Bava Metzia 69

Bava Metzia 69

אִי פַּלְגָא בְּהֶפְסֵד – תְּרֵי תִּילְתֵי בַּאֲגַר.

or it must have been that the other party accepted one-half of the loss and that Rav Ilish was entitled to two-thirds of the profit. Either way, the disparity in the terms served as payment to Rav Ilish for his effort, removing any concern about violation of the prohibition of interest.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, וַאֲמַר לִי: דִּלְמָא רַב עִילִישׁ טוֹבֵל עִמּוֹ בְּצִיר הֲוָה. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו הִלְכְתָא אִיתְּמַר, אֶלָּא שִׁיטָה אִיתְּמַר.

Rav Kahana said: I said this halakha before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a and he said to me: Why is it certain that the document included all the details of the transaction? Perhaps Rav Ilish immersed his bread in brine together with the other party? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this would suffice to avoid the prohibition of interest, and Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Kahana said to Rav Zevid: It was not stated by Rav Naḥman that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but rather it was stated that a single opinion is common to three Sages: Rabbi Yehuda; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. This does not establish the halakha in accordance with their statements, but on the contrary, they all hold one common opinion that is not accepted as the halakha.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי – לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִיחְשַׁב וּלְמֵימַר הֲלָכָה הֲלָכָה? לֵימָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּמֵיקֵל מִכּוּלְּהוּ.

The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, as, if you do not say so, why did Rav Naḥman list them individually and say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so? Instead let Rav Naḥman say simply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he is the most lenient of all of them, and their rulings can be derived from his. Since Rav Naḥman did not state this, it is reasonable to say that he was not issuing a ruling in accordance with their opinion, but simply clarifying that these three opinions are actually one.

אָמַר רַב: מוֹתַר שְׁלִישׁ בִּשְׂכָרְךָ – הֲרֵי זֶה מוּתָּר. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: לֹא מָצָא מוֹתַר שְׁלִישׁ, יֵלֵךְ לְבֵיתוֹ רֵיקָן! אֶלָּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: קוֹצֵץ לוֹ דִּינָר.

§ Rav says: If one says to another: I am giving you a calf to fatten, and let us divide the profit between us when it is sold, and the surplus over one-third of its current value is your wages, meaning that they will split the profits up to one-third of the value of the calf, and any additional profits will belong exclusively to the one who fattened the animal and serve as his wages, this arrangement is permitted, because the one fattening the calf is compensated for his efforts, and there is therefore no interest on the part that is a loan. And Shmuel says: It is not permitted, because if there is no surplus over one-third and he goes home empty-handed, he will have worked for free, and this is considered interest. Rather, Shmuel says: The owner of the calf must set aside a dinar for the other, to compensate him for his efforts in the event that there is no surplus over one-third.

וְסָבַר רַב אֵין קוֹצְצִין לוֹ דִּינָר? וְהָאָמַר רַב: רֵישׁ עִגְלָא לְפָטוֹמָא, מַאי לָאו דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: מוֹתַר שְׁלִישׁ בִּשְׂכָרְךָ?

The Gemara asks: And does Rav hold that he is not required to set aside a dinar for him? But doesn’t Rav say a different way to structure such an arrangement, that the head of the calf is given to the fattener, i.e., they may divide most of the profits evenly, but the head of the calf is given as a supplement to the one who does the fattening? What, is it not that he said to him: The surplus over one-third is your wages, and according to Rav the calf’s owner must nevertheless also give him the head in case there is no surplus?

לֹא, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מוֹתַר שְׁלִישׁ, אִי רֵישׁ עִגְלָא לְפָטוֹמָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי קָאָמַר רַב מוֹתַר שְׁלִישׁ בִּשְׂכָרְךָ מוּתָּר – כְּגוֹן דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּהֵמָה לְדִידֵיהּ. דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: גַּבֵּיל לְתוֹרָא, גַּבֵּיל לְתוֹרֵי.

The Gemara refutes this: No, Rav was referring to a case where the owner of the calf said to him: Either he will receive the surplus over one-third, or the head of the calf will serve as wages to the fattener. Or if you wish, say instead: When Rav says that if the owner said to him: The surplus over one-third is your wages it is permitted, this was a case where the one fattening the calf already had his own animal to fatten, as people say in a common adage: Mix food for an ox, mix for oxen, meaning that since he already has to prepare food for one ox, it is not a big inconvenience and expense for him to add food for an additional ox, so the surplus over one-third is sufficient to compensate him.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא זָבֵין בְּהֵמָה, וְיָהֵיב לֵיהּ לַאֲרִיסֵיהּ מְפַטֵּים לֵיהּ, וְיָהֵיב לֵיהּ רֵישָׁא בְּאַגְרֵיהּ, וְיָהֵיב פַּלְגָא רַוְוחָא. אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ דְּבֵיתְהוּ: אִי מִשְׁתַּתְּפַתְּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ יָהֵיב לָךְ נָמֵי אַלְיְתָא. אֲזַל זָבֵין בַּהֲדֵיהּ, פְּלֵיג לֵיהּ מֵאַלְיְתָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּא נִפְלְגֵיהּ לְרֵישָׁא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא כְּמֵעִיקָּרָא נָמֵי לָא?

The Gemara relates: Rav Elazar of Hagronya purchased an animal, and gave it to his sharecropper to fatten it, and gave him the head as his wages and gave him one-half of the profits. The sharecropper’s wife said to him: If you would have participated with him in the purchase of the animal he would have given you the tail also. The next time, the sharecropper went and purchased the calf with Rabbi Elazar, and Rabbi Elazar gave him one-half of the tail and then said to him: Let’s divide the head. The sharecropper said to him: Now will you not also give me as you did initially? Before, when I was not a partner in the animal but accepted it only in order to fatten it, you gave me the entire head. Now that I am a partner with you, are you going to give me only one-half of the head?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עַד הָאִידָּנָא זוּזֵי דִּידִי הֲווֹ, אִי לָא הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לָךְ טְפֵי פּוּרְתָּא – מִיחֲזֵי כְּרִבִּית, הַשְׁתָּא שׁוּתָּפֵי אֲנַן, מַאי קָאָמְרַתְּ טָרַחְנָא טְפֵי פּוּרְתָּא, אָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: סְתַם אֲרִיסָא לְמָרֵי אַרְעָא קָמְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ לְאֵתוֹיֵי לֵיהּ רִעְיָא.

Rabbi Elazar said to him: Until now the money was mine, and had I not given you a little more value as compensation for your efforts, it would have appeared to be like interest. But now that we are partners, what can you say? That you must exert a little more effort than I do to take the animal in and out of the pasture? As people say in a common adage: An ordinary sharecropper subjugates himself to the owner to bring him pasture. Sharecroppers are accustomed to expending extra effort on behalf of the owner of the field. Therefore we are equal partners and divide everything.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַשָּׁם בְּהֵמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ, עַד מָתַי חַיָּיב לִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ? סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר: בַּאֲתוֹנוֹת שְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, בְּגוֹדְרוֹת עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ. וְאִם בָּא לַחֲלוֹק בְּתוֹךְ זְמַנּוֹ – חֲבֵרוֹ מְעַכֵּב עָלָיו, אֲבָל אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה טִיפּוּלָהּ שֶׁל שָׁנָה זוֹ לְטִיפּוּלָהּ שֶׁל שָׁנָה אַחֶרֶת.

The Sages taught: With regard to one who appraises an animal for another to raise, how long is the other obligated to care for it if they did not stipulate this explicitly? Sumakhos says: For female donkeys, eighteen months; for flocks of sheep or goats, twenty-four months. And if one of them comes to divide, i.e., if he wishes to sell the animal and divide the profits, within the time, i.e., before the time for taking care of it has ended, the other can prevent him from doing so, but the effort involved in the care of the animal for this year is not comparable to the care of another year.

״אֲבָל״ מַאי קָאָמַר? אֶלָּא: לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה טִיפּוּלָהּ שֶׁל שָׁנָה זוֹ לְטִיפּוּלָהּ שֶׁל שָׁנָה אַחֶרֶת.

The Gemara asks: With regard to the word but that was said here, what is it saying? It does not seem to belong in the statement. Rather, the text must be corrected as follows: Because the care of this year is not comparable to the care of another year. The profits are not necessarily divided evenly during the entire time of the animal’s growth, and therefore either party can insist that the contract be carried through to the end of the specified period.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַשָּׁם בְּהֵמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ, עַד מָתַי חַיָּיב לִטַּפֵּל בַּוְּלָדוֹת? בַּדַּקָּה – שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וּבַגַּסָּה – חֲמִשִּׁים יוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּדַּקָּה שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁטִּיפּוּלָהּ מְרוּבֶּה. מַאי טִיפּוּלָהּ מְרוּבֶּה – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁשִּׁינֶּיהָ דַּקּוֹת. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ נוֹטֵל מֶחֱצָה שֶׁלּוֹ, וַחֲצִי מֶחֱצָה בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who appraises an animal for another to raise, for how long is the latter obligated to care for the offspring that are born to it? For a species of small animals, he is obligated to care for the offspring for thirty days, and for a species of large animals, fifty days. Rabbi Yosei says: For a species of small animals, he is obligated to care for the offspring for three months, as it requires a lot of care. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: A lot of care? It means that due to the fact that its teeth are thin, its food has to be cut up for it, which is not necessary for a species of large animals. From this point forward, the one raising the animal takes one-half of the offspring as his share, since one-half of the animal is his, and he takes one-half of one-half of the other’s share of the offspring, i.e., one-fourth of the total, as wages for caring for the animal and raising it.

רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר גַּדָּא שְׁקַל מֶחֱצָה שֶׁלּוֹ וַחֲצִי מֶחֱצָה בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן פְּלַג לָךְ? וְעוֹד: מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לְגַדֵּל הוּא, וּתְנַן: מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לְגַדֵּל – יְגַדֵּילוּ.

The Gemara relates: Rav Menashya bar Gadda accepted an animal to raise, and of the offspring he took his one-half and one-half of the other’s one-half. This matter came before Abaye. Abaye said to Rav Menashya bar Gadda: Who divided it for you? Since he did this on his own, there is a concern that he may not have divided it fairly. And furthermore, this place is a place where it is customary for the one raising the animal to raise the offspring, and we learned in a mishna (69b): In a place where it is customary to raise the offspring, they should be raised by the one raising the mother, and not divided between them.

הָנְהוּ תְּרֵי כּוּתָאֵי דַּעֲבוּד עִסְקָא בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי. אֲזַל חַד מִנַּיְיהוּ פְּלַיג זוּזֵי בְּלָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּחַבְרֵיהּ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? הָכִי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: זוּזֵי כְּמַאן דִּפְלִיגִי דָּמוּ.

The Gemara relates: There were these two Samaritans who entered into a joint venture with each other. One of them went and divided the money without the knowledge of the other. They came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the plaintiff: What difference is there, meaning: What did you lose? This is what Rav Naḥman said: Money is considered as though it were already divided. It is not viewed as a single sum.

לְשָׁנָה זְבוּן חַמְרָא בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי. קָם אִידַּךְ פְּלַיג לֵיהּ בְּלָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן פְּלַג לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קָא חָזֵינָא דְּבָתַר דִּידִי קָא אָתֵי מָר! אֲמַר רַב פָּפָּא:

The next year these same two purchased wine together, and the other one arose and divided the wine without the knowledge of the other. And again, they came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the defendant: Who divided it for you? You did not act properly since you did not get your partner’s permission to divide the wine. The Samaritan said to him: I see that the Master pursues me in order to harass me, since last year, when we came with what appears to be essentially the same case, you gave a different ruling in favor of the other. Rav Pappa said:

כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא וַדַּאי צְרִיךְ לְאוֹדוֹעֵיהּ: זוּזֵי, מִי שָׁקֵיל טָבֵי וְשָׁבֵיק חַסִּרֵי?

In a case like this it is certainly necessary to inform the litigant of the reasons for the decision. Although a judge is not always obligated to explain the reasons for his decision to the litigants, in a case like this, where there is room for suspicion, he must. Rav Pappa explained: Last year, when the other individual divided money, did he take the good coins and leave the deficient ones?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חַמְרָא, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יָדְעִי דְּאִיכָּא דִּבְסִים וְאִיכָּא דְּלָא בְּסִים.

The Samaritan said to him: No, he simply divided the money without any particular consideration, and that was acceptable, as there is no difference between one coin and another. Rav Pappa said to him: With regard to wine, everyone knows that there is wine that is sweet and there is wine that is not sweet, so it is not equitable to simply divide the barrels evenly. Therefore, I ruled that you were not entitled to divide the wine without your partner’s knowledge.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: זוּזֵי, כְּמַאן דִּפְלִיגִי דָּמוּ. הָנֵי מִילֵּי טָבֵי וְטָבֵי, תְּקוּלֵי וּתְקוּלֵי. אֲבָל טָבֵי וּתְקוּלֵי – לָא.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the matter itself: Rav Naḥman said: Money is considered as if it were already divided and there is no need to actually divide it in the presence of both of them. The Gemara comments: This matter applies when he divided between good dinars and good dinars, or heavy dinars and heavy dinars, as then there is no need for evaluation. But if some of the coins were good and some were heavy, it is not permitted for him to divide them without informing the other party, as either one may have a preference for a particular type of coin.

רַב חָמָא הֲוָה מוֹגַר זוּזֵי בִּפְשִׁיטָא בְּיוֹמָא. כְּלוֹ זוּזֵי דְּרַב חָמָא. הוּא סָבַר: מַאי שְׁנָא מִמָּרָא? וְלָא הִיא מָרָא הָדְרָא בָּעֵינָא וִידִיעַ פְּחָתֵיהּ, זוּזֵי לָא הָדְרִי בְּעֵינַיְיהוּ וְלָא יְדִיעַ פְּחָתֵיהּ.

§ The Gemara relates: Rav Ḥama would rent out dinars at a rate of one peshita, i.e., one-eighth of a dinar, per day for a dinar. He viewed this as rental of an item for use rather than as a loan. Ultimately, all of Rav Ḥama’s money was lost as divine punishment for violating the prohibition of interest (see 71a). The Gemara explains: He did this because he thought: In what way is it different from the rental of a hoe? He viewed the money as an item that can be rented for a fee. But that is not so, as the hoe returns to its owner as is, and its depreciation is known, but the dinars do not return as is, as a borrower does not return the same coins he borrowed, and their depreciation is not known. Therefore, this cannot be called a rental; it is a loan with interest.

אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁרֵי לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ לְמֵימַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: הֵילָךְ אַרְבְּעָה זוּזֵי וְאוֹזְפֵיהּ לִפְלָנְיָא זוּזֵי, לֹא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא רִבִּית הַבָּאָה מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה. וְאָמַר רָבָא: שְׁרֵי לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ לְמֵימַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ ״שְׁקֹל לָךְ אַרְבְּעָה זוּזֵי וֶאֱמוֹר לֵיהּ לִפְלוֹנִי לְאוֹזֹפַן זוּזֵי״. מַאי טַעְמָא – שְׂכַר אֲמִירָה קָא שָׁקֵיל.

Rava said: It is permitted for a person to say to another: Here are four dinars; go and lend money to so-and-so. Even though the lender earns a profit from the loan, it is not prohibited because the Torah prohibited only interest that comes directly from the borrower to the lender, but not that which comes via a third party. And Rava said: It is permitted for a person to say to another: Take four dinars for yourself and tell so-and-so to lend me money. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? It is permitted because he takes payment for talking to the lender, as these four dinars are a fee for the brokerage in arranging the loan.

כִּי הָא דְּאַבָּא מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל אוּגְנָא דְקִירָא מִקִּירָאֵי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ לַאֲבוּהּ: אוֹזְפִינְהוּ זוּזֵי. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב פָּפָּא: אָכֵיל בְּרֵיהּ דְּמָר רִבִּיתָא! אֲמַר לְהוּ: כֹּל כִּי הַאי רִבִּיתָא נֵיכוֹל, לֹא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא רִבִּית הַבָּאָה מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה. הָכָא – שְׂכַר אֲמִירָה קָא שָׁקֵיל, וּשְׁרֵי.

This is similar to this situation where Abba Mar, son of Rav Pappa, would take pans of wax from wax manufacturers and tell his father: Lend them money. The Sages said to Rav Pappa: The Master’s son consumes interest, since the wax he receives is payment of interest for the loan. Rav Pappa said to them: We may consume any interest of this kind. It is totally permitted, as the Torah prohibited only interest that comes directly from the borrower to the lender. Here, he takes payment for talking, and this is permitted.

מַתְנִי׳ שָׁמִין פָּרָה וַחֲמוֹר וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה וְאוֹכֵל לְמֶחֱצָה. מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לַחְלוֹק אֶת הַוְּלָדוֹת מִיָּד – חוֹלְקִין. מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לְגַדֵּל – יְגַדֵּילוּ.

MISHNA: One may appraise a cow or a donkey or any item that generates revenue while it eats and give it to another to feed it and take care of it in exchange for one-half the profits, with the one who cares for the animal benefiting from the profits it generates during the period in which he raises it. Afterward, they divide the profit that accrues due to appreciation in the value of the animal and due to the offspring it produces. In a place where it is customary to divide the offspring immediately upon their birth, they divide them, and in a place where it is customary for the one who cared for the mother to raise the offspring for an additional period of time before dividing them, he shall raise them.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שָׁמִין עֵגֶל עִם אִמּוֹ, וּסְיָח עִם אִמּוֹ, וּמַפְרִיז עַל שָׂדֵהוּ, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם רִבִּית.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may appraise a calf together with its mother or a foal with its mother even though these young animals do not generate revenue while they eat. The costs of raising the young animal need not be considered. And one may inflate [umafriz] the rental fee paid for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to the prohibition of interest, as the Gemara will explain.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַפְרִיז עַל שָׂדֵהוּ וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם רִבִּית, כֵּיצַד? הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַשָּׂדֶה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ בַּעֲשָׂרָה כּוֹרִים חִטִּין לְשָׁנָה, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ: תֵּן לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז וַאֲפַרְנְסֶנָּה, וַאֲנִי אַעֲלֶה לְךָ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר כּוֹרִין לְשָׁנָה – מוּתָּר.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: One may inflate the rental fee paid for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to the prohibition of interest. How so? In the case of one who rents a field from another for the price of ten kor of wheat per year, and the renter says to the owner: Give me two hundred dinars as a loan and I will use it to cultivate the field and equip it by fertilizing it and hiring people to work in it, and then I will pay you twelve kor per year in addition to returning your two hundred dinars, this is permitted, as the two hundred dinars are viewed as a joint investment in improving the field, with the owner providing the capital and the renter providing the labor. The higher rental fee is therefore paid for a higher-quality field, and not as interest on the loan.

אֲבָל אֵין מַפְרִיז לֹא עַל חֲנוּת וְלֹא עַל סְפִינָה.

But one may not inflate the rental fee paid for a store or a ship. The renter cannot borrow money from the owner to purchase merchandise to sell in the store or transport in the ship and in return increase the rental fee. That is considered a loan with interest.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: פְּעָמִים שֶׁמַּפְרִיז עַל חֲנוּת לָצוֹר בָּהּ צוּרָה, סְפִינָה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָהּ אִיסְקַרְיָא. חֲנוּת לָצוֹר בָּהּ צוּרְתָּא: דְּצָבוּ בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְהָוֵי אַגְרָא טְפֵי. סְפִינָה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָהּ אִיסְקַרְיָא: כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁפִּירָא אִיסְקַרְיָא טְפֵי – אַגְרָא טְפֵי.

Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh said: There are times when one may inflate the rental fee paid for a store, such as in a case where one needs money in order to paint a design on its walls, or in the case of a ship, where one needs money to fashion a new sail [iskarya]. The Gemara explains: It is permitted when the money is borrowed to invest in a store in order to paint a design on its walls, because people will want to come to the more attractive store to purchase, and the profits are thereby increased. Similarly, it is permitted when the money is to be used for a ship to fashion a sail, because the profits from the use of the ship are greater since the sail is improved. Therefore, in these cases the arrangement is an investment, similar to the case of the field, and not interest.

סְפִינְתָּא, אָמַר רַב: אַגְרָא וּפַגְרָא. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי לְרַב: אִי אַגְרָא – לָא פַּגְרָא, אִי פַּגְרָא – לָא אַגְרָא. שְׁתֵיק רַב.

Since the subject of a ship was raised, the Gemara mentions a related statement of Rav. Rav said: For a ship, it is permitted to conduct a transaction where someone pays rent for the use of the ship and is also liable to pay for any damage caused to the ship. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: If he receives rent, then he should not receive payment for damage, and if he receives payment for damage, then he should not receive rent, as, if the ship is the responsibility of the renter, it is a loan, and if he pays rent for such a loan, it is interest. Rav was silent, and it appeared that he could not answer this question.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מַאי טַעְמָא שְׁתֵיק רַב? לָא שְׁמִיעָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּתַנְיָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ אֵין מְקַבְּלִין צֹאן בַּרְזֶל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל מְקַבְּלִין צֹאן בַּרְזֶל מִן הַגּוֹיִם. אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: הַשָּׁם פָּרָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְאָמַר לוֹ: הֲרֵי פָּרָתְךָ עֲשׂוּיָה עָלַי בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים דִּינָר, וַאֲנִי אַעֲלֶה לְךָ סֶלַע בְּחֹדֶשׁ – מוּתָּר, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא עֲשָׂאָהּ דָּמִים.

Rav Sheshet said: What is the reason that Rav was silent? Did he not hear that which is taught in a baraita: Even though the Sages said that one may not accept a guaranteed investment [tzon barzel] from a Jew, meaning one may not accept from a Jew animals to raise and receive one-half of the profits while also accepting full responsibility to pay the initial value of the animals in the event there is a loss, as this arrangement is deemed a loan with interest, but one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles, because there is no prohibition against paying them interest. But nevertheless, the Sages said: If one appraised a cow for another to raise and to divide the profits, and the one accepting the cow said to the cow’s owner: Your cow is evaluated for me at thirty dinars if I do not return it to you, and I will pay you a sela per month for the use of it, this is permitted, because he did not make it a matter of lending money.

וְלֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ?! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ דָּמִים מֵחַיִּים, אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

The Gemara asks rhetorically: And did he not make it a matter of lending money? He most certainly did, as he obligated himself to pay for the cow if he does not return it, making the transaction into a loan, and therefore the payment of a sela per month should constitute interest. Rav Sheshet said: It means that he did not make it a matter of lending money while the cow was alive, meaning that he did not obligate himself to return this specific sum to him if the value of the cow decreased, but rather agreed to pay the set payment of thirty dinars only after its death. Therefore, the transaction was not a loan and the monthly payment is not interest. According to this baraita, the halakha should be the same in the case of a ship.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, הִלְכְתָא: סְפִינָה אַגְרָא וּפַגְרָא.

Rav Pappa said: In fact, the halakha is that in the case of a ship it is permitted to collect rent and payment for damage.