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Introduction to Bava Metzia

05.29.2025 | ב׳ בסיון תשפ״ה
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Introduction to Bava Metzia

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In honor of the Hadran Women of Long Island.

Bava Metzia is the second masechet of Seder Nezikin.  Its name, literally “the middle gate,” refers to its position as the second of three masechtot know as the Bava’s (“gates”), which are sometimes referred to as Nezikin as well – Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra (first gate, middle gate, and last gate). Unlike Bava Kamma and Bava Batra, Bava Metzia does not deal with torts and damages. Instead, it discusses other areas of civil law, such as found objects, exploitation, verbal mistreatment, the obligations of shomerim (custodians), sales, interest on loans, hiring practices, sharecroppers, and rentals.
As Rav Steinsaltz zt”l notes, “A basic element in Jewish civil law is the integration of compassion with justice.” In general, halacha will seek to go beyond the requirements of justice. Based on the conception of the Jewish people as one family, the laws that govern interactions with fellow Jews reflect the obligation to care for one another. The laws governing economic life are broader and are seen as part of the Sheva mitzvot Bnai Noach (the Noahide obligations) incumbent on all.
There are four basic categories of laws discussed in this masechet:
  • Transactions (a basic component of any legal system)
  • Transactions between Jews
  • Acts that are not punishable by courts but discouraged
  • Ethical behaviors
Throughout the masechet, we will deal with the issue of ownership. While generally, we would assume that ownership is equivalent to physical possession, there are times when this is not the case: for example, if an item is rented or lent, used as collateral, or lost.  We will need to determine who has halachic ownership of the item, and who bears responsibility for damage caused to it or by it. We will also learn about the transfer of ownership of movable property (metaltelin) and the determination of when that transfer occurs and the point at which it becomes irrevocable.
Muchzak
In a great deal of litigation, the concept of muchzak, presumption of possession is invoked. As we learned in Bava Kamma (46b), the principle of המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה (the burden of proof is on the one who wants to take from the other) is seen as logical and not requiring a textual basis.  However, Sumchos limits the parameters of this concept, stating that there are cases where disputed property is divided in the absence of proof of ownership. It should be noted that the use of this principle does not imply that the person owns the object – it establishes the rules of evidence, and states that whenever there is insufficient evidence to establish ownership, the person in prior possession is granted the object.
Kinyan
The transfer of ownership (kinyan) must be accomplished through a formal mode of acquisition (except for inheritances). The method varies based on the type of article being transferred and the location of the transfer. Acts of kinyan include pulling, transferring, controlling, lifting, or exchanging an article.
There are 4 stages to kinyan:
  • Agreement on a price (mental acceptance by the seller)
  • Verbal commitment
  • Transfer of money (this is not a binding act of kinyan but if either side backs out at this stage, they incur a severe curse)
  • The physical act of kinyan, which depends on the item being acquired.

 

Mode of Kinyan Effective For
1. Lifting (הגבהה) All moveable property (מטלטלין)
2. Pulling (משיכה) Moveable property too heavy to be lifted
3. Handing over (מסירה) Moveable property that is too heavy to be lifted or pulled.
Only effective in public domain (reshut harabim) or a private domain that does not belong to the seller or buyer.
4. Leading (הנהגה) For large animals; purchaser leads or drives the animal a short distance
5. Exchange (חליפין) When bartering – once one party takes ownership through one of the methods of kinyan,
the other party automatically takes ownership of the second item.
6. Courtyard (חצר) A person’s courtyard acquires unowned property that is found in it without the need for an act of kinyan.
A guarded (fenced and locked) courtyard has greater power to acquire than an unguarded one.
7. Hand (יד) One’s possession that is considered his legal extension or one acting on another’s behalf.
8. Money (כסף) For land/real estate, purchase of slaves (Hebrew and Canaanite), selling an item to the Temple, betrothal of a woman, redeeming maaser sheini (second tithe), consecrated items, and a firstborn son.NOT VALID for moveable property – even after the seller is paid, an act of kinyan is still required. Except for maaser sheini, any article of value can serve as a substitute for money.
9. “Kerchief” סודר (אגב) An extension of chalipin. The symbolic transfer of a handkerchief or other small item formalizes the agreement between the two parties.
Generally done by the seller taking the buyer’s handkerchief, lifting it, and then returning it.

 

Structure and Content

Chapter 1: 2a–21a שנים אוחזין Determining ownership of an item that is claimed by two individuals.
Chapter 2: 21a–33b אלו מציאות Laws of returning lost items
Loading and unloading animals
Chapter 3: 33b–44a המפקיד Safeguarding a deposit
Responsibilities of bailees
Misappropriation
Chapter 4: 44a–60b הזהב Definition of money
Exploitative financial transactions
Chapter 5: 60b–75b איזהו נשך Interest
Chapter 6: 75b–83a השוכר את האומנין Hiring craftsmen
Craftsmen’s liability for damages
Chapter 7: 83a–94a השוכר את הפועלים Hiring workers
Chapter 8: 94a–103a השואל Bailees
Responsibilities of a borrower
Renting houses
Chapter 9: 103a–116a המקבל Sharecroppers and contractors working a field
The prohibition of withholding wages
The prohibition of destroying collateral
Chapter 10: 116b–119a הבית והעלייה Shared ownership of a building or land
ayeletHLheadshot-2019

Dr. Ayelet Hoffmann Libson

Dr. Ayelet Hoffmann Libson is a scholar of Talmud and Jewish law, and serves as associate professor of law at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. She has also served as the Gruss Visiting Professor of Talmudic Jurisprudence at Harvard and Penn Law Schools. She received a B.A. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from New York University. She is a graduate of the Matan Advanced Talmud Institute and the Beit Morasha Program in Jewish Law. Her publications have appeared in journals such as AJS Review, Jewish Quarterly Review, American Journal of Legal History and Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, and she is the author of Law and Self-Knowledge in the Talmud (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

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