspring.
וּמַאי פְּסָקַאּ? סְתָמָא דְּמִלְּתָא שְׁבָחָא דְּאָתֵא מֵעָלְמָא, עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּמַקְנֵי. שְׁבָחָא דְּמִגּוּפַהּ, לָא עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּמַקְנֵי.
The Gemara asks: If so, why was this halakha stated in the mishna without qualification? Does every owner necessarily have that condition in mind? The Gemara answers: Typically, profit that comes from elsewhere, e.g., the double payment from a thief, which is difficult to anticipate, a person is apt to transfer to the bailee. But profit that originates from the body of the animal, which can be anticipated, a person is not apt to transfer to the bailee.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לוֹ, לִכְשֶׁתִּגָּנֵב וְתִרְצֶה וּתְשַׁלְּמֵנִי, סָמוּךְ לִגְנֵיבָתָהּ קְנוּיָה לָךְ. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?
Some say that Rava says his response differently. It is as though the owner said to the bailee at the time of the deposit: When it will be stolen, and you will wish to refrain from taking an oath, and you will pay me instead, ownership of my animal is transferred to you adjacent to, i.e., immediately before, its theft. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the formulations in Rava’s two responses?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ קוּשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא. אִי נָמֵי דְּקָיְימָא בַּאֲגַם.
The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to the difficulty raised by Rabbi Zeira with regard to fleece and offspring, which is irrelevant according to the second formulation. Alternatively, there is a difference in a case where the animal is standing in a marsh [ba’agam] at the time of its theft. Since the animal was not on the bailee’s property at that time, he could not acquire it.
שִׁילֵּם וְלֹא רָצָה לִישָּׁבַע [וְכוּ׳]. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא ״שִׁילֵּם״ – שִׁילֵּם מַמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁילֵּם.
§ The mishna teaches that if the bailee paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath, the thief pays the double payment to the bailee. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the mishna says: If the bailee paid, it does not mean that he actually paid. Rather, once the bailee said: I hereby choose to pay, even if he did not yet actually pay, he acquired the double payment and all other profits.
תְּנַן: שִׁילֵּם וְלֹא רָצָה לִישָּׁבַע. שִׁילֵּם – אִין, לֹא שִׁילֵּם – לָא. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: נִשְׁבַּע וְלֹא רָצָה לְשַׁלֵּם. טַעְמָא דְּלֹא רָצָה, הָא רָצָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁילֵּם. אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned in the mishna: If the bailee paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath, the thief pays the double payment to the bailee. The Gemara infers: If the bailee paid, yes, he acquires these rights; if the bailee did not pay, he does not. The Gemara answers: Say the latter clause of the mishna: In the case of a bailee who took an oath and did not wish to pay, the thief pays the double payment to the owner. The Gemara infers: The reason that the thief pays the owner is that the bailee did not wish to pay. But if the bailee wished to pay, although he did not actually pay, he acquires the rights to the double payment. Rather, because the inference from the first clause and the inference from the latter clause are contradictory, no inference is to be learned from this mishna.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׂוֹכֵר פָּרָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, וְנִגְנְבָה, וְאָמַר הַלָּה: ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם וְאֵינִי נִשְׁבָּע״, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל לַשּׂוֹכֵר.
The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and it was stolen, and the other party, the renter, said: I hereby choose to pay and I will not take an oath, and the thief was located thereafter, the thief pays the double payment to the renter. Apparently, once the renter chooses to pay, he acquires the rights to the double payment.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר ״פָּשַׁעְתִּי״, מַקְנֵה לֵיהּ כְּפֵילָא. דְּאִי בָּעֵי פָּטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ בִּגְנֵיבָה. שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר ״נִגְנְבָה״, מַקְנֵה לֵיהּ כְּפֵילָא. דְּאִי בָּעֵי פָּטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה.
Rav Pappa says: In the case of an unpaid bailee, once he stated: I was negligent, thereby rendering himself liable to compensate the owner, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if the unpaid bailee wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim of theft. Admitting negligence is tantamount to agreeing to pay rather than taking an oath. Likewise, in the case of a paid bailee, once he stated: It was stolen, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if the paid bailee wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim that the animal was maimed or died due to circumstances beyond his control.
שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״ – לָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ כְּפֵילָא, בְּמַאי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמִפְטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ? בְּמֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה, מֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה לָא שְׁכִיחַ.
By contrast, in the case of a borrower who says: I hereby choose to pay, the owner does not transfer the rights to the double payment to him. The borrower’s statement that he chooses to pay is ineffectual, as he is liable to pay even without it. Because the statement is ineffectual, it does not confer any rights. With what claim would a borrower be able to exempt himself from payment? It is only with the claim that the animal died due to ordinary labor. A case of an animal that died due to ordinary labor is uncommon, and this claim is therefore accepted only with corroborating proof.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שׁוֹאֵל נָמֵי כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״ – מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ כְּפֵילָא, דְּאִי בָּעֵי פָּטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּמֵתָה מֵחֲמַת מְלָאכָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב זְבִיד: הָכִי אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שׁוֹאֵל עַד שֶׁיְּשַׁלֵּם. מַאי טַעְמָא? הוֹאִיל וְכׇל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ, בְּדִיבּוּרָא לָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ כְּפֵילָא.
Some say that Rav Pappa said: In the case of a borrower, once he stated: I hereby choose to pay, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if a borrower wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim that the animal died due to ordinary labor. Rav Zevid said to him that this is what Abaye said: A borrower acquires the rights to the double payment only when he actually pays for the item. What is the reason for this? Since all of the benefit accrues to the borrower, as he enjoys the use of the item without payment, the owner does not transfer the rights to the double payment to the borrower due to his statement that he chooses to pay.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד: הַשּׁוֹאֵל פָּרָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְנִגְנְבָה, וְקִידֵּם הַשּׁוֹאֵל וְשִׁילֵּם, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל לַשּׁוֹאֵל.
The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Zevid: In the case of one who borrows a cow from another, and it was stolen, and the borrower went ahead and paid, and the thief was located thereafter, the thief pays the double payment to the borrower. This indicates that the borrower receives the double payment only if he actually paid the owner for the item.
לְלִישָּׁנָא קַמָּא דְּרַב פָּפָּא – וַדַּאי לָא הָוְיָא תְּיוּבְתָּא. לְלִישָּׁנָא בָּתְרָא לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ?
The Gemara comments: According to the first version of the statement of Rav Pappa, that the owner transfers rights to the double payment to the borrower only if he actually pays the owner, this baraita certainly is not a conclusive refutation [teyuvta] of the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the baraita corresponds to his opinion. According to the latter version of Rav Pappa’s statement, that the owner transfers rights to the double payment to the borrower even if the borrower merely says that he chooses to pay, shall we say that this baraita would be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Pappa?
אָמַר לְךָ רַב פָּפָּא: מִי אַלִּימָא מִמַּתְנִיתִין? דְּקָתָנֵי ״שִׁילֵּם״, וְאוֹקֵימְנָא, בְּאָמַר הָכָא נָמֵי בְּאָמַר.
The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa could have said to you: Is the baraita stronger than the mishna, which teaches that the bailee receives the double payment if he already paid the owner, and nevertheless, we established that the mishna is referring to one who states his intent to pay but has not yet paid? Here, too, establish the baraita as referring to one who states his intent to pay but has not yet paid.
מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לָא קָתָנֵי ״קִידֵּם״, הָכָא קָתָנֵי ״קִידֵּם״! מַאי ״קִידֵּם״? קִידֵּם וְאָמַר.
The Gemara questions this: Are these cases comparable? There, in the mishna, it is not taught that he went ahead and paid. Here, in the baraita, it is taught that he went ahead and paid, which indicates that he actually paid and not merely that he agreed to pay. The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of went ahead? It means that he went ahead and stated his intent to pay, although he did not yet actually pay.
הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי גַּבֵּי שׂוֹכֵר ״וְאָמַר״, וְגַבֵּי שׁוֹאֵל ״קִידֵּם״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דַּוְקָא קָתָנֵי! מִידֵּי גַּבֵּי הֲדָדֵי תַּנְיָא?
The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the tanna teaches the halakha in the baraita cited earlier with regard to a renter with the formulation: And he said that he would pay, and in the baraita with regard to a borrower the tanna uses the formulation: Went ahead, conclude from it that the baraita concerning a borrower is teaching specifically that he actually paid. The Gemara rejects this proof: Are these two baraitot taught together so that one can draw a conclusion based on a discrepancy in their formulation? Perhaps the baraitot are unrelated and are simply formulated in different styles.
שַׁיְילִינְהוּ לְתַנָּאֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא וּדְבֵי רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא, וְאָמְרִי: גַּבֵּי הֲדָדֵי תַּנְיָין.
The Gemara comments: The Sages asked the tanna’im of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya, experts in mishnayot and baraitot, if these baraitot were formulated together. And they said that the baraitot were taught together as one long baraita, and therefore one can draw a conclusion based on a discrepancy in their formulation.
פְּשִׁיטָא: אָמַר ״אֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״ וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״, – הָא קָאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״. אֶלָּא אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״
§ The Gemara comments that it is obvious that if the bailee initially said: I will not pay, and then said: I hereby choose to pay rather than taking an oath, he is entitled to the double payment, as didn’t he ultimately say: I hereby choose to pay? The Gemara raises a dilemma: But if he initially said: I hereby choose to pay,
וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״אֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״, מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן מִהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּמִלְּתֵיהּ קָאֵי וְדַחוֹיֵי הוּא דְּקָא מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ?
and then said: I will not pay, what is the halakha? Do we say he is retracting his intention to pay and therefore has no right to the double payment? Or, perhaps he stands committed to his initial statement and is merely postponing payment to a later date, in which case he maintains rights to the double payment.
אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי מְשַׁלֵּם״ וָמֵת, וְאָמְרוּ בָּנָיו ״אֵין אָנוּ מְשַׁלְּמִין״, מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן מִהְדָּר קָא הָדְרִי בְּהוּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּמִלְּתָא דַאֲבוּהוֹן קָיְימִי, וְדַחוֹיֵי הוּא דְּקָא מְדַחוּ לֵיהּ?
The Gemara raises another dilemma. If the bailee said: I hereby choose to pay, and then he died before paying, and his sons said: We are not paying, what is the halakha? Do we say they are retracting their father’s decision to pay, or perhaps they stand committed to fulfilling their father’s statement and are merely postponing payment to a later date when they will be able to pay?
שִׁלְּמוּ בָּנִים, מַאי? מָצֵי אָמַר לְהוּ: כִּי אַקְנַאי כְּפֵילָא – לַאֲבוּכוֹן דַּעֲבַד לִי נְיָיח נַפְשַׁאי, לְדִידְכוּ לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא.
The Gemara raises another dilemma. If the father died before he declared his willingness to pay and the sons paid, what is the halakha? Can the owner say to them: When I transferred rights to the double payment, I transferred them to your father, who pleased me, but to you, I did not transfer those rights? Or perhaps this case is no different, and the owner transfers rights to the double payment provided that he receives payment, and it does not matter whether it was the bailee or his sons who paid him.
שִׁילֵּם לְבָנִים, מַאי? מָצוּ אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: כִּי אַקְנִי לָךְ אֲבוּנָא כְּפֵילָא – דַּעֲבַדְתְּ לֵיהּ נְיָיח נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אֲבָל אֲנַן לְדִידַן לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא. שִׁלְּמוּ בָּנִים לְבָנִים, מַאי?
If the owner of the deposit died and the bailee paid the payment to the owner’s sons, what is the halakha? Can the sons say to the bailee: When our father transferred rights to the double payment to you, it was because you pleased him, but as far as we are concerned, you did not please us? Or perhaps it is no different, and the bailee receives the double payment. Likewise, if both the owner and the bailee died, and sons of the bailee paid the sons of the owner, what is the halakha?
שִׁילֵּם מֶחֱצָה, מַאי? שָׁאַל שְׁתֵּי פָּרוֹת וְשִׁילֵּם אַחַת מֵהֶן, מַאי? שָׁאַל מִן הַשּׁוּתָּפִין וְשִׁילֵּם לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן, מַאי? שׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁשָּׁאֲלוּ וְשִׁילֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן, מַאי? שָׁאַל מִן הָאִשָּׁה וְשִׁילֵּם לְבַעְלָהּ, מַאי? אִשָּׁה שֶׁשָּׁאֲלָה וְשִׁילֵּם בַּעֲלָהּ, מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara raises additional dilemmas: If the bailee paid half the value of the deposit before the thief was discovered, what is the halakha? If one borrowed two cows, and they were stolen, and he paid the value of one of them, what is the halakha? If one borrowed an item from partners, and he paid one of them, what is the halakha? In the case of partners who borrowed an item and one of them paid, what is the halakha? If one borrowed an item from a woman and paid her husband, what is the halakha? In the case of a woman who borrowed an item, and her husband paid, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All of these dilemmas shall stand unresolved [teiku].
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. מַאי טַעְמָא? חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא עֵינָיו נָתַן בָּהּ.
§ Rav Huna says: Even if the bailee declares his intention to pay for the deposit, the court administers an oath to him that the item was actually stolen or lost and is not in his possession. What is the reason for this oath? We are concerned that perhaps he coveted that item.
מֵיתִיבִי: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן, וְאָבַד הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן, וְאָמַר לוֹ: סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, שֶׁקֶל הָיָה שָׁוֶה. וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִּי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, סֶלַע הָיָה שָׁוֶה – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Shevuot 43a): In the case of one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost, and the creditor says to the debtor: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and that collateral was worth a shekel, i.e., a half-sela. Therefore you owe me a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says in response to that claim: That is not the case. Rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth a sela; I owe you nothing. In this case, the debtor is exempt from payment.
סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, שֶׁקֶל הָיָה שָׁוֶה, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁלֹשָׁה דִּינָרִים הָיָה שָׁוֶה – חַיָּיב.
The mishna continues: If the creditor claimed: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is obligated to take an oath, due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the creditor with a partial admission.
סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁנַיִם הָיָה שָׁוֶה, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִּי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, סֶלַע הָיָה שָׁוֶה – פָּטוּר.
The mishna continues: If the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. Here, the creditor is exempt.
סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁנַיִם הָיָה שָׁוֶה, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִּי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, חֲמִשָּׁה דִּינָרִים הָיָה שָׁוֶה – חַיָּיב.
If the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth five dinars. Here, the creditor is obligated to take an oath due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the debtor with a partial admission.
מִי נִשְׁבָּע? מִי שֶׁהַפִּקָּדוֹן אֶצְלוֹ. שֶׁמָּא יִשָּׁבַע זֶה וְיוֹצִיא הַלָּה אֶת הַפִּקָּדוֹן.
The mishna concludes: Who takes the oath? The one in whose possession the deposit was located, i.e., the creditor, who took collateral from the debtor. The Sages instituted this provision lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.
אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַסֵּיפָא, וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דִּשְׁבוּעָה גַּבֵּי מַלְוֶה הִיא, דְּהָא קָא מוֹדֵי מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אַרֵישָׁא.
The Gemara seeks to clarify the mishna: To which case in the mishna is this halakha referring? If we say it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, where the debtor claims that the creditor owes him money, the mishna’s explanation is unnecessary: Derive that the obligation to take the oath is incumbent upon the creditor due to the fact that he admits to part of the debtor’s claim, which renders one obligated to take an oath by Torah law. Rather, Shmuel says: This halakha is referring to the first clause of the mishna.
מַאי אַרֵישָׁא? אַסֵּיפָא דְּרֵישָׁא, סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו שֶׁקֶל הָיָה שָׁוֶה, וְהַלָּהּ אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִּי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁלֹשָׁה דִּינָרִין הָיָה שָׁוֶה – חַיָּיב. דִּשְׁבוּעָה גַּבֵּי לֹוֶה הוּא, וַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: לִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה, שֶׁמָּא יִשָּׁבַע זֶה וְיוֹצִיא הַלָּה אֶת הַפִּקָּדוֹן.
The Gemara clarifies further: What is the meaning of Shmuel’s statement that this halakha is referring to the first clause of the mishna? It is referring to the latter part of the first clause: The creditor says: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars. Here, the halakha is that the debtor is obligated to take an oath. Fundamentally, the obligation to take the oath is that of the borrower, as he is the one who responds to the creditor’s claim with a partial admission. But the Sages said: Let the creditor take the oath to bolster his claim, lest this party, the debtor, take an oath and the other party, the creditor, produce the deposit.
וְאִם
After explaining this mishna from tractate Shevuot, the Gemara analyzes its connection to the statement of Rav Huna: But if
